Essay: Why media management became such an important focus for the Labour Party

On the 12th of June 2007, former Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a brief speech on ‘public life’, through the international news agency Reuters. Blair offered some retrospective insight into his time in government, and expressed succinct concerns on the changing nature of the relationship between British politics and the mainstream media. In this, Blair admits that during his time as Prime Minister, his office “paid inordinate attention, in the early days of New Labour to courting, assuaging, and persuading the media. [which] in our own defence, after 18 years of Opposition and the, at times, ferocious hostility of parts of the media, it was hard to see any alternative.” (Blair, 2007). This statement introduces the fundamental ideas of New Labour and it’s strategy of ‘spin’, which I shall attempt to analyse throughout this essay. From the excerpt, Blair himself seems to feel as though the focus of New Labour on the party’s press image was excessive, and in a sense, a forced situation. Using this as the premise for my essay, I will judge why it was that media management became such an important focus for the Labour Party, spanning from as early as the 1970s leading up until 2010 when the Conservatives regained power. Ultimately, I aim to challenge whether this ‘courting, assuaging and persuading’ of journalists and news channels was beneficial to the New Labour project or not. To a large extent, it can be argued that these strategies only served to undermine the labour governments of the time and have left a lasting effect on the party and its relationship with the mass media, still lingering even to the present day.
The Path to the ‘New Labour’ Project
To begin, it is crucial to establish what series of phenomena it is exactly that the term ‘New Labour’ emerged from. Over the course of the 1970s, Labour began to make headway in developing a new strategy. National Executive Committee groups were established to help correlate better the political climate among the general public to policy creation. Moreover, the People and the Media Report opened the debate within the Labour Party on the inquest into democratic media ownership, continued in 1977 by the Royal Commission of the Press.(Tunney, 2007) All of these developments impacted Labour’s 1983 manifesto and election campaign, but to no avail. After Labour Party leader Michael Foot’s disastrous defeat in 1983, it was clear that the Conservative party had a stronger understanding of how to tailor its marketing and public relations to the demands of the mainstream media, specifically utilising television broadcast. On the contrary, Foot untactfully “preferred addressing public meetings to taking part in studio interviews” and so was vilified by the popular press for his general uneasiness and “glib answers”. (Wring, 2005). This realisation spurred both ideological and structural reforms of the Labour party, and thus the process of ‘modernisation’ was began by new party leader Neil Kinnock. (Shaw, 1994). At this point, British politics was still dominated by the lingering ideology of Thatcherism and the institutional changes that had occurred across her time in government. It was strategised that to appeal to wider public the Labour Party should adopt a more central, social democratic position as opposed to it’s traditionally more left-wing, socialist ethos. In response to this, Kinnock “introduced changes which reduced the power of unions within the party, and introduced a more professional approach to party communications,” in this time of transition. (Grayson, 2010). An alteration of policy and also structural reconstruction was perceived to be the necessary reaction of the Labour party. Thus, leadership had accepted that the ‘mediatisation’ of the party way the key to greater electoral success, and so the roles of men such as Peter Mandelson emerged, to mastermind a new communication strategy ahead of the 1987 election campaign. Labour strategists focused on contacts within the “quality press”, and more “sophisticated methods of managing” the headlines. (Tunney, 2007). Despite the surge for more media-driven campaigning across 1987 to 1992, Kinnock garnered little success and was ultimately unable breakthrough and win power from the Conservatives. (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). After Kinnock’s resignation, the party’s modernisation was perdured briefly by John Smith but codified and characterised by the defining party leadership of Tony Blair from 1994 onwards. This marked adaptation by the Labour Party facilitated the election of Blair in 1997, in what Richard Grayson deemed “the triumph of the most effective political rebranding ever in British Politics”. (Grayson, 2010). Thereupon, Blair and his chief strategist Philip Gould “popularised the dichotomy of ‘new’ versus ‘old’ Labour” and foundation of the New Labour Project had been well and truly laid leading up until this point. (Wring, 2005).
