The argument Thomson contradicts concludes that abortion is always morally impermissible. She first grants the fact that the fetus is considered a person once it is conceived and that every person has a right to life. Therefore, the fetus has an implicit right to live. The mother does have a right to decide what happens in and to her body, but someone’s right to life outweighs this claim, so the fetus cannot be killed. With that logic, abortion is always morally impermissible, with the exception of when the pregnant woman’s life is in danger, as her right to live is equal to that of the fetus.
Thomson brings up a critique of this argument by creating an example with a famous violinist, who has “a fatal kidney ailment.” In this, the Society of Music Lovers kidnaps someone who has the right blood type to help the violinist, and plugs her circulatory system into his, so her kidneys can be used to extract poison from his blood. While she only has to be hooked up to him for nine months, if she were to be unplugged from the violinist during this time, he would die. Thomson states that these are analogous, therefore the argument that abortion is morally impermissible is disproven. That argument would go as follows: The violinist has a right to life, and she has a right to decide what happens in and to her body, but the violinist’s right to life outweighs her right to decide. However, this does not sound reasonable, Thomson states, so there must be something wrong with the first argument.
Thomson’s critique implies that a woman’s right to choose what happens in and to her body outweighs the fetus’ right to life.
This critique, however, uses an analogy that does not align exactly with pregnancy. In the example with the violinist, unplugging him is not a direct form of killing him. What would kill him would be the fatal kidney ailment. However, with a pregnancy, termination of a pregnancy directly kills the child. Therefore, in the violinist example, the action is not to kill the violinist, but to unplug her from him. While he will die once being unplugged, this is not the direct action. However, in the case of an abortion, receiving an abortion is the action, which does directly kill the fetus. This shows a clear distinction between the example of the violinist, and that of a pregnancy.
It can be argued then that receiving an abortion which does not kill the fetus directly can be considered morally permissible, as the fetus does not die from the abortion itself but as a byproduct of that. The fetus would still die, but it would not be a direct result of that abortion. Thomson’s analogy would only be valid if the initial argument stated that the abortion does not directly kill the fetus. If it does, the analogy does not align, and her critique is invalid. The initial argument must then be revised to clearly state that abortion that does directly kill the fetus is impermissible. It can be explained as follows: every person has a right to life, so the fetus has a right to life. That right to life outweighs the claim that a woman has the right to choose what happens in and to her body, so the fetus must not be killed. However, in cases where the pregnancy results in the death of the mother, and in cases where the fetus dies indirectly, abortion is permissible. This is because the mother’s right to live compounds with her right to choose, allowing her to be in charge of that decision if her life is in danger.
Phil 233, Exam 2 Prompt 2 Word count: 571
Using the doctrine of double effect, a case where an ectopic pregnancy is terminated by administering a drug, methotrexate, which targets the growing embryo’s cells, thus “killing” the embryo, is seen as morally wrong. However, a case where an ectopic pregnancy is terminated by removing the whole section of the tube on the side where the embryo is lodged, which also results in the death of the embryo, is seen as morally permissible. This is because the doctrine of double effect states that an action that has both bad and good effects is considered morally permissible if the action is not itself wrong, the bad effect is not the desired result, and the bad effect is not the means to get to the end goal. Also, the bad outcome must not be disproportionally worse than the good outcome. In this case, the administration of methotrexate and the removal of the whole section of the tube are said to be the actions, both of which have good and bad outcomes, the good being the saving of the mother, the bad being the death of the embryo. However, a moral distinction is drawn between the two. For the first action, although it is not immoral to administer a drug, nor is the death of the fetus the chosen outcome, the killing of the embryo is a means to save the mother. For the second, the embryo is not killed directly, nor is it the way to save the mother. Instead, the embryo is killed as a byproduct of removing a part of the tube. Because of this, according to the doctrine of double effect, the latter action is said to be morally permissible while the former is not.
