In the early 1990s, there was a large response by the U.S. government to change its immigration strategies after the failure of some previous policies. In October 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act, otherwise known as IRCA, was passed in the hopes to ease some of the rising tensions in the public over immigrants taking jobs from natives. This act sought out to do four things: it increased enforcement and Border Patrol, it imposed sanctions on employers to prevent the hiring of undocumented migrants, it authorized a large amnesty to about 3 million people, and lastly, it gave the president of the U.S. the authority to declare an “immigration emergency” if large numbers of undocumented immigrants came into the country. The goal of passing this legislation was to see the numbers of illegal migrants declining and to slow down Mexican migration. But by 1990 it was obvious that this was not the case. Numbers of border apprehensions were once again rising, increasing 26 percent from the previous year (Massey, 91). With the failure of IRCA in mind, Congress decided to make some changes to its strategy in the start of the new decade.
In trying to prevent the illegal entry of migrants across the southern border, the United States government began to draft a new policy strategy guided largely by the notion of “prevention through deterrence”, with some examples of this being a massive increase in border patrol as well as new law enforcement initiatives and operations that were launched at the border. These actions were geared towards discouraging undocumented immigrants from attempting to cross the border by signaling at the danger and risk of illicit entry. But as we will find out, these new policy strategies did not meet the results that they were originally supposed to meet. Additionally, we can now see that the unintended results of the governments strategy in the 1990s has actually made the immigration problems in the U.S. worse by making circular migration less likely. The final effects of the policies enacted include the continued illicit entry of migrants through different, more dangerous locations, and the prolonged stay of migrants in the country.
The new immigration policies enacted in the mid 1990s, based off of the new “prevention through deterrence” approach, had one goal in mind: “The idea was to prevent Mexicans from crossing the border illegally in order to avoid having to arrest them later” (Massey, 93). One of the main ways that the U.S. government wanted to do this was by launching large enforcement operations in the main points of entry of the southern border. These include El Paso’s 1993 “Operation Blockade”, which was the first largely successful operation established in this Texas point of entry. After seeing the success of this new strategy, the Border Patrol’s Strategic Plan of 1994 incorporated the basic idea of the new enforcement operation and drafted a plan for the repetition of such in other border entry points.“Operation Gatekeeper” in San Diego, California saw the largest installation of new high-intensity floodlights, eight-foot steel fences along fourteen miles of the border, as well as the increased stationing of Border Patrol officers all along the area (Massey, 94). San Diego drastically went from being the busiest point of entry on the entire border, to a quiet and sometimes even boring border city. Just as in El Paso, the operation seemed to be largely successful in putting an end to immigrants illegally entering the United States. With the perceived success of these enforcement operations in the U.S.-Mexico border, in 1996 Congress once again passed legislation that was heavily focused on prevention through deterrence. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 allowed for more funds to be used in border enforcement such as: the construction of more fences in San Diego, the installation of military technology along the border, and the hiring of a thousand enforcement agents per year to bring the total number of the Border Patrol force to ten thousand (Massey, 95). This new legislation also allowed for tougher penalties on smugglers, undocumented immigrants and those who overstay their visas.
The results of the new policies and strategies enacted in the 1990s might have had the initial results that the government was looking for, but in the long run the effects turned out to be somewhat counterproductive. The large enforcement operations in San Diego and El Paso might have seemed successful at the beginning, but after looking at the number of undocumented immigrants who continued to enter the U.S. remain relatively the same, the conclusion then is that these enforcement operations simply deflected and channeled the entry points to more remote locations of the southern border.
In figure 6.1 (Massey, 107), Massey graphs the probability of apprehension, as well as the probability of non-Tijuana and non-California crossings from 1980 to 1998. Of course, after the launching of Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper the probability of apprehension went up from 1993 until its sharp decline after 1998. After the border enforcement operations, the probability of crossing through other entry points besides Tijuana and California also went up. Looking at all of this data together, the conclusion then is that as unaware immigrants initially were being caught more, it lead to the increase in apprehension probability. But as immigrants then learned that the traditional entry points were no longer a viable option they adapted and began to enter via non-Tijuana and non-California locations, leading also to the increase of non-traditional entry probability and the decrease of apprehension probability.
This leads to my next point of the failure of immigration strategies enacted in the 1990s, which is that the effects of such new strategies actually lead undocumented immigrants to remain in the country for longer periods of time making the flow of circular migration less likely. The idea of circular migration is that migrants tend to come to the U.S. with the goal of maximizing their benefits and profits, sending these profits back to Mexico to establish financial security for their families, and ultimately going back to join their loved ones. I argue that the effects of these new policies from the 1990s make circular migration less likely by increasing the costs of getting to the United States, in turn making it harder for immigrants to reach that desired point of financial security and maximization of profits, which is why they stay in the country longer.
There are a couple of ways in which the costs of migrating to the U.S. have increased. For example, once immigrants learned about the dangers and risks of crossing through California and Texas, they modified their modes of entry to fit the new circumstances and began to travel through more dangerous terrain in the Arizona desert. Some immigrants need the help of smugglers who might know more about the harsh Arizona terrain. And with the demand of these smugglers, also known as coyotes, going up then the prices to hire them also increase. In the Massey book, Figure 6.10 (Massey, 130) shows the cost of hiring a coyote in Tijuana going up over time. After “Operation Blockade” was launched, the cost of hiring a coyote in 1992 went from about $200 to around $525 in 1998. This increases the costs of getting to the U.S. significantly, which then leads migrants to take longer to reach that desired point of financial security.
The effects of having migrants enter through nontraditional border points also include migrants moving to other parts of the country that were not previously seen. In fig. 6.9 (Massey, 128), Massey graphs the percentage of immigrants going to nontraditional destinations in the U.S. After “Operation Blockade” in El Paso, the number of undocumented migrants going to nontraditional destinations goes up from twenty percent in 1993 to about forty-five percent in 1998. Since immigrants were no longer entering through the traditional California and Texas locations and then finding employment there, it was becoming easier for them to travel to other areas in the Northeast and the Midwest. And since these new regions are a a lot farther from the border, its easier for migrants to settle there rather then travel back home like they initially planned to.
The amount of time that it takes for undocumented immigrants to save and maximize their profits is also affected by other aspects of the new policies enacted in the 1990s. I had mentioned earlier that some of the legislation also included tougher penalties on employers who hired undocumented immigrants. This leads to employers decreasing their wages in order to make up for the costs of added paperwork (Massey, 120). As a result, migrants are making less because of lower wages, once again making it harder for them to reach that coveted point of financial security. In conclusion, all of the U.S. immigration and border policies of the 1990s transformed what had previously been a circular flow of migration from Mexico to the United States, and has now led to an increase in undocumented immigrants who have now chosen to stay and settle in the country.