Harry S. Truman and U.S. Foreign Relations
Kaete O’Connell
Summary
Sworn in as the 33rd President of the United States following the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945, Harry S. Truman faced the daunting tasks of winning the war and ensuring future peace and stability. Chided by critics for his lack of foreign policy experience but championed by supporters for his straightforward decision-making, Truman guided the United States from World War to Cold War. The Truman presidency marked a new era in American foreign relations, with the United States emerging from World War II unmatched in economic strength and military power. The U.S. assumed a leadership position in a postwar world largely shaped by growing antagonism with the Soviet Union. Under Truman’s leadership, the United States witnessed the dawn of the atomic age, approved billions in economic aid to rebuild Europe, supported the creation of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, recognized the state of Israel, and intervened in the Korean peninsula. Truman pursued an interventionist foreign policy strategy and took measures to contain Soviet influence in Europe and the spread of Communism in Asia. The challenges he confronted and the policies he implemented laid the foundation for 20th century U.S. foreign relations throughout the Cold War and into the next century.
Keywords
Truman, Cold War, containment, Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, National Security Act, Point IV, Israel, Korean War, McCarthyism
The End of the Second World War
The Second World War left the international system irreparably broken. In addition to the enormous military casualties incurred by all sides, six million European Jews were systematically exterminated in the Holocaust, alongside the persecution and murder of numerous other population and ethnic groups deemed undesirable. Countries across the globe lay in shambles, city skylines vanished, transportation came to a halt, and food and clean water remained scarce. The war impacted civilians in an unprecedented manner and millions of refugees and displaced persons roamed the wastelands of postwar Europe. The international system that predated the war ceased to exist in 1945, replaced by a bipolar system that left only the United States and Soviet Union in positions of power. The instability created by the scale of destruction fostered an environment of anxiety and distrust that exacerbated existing antagonisms between the two superpowers. As 1945 drew to a close, the Grand Alliance fizzled, yet another casualty of war.
In a radio broadcast announcing German surrender on May 8th, 1945, Truman urged Americans to “bind up the wounds of a suffering world–to build an abiding peace, a peace rooted in justice and in law,” a task that demanded cooperation “with our allies in peace as we have in war.” The Missouri Senator had occupied the Oval Office for less than a month, but had adapted quickly to a steep learning curve, especially given his lack of diplomatic experience and scant preparation for the job ahead. Truman’s first decision as President was whether to continue with plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco on April 25th. He wrote in his memoirs that he “did not hesitate a second,” and told the Cabinet that the conference would be held as Roosevelt directed. Truman declared continuity with FDR’s vision for the postwar future, but in time the peace came to be shaped as much by Roosevelt’s idealism as Truman’s pragmatism.
Truman was acutely aware of his foreign policy handicap and spent weeks poring over State Department documents in Roosevelt’s Map Room, using James Byrnes’s transcribed notes to fill in the gaps on the Yalta Agreements. In a speech before Congress at the end of April, Truman upheld Roosevelt’s war policies, reaffirming the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. Like most policymakers, Truman favored a “hard peace” in Germany, but he was unimpressed by Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s plan for a pastoral Germany, finding it to be an unnecessarily vengeful program that posed a serious threat to future peace and economic stability. Prior to his departure for Germany, Truman appointed Byrnes as Secretary of State, believing he possessed the necessary knowledge and skill to direct foreign policy, and as Robert Messer highlighted, Byrnes also provided an important link to Roosevelt. Truman met with Churchill and Stalin in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam to discuss plans for the war in the Pacific, the occupation of Germany, and postwar reconstruction. Truman wanted to avoid mistakes made a generation earlier in the Treaty of Versailles but grew frustrated by stalemates over Polish borders and reparations.
