The European Union has initiated multiple military and political missions to Mali after the recent events as the EU is a major player in world politics and a reliable partner when it comes to solving conflicts. The chaos in Mali is a perfect situation for terrorists to organize themselves as we have seen in the past and concerns the EU. Furthermore, the distance to EU borders is not far meaning that refugees can relatively easy reach the EU. Peace and prosperity around the EU means an opportunity for businesses to thrive. Foreign investments also lead to revenue for EU businesses and citizens. Stability in non-EU Members States allows EU citizens to travel freely, and learn, communicate and enjoy other cultures and ideas. That the EU must do something is therefore clear, whether the EU has been dealing with Mali in a proper way remains to be seen. For the future it remains unclear how the EU should act.
The conflict
To understand this paper, one needs to understand the conflict and its background. The issue as we know it today finds it origin in the previous century. Events that happened in the 1960’s eventually led to the situation as we know it today.
Mali gained its independence in 1960 with Modibo Keita as president. Immediately the country becomes a one-party state and disconnects itself from any French influences. The country remains to be a one-party state until 1992. Until then, the former President Keita died in prison, Mali and Burkina Faso fight over a piece of border and President Moussa Traore has already been re-elected. (BBC News, 2017)
In 1992, the first democratically president has been elected, Alpha Konare and the country becomes a multi-party state. It is in this time when the first issues start with the Tuareg tribes. The Tuareg are a Islamic group of people with a population of 1 million in the north-western Sahara. Yet, these are eventually solved once in 1995 a peace agreement has been signed between the Malines government and the Tuareg. The consequence is that thousands of refugees, who fled for the violence, returned to Mali. (BBC News, 2017)
In 2007, the issues with the Tuareg in the north start again. The Tuareg kidnap and kill several government soldiers in several attacks and this will continue for several years. According to a news article published by the Guardian, the relationship between the north and south have always been difficult (Tran, 2013)
‘’Relations between the north and south have been historically fraught. The north has chafed under southern rule; the region has seen major rebellions from the Tuareg – nomadic – communities who feel marginalised in an already poor country’’ and ‘’ According to the International Crisis Group, a Brussels thinktank, deep resentment was caused by stories of massacres, the poisoning of wells and forced exile from 1963, score-settling by pro-government militias against Tuareg civilians in the 1990s’’ (Tran, 2013)
In 2009, an interesting event takes place; Algeria starts sending military equipment to Mali. The countries around Mali, being Algeria, Mauritania and Niger are becoming afraid of terrorist actions and al-Qaeda linked militant groups. (BBC News, 2017)
In the years that follow, the countries mentioned in the previous paragraph, organise themselves and set up an even more direct and active military action against terrorism in and around the region. A joint military command is initiated. This join command comes in handy when in 2012, the Tuareg launch new attacks in the cities in the north and take over the entire northern territories and declare independence. Many civilians in fear of further attacks flee into Mauritania.
In the mean-time, the in 2007 re-elected president Toure becomes victim of a military coup because he is accused of not being capable of dealing with the rebellion situation in the north. The country of Mali is suspended from the African Union. An interim government led by President Dioncounda Traore comes into place but this leads to several protests that will eventually lead to an event where President Traore is beaten unconscious.
The problems with the rebellion groups in the north continue. President Toure had difficulties with the Tuareg but president Traore does too. The Tuareg, now called MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) start working together with its ally Ansar Dine and declare northern Mali to be an Islamic state. The Islamic law is violently imposed on the civilians living in the north and al-Qaeda approves the cooperation between the two groups. Yet, the cooperation does not last long, not even a year later Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda start attacking targets under MLNA command and start destroying any Islamic shrine that is not in line with its radical point of view. Several months later, rebel groups of Ansar Dine and al-Qaede capture of an important city in the north; Douentza. This action is important because it creates a more strategical location for the groups. Backed with UN and African Union support, Ecowas (Economic Community of West African States) initiates a military operation. Preparations however take several months.
Then finally in 2013, Operation Serval is launched by the French forces that would last 1.5 years. In 2012, the UN adopted Resolution 2085 that meant the starting of Operation Serval in which France send in over 5000 troops supported by 2900 troops of AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali). At first France used air strikes only but later used ground troops to execute more complex and sensitive missions. (NRC, 2013)
After the French troops took over several cities and slowly restored peace again, they hand over the command to the UN and a peace treaty was signed with the Tuaregs. Again, this peace does not last long as the Tuaregs start attacking cities again and even open an embassy in the Netherlands; the Azawad Embassy as they call the independent state in the north of Mali.