The Necessity for New Media Strategies
And so, the ‘New Labour’ project can be broadly interpreted as encompassing first and foremost “a policy agenda, a political project [that is] on concerned with propelling Labour into office,” with the aim of embracing “policy perhaps being ‘whatever works’ under the contemporary economic and social conditions,”. (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). Having outlined how the party arrived at this, it is clear to see why a more intense and targeted media management was needed by the Labour party, after so long fighting in opposition, and against a seemingly right-wing press. During this structural upheaval, a largely fabricated presentation of a party in conflict was concocted by the mass media as news outlets fell more and more vulnerable to the stratagem of sensationalism, much to the party’s electoral detriment, and that of political discourse in general. Divisions within the party were amplified by many journalists, especially those working for pro- Conservative newspapers, or “the Murdoch press”, as means of creating Labour as a party unable to govern. (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). And thus a strong image of leadership and party unity was needed to counteract this, and became core to the New Labour project. Wring concisely assesses how the Labour Party are at an intrinsic disadvantage when liaising with the press, due to the fact that Conservatism “welcomes a democratic franchise because experience shows and research suggests that it can manipulate that franchise, maintaining it’s control of the press.” (Wring, 2005). Here, the assessment can be made that the politicised nature of the press during the 18 years of conservatism prior to Blair, and even before that including and succeeding the Churchill post-war government, creates a media environment within which the Labour Party customarily are on the back foot. Leading up to the 1997 general election, New Labour was surprisingly successful in realising this objective, gaining the favour of several popular, right-wing tabloids. It is quite evident, according to Tunney, that “studies of the 1980s and early 1990s, a period in which the press was particularly blamed for Labour’s defeats, have pointed to the influence of news values that the Conservative press had on broadcasters,”. (Tunney, 2007). It is fair to say that this could not have been achieved without the policy of ‘spin’.
The word ‘spin’ has for the last decade “been used to describe the efforts of politicians to get across their message,”. (Grayson, 2010). In specific, key roles were created to micro-manage the journalistic reporting on the Labour party, in an attempt to limit the negative press, and put forward New Labour’s agenda in the best light. “Proactive media management” has been accorded by many as the central mechanism in the operation of the New Labour project. This can be simplified as a more ‘electoral professional’ approach. (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). Enshrined in the ambition of ‘spin’, areas of government were tasked with generating news stories and events for certain media coverage, while unscrupulously controlling the release of this information in order to maintain a “steady flow of primary material detailing positive governmental activities and policy initiatives”. (Heffernan and Stanyer, 1998). This creates a codependent relationship between politicians and their favoured press outlets, as journalists benefit from the often exclusive releases of parliamentary events and political information. The government can thus hope to feed the media’s need for information in return for good publicity. (Heffernan and Stanyer, 1998). In so many words, newspapers now had huge commercial reason to alter attitudes surrounding New Labour in order to stay in tune with the opinions of readers.
And so, the use employment of ‘spin’ as a key media relations strategy had become increasingly important up until the election of Blair as Labour Party Leader in 1994. As labour undertook its reactionary ideological reform, the focus turned to the press as the most influential platform to communicate the New Labour project to the electorate. The policies of New Labour were tailored for mass appeal, and needed to reach the mass audience. Five Pledges were made from 1994 to 1997, including the promise to reduce class sizes, cut NHS waiting lists and to secure no rise in income tax while keeping inflation and interest as low as possible. In summary, to communicate this message to the voting public, ‘spin’ was needed to bring sufficient attention to Labour policy. This was achieved by making full use of the news media to frame and disseminate its message, “packaging its appeal through carefully chose imagery”, and perpetually seeking favourable media coverage. (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003).
However, when determining the value and importance of ‘spin’ to New Labour, it should not be ignored that other factors exist in the change and conduct of the party across this same frame.
It must be addressed that there are other factors to credit the early achievements of the Blair and the New Labour project. There was more to the New Labour project, in its methods of strengthening the party’s voice, than just ’spin’ and press “control-freakery”. (White and Chernatony, 2002). The structural changes transcended external press communications, but existed deep within the internal management of the Labour party, insofar as achieving more centralised operation. The government’s communications strategy of “command and control” is mirrored in the new highly integrated organisation of the party administration. The aim was to coordinate governmental communications and successfully impose a clear-cut message from the top down. Without this internal organisational reform, achieving the external controls of the New Labour image would have been a near impossible feat, especially in light of the aforementioned history of slander towards the party’s capacity to govern.
Moreover, It is true that many elements help to explain the striking improvement Labour’s press image from 1992 to 1997. Several newspapers had already become disillusioned with the conservative party after the failures of the previous Prime Minister John Major. Even without the underhand tactics, in light of the disasters of the recent conservative governments New Labour’s ideological repositioning made it a more appealing as an party for press outlets and journalists. In addition to this, Blair was seen to be a strong and effective leader and the combination of this bold and forceful leadership in the service of ideological modernisation was graphically demonstrated in Blair’s decision in 1994 to change the “traditional collectivist wording” of Clause Four from the Labour party’s constitution. (Coates and Lawler, 2004). This made the Labour Party as a package less radically left-wing and more attractive, even without ‘spin’ to force this message. It is these fundamentals that In exploring just one congeneric component of the New Labour project, it serves to outline how the inner workings of ‘spin’ and the consequent impacts to the party largely outshine other important developments that were made to further the project. It cannot be negated, however, that ‘spin’ and the ensuing strategies of image management for the Labour Party during this time was a marked phenomena and fundamental to the initial electoral success of the 1990s. But in order to draw a full evaluation, alongside this assessment of how important ‘spin’ seemed to have become, it is unavoidable that the overall outcome of this period of media monopolisation is analysed.