Despite these problems, Allied leadership did agree on several matters related to the German occupation, including the four zones of occupation and the creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers. The Potsdam Declaration, outlined the Allied program for Germany with its emphasis on the four D’s (demilitarization, democratization, denazification, decartelization), and also warned Japan that failure to submit to the terms of unconditional surrender would result in “prompt and utter destruction.” On August 6th, the United States detonated an atomic bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9th, followed closely by the Emperor’s surrender. With the war over, Truman now faced the monumental task of implementing Roosevelt’s postwar strategies for peace, which included efforts at international relief and large-scale demobilization, but deteriorating relations with the Soviets assumed center stage. Buoyed by the success of the atom bomb, an overly confident Byrnes failed to secure any diplomatic agreements regarding Soviet interference in Eastern Europe at the first meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945. At the second meeting in Moscow in December, Byrnes practiced conciliatory diplomacy, adopting an approach that garnered results but angered conservatives who feared concessions compromised the U.S.’s political position and charged Byrnes with appeasement. Truman’s faith in Byrnes wavered, and he responded with what Arnold Offner calls a “personal declaration of Cold War,” writing that Stalin only understood an “iron fist” and he was tired of “babying the Soviets.”
The Cold War looms large in any discussion of U.S. foreign relations under Harry Truman, but in many ways, it was postwar plans for the peace that laid the cornerstone of Truman’s foreign policy, forcing the President to adopt a tough stance toward Stalin in an effort to control the terms of peace. The disagreements at Potsdam laid bare the ideological conflicts that simmered beneath the surface and threatened to disrupt plans for. American power was at its height, but rather than provide Americans with an increased sense of security, it contributed to growing anxiety about the future, with many fearful that Stalin would exploit postwar instability to increase Soviet influence.
The Dawn of the Atomic Age
The Potsdam Conference is also notable for the exchange that occurred between Truman and Stalin on July 24th, when the President informed his Soviet counterpart that the United States possessed an atomic bomb. Some scholars argue this was posturing on Truman’s part, with the information only shared in an effort to gain bargaining power. It is unlikely, however, that Truman’s disclosure carried much weight. Soviet intelligence already knew about the American nuclear program, and Stalin never wavered.
Roosevelt authorized the Manhattan Project in December 1942, motivated by a fear that German scientists had a similar program in operation since the 1930s. The Manhattan Project brought together scientists and military experts for research in nuclear weapons technology. The program was directed by physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, with much of the work conducted at a site in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The Atomic Age was officially ushered in following the successful Trinity Test at a desert location in New Mexico on July 16th, 1945. Dropped from a B-29 bomber, “Little Boy” exploded over Hiroshima on August 6th. And when the Japanese failed to surrender, a second bomb, “Fat Man”, was dropped over Nagasaki. The destruction was overwhelming. While thousands were killed instantly, radiation exposure meant casualties continued to mount in the ensuing weeks, with estimates placing total deaths at approximately 200,000.
The Manhattan Project was one of the most highly guarded secrets of Roosevelt’s presidency, and Truman was not read-in until April 24th, when Secretary of War Henry Stimson requested an urgent meeting to discuss a matter with “such a bearing on our present foreign relations.” The historiographical controversy surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs remains polarizing, with two schools of thought dominating the discourse. The first explanation argues that Truman wanted to end the war as quickly as possible. This is grounded in Truman’s official statement following the bombings, where he claimed the choice was made to shorten the war and save lives. It was supported by a 1947 article published under Stimson’s name that reiterated the United States was faced with two choices: a deadly invasion of Japan or dropping the bomb to force a quick surrender. The second explanation pointed to Cold War tensions and gained popularity in the 1960s following publication of Gar Alperovitz’s Atomic Diplomacy (1965), which argued that the development of the bomb influenced American diplomacy pre-Hiroshima and contributed to Truman’s stiffening resolve on matters of Soviet expansion. In his memoirs, Truman discussed his decision at length, reaffirming his belief that he made a military decision as commander-in-chief, in agreement with his military advisors, to drop the bomb for the purpose of a military surrender. Truman’s faith in the decision never wavered.
At the Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in December 1945, representatives agreed to the creation of a United Nations commission designed to advise, monitor, and eventually eradicate nuclear weapons. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created in January 1946 and included six permanent members (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Canada) as well as six rotating members. Proposals presented to the AEC called for greater oversight of nuclear facilities, research, and development, and even called for the gradual destruction of the U.S.’s existing nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, these plans never garnered unanimous approval, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining from the vote. Initially lacking the materials and scientific expertise to build nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union developed their own nuclear bomb in August 1949, much sooner than U.S. intelligence reports predicted. This competition for nuclear supremacy launched an arms race, with both governments spending millions in the research and development of nuclear weaponry.
