The three main intellectual virtues of; theoretical being sophia, episteme and nous, techne and particularly phronesis, play a significant role in Aristotle’s account of political science, and its purpose. In the first part of this essay I will argue the significance of their role, whilst also explaining what Aristotle’s account of political science is and its purpose. However, in the second part of this essay I will suggest four critical views of the opinion that Aristotle is right to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics; the view that Plato’s theory of finding justice is superior to Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, the opinion that the extent to which Aristotle is right depends on which intellectual virtue is being looked at, the skepticism over the over-reliance on a virtue-based theory and the emphasis on moral virtues over intellectual ones. Nevertheless, on evaluation, I will argue that these critical views are wrong and the emphasis Aristotle’s places on the intellectual virtues, especially phronesis in his politics is reliable. This is because the intellectual virtues especially phronesis provide the foundations for his account of political science and its achievement of eudaimonia.
The purpose of Aristotle’s account of political science is to have a good life, achieved through all processes tending towards an end of which the highest end is the equivalent of the highest good, eudaimonia. Aristotle belief in teleology, that all living things have a function and in completing that function their life will be at its happiest applies in his account of political science. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is found by humankind completing their function of logos, also known as rational reasoning. This rational reasoning is found through implementing a virtue which allows us to reason well, which are described in Book Six of Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics as the ‘intellectual virtues’ (Aristotle, 2009: 102). The intellectual virtues help us understand ‘what correct reason is and what is the standard that fixes it’ (Aristotle, 2009: 102), thereby enabling us to find eudaimonia. Consequently it is clear that the intellectual virtues play the most significant role in Aristotle’s account of political science because they enable people to understand the rational logic behind the moral virtues resulting in a good life. Without the intellectual virtues particularly practical wisdom, ‘the choice’ would not ‘be right’ (Aristotle, 2009: 117), and the ultimate goal of eudaimonia would be impossible.
The intellectual virtues also play a key role in Aristotle’s account of political science in The Politics. Whilst The Nicomachean Ethics established that humans achieve eudaimonia through completing their function, in order to complete this function to the best of its ability, The Politics shows how this must take place through co-operation and association. This creates the polis, which is that space in a state, where through human interaction, humankind is able to see their true selves, therefore exercising the intellectual virtues and therefore rationality, to its highest degree, achieving eudaimonia. As a result of this, the intellectual virtues play a crucial role in Aristotle’s account of political science and its purpose because without the strong foundations of the intellectual virtues particularly phronesis, rational association and therefore eudaimonia, which is the ultimate purpose of his account, would fail.
Furthering this, not only do humans need the intellectual virtues to achieve eudaimonia, human nature implies that humans achieve their highest flourishment through the habituation of the intellectual virtues, and politics also known as laws, is the way in which our key intellectual virtue, phronesis, knowing how to act, is habituated. Politics allows us to develop our intellectual virtues, not by teaching or nature but by being based on the creation and implementation of laws through legislation. ‘Virtue in the strict sense…involves practical wisdom’ (Aristotle, 2009: 116). It is about creating an environment, where people can maintain their intellectual virtues, especially phronesis through habituation. Therefore ‘man is by nature a political animal’ (Aristotle, 1996: 13) and for this reason, the intellectual virtues in Aristotle’s account of political science play a key role as by engaging with the polis, eudaimonia which is Aristotle’s ultimate purpose in his account of political science, is possible.
Secondly, Aristotle argues the practical intellectual virtue of phronesis plays the most significant role of all of the intellectual virtues in Aristotle’s account of political science. Aristotle believes that all human activity is constantly changing and the right response to every human situation is not predetermined but changes depending on the individual circumstances. Therefore the intellectual virtue of phronesis provides a superior explanation as to how to handle each situation, using the moral virtues and vices. This is because unlike the other forms of intellectual virtues, phronesis is not tied down by the rules of regulations of techne also known as art, the contemplation elements of sophia also known philosophical wisdom and the mathematical and therefore fixed law elements of episteme also known as scientific knowledge. For this reason, Aristotle only briefly talks about these parts of the intellectual virtue (Aristotle, 2009: 108), and focuses more on phronesis, which is vital because ‘political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same states of mind’ (Aristotle, 2009:109). Due to this, phronesis is that intellectual virtue that determines the appropriate way of acting in politics through using the golden ‘mean which we say are intermediate between excess and defect’ (Aristotle, 2009:102), provided by each spectrum of action in the moral virtues. Consequently I argue that phronesis plays a particularly crucial role in Aristotle’s account of political science and its purpose.
The second part of this essay firstly demonstrates how when looking at Plato’s theory, it could be argued, it provides a greater explanation of how to achieve a good life, not through using the intellectual virtues, but by searching for justice in a city (Plato, 2000). However, Aristotle purposely goes out of his way in Book Two of The Politics to criticise other forms of government including Plato. He establishes that ‘all the constitutions which now exist are faulty’ (Aristotle, 1996: 31) and it is, in fact, his theory, which uses the intellectual virtues, which will be superior to all the other forms. Supporting this by structuring it so that The Politics puts Aristotle’s account of political science explained in The Ethics into practice in his politics further highlights the legitimacy of Aristotle’s theory. Also, he criticises Plato’s theory of a need for ‘unity of the state’ (Aristotle, 1996: 34) in many things such as women, property and children (Aristotle,1996: 33-34). Aristotle claims that ‘excessive unification of the state’ (Aristotle, 1996:34) causes loss of happiness and instead in order to find eudaimonia we must accept differences in society and cooperate through the intellectual virtues with these differences in mind or else eudaimonia cannot be achieved. Therefore, Aristotle is completely right to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics.