The Successes and Failings of ‘Spin’ for New Labour
In a positive light, academics have argued that “The effectiveness of the new government’s media strategy could not be ignored. As the new administration settled into office, Tony Blair’s popularity ratings rose rather than fell. Campbell’s determination to control and coordinate the presentation of policy announcements paid handsome dividends, and the weeks when the government failed to set the news agenda were few and far between.” (Jones, 1999). It is a fair assessment that Blair was initially exceedingly popular; even gaining the endorsement of the Sun for a short time. This exemplifies a great success of the ‘spin’ strategy and of key figures in its implementation. In addition to this, “the Daily Mail sedulously courted [and] played their part in convincing voters, especially swing voters in marginal constituencies, that Labour had changed.” (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). New Labour were able to garner favour in sects of the national press, among which the most impressive being tabloids in Rupert Murdoch’s News International conglomerate. This more effective media management strategy ensured that “New Labour attacks on Conservative government policy were skilfully prepared for journalists across a whole range of issues and as New Labour’s electoral fortunes improved so did the outcomes of opinion polls” which for the late 1990s, showed them pulling ahead of the Conservatives in an unprecedented manor. (Jones, 1999)
Be that as it may, this success was not long-lasting. The issues of ‘spin’ reached a peak during Labour’s first term. Peter Mandelson’s role is of particular interest here, as press secretaries and new ‘political’, as opposed to ‘special’, advisers began to take a more crucial role. Mandelson had a very in-depth professional knowledge of the media, and used this “intimate knowledge of pressures, rivalries and the motivations of the journalistic milieu for the party’s benefit” from 1992 up until the turn of the century. (Faucher-King and Le Gales, 2010). Mandelson was undoubtedly integral to the fulfilment of New Labour’s news management strategies. However, the obstinacy of his methods was later questioned when the actual “newness” of new labour came under the microscope. Mandelson was seen to merely provide Labour with “a whole new style and facade […] but of course it was a facade.” (Wring, 2005).
This challenges the overall effectiveness of ‘spin’ at conveying the core policy changes of the New Labour project. Yet, Mandelson rejected the idea that “the party was a creation of the spin doctors [and] lack[ed] real substance,” and continued to work to improve Labour’s image. (Wring, 2005). But it was Alastair Campbell and his involvement in the party’s media strategy attracted the most attention. Campbell became Blair’s press spokesman in 1994, having great value to the administration as a former journalist. Questions around his influence however, have also arose, as he was seen to communicate to the media “with the authority of the Prime Minister himself,” even involving himself in Cabinet meetings, getting the “reputation of having more influence in decision-making than policy advisers.” (Osborne, 1999). The status of both men in their involvement in the mainstream media, however, eventually played a part in undermining the New Labour project. Independently, Mandelson and Campbell achieved a great deal, but their relationship was turbulent and this conflict was taken captive by the very publications they aimed to court the favour of. It was clear that “since 1994 the pair have tussled for Mr Blair’s ear”, and their competition came to a head in 1998 after Mandelson was forced to resign over scandal. Blair quickly invited him back into the administration which only served to strengthen the feud between Mandelson and Campbell. (Maguire, 2001). In review of these key players in the ‘spin’ strategy, it is apparent that press control is largely illusionary, when the very politicians tasked with managing this complex relationship could not escape becoming targets of themselves. The competitive cycle in the mainstream media to engage a wider audience makes news coverage of politicians and personalities very attractive. It is the public’s interest in scandal that fuels the journalistic focus on internal political disagreement, and so the imperative for an enticing story is in conflict with the governmental pursuit of positive publicity. By the end of the 1990s, Philip Gould, an original orchestrater of the new labour project described the ‘contamination’ of the brand, as “the object of constant criticism” leading to the feeling that Labour was “undermined by a combination of spin” in addition to an “apparent lack of integrity”. (White and Chernatony, 2002). While unity was perceived as an essential element in the government’s construction and maintenance of its media image, leading New Labour spin doctors were settling inter-personal scores via their favoured journalists in the media. So, despite great successes, the rivalry between Peter Mandelson and Alastair Campbell, and also their individual conduct, can be seen to have undermined the project to a great degree.