The Truman Doctrine
US-Soviet relations were strained from the moment Truman entered office, with ideological differences exacerbating long-standing tensions. Eschewing isolationism, the Truman administration adopted a proactive approach to the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Eastern Europe. The result was a series of programs and international agreements complimented by an unprecedented peace-time buildup of American military forces and technology.
In February of 1946, the U.S. Treasury requested information from the Embassy in Moscow regarding the Soviet Union’s hesitancy to support the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. George F. Kennan, the head of the American Embassy in Moscow, responded to the inquiry with the “long telegram,” later published in Foreign Affairs as the “X article.” In the piece, Kennan concluded that the Soviets were incapable of pursuing a path of peaceful co-existence and were determined to expand their influence. His proposed solution was the policy of containment. Adopted by the Truman administration, containment permitted the use of military power, economic aid, or psychological warfare to check Soviet expansion. Only a few weeks later, the Soviet challenge was presented to the American public in the form of an Iron Curtain. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his infamous “Iron Curtain” speech before an audience in Fulton, Missouri. He began by praising American strength and prestige, before advocating for a closer relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain. Proclaiming that an Iron Curtain had descended upon Europe, Churchill warned Americans of the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union and communist fifth columns operating throughout Europe.
Churchill’s speech was received warmly, but came at a time when Americans, especially State Department officials, grew increasingly suspicious of Soviet actions. The situation worsened the following year, when the British announced in March 1947, that they could no longer provide military and economic aid to support the Greek government’s civil war against the Communists. Angered by Stalin’s attempts to pressure the Iranian government for oil and Soviet efforts to strongarm transit rights through the Turkish Straits, Truman adopted a hardline approach to Soviet expansion. The Truman Doctrine committed the U.S. to an interventionist foreign policy, offering political, military, and economic assistance to democratic nations threatened by Communism. In a speech before Congress, Truman requested $400 million to aid the governments of Greece and Turkey.
In an effort to better meet the demands of this new era, the Truman administration began a massive overhaul of government. The first step in this restructuring was the passage of the National Security Act in 1947. The landmark piece of legislation combined the War and Navy Department under the Department of Defense and institutionalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also created the National Security Council and established the Central Intelligence Agency as a successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Service (OSS). The National Security Act was a gamechanger for American foreign policy, significantly increasing the power of the State Department. The first test of the new national security occurred in Italy. Fearing a Communist victory in the 1948 elections, the CIA embarked on its first covert mission and funneled large amounts of money to the Christian Democrats. The operation was a success, contributing to policymakers’ growing reliance on and unwavering faith in covert operations.
Foreign Aid
In the early weeks of his presidency, Truman met with several military officials who warned that pestilence and famine posed serious threats to postwar peace and stability. At Stimson’s urging, Truman requested a meeting with former President Herbert Hoover to discuss the global food situation. Hoover’s assessment was bleak, and in early 1946, he agreed to lead the President’s Famine Emergency Commission, studying the effects of famine and malnourishment across the globe. Over the course of Hoover’s travels, he held dozens of press conferences, underscoring the urgent need for grains and pleading with Americans to think of the hungry global population as their neighbors.
Throughout American history, the United States provided foreign aid to Allies with the tacit understanding that it often served political as well as humanitarian interests. Under Truman, foreign aid became an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine was more than a declaration of intent or commitment, and for the first time, Congress supported a peacetime assistance program which included a massive aid program for Greece and Turkey.
Events in the spring and summer of 1947 served to harden the ideological and geographical lines of the Cold War, and, consequently increase Truman’s reliance on foreign aid as an anti-Communist tool. George C. Marshall, Truman’s Secretary of State, was of a similar mindset. He recognized that while continued food shortages were a result of the physical destruction of war, their persistence threatened the peace. He believed that stabilizing European economies would foster the growth of democracies and stop the spread of Communism. Marshall tasked a group within the State Department with designing an aid program that could tackle the related problems of food shortages and agricultural and industrial recovery. On June 5, 1947, he introduced the Economic Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), which called for a program to rebuild European economies framed in the familiar framework of helping people to help themselves. The response from Europe was overwhelmingly positive—16 nations met in Paris to draw up a proposal for European reconstruction. Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in March 1948, authorizing loans to Western European nations. This was not aid freely gifted, but an investment in the future.
