Why did Leave campaigners want Britain out of the EU? Critically evaluate the ways in which they drew on historical traditions of thought in British foreign policy role to back their claims.
The EU referendum held in June 2016 produced an unexpected result with the Leave campaign winning. The relationship between Europe and Britain has historically always been uneasy and complicated. The Leave campaign focused on illustrating the EU as an outdated and uncontrollable institution whose membership no longer proved beneficial. In order to analyse the ways in which they drew on historical traditions of thought in British foreign policy, it is important to first define what this is. Historical traditions of thought in British foreign policy in this essay are concepts that are widely associated with the past actions, culture and history of British foreign policy. They emerge from a pattern or significant intended actions taken by individuals in the past and as a result have created an image of a country’s aims in foreign policy. This essay will first explain why Leave campaigners wanted Britain out of the EU, and secondly go on to evaluate the use of historical traditions of thought to convey these reasons. The four historical traditions of thought in British foreign policy used in the Leave campaign and will be analysed are Britain as an outsider to Europe, the British prioritising the Commonwealth and the US, Britain being a dominant power in the world and a champion for freedom and democracy. Analysis of the Leave speeches and campaigns will show how the Leave campaign was strategic and utilised historical traditions of thought well to convince the electorate.
The EU referendum was debated by two sides; Remain and Leave. For those campaigning the Leave vote there were two separate campaign teams: Vote Leave, the official campaign, and Leave.EU, founded by UKIP donor Arron Banks. For the purpose of this essay, speeches and actions by both Leave campaigns will be analysed and their motivations for why they campaigned to leave the EU will be based on their campaigns. The key leaders for the Leave side included Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel, Nigel Farage, Lord Howard and many other notable politicians.
The debate on Britain’s membership of the European Union focused on a few significant and substantial areas; immigration, democracy, cost and economy. The most salient issues for voters was immigration (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), with the freedom of movement and the inability to control high level inflows from the EU being the focal point. The Leave campaign consistently stressed that the only way to ‘take back control’ was to leave the EU and this was one of the strong points from the Leave campaign, as statements from the EU and other leaders reiterated this, such as Angela Merkel (Foster, 2015). The Leave campaign argued that the inability to control immigration was putting stress on the country’s infrastructure, but also posed a threat as convicted criminals within the EU could enter Britain freely. The high number of EU migrants entering the UK has caused the UK to have reject smart professionals who could contribute to the country but were not from EU countries according to Vote Leave. Many Leave campaigners also cited the possibility of more nations joining the EU, such as Turkey, as a fundamental problem for the UK. ‘Nearly 2 million people came to the UK from the EU over the last ten years. Imagine what it will be like in future decades when new, poorer countries join.’ Immigration was a crucial factor in deciding how voters voted and proved advantageous to the Leave campaigns.
A recurring reason stated by politicians who decided to join the Leave campaigns was the lack of democracy in EU institutions. Michael Gove in his announcement speech about joining Vote Leave focused heavily on Britain’s history as a democratic nation and the absence of it within the EU, while Nigel Farage campaigned against the evolution of a United State of Europe as well. Several figures, including Lord Howard, pointed to the unaccountable and unelected European Court of Justice and their ability to overrule British legislation as an example of the EU controlling large areas of the legislation. There was also a focus on the large amount of ‘red-tape’ and bureaucracy caused by the EU, for instance Vote Leave argued that ‘only 6% of British businesses export to the EU but 100% suffer the burden of EU red tape’ . The Leave campaign argued that the lack of democracy and unnecessary bureaucracy present within in the EU proved the EU was outdated and only there to serve the elite. Instead, Leave campaigners strongly argued that Britain would prosper out of the EU by making its own laws and not follow EU regulations on items such as bananas, which according to Boris Johnson could not be sold in bunches more than three (Simons, 2016). Regardless of whether the claims were true or not, there was a strong attack on EU regulations and the lack of democracy throughout the campaign.
In relation to the unnecessary bureaucracy and regulations of the EU, the Leave campaign emphasised the cost of EU membership. ‘We send the EU £350 million a week’ became an infamous slogan advertised everywhere, even being printed to the side of a bus, and immediately produced a reaction from the electorate. Essentially, the Leave camp believed that the money being sent by Britain to fund the EU was being wasted and that taxpayers’ money should no longer be sent to the EU, as Britain was sending more money than it was receiving by being a member. They argued that the country was in need of investment in order to cope with the increasing population, caused by uncontrolled immigration, and that the cost of being a member could not be justified.
A further reason why Leave campaigners wanted Britain out of the EU was because the EU’s restrictions on trading with non-EU members through Common External Tariffs (CETs) was damaging the British economy. Campaigners, such as Priti Patel, pointed to EU’s struggling economy and attacked the claim that ‘the EU is ‘good for jobs’ when there is over 20% unemployment in Spain and Greece’ . The Eurozone crises and the imposed austerity on Greece show why Leave campaigners disagreed with the economic argument to staying in the EU. A motivation to leave the EU for Johnson, Gove and Farage was the ability to then trade freely with the Commonwealth and growing economies such as China, India and Brazil. Within the EU all 28 member states have to agree to a free trade deal, but if Britain left, they argued, that we could do it ourselves and make it more beneficial. The ability to dictate Britain’s future and regain influence in the world for Leave campaigners was based on leaving the EU and becoming a trading nation globally once again. The argument was reinforced by asking doubters would other EU member states, such as Germany, refuse to trade with Britain considering the current situation where Britain purchases so many EU exports, such as German cars.