This reasoning is correct, as the doctrine of double effect shows that the ends do not justify the means. Protecting the mother is the end goal. Doing this in ways that will directly kill the embryo is morally impermissible, while doing it in a way that will indirectly kill the embryo is not. This is because the embryo dying is merely a byproduct of the action rather than the action itself.
One might argue that the woman will have reduced fertility from removing the section of the tube, which is a bad effect caused by the permissible action. The fact that the embryo dies is worse than the mother being less fertile, therefore that is considered the single bad outcome. The woman’s fertility is reduced, not diminished, while the embryo is killed regardless. While it is necessary to terminate the pregnancy, as not doing so will end the mother’s life, reduced fertility is not the worst outcome. Therefore, using the doctrine of double effect, the argument supporting the moral impermissibility of the methotrexate case but not that of the latter, stands.
One may argue that in both cases, the embryo has still died. However, the ways of getting to that outcome are just as important as the outcome itself. In the first case, the way to terminate the pregnancy and kill the embryo is by directly targeting the growing cells of that embryo. In the second case, the way to do so is by removing the section where it is, which kills the embryo shortly after. It is true that the embryo does die in both cases, but there is an obvious moral distinction between directly killing and death as a byproduct of something else.
Phil 233, Exam 2 Prompt 3 Word count: 642
Disability is often explained as a negative difference maker, which is something that makes one worse off because of a difference. In this argument, disability is something that makes one’s life harder, therefore it has a negative impact on their quality of life. Because of this, it is considered a negative difference maker. Barnes critiques this argument, specifically the second line of reasoning which states that disability has a negative impact on someone’s quality of life. She argues that there are two notions of quality of life: local and overall. Local refers to one’s quality of life with respect to a specific feature at a specific time. The argument that disability negatively impacts one’s local quality of life is not enough to support that it is a negative-difference maker. It cannot be concluded that because something creates a lower quality of life in some aspect makes that thing a negative difference maker, as it does not make the person “worse off” in an overall sense.
The argument that disability affects one’s overall quality of life, according to Barnes, is just wrong. She grants that it does make one’s life more difficult, but that does not necessarily mean it negatively impacts the overall quality. She does so by first using the example of homosexuality, something that, while it makes one’s life difficult, does not make one overall worse off, as many gay people greatly enjoy being gay. Barnes also uses testimonies from others with disabilities, who feel that their lives have actually improved by their experiences. While it makes their lives harder, thus impacting their local quality of life in some respects, it benefits them in others, therefore not negatively impacting their quality of life as a whole. With that, according to Barnes, disability does not negatively impact one’s overall quality of life, so it cannot be inferred that it is a negative difference maker.
Disability is not a negative difference maker. A negative difference maker is defined as something that causes a substantial, adverse impact on someone. Disability does have a great impact on someone; this does not mean it is adverse. While it can be argued that those with a disability do not have the same capabilities of an able-bodied person, such as a blind person cannot see, this does not always have such negative effects. Losing sight does not make life worse as a whole; in fact, those who lose their sight often gain acute hearing, or a higher sense of smell. Therefore, disability has an effect, but it does not mean that overall it is adverse or makes one’s life worse off.
As stated before by Barnes, disabilities do not make life easy, however, according to the testimonies by those who are disabled, their lives have been improved by their disability. They see it as not a negative impact but a positive one. While one may argue that those who are disabled may not know that their disability causes adverse effects, that is something that an able-bodied person cannot understand. Because they have never experienced disability, they cannot speak to the experiences of those who are disabled. Instead, they must go off what they know and hear, which is that disability does make life difficult, but that does not make one’s life worse altogether. Just as it seems morally implausible for men to talk to the experiences of women or invalidate their experiences by claiming that their testimonies are false, it is just as implausible for those who are able-bodied to talk to the experiences of the disabled. While it may be possible that those who have a disability may be deluded by their experiences, the assumptions of able-bodied people that disability makes one’s life worse as a whole does not provide substantial proof that it does. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that disability is a negative difference maker.