Truman took the ideas represented by the Marshall Plan one step further in his 1949 inaugural address where he proposed a program for international development assistance called Point IV. Point IV had two interrelated goals. First, it sought to reduce poverty and increase the production levels of developing countries, thus creating new markets for American products and resources. Aid to developing nations also reduced the likelihood of Soviet interference. Truman’s introduction of Point IV highlighted aid’s contributions to national security, with Point III establishing the national security state and elevating military aid to the same level of importance as economic assistance.
Israel
At midnight on May 14th, 1948, the British mandate over Palestine ceased to exist and the Israeli State was proclaimed. Later that day, without notifying the State Department, President Truman formally recognized the provisional government of Israel. That evening, Secretary of State Marshall sent a State Department official to the United Nations to prevent the U.S. delegation from resigning. The following day Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq attacked the newly formed Jewish homeland. Within a 24-hour window, the last British troops left Palestine, a new state was declared, the Arab-Israeli war began, and the United States replaced Great Britain as the chief Western power in the region.
Unlike his predecessor, Truman publicly voiced support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, but his support wavered as he sought to reconcile too many competing interests. Truman was sympathetic towards a movement pressuring Great Britain to permit Jewish refugees to settle Palestine in 1945. In 1946, he supported the findings of a study group that recommended the creation of an international trusteeship in Palestine. But, when the UN recommended the partition of Palestine into two states in 1947, Truman advised the State Department to support the plan. Representatives within the State Department feared intervention on behalf of the Jews would destabilize the region, leaving it susceptible to Soviet intervention, and limit American access to Arab controlled oil supplies, yet Marshall acquiesced. With Arab-Israeli violence mounting, the British announced they would leave in May 1948, but Truman vacillated once more, exhibiting interest in an international trusteeship, but it was too late.
While many scholars stress humanitarian concerns in the aftermath of the Holocaust as the primary motivator behind Truman’s support for Israel, others conclude that his inconsistent policy was swayed by political considerations, with U.S. recognition winning valuable Jewish votes during an election year. Truman’s recognition of Israel complicated efforts to cultivate relationships with the Middle East’s Arab populations, and ultimately contradicted the State Department’s attempts to secure access to Middle Eastern oil. The foreign policy implications of Truman’s actions in Palestine continue to reverberate in the present. In addition to highlighting America’s growing dependence on Arab oil, American intervention in the Middle East also exposed stark divisions within Truman’s administration.
Crisis in Berlin
In early 1947, Truman again reached out to Hoover, this time asking that he study the long-term needs of Germany and Austria in an attempt to relieve the burden on American taxpayers. Hoover’s reports recommended continued assistance, urged greater Congressional funding, and advocated for a reassessment of economic policy in the occupied Zones. Hoover believed German reunification was necessary to restore stability, emphasizing economic recovery over short-term relief. British and American occupation officials arrived at similar conclusions, and initiated discussion of German economic unification, including currency reform, in the spring of 1948. The Soviets feared that the introduction of a new Deutsche Mark would further devalue the Reichsmarks used in the east and retaliated by barring all road and rail traffic into West Berlin in June 1948.
Abandoning the city was never an option. Instead, Allied leadership devised a system to airlift food and fuel into the western sectors Berlin. Originally designed as a temporary measure, the Anglo-American airlift lasted eleven months and was surprisingly successful, delivering more than 2.3 million tons of cargo. In addition to providing supplies, Operation Vittles served an important propaganda function, eliciting praise from a grateful German public and undermining Stalin’s authority. Rather than turn West Berliners against the Allies, the blockade served to bring the former enemies closer together. Recognizing the futility of their efforts, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade in May 1949.