To summarise, there are several main reasons why Leave campaigners wanted Britain out of the EU. The struggling economic situation within the EU coupled with the large cost of membership brought the economic benefits of the EU into question. The democratic deficit in EU institutions, inability to hold decision-makers to account and the loss of power in Westminster is a strong argument to make, as is arguing that being a member of the EU inhibits better relations with non-EU countries in terms of trade and politically. These arguments all featured in the Leave campaigns and played a key role in convincing voters to vote leave. The following section will now focus on the four key historical thoughts of tradition in British foreign policy the Leave campaigners utilised to back some of the arguments discussed above.
British history shows Britain in a powerful light as a result of its imperialistic past, which affected numerous countries and civilisations across the world. More importantly, it also created a sense of responsibility and duty for the world at its peak, and this sense of duty can be argued to still exist today for some. The outsider tradition can be argued to be a consequence of this, as the sense of duty and responsibility is what has often led British foreign policy in many parts of the world, including Europe, in the past, but Britain has also been reserved on how involved she gets. Outsider tradition best defines Britain’s complicated relationship with Europe in terms of involvement (Daddow, 2015). Broadly speaking this tradition has enabled Britain to remain involved in European affairs to an extent. Winston Churchill’s Zurich speech in 1946 best illustrates this, as he advocated the creation of United States of Europe to promote peace and unity, however stated that ‘Great Britain…must be friends and sponsors of the new Europe’ . This essentially encouraged Europe to unite and to expect support from Britain, but labelled Britain more as an observer than participant. Boris Johnson’s speech on May 9th had a feeling of déjà vu when he made the same distinction between the EU not being Europe, as Thatcher did in her Bruges Speech. Thatcher’s Bruges speech can be seen as a symbol of the outsider tradition Britain has held in its relationship with EU. Throughout her speech Thatcher explained the importance of Europe for Britain and the benefits of the EEC, for instance how Britain’s ‘destiny is in Europe, as part of the community’ . However, alongside this Thatcher also explicitly stated that ‘that is not to say that our future lies only in Europe’ which illustrates the outsider status Britain has kept. Referring to himself as ‘a child of Europe’ , Johnson stated his inherent feeling for Europe and the importance of European culture in the history of Britain, which is the same point Thatcher made when attempting to change the direction of the EEC in 1988. Like Thatcher, Johnson spoke on the wrong direction the EU had taken and the unnecessary powers the EU now holds. The entire debate of UK’s membership of the EU and the referendum can be argued to symbolise the continuation of Britain’s status as an outsider to the rest of Europe. The use of this historical tradition of thought enabled the Leave campaign to distance Europe from the minds of the voters by showing how the voters that they are European, but they are British first and followed the patriotic undertone of the campaign.
A key cause of Britain’s awkward relationship and being the ‘outsider’ stems from the historical view towards Europe. The historical tradition of thought that guided British foreign policy prior to Britain to joining the EEC viewed Europe as the last option, after the US and the Commonwealth. This thought was linked to the ‘outsider’ status Britain is associated with as Britain’s historical involvements and commitments to Europe were rarely a priority in comparison to the Commonwealth and the US. During the 1971 referendum, politicians such as MP Jeffrey Thomas argued that Britain should launch ‘an initiative which included North America, EFTA – which the pro-Marketeers seem to forget altogether – and the rest of non-EEC Europe and Japan alone would account for over three-quarters of the industrialized non-Communist world.’ The special relationship with the US and the history of the Empire for some meant that leaning to Europe ‘would imply not a broadening of the UK’s international horizons, but their contraction’ (Ludlow, 2014). This debate between becoming more involved in Europe and risking closing off the rest of world has existed since 1947. During the formation of the European Steel and Coal Community, the Atlee government was worried about weakening the Atlantic Alliance and this is one of the reasons why the UK did not join the ECSC. The Commonwealth would be at risk and would ‘mean the end of a thousand years of history’ argued Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell in 1962 if Britain joined the EEC. The events in between Britain rejecting the ECSC in 1951 to applying for EEC membership in the 1960s show what pushed Britain towards European involvement. In the ten years between the initial rejection of Europe before the change of mind was a period where the Empire and the Commonwealth declined, while the special relationship with the US had diminished due to the initial rejection of the ECSC (Carolan, 2008). British foreign policy had no other real direction to go but to Europe. This tradition of thought has continued and was visible during the Leave campaign. Andrea Leadsom’s speech at Vote Leave HQ justified Britain’s foreign policy to Europe thus far, however argued that the EU had no interest to reform shown by Cameron’s inability to negotiate any. Leadsom’s argument for leaving the EU was that the lack of concession on reforms and refusal to reform, now meant that ‘the UK’s best days lie ahead of us as an independent, free trading, globally competitive nation.’ The European project, from the EEC to the EU, had benefitted the UK until now, and therefore it is time to look elsewhere. Like other Leave campaigners, Leadsom touched on ‘the Commonwealth of 2.2 billion consumers’ which the UK should now focus on instead of only Europe. The key argument for those who believed in internationalism, such as Lord Lawson, argued that by being part of the EU had closed us off to the rest of the world. By leaving the EU, ‘we would become once again a self-governing democracy, with a genuinely global rather than a little European perspective’ but ‘we would continue to trade with the EU’ (Lawson, 2016). This strong belief and confidence in strengthening trade links with the Commonwealth was accompanied with a sense of patriotism and arguably based on the proud history of the British Empire. By reminding the audience of the possibilities open with the Commonwealth, the audience was reminded of Britain’s rich history of being a globally trading nation before the EEC and provided a sense of direction if Britain left the EU, which worked well for the Leave campaign.
Throughout the Leave campaign it was clear that there was an aim to assure and convince the voters that Britain was strong enough to survive if they were to leave the EU. Lord Howard’s address to the