In another attempt to reach a peace agreement, the Mali government gives the leaders of the rebel groups in the north more autonomy and retracts arrest warrants for some of the key figures. Although this agreement was successful, Islamist groups like Ansar Dine and al-Qeada remain active and still launch terrorist attacks against UN personnel and Mali government officials. In fact, Mali becomes the most lethal place for the UN to serve; more than 100 UN staff have been killed over the course of the UN mission in Mali. The Tuareg MNLA now patrol together with Mali government troops still remaining a target for Islamic groups as shown by an attack in January 2017, where a car bomb exploded near a military camp where both government- and Tuareg troops were stationed; 37 where killed. Next to al-Qaeda and Ansar Dine, Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen becomes an active attacker and organizer of terrorist attacks with its latest attack in June 2017. (BBC News, 2017)
Research
Part of this research is the understanding and review of the already existing literature and actions that have already been undertaken by the EU and its partners. Key is the focus on the military missions that will be explained and analysed below.
UN Resolution 2085
The United Na
tions Security Council Resolution 2085
was adopted in 2012 and is a follow up of several other UN Resolutions ( 2056, 2071) and press-statements. In this specific resolution the UN calls upon multiple international organizations to act militarily. In article II paragraph 7 the UN urges regional and international organizations ‘’to provide coordinated assistance, expertise, training, including on human rights and international humanitarian law, and capacity-building support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces’’ (United Nations Security Council, 2012)
The organizations meant in this paragraph are the ECOWAS and AFISMA. The UN authorizes the deployment of a one-year African-led coalition to:
• ‘’contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process, including the European Union and other UN Member States;
• support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA and associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate measures to reduce the impact of military action upon the civilian population;
• transition to stabilisation activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities;
• support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population;
• support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, as requested, within its capabilities and in close coordination with humanitarian actors;
• protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and movement of its personnel’’ (United Nations Security Council, 2012)
The article does not state that the AFISMA and ECOWAS should set up their own military training mission. The UN specifically states in paragraph 8 of that same article that the EU should set up a military training mission. It is interesting to see that the UN asks the EU to set up a military training mission and not the ECOWAS or AFISMA as they are closer to the problem and can relate better to what is needed in Mali due to their geographical location. Apparently the UN sees the EU as a capable and reliable partner in setting up a military mission.
Interesting in this resolution is the fact that the UN gives the EU space to initiate any kind of military mission it wants. The text does not specify to what extend the EU can operate, its specific aims, or any kind of criteria set out by the UN that the EU has to follow. With that freedom the EU has come up with a broad strategy consisting out of the EUTM and the EUCAP Sahel Mali. Furthermore, nothing in the Resolution describes any form of humanitarian aid to the Malian people.
EUTM Mali (European Union Training Mission to Mali)
In 2013, the EU launched a military training mission to Mali; EUTM. In a accordance with and at the request of the Mali government and UN Security Council Resolution 2085. The mission has trained approximately 10.000 Malian armed forces so far. (BELGA, 2018) The mission consists of approximately 580 military personnel out of 22 EU Member States and 5 non-EU Member States. the mission does not have a permanent command, currently the mission is led by Brigadier general Bart Laurent (Belgium) Since 12 July 2017 (EUTM Mali, 2018). The mission will be taken over by Spain at the end of January 2018. (BELGA, 2018)
The mission objectives are:
• training support for the benefit of the Malian Armed Forces,
• training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources, as well as training on International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians and human rights,
• a contribution, upon Malian request and in coordination with MINUSMA, to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process framed by the Peace Agreement, through the provision of training sessions in order to facilitate the reconstruction of inclusive Malian Armed Forces,
• support to the G5 Sahel process, within the activities of EUTM Mali in support of the Malian Armed Forces, by contributing to enhancing coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces. (EUTM Mali, 2018) (the G5 are Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad)
Next to military support, the ‘’EUTM Mali provides advice at both strategic and regional level, to the Ministry of Defence, Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) authorities and to military headquarters in the military region garrisons in support of to the implementation of the structural reforms encompassed in the Defence Programming Law’’. (EUTM Mali, 2018)
Additionally, the Mission assists the MaAF in assessing the implementation of the reform. French-speaking, multi-disciplinary, military advisors share their experience and expertise with their Malian counterparts in the domains of human resources management, logistics, intelligence, conduct of operations, information systems, finances and planning. (EUTM Mali, 2018)
The EUTM, is the military mission the UN gave the authorization for in Resolution 2085.
