I will begin this essay by using Warren’s definition of abortion – ‘the act a woman performs in deliberately terminating her pregnancy before it comes to term, or in allowing another person to terminate it.’ In this essay, I will be offering short introductions to Warren, Tooley’s, and Thomson’s arguments surrounding abortion and then concluding at the end of each introduction on whether they defend abortion without making infanticide morally permissible.
An introduction to Tooley’s perspective of abortion
At the very beginning of his article, Tooley addresses the issue that it is very difficult for anyone to have an entirely accepting view of abortion without being criticised. His main argument centres around the ‘self-consciousness requirement’. Tooley’s argument can be simplified into: a being can claim a right to life if it possesses some sort of knowledge of themselves as an experiencing being. The second half of this argument is that a being must also be able to ‘desire to continue to exist’
Despite Tooley having the shortest defence of abortion, it is quite clear that his criteria allow abortion as well as infanticide. Infants do not have the concept of being an experiencing entity, meaning they cannot claim a right to life.
A brief introduction to Thomson’s perspective of abortion
The beginning of Thomson’s chapter offers a summary of some of the main arguments used for and against abortion. The arguments that she addresses include that ‘opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being […] from the moment of conception.’ But she also says that this point has been poorly argued. Thomson offers six parts and some analogies to why abortion may or may not be morally permissible. In this essay, I will only be referring to one analogy and one part.
One of the first parts of her argument presents a defence of abortion in a rape situation. Thomson uses an analogy of a dying violinist to illustrate this example. The victim had been kidnapped by a music society and wired up to the violinist, keeping them alive. The victim had not consented to keeping this body alive at all, much like a woman who has been raped. She then goes on to say why the supporters of the quote above will not allow this – ‘a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body.’ Thomson, rather successfully, highlights why the argument doesn’t sound as acceptable. This is because during the analogy application she illustrates the absurdity of someone being forced to keep someone alive.
Another area of Thomson’s defence applies to if the mother becomes severely ill or has a severe illness that will be intensified while pregnant. She openly states that both the mother and the unborn child have an equal right to life. Thomson then makes a distinction between two types of killing: direct and indirect. Direct killing is where the death of a
person is intended e.g. abortion. On the other hand, indirect killing is more of an omission of care e.g. letting the mother die of an illness. Thomson updates her analogy by saying the victim’s life is now in danger. The argument of many here is that intending to kill an innocent life is murder, therefore not morally permissible. But Thomson seems to suggest that by simply unplugging yourself to save your own life, is not murder, it is self-defence.
Here, I will now apply these points to infanticide. in my opinion, these points do offer a sound defence of abortion in the cases that Thomson presents. She provides a reasonable explanation of why exceptions can be made in rape situations, as they lack consent and willingness, responsibility should not be forced onto the victim. Furthermore, she also provides an explanation of why exceptions should be made when the mother’s life is at risk, arguing it is more self-defence than murder. As neither case is now murder, abortion seems morally permissible. As her arguments are specific to situations when abortion may be used, they do not allow mass terminations of pregnancies.
A brief introduction to Warren’s view of abortion
Warren begins by outlining her perspective from the beginning. Abortion is morally acceptable and therefore, every woman should be able to access it freely and legally. The main defence from Warren is that foetuses are not persons, and therefore do not have the same moral rights as a child or a teenager etc. She gives a list of six characteristics that define a being into personhood: sentience, emotionality, reason, communication, self-awareness, and moral agency. Warren explains that not every characteristic needs to be met in order for the being to be a person however, the fewer met, the more difficult it is for them to be a person. She considers the first characteristic (sentience) to be ‘the most basic mental capacity’. From this, she then explains that foetuses may not be considered persons because they are not sentient. But, she then raises a few issues within her own argument, such as young infants not having sentience and therefore not being humans. This point seems to be an opening for a justification of infanticide.
Warren does little to refute the fact that her argument can be used to justify such a heinous act. Her only objection as to why her argument shouldn’t be used for the justification of infanticide is that infants are so close to becoming full persons, that we shouldn’t commit this act. Just before her conclusion she admits, ‘on my view, neither abortion nor the killing of newborns is […] murder.’ As an improvement to her argument, Warren could have attempted a similar approach to Thomson, by taking specific problems surrounding the issue of abortion and addressing them.
In conclusion, the only philosopher to provide at least the beginnings of an defence of abortion without justifying infanticide is Thomson. Her break down of individual situations surrounding the ethical dilemma of abortion means that she manages to slowly shut down the argument that infanticide can be justified. Tooley’s argument is perhaps the clearest example that can be used for the justification of infanticide. This is because it gives two premises of when a right to life can be assigned and neither foetuses nor infants meet these premises. Warren freely admits that her argument may be used for justification for both abortion and infanticide. In light of the question, and after examining these three defences, I can draw the conclusion that it’s extremely difficult to offer a defence that does not make infanticide morally permissible, but it can be done.