Another critic of Aristotle is his focus on biology and not mathematics, which is causing an over-emphasis on the intellectual virtues and especially phronesis. Alternatively, Plato’s theory which puts emphasis on mathematics could be seen as more practical. Plato argues that unity is needed for a state to function, and happiness and therefore justice to be found. However Aristotle argues that ‘happiness is not like the even principles in numbers’ (Aristotle, 1996: 39) like Plato would think, and is instead about the biological differences between us. God does not create some men gold and others silver like Plato’s noble lie would portray, but ‘mingles gold in some, and silver in others’ (Aristotle, 1996: 39). Aristotle believes differences do exist and should be excepted in a society, unlike Plato’s theory. On top of this eudaimonia can only be achieved if everyone is happy through cooperation and association using the intellectual virtues. However Plato’s theory ‘deprives guardians… of happiness’ (Aristotle, 1996: 39) and ‘if the guardians are not happy, who are?’ (Aristotle, 1996: 39). Therefore, I argue that Aristotle is completely right to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics.
Secondly, it could be argued that Aristotle is right to place such an emphasis on some but not all of the intellectual virtues. For example, Aristotle placing an emphasis on the intellectual virtue of ‘art- the knowledge how to make things’ (Aristotle, 2009: 105) could be seen as wrong. This intellectual virtue does not produce any ‘view to a good end’ (Aristotle, 2009:106) and consequently is not relevant to Aristotle’s argument and for that reason, it should have no emphasis put on it at all. Instead Aristotle tells us the ability to deliberate is key to achieving eudaimonia (Aristotle, 2009: 103), and therefore because ‘man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom’ (Aristotle, 2009:106) and not the intellectual virtue of art (techne), there should not be any focus on the intellectual virtue of art at all. Nevertheless, Aristotle states how ‘art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving true reasoning’ (Aristotle,2009:105) and therefore by art being essential to a state with reason, it is right for Aristotle to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtue of techne in his politics.
Furthering this, it could be argued it is wrong for Aristotle to place such an emphasis on phronesis and it should be the ‘philosophical wisdom’ (Aristotle, 2009: 107) also known as sophia, which he should focus on because this is superior to practical wisdom. Philosophical wisdom is ‘the most finished of the forms of knowledge’ (Aristotle, 2009:108) and therefore key to wisdom. Nevertheless, whilst philosophical wisdom is important, it is not the most important for Aristotle’s politics. Aristotle does state that phronesis ‘is not supreme over philosophic wisdom’ (Aristotle, 2009: 117) but that phronesis needs particular emphasis because it is the method to achieving Aristotle’s purpose of his account of political science, eudaimonia. Aristotle then backs up his point through using vivid imagery of the Gods, being philosophical wisdom, being ruled over by the art of politics, being phronesis, just because ‘it issues orders about all the affairs of the state’ (Aristotle, 2009: 117). This ridiculous idea supports his view that philosophical wisdom is definitely superior to phronesis but that phronesis needs more emphasis due to the fact it is key to his account of political science and its purpose because it is a way towards implementing the art of politics and therefore achieving philosophical wisdom and eudaimonia.
A third critic to Aristotle’s emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics is presented by Louden. He believes it is hard to tell who is ‘virtuous and who is vicious’ (Louden, 1984: 7) and therefore there will always be scepticism over a system based on virtues. However, although scepticism may exist Aristotle’s theory states that through complete focus on the polis and human interaction through phronesis, a society in which the highest happiness will become the ultimate aim will be produced and therefore Aristotle is right to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues.
Finally, there is the question as to whether it is right to place emphasis on the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues. The moral virtues are the actions taken towards achieving eudaimonia, whereas the intellectual virtues could be viewed as simply thoughts. Therefore Aristotle is wrong to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics and instead should be placing more emphasis on the moral virtues. However, Aristotle does state in The Nicomachean Ethics that he is right to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics because ‘if a man only had’ the knowledge of moral virtue ‘he would be none the wiser’ (Aristotle, 2009: 117). Instead, he needs the intellectual virtue of phronesis, which shows us what is the just thing to do, in order to achieve the moral virtues, which help us to do just things. Therefore the intellectual virtues are right to have such an emphasis put on them in Aristotle’s politics.
In summary, I have argued that the three intellectual virtues of theoretical, techne and particularly phronesis play a very significant role in Aristotle’s account of political science, and its purpose, achieving eudaimonia. On the other hand, this essay did discuss four key criticism of the view that Aristotle is right to place such an emphasis on the intellectual virtues in his politics; the idea that Plato’s theory is superior over Aristotle, how right Aristotle is to place an emphasis on the intellectual virtues depends on which intellectual virtues are being discussed, the scepticism over the over-reliance on a virtue-based theory and the reliance on moral virtues over intellectual ones. However, Aristotle’s emphasis on the intellectual virtues, especially phronesis in his politics I have argued is correct. This is because not only do they provide the foundations for his political science to work, especially phronesis, but they also provide a more advanced explanation for the purpose of political science.