EUCAP Sahel Mali
EUTM is part of a larger strategy that deals with the situation in Mali and the Sahel region. While the EUTM only focuses at training and advising the Malian military, the EUCAP Sahel Mali has a broader focus. EUCAP focuses on capacity building and training of national security forces such as the police, Gendarmerie and the National Guard. EUCAP also has a mandate to strengthen the public organisation of Mali by;
• ‘’Improving their operational efficiency
• Re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains
• Reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions
• Facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country’’ (Council of the European Union, 2014)
Both missions (EUTM and EUCAP) find its legal basis in a combination of EU legislation drafted by both the Council and Political and Security Committee while the day to day planning and organization falls under the responsibility of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). (EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2018)
EUCAP is again a military mission not a humanitarian one.
MALI: AVOIDING ESCALATION
The International Crisis Group is ‘’an independent organization working to prevent wars and shape policies that will build a more peaceful world’’
‘’Crisis Group sounds the alarm to prevent deadly conflict. We build support for the good governance and inclusive politics that enable societies to flourish. We engage directly with a range of conflict actors to seek and share information, and to encourage intelligent action for peace.’’ (International Crisis Group, 2018)
In July 2012, the International Crisis Group published an journal article (MALI: AVOIDING ESCALATION) in which it summarizes how the events in Mali led to the situation in which the country occurs today. The article emphasizes the chaos and lack of knowledge about what is really going on in Mali; ‘’the situation in northern Mali is changing rapidly and there is only fragmentary knowledge of what is really going on’’ (International Crisis Group, 2012)
The article furthermore stresses the influence of the 2011 conflict in Libya, as large numbers of fighters, weapons and ammunition find their origin in Libya. After the defeat of Qhadafi in Libya, many of
the former members of the Libyan Armed Forces travelled to Mali
. A substantial amount of those armed forces are either born in Mali or have a Tuareg background. They sought support for their own cause. Qhadafi had the financial resources to finance and facilitate militant groups throughout the Sahel region. By doing so, he had tried to create alliances in the region. Because of the lack of public governance in Libya after the conflict and the immense amounts and high power weapons coming into Mali, the Malian Armed Forces were surprised with large and violent offensive once those fighters returned to Mali and started fighting for the MNLA or other rebel groups.
When digging deeper into the article it becomes clear that there is a major power struggle happening in the Sahel region. After the large attacks by the MLNA, local African armies begin to mobilise because it becomes clear that the Mali Armed Forces cannot deal with the situation on its own. Because of the rapid change in the situation in Mali, the African Union Commission called for a meeting to examine the case on a ministerial (PCS, African Peace and Security Council) in Addis Ababa early 2012. Only at that meeting the urge for an international coordinated action plan was opposed for the first time.
The article further clarifies that the problem in northern Mali does not only concern Mali alone. The entire northern Sahel region is one big mosaic of militant groups, Islamic terrorist organisations and badly organized public systems. The author therefore calls for an broader strategy to tackle the issue and directly addresses all stakeholders involved including the EU;
‘’To Mali’s Bilateral and Multilateral Partners, particularly the European Union, France and the U.S.:
Provide political and financial support to Malian political and social initiatives that seek to resolve the crisis by uniting all communities, in the north and the south, through promotion of respect for the republic’s fundamental principles and society’s traditional religious tolerance.
Support efforts to reconstitute the defence and security forces, with a view to strengthening their cohesion, discipline and effectiveness so they can ensure security in the south, constitute a credible threat of last resort to protect the populations trapped in the north and be capable of participating, if necessary, in regional actions against terrorist groups.
Provide intelligence support to the armed forces of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria to help them locate terrorist groups and their arms caches.’’ (International Crisis Group, 2012)
AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) is, according to this article one of the main problems in the region. AQIM is originally an Algerian Islamic organisation but finds many of its members in Mali; the Tuaregs. Recently (2007-present) the AQIM kidnapped multiple Western diplomats and civil servants for ransom. However, both the EUTM and EUCAP mission do not support Algeria in the fight against the AQIM and other organisations. While the AQIM is a Algerian organisation, one would expect that Algeria should play an important role in this problem and that the EU should support and Algeria and demand cooperation. According to the International Crisis Group article, Algeria backs away from the problem.
