For every subject, there must be an object; this is the basis of the argument found in Simone de Beauvoir’s 1949 text The Second Sex. Drawing from the influence of Hegel, Beauvoir attempted to diagnose the secondary position of women in society through the concept of the ‘Other’. This essay will explain the argument central to Beauvoir’s thinking, that ‘woman is the absolute Other’, as well as exploring its implications for political theory. The paper will then critically asses the relevance of Beauvoir’s argument of the ‘Other’ in a modern society, before concluding that Beauvoir, despite being reduced by her circumstances, was ultimately a revolutionary thinker whose core ideas can still be applied today.
The concept of the ‘Other’s is central to Simone de Beauvoir’s thinking; indeed, all of her writings can be considered by a marked concern to map an ethical relation with the Other (Tidd, 1999). This idea was cemented, however, with the development of The Second Sex, a work that served as an investigation into the oppression of women in society. Drawing on the Hegelian ideas of self-consciousness, Beauvoir claimed of the genders that, “He is the Subject, He is the absolute: She is the Other.” (Beauvoir, 1949) According to Hegel, reality is made up of the interplay of opposing forces; therefore, for a being to define itself, it must define something in opposition to itself. For Beauvoir, this opposition is the woman. Throughout history, man has been the Subject; he fundamentally oppresses women by characterizing her as the Other. As explored by Irigaray, the Other are imperfect copies of the idea of man. Moreover, these ‘copies’ are not defined within their own subjectivity, but as “a function of their inadequacies with respect to that ideal.” (Irigaray and Guynn, 1995) Thus becomes clear the implications of the denotation of woman as the ‘Other’.
Throughout The Second Sex, Beauvoir explores the idea that “One is not born a woman, but rather, becomes a woman.” (Beauvoir, 1949) Therefore, femininity is neither a substance, nor an essence, but rather a “becoming.” (Pectu, 2016). If we are to “become” woman, a gender defined as ‘Other’ by the dominant, then we are to become what a patriarchal society wishes us to be; the woman becomes the second gender. By defining women as ‘Other’ throughout history, men have been able to make women “themselves other than their bodies, and to make their bodies other than themselves.” (Butler, 1986) Gothlin has made a similar suggestion, arguing that for women, being the Other signifies becoming what others will for them to be. (Gothlin, 2003)
Beauvoir also comments on the complicity of women in their situation. Living in the role of an object is unnatural to a human being, and so to accept the role of the ‘Other’ in society the woman must surrender her freedom. If one is to “become” a woman, then there are women who comply with their oppressors in “bad faith.” (Beauvoir, 1949). Western women consent, and sometimes choose, their situation, making them complicit in the construction of the second gender, the ‘Other’. However, for Beauvoir, these women are not the primary source of the problem and in this way, she draws on the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre’s woman is not responsible for her complicity, since she could not have done otherwise, (Kruks, 1995) and this mirrors Beauvoir’s argument on the oppressive nature of a patriarchal society.
The relevance of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical argument of the ‘Other’ cannot be understated; it is central to contemporary feminism. Beauvoir was undoubtedly constricted by her time, but her thought remains highly relevant to the liberation of both sexes in a modern society. As Bair has argued, feminist ideology simply cannot ignore Beauvoir. She remains highly relevant to current feminist thought and her importance is undeniable. (Bair, 1986) It is also clear that Beauvoir’s thinking still serves as an example for modern feminism.
Beauvoir certainly was a product of her time. She wrote in a distinctly intellectual milieu, and her existential surroundings shaped her own thought. (Kruks, 1992) Therefore, in order to characterize Beauvoir’s thinking, one must examine the context in which she was writing. As Vintges has argued, through an analysis of her life we can discover that Beauvoir, in fact, argues “for both men and women to become a sensitive self.” (Vintges, 1999) Feminist thought is easily categorised as female-centric. However, it is clear that The Second Sex is relevant to both genders and their interaction with one another. As explained by Adkins, Beauvoir does not wish to eradicate men, nor does she wish for woman to be something other than herself. (Adkins, 2013) Rather, The Second Sex acts as a plea to both men and women to change; women have the chance to develop into a Self if only we think carefully about the liberation of the genders in “a deeply perigendered world.” (Adkins, 2013) Beauvoir also observes an element of mutual dependence within freedom; freedom of one gender is enmeshed in the freedom of another, and so this is a collective responsibility. (Tidd, 1999) In an interview with Susan K. Brison, Beauvoir stated that she did not know of any men who are truly liberated. Drawing on Marxist ideas on alienation, she claimed that “everybody is alienated in some way or another.” (De Beauvoir, 1976) Thus, The Second Sex can certainly be read as a plea to both genders and so is applicable to gendered relationships as a whole.