The crisis in Berlin escalated Cold War antagonisms and hastened the creation of West Germany. It also propelled the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In April 1948, five European nations, led by Great Britain, signed a mutual defense pact. British leadership sought to increase the strength of the organization by building a regional alliance that included the U.S. and Canada, as well as additional European nations. The Soviet Blockade of Berlin gave urgency to these concerns, and talks commenced that summer. Established in 1949, NATO represented the military alliance of the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations designed as a counter to Soviet military aggression in Europe.
Fighting Communism in Asia
The Chinese civil war, paused during the Second World War, reignited following the surrender of Japan in August 1945, with both Mao Zedong’s Communist forces and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists vying for power. Publicly, Stalin recognized the Nationalists, but behind the scenes the Soviets facilitated Communist takeovers. The U.S. responded by providing the Nationalists with military assistance and more than $1 billion in emergency military aid. Hoping to keep the Soviet Union out of the conflict, Truman sent General Marshall to China in late 1945 to establish a coalition government. Marshall proved surprisingly successful early on, even brokering a cease-fire, but peace was short-lived when the Communists recognized that the U.S. designed coalition favored the Nationalists. Preoccupied in Europe, the United States hoped to delay a Communist victory by providing Chiang with millions in economic and military aid. Recognizing that the end was imminent, Acheson wrote the infamous China White Paper in August 1949, absolving the United States of blame for the Nationalist defeat.
As Cold War tensions intensified in the Pacific, attention turned toward Japan and Southeast Asia. The occupation of Japan was led by General Douglas MacArthur. Subject to little oversight in the early years of occupation, MacArthur imposed numerous reforms to democratize Japan, including drafting a new constitution, demobilizing the military, implementing land reform, and encouraging labor unions. Worried these reforms could result in economic and political instability, U.S. officials adopted a “reverse course,” that established economic recovery as the primary objective of the occupation. The Truman administration also approved direct military aid to France, assisting in their war against the Communist leader of the Vietnamese independence movement, Ho Chi Minh.
On June 25, 1950, Communist North Korea launched a surprise attack on South Korea. Korea was occupied by Japan during WWII, and partitioned along the 38th parallel afterwards, with a Soviet-backed Communist regime controlling the north, and a U.S. supported government in the South. Believing this to be a Soviet act of aggression, Truman acted quickly and decisively, declaring war without congressional approval and then securing UN support. North Korean forces covered an impressive amount of ground, before the American military, led by MacArthur, launched a counter-attack behind enemy lines that enabled UN forces to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel.
Hungry for victory, MacArthur received orders from the administration to push past the 38th parallel and force a reunification of the country. Emboldened, MacArthur guaranteed victory by Christmas and was stunned when China entered the fray in late November, pushing American and UN forces back to the 38th parallel. By the spring of 1951, the war had turned into a costly stalemate, with a humiliated yet defiant MacArthur publicly questioning Truman’s strategy. MacArthur was relieved of duty, but the damage was done.
Truman’s reputation never recovered from Korea, playing a major role in his decision not to seek reelection in 1952. Regardless, Korea remained a decisive moment in the early Cold War with serious consequences for U.S. policy in Asia. Under the guidelines of NSC-68, the United States began full-scale mobilization and Truman’s budget for defense soared, underscoring the importance of the military in the national security state. Caught off guard by the North Korean invasion, the intelligence community responded by creating the National Security Agency (NSA). Chinese intervention pushed the United States closer to Chiang’s government on Taiwan and American military purchases poured billions of dollars into the Japanese economy. Korea also provided the impetus for increased European defense spending and an enlarged NATO, with membership extended to Greece and Turkey.
McCarthyism
In February 1950, Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin gave a speech at the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia, where he accused the State Department and Secretary of State Dean Acheson with harboring Communists. The Senator claimed to be in possession of a list of known Communists which he displayed in Wheeling and in a later speech on the Senate floor. McCarthy’s speech was an attack not only on Acheson and the State Department, but also Truman’s foreign policy agenda.