‘’Algeria is a blind spot in diplomatic activity on the Sahel question. Its position is the subject of much speculation, which is more or less plausible but rarely supported by hard evidence. AQIM is an originally Algerian organisation, which should logically give Algeria a preponderant role in the “war on terror”. However, in practice, its involvement is not proportional to the considerable military resources at its disposal’’ (International Crisis Group, 2012)
Summarized, the International Crisis Group is opting for a broader focus of the EU. The problem not only lies in Mali itself. To solve the conflict, the EU should focus more on countries and actors outside, especially Algeria. To move the Algerian government to undertake more action, the EU could for example sanction the country. The EU Commission signed a trade deal with Algeria;
‘’ The European Union is Algeria’s largest trading partner and absorbs the major part of Algerian international trade (54.1%). Total trade between the EU and Algeria amounted to €37.4 billion in 2016.’’ (European Commission, 2017)
European Development Fund
As explained before, EUTM and EUCAP are both part of a bigger strategy. Military and civil action is important to ensure safety at the moment. For a long lasting solution more needs to be done on sustainable development. For that reason the EU has launched the European Development Fund programme as a complement to the military missions. Once the military missions end, the country of Mali would be left with a dysfunctional organization. The European Development Fund finds it origin in the Treaty of Rome but today comprises a €30.5 billion for the period 2014-2020. (European Council, 2014) A total of €615 million euro of that initial amount is reserved for Mali. (Union Europeene-Mali, 2015)
‘’This support focuses on state reform and consolidation of the rule of law, rural development and food security, education, and road transportation in addition to other projects scheduled in Mali’s northern regions’’ (Delegation of the European Union to Mali, 2016)
These actions are very imported for the survival and stability of Mali once the mandate for the missions are expired. These objectives are cheered at by several analyst such as the International Crisis Group.
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
Where there is war, there are people in need of help. The EU has done a very extensive job so far on helping the people who are in need of food, shelter and medication trough the ECHO programme. Reopened in 2012, ‘’ECHO has also mobilised its air service, ECHO flight, in order to facilitate access to humanitarian programmes and to the populations in the north’’
Looking at the results of the survey conducted, ECHO should be approved. In fact, when researching what the EU has done so far on Mali we find extensive information on its military and political missions, while too a far less extent on its humanitarian missions while that seems to have the preference from the respondents to the survey results explained below.
What is even more surprizing is that according to report published by Doctors Without Borders (DWB), that military intervention in Mali would compromise the organisation. (Medicins Sans Frontieres, 2017)
‘’The union of these three logics can have a serious impact on the provision of humanitarian action, which can be confused by the population and some actors as being part of the conflict. According to the report published today by MSF, there are four main risks for humanitarian action in Mali. First, the risk of the assistance being perceived as support for the government’s political agenda. Second, the humanitarian aid can be rejected by the population and groups opposed to this political agenda. Third, and as a consequence of this, humanitarian organisations can be attacked if they are identified as belonging to the enemy. The use of armed escorts by humanitarian workers and the use of civilian vehicles by the military, both common practices in Mali, may increase the likelihood of these attacks. And finally, there is a risk that vital humanitarian aid cannot be implemented on the scale it is needed due to the other three risks, aggravating the needs of the population to be assisted’’ (Marín, 2017)
Survey
To answer the main question of this research; How should the EU respond towards the continuing conflict in Mali?, a wider view of answering should be used. The EU is a democratic society that values the transparency and efficiency of its legisl
ative bodies. Within the EU thousands of c
ivil servants are responsible for spending tax money paid by its citizens. Because the EU is a large player in the international field, it can cause a positive result when it comes to solving international conflicts. At the same time, because of the amount of bureaucracy and size it can also cause negative results. With its more than 500 million citizens, who rely on a well-organized public system, it reasonable to take its citizens of view into account when it comes to answering questions about the possible actions of the EU towards non-EU Member States.
EU citizens indirectly choose on how the EU should deal with Mali trough elections and that should, in theory, be translated trough their Government/Member of Parliament/President of choice. However, as citizens we do not have a direct say in decision and it is therefore hard to see the voices of ordinary EU citizens in the actions set up by the EU.