Beauvoir’s comments on the ‘Other’ are not only applicable to gendered interactions. The idea of woman as ‘Other’ is transferable to other relationships, thus highlighting its importance for modern political thought. Just as one can become a woman, one can also become white, or French, or American, as has been argued. (Kruks, 2005) These are things that are inescapably given to you, yet they are also self-produced. The same idea can be applied to the relationship between the white man and the black man. A. V. Adkins has argued that “one is not born a black man, rather, he becomes a black man”, likening his situation to that of the woman. She expands that white males can exert the power of the gaze to remind you of what you are – a black man, or a woman. (Adkins, 2013) Through this comparison it can be argued that Beauvoir was not only aware of the connection between gender and race, but also seemed “sensitive to the forces of alienation that prevail and manifest in different bodies.” (Adkins, 2013) In a highly polarized world the relevance of Beauvoir is clear. If we seek to deconstruct patriarchal, racially-biased norms, we must first look to understand the concept of the ‘Other’ and how this impacts how we view one another within society.
Simone de Beauvoir has been considered the mother of modern feminism, and so it is understandable that the ideas she has presented have come under intense scrutiny. One of the main criticisms of Beauvoir’s argument is that her writing favours hetero-normative, Western notions of masculinity and femininity. It is clear that Beauvoir favours heterosexual sexuality and relationality in her writings. (Pectu, 2016) However, upon a closer reading of The Second Sex one also discovers the heavy reliance on Western and masculine paradigms. Beauvoir’s polemic is grounded in her own culture, not that of others, as Okley has noted that her experience as a bourgeois Parisian lurks amongst the arguments provided in The Second Sex. (Okley 1996) Moreover, it has been argued that Beauvoir persistently uses sexist language in her writings; words such as “man” and “his” world. (Kruks, 1992) Whilst this is distinctly Sartrean in nature, it also speaks to a narrative that philosophical thought has been consistently dominated by men.
A further argument made by Kruks is that Beauvoir presents “her horror of the female body and its functions” throughout The Second Sex. (Kruks, 1995) According to Kruks, Beauvoir explores women’s bodily functions through an identification with animality and lack of freedom and are “denigrated from the masculinist standpoint of an apparent disembodied reason and freedom.” This speaks to the argument that Beauvoir stands outside her analysis of gender; she is discussing other women and their place in society, and not her own.
This argument from Kruks is indeed a compelling one. However, this is an argument that can most certainly be disputed, as Kruks herself has concluded that Beauvoir’s era is bygone; “of course, in many ways, Beauvoir’s era is no longer ours.” (Kruks, 2005) Beauvoir lived in a different time, and one cannot analyse a philosophy of thought without considering the context in which it was written. As an example, Beauvoir spent most of her intellectual life in the company of men, often as the only women amongst them (Bair, 1986), and so it would be logical to conclude that this would have had a profound influence on her choice of language. Beauvoir, like all of us, is a product of her time, and this is bound to pose certain restrictions. Furthermore, despite her use of ‘sexist’ language, Beauvoir has renounced the idea of male-dominated philosophy. She posited the view that all historical theories are biased and inaccurate, and because they had been devised by men, they are useless for any evaluation of women. (Bair, 1986) Therefore the argument from Kruks is a weak one; Beauvoir was not unique in her male-bias, as this was the realm in which she was writing, and therefore one cannot dismiss her writings for this reason. Despite living in relative isolation from other women, and without the context of a feminist environment, Beauvoir was still able to succeed in defining central feminist issues that are still of international focus today. (Baird, 1986)
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