McCarthy’s allegations were not new—he tapped into a pre-existing network of conservatives who long believed that communism posed a threat to the American way of life and argued for years that Communists worked for the American government. Created in 1938, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) investigated public employees, private citizens, and various organizations suspected of Communist ties. HUAC pressured witnesses to provide names of Communist sympathizers or risk being held in contempt. The Committee targeted the Hollywood film industry in 1947 and made national headlines in 1948 following a public hearing where former Communist spy Whittaker Chambers accused Alger Hiss, a State Department official, of working for the Soviet government. The Chambers-Hiss case was followed by revelations that German scientist Karl Fuchs, who worked on the Manhattan Project, had passed information to the Soviets with the help of American citizens, including Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
Fueled by a climate of rising paranoia, McCarthy launched an aggressive campaign that sought to expose Communists in the U.S. government, lending his name to the wave of anti-communist political repression that plagued Washington in the early 1950s. With a flair for the dramatic, McCarthy was skilled at manipulating American fears following the fall of China, quagmire in Korea, and Soviet mastery of the atom bomb. After his inflammatory speech in Wheeling, he waged a campaign that called for a series of investigations of government officials. Throughout the 1940s, Truman had supported efforts to identify subversives within the federal government, but he was unsuccessful in his attempts to thwart charges that his administration was “soft” on Communism.
Legacy
Truman opted not to run for re-election in 1952. While he publicly announced this decision in March, he alluded to it privately as early as 1950. His victory against Dewey in 1948 was a narrow one, and polls revealed that Truman had fallen out of favor with the American public. The Korean War, McCarthyism, and charges of corruption in the administration resulted in alarmingly low approval ratings, dropping from a high of 87% in June 1945 to a low of 22% in February 1952. Truman sought General Dwight D. Eisenhower as a successor, but in January of 1952, Eisenhower announced his bid for President as a Republican, running on a campaign platform that highlighted Truman’s flaws: Korea, Communism, and Corruption. Truman placed his support behind Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, campaigning vigorously for Stevenson, who lagged in the polls, throughout the summer. For many, the election served as a referendum on the stalemate in Korea, with Eisenhower reminding Americans in a campaign speech that Korea, the burial ground of more than 20,000 U.S. troops, was “a symbol of the foreign policy of the nation” and a “damning measure” of American leadership. The General then pledged to go to Korea himself, which he did as President-elect in December. The armistice was signed eight months later, officially ending combat operations on the peninsula and reestablishing the border along the 38th parallel.
Harry Truman returned to Independence in January 1953, where he spent his post-presidential years living a life of modest means, known for his strolls about town with the Secret Service not far behind. Unlike previous commanders-in-chief, Truman did not have personal wealth or family money to sustain his retirement and benefitted greatly from Congress’s approval of the Former Presidents Act in 1958, which provided a lifetime pension to former presidents. As a result of his financial situation, Truman quickly signed a book contract for his memoirs, selling the rights to Life magazine. He spent the early years of his retirement overseeing the construction of his Presidential Library, traveling, and entertaining friends and dignitaries in Independence and Key West. The Library was dedicated in the summer of 1957 and served as Truman’s primary office, where he was known to interact regularly with visitors.
Truman continued to comment on American politics and foreign affairs throughout the 1950s and 60s. He remained critical of the Eisenhower administration, returning to the campaign trail in support of Adlai Stevenson’s failed run in 1956. Truman exhibited skepticism over John F. Kennedy’s nomination in 1960. Worried Kennedy was inexperienced and believing that the Massachusetts Senator’s Catholicism could negatively affect his bid, Truman also harbored a deep distrust of Joe Kennedy and publicly supported Missouri Senator Stuart Symington. Fearful that Truman would publicly criticize Kennedy and harm the Party’s chance at regaining the White House, Acheson wrote a detailed letter to his friend with a series of “don’t’s,” including a request that Truman not comment on foreign policy. Truman had a difficult time accepting the passing of the old guard, and while he warmed to Kennedy publicly, he remained critical in personal correspondence with Acheson. He was much more comfortable with Lyndon Johnson whom he knew from his years in the Senate.