To answer the question on how the EU should deal with Mali from the EU citizens point of view a short survey (see appendix 1) has been designed both in English and Dutch. The results have been translated and combined. The survey aims to answer the research question by using nine questions. These questions have been distributed among a group of people from all kinds of different backgrounds, being a Facebook group of approximately 750 people, to receive the most reliable and broad results; in the end, the EU remains to be united in diversity. Because there are only nine questions and 35 respondents the results cannot be perceived as a complete image of the what the EU public actually considers the best solution to the conflict in Mali.
The survey asks for gender (Q. 1) and age (Q. 2); this should give an idea about the people who answered the survey. Generally, more males (68%) than females (32%) have answered the survey although the Facebook group has approximately an equal amount of males and females. Besides gender, age was also asked in the survey. It is not surprising that the biggest group of respondents, 18-25 (56%) responded to the survey.
Furthermore, there is a possibility that non-EU citizens have answered the questions due to the fact that multiple people in the Facebook group are non-EU citizens. However, we can assume that someone who is politically active has a basic understanding of the what the EU is and how important it is in world politics and as a partner for non-state actors. The survey specifically asks whether the respondent is politically active and in what way (Q. 3). 56% of the respondents are politically active in several different manners. Respondents have answered that they were either political science student, that they give opinions about European legislation drafts, that they participate in demonstrations or a candidate for the municipality council.
To the question (Q. 4) if the respondent would be in favour of a stronger, most replied with yes (68%). Many respondents gave different reasons for being in favour of a stronger EU that it is the ‘’most effective peace project in history’’, ‘’together we can achieve more’’ or that ‘’integration and standardisation’’ are important This is interesting due to the fact that Euroscepticism seems to become a bigger general opinion in the last years but according to this small survey that does not seem to the case.
It also seems that a substantial amount of respondent (52%) already know something about the conflict in Mali and at the same time most respondents (72%) want to learn more about it. However, moving towards question 7, 8 and 9 we see a slight change in opinion. When asked if the EU should do more to solve conflicts outside the EU (Q. 7), not even half of the respondents answer with yes; depending on the situation some say. The ones who answered yes do give a specific reason why; ‘’peace there is peace here’’, ’’we should help others in need’’, ‘’peace is good for everybody’’, but also ‘’depending on the conflict’’ and ‘’it creates new markets’’.
When specifically asked about the conflict in Mali whether the EU should do more, only 40% answers with yes. Taking into account the answer to the previous questions and that more than half of the respondents are politically active, the respondents find a strong EU important and care about the benefits it brings along. However, when the respondents are asked about how the EU should act towards the outside, many say that it is not necessary to solve conflicts outside in a military way.
That becomes clear when we analyse the answer from question 9. For this questions, respondent could give several answers. However, the most respondents considered that the provision of solely humanitarian aid would be sufficient (66.7%). Next to that, 55.6% answered that the EU should only act as an negotiator and facilitate between the fighting partners. That the respondents to the survey do not want any boots on the ground can be derived from the only 14.8% who answered in favour. Some (25.9%) even say that the EU should do nothing towards the conflict in Mali.
One possible answer that could have been given by the respondents is the training of local armed forces. That is basically what the EU is doing at the moment with the EUTM. However, only 29.6% of the respondents are in favour of an EU training mission. Considering the fact that EU legislation and actions should more or less reflect the opinions of the public and that most respondents have some political knowledge, means that the EU no longer should continue with the mission in Mali.
Methodology
In line with the assignment and research for this paper several sources and methods of research have been used. Key in understanding the issue at hand and answering the questions raised in the first part of this paper is taking into the account what the EU already did when it concerns Mali. Therefore, the official websites, legislation and factsheets have been consulted and analysed, the website with its documents of the European External Action Service for example. Furthermore, the individual websites of the EU missions in Mali and the Sahel region play an important role in answering the question. Desk research and secondary research form the backbone of this paper as well as the survey.
Conclusion
The events in Mali have caused serious harm to the Malian society and its neighbours. As one of the biggest players in the international field and close partner to the Sahel region, the EU feels responsible and threatened by the issues that continue in Mali. Th creation of EU missions such as the EUTM, EUCAP and the European Development Fund continue to make substantial change to the situation in Mali and the Sahara/Sahel region.
The EUTM mission specifically focuses on Mali and has led to