However, these judgements of Labour and ‘spin’ seem to forget that it was not a strategy dreamt up by the Labour Party, but has existed in politics since the emergence of the tabloid press in the ‘public sphere’. (Bingham and Conboy, 2015). For this reason, it could be perceived that the disgust towards Labour’s focus on it’s media management could be seen to be too intense. This most notable applies to the Thatcher premiership of the 1980s. Her Chief Press Secretary, Bernard Ingham, bullied and cajoled journalists, using the lobby to promote the Prime Minister personally and, where necessary, brief against ministers who were out of favour. Using the Thatcher premiership as an example, it seems possible, therefore, to build up a picture of the relationship between government and political journalism in Britain largely in terms of governmental dominance and journalistic subordination, and that ‘spin’ was not a Labour invention.
The Lasting Legacy: are Media and Politics in Crisis?
In the past, tactics such as ‘spin’ were “largely the preserve of political parties during the short periods of election campaigns”, whereas now, political communication strategies “appear to infuse every facet of elite political behaviour”. (Wernick, 2012). The Political Association have assessed that in the modern day, when It comes down to it, “winning elections is really a question of salesmanship, little different from marketing any branded article” (J.C.C. Davidson, in Politics Association, 1997). It is one part of the argument, to debate the successes of ‘spin’ contemporary to the Blair administration, however, it must be drawn into any conclusions the lasting impact of the project. Britain has moved into an age of “the permanent campaign”, in which parties constantly fight to dominate the media with their version of events. Recently, academics in Britain have described this phenomena as ‘designer politics’. (Scammell 1995). To return to the retrospective outlook of Tony Blair, “The news schedule is now 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It moves in real time. Papers don’t give you up to date news. That’s already out there […] a vast aspect of our jobs today – outside of the really major decisions, as big as anything else – is coping with the media, its sheer scale, weight and constant hyperactivity.” (Blair, 2007). This cycle has only escalated since the 1990s, when technological advancement and the changing landscape of politics seemed to forge a more hostile political media environment, partly at the hands of New Labour. “Initially, control over every detail of the party’s external communications was justified by the desire to win power in a very hostile media environment,” but spin had serious and damaging consequences “on the relations between political parties and the press.”(Faucher-King and Le Gales, 2010). Scholars have argued the strategies of Labour during this time “fuelled growing disillusionment with the media on the part of the British electorate,” and this ultimately counterintuitive to the aims of the project. (Faucher- King and Le Gales, 2010). This is an idea supported by many press reformists, and academics, succinctly put: “the relationship between the media and politics is certainly in crisis.” (Grayson, 2010). Therefor, this should be seen as a failing of the ‘spin’ strategies in escalating the damage done to this fragile coexistence and codependence of mass media and government. The aim of ‘spin’ was to propel the Labour party’s agenda into the right-wing press and establish a more level playing field in political reporting. It can be argued that this was only achieved for a very short period, and undermined New Labour to such a degree that since 2010, it has been only more difficult for Labour in the media and Labour politicians such as Ed Milliband and Jeremy Corbyn have been put on trial as individuals far more aggressively than even Michael Foot.
To conclude, New Labour’s strategy to try and manipulate the press to their benefit was largely misguided, mismanaged and ultimately damaging to Blair’s administration and the politicians that surrounded the media management project. The relationship between the Party and the press became to hard to control, when so many complex factors are at play. It is clear that “on an individual level, the ultimate aim of any politicians in dealing with the media is to get themselves and their message portrayed in a positive light,” however, the way in which New Labour attempted to stay consistently one step ahead of the tumultuous news cycle was unsustainable. (Grayson, 2010). However, the policy of ‘spin’, albeit largely flawed, can be understood when looking at the circumstance of the Labour Party having spent 18 years in opposition. It was vital to the initial successes of New Labour in modernising and competing with the Conservative party and the broadly right-leaning British press. More than a marketing devise, ‘New Labour’ was and is a political invention, and the platform that ‘spin’ propelled the New Labour on to was hugely important to securing two successive Labour governments in 1997 and then 2007. (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). Yet, it cannot be ignored that “the credibility of all political parties emerges weakened from the new labour project,” and from such heights there was a great fall. (Faucher-King and Le Gales, 2010). ‘Spin’ may have seemed like the only option, but the extent of attempted media control, the individuals responsible and the nature of the press, left the New Labour project undermined and fractured moving forwards.