Truman’s energetic lifestyle stalled after he suffered a fall in 1964. He passed away at the age of 88 on December 26, 1972, the result of complications arising from a bout of pneumonia. Rather than a large state funeral, the family held a small, private service in Independence followed by a viewing at the Truman Library where he was buried in the courtyard. The man who left office one of the most unpopular Presidents in American history, was celebrated in the press as a man of principle who represented the common folk, the scandals and criticisms that plagued the final years of his presidency fading from memory.
Primary Sources
The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and located in Truman’s hometown of Independence, Missouri. It was the first presidential library created under the 1955 Presidential Libraries Act. Truman was a strong supporter of the Act, which encouraged Presidents to donate their papers to the government, ensuring the preservation and accessibility for the American people. Major collections of the Library include the President’s Secretary’s Files, White House Central Files, files named for offices, such as the Korean War File, National Security Council Files, and Psychological Strategy Board Files. The Library also holds several groups of federal records relevant to foreign policy, including RG 59 General Records of the Department of State and RG 220 Records of Temporary Committees, Commissions and Boards. Additional relevant federal holdings can be found at Archives II in College Park, Maryland.
Truman was an avid writer, sending Bess, his mother, sister, cousins, old military buddies, and political associates thousands of letters throughout his lifetime. Some of this correspondence was published in curated volumes including Dear Bess: The Letters of Harry to Bess Truman, 1910–1959 (1983) edited by Robert Ferrell and Affection and Trust: The Personal Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953–1971 (2010) edited by Raymond Geselbracht. In addition to the multitude of letters, Truman was an ardent diarist and his memoirs, published in 1955 and 1956, are peppered with diary and letter excerpts. Unfortunately, Truman doubted his abilities as a memoirist and relied on an ever-growing team of researchers and editors to aid in the writing process, resulting in books that Alonzo Hamby described as “poorly organized, marred by leaden writing, and offer[ing] neither a comprehensive account of the Truman presidency nor many insights.” Reviews at the time were mixed, with many praising the volumes for their historical contribution, but believing Truman’s voice had been obscured. Regardless, both volumes sold remarkably well.
In addition to the Truman papers, the Library’s holdings include 450 manuscript collections belonging to individuals with personal and professional connections to Truman. The most significant collection from a foreign relations perspective are the papers of Dean Acheson. The Acheson Papers include the Dean Acheson Memoranda of Conversations database, accessible through the Library’s website. The Truman Library’s holdings on Acheson’s predecessors, George Marshall and James Byrnes, are notably slimmer. Byrnes left his personal papers to Clemson University, while Marshall’s personal papers are kept by the George C. Marshall Foundation Library and Archives in Lexington, VA. In 1961, the Truman Library launched an oral history project to complement its manuscript collections, with approximately 500 transcribed interviews available to read online.
The Truman Library’s audio-visual collection includes tape recordings of Merle Miller’s interviews with Truman and the Screen Gems Collection. Miller was hired as a writer for a television series on the Truman presidency which was later abandoned. Miller spent hours interviewing the President for the original project and prepared an oral biography, Plain Speaking (1974). Published after Truman’s death, the book was a bestseller and contributed to the growing tide of positive reassessments of Truman’s legacy. Screen Gems took over the television project and the Library’s collection features outtakes from the film production of Decision: The Conflicts of Harry S. Truman (1964–65). The 26-episode series featured Truman reflecting on his life and the decisions he made, accompanied by informal interviews with family members and colleagues. The films are available for viewing at the Library, with several of the outtakes digitized and provided on the Library’s website.
In addition to government documents and manuscript collections, the historical documents declassified by the CIA and NSA provide additional insights into Truman’s foreign policy. In the 1980s, under Director William Casey, the CIA established the Historical Review Program and permitted the declassification and transfer of records to the National Archives, beginning with the OSS records. Director Robert Gates created a more formal Historical Review Program (HRP), a voluntary program of declassification that emphasizes records deemed historically valuable. In 2000, an electronic full-text searchable system called CREST (CIA Records Search Tool) was installed at Archives II, providing researchers with access to a repository of records. In 2017, the CREST records were published online. The Digital National Security Archive also provides a large, curated database of declassified documents including collections on U.S. Espionage and Intelligence, Covert Action, and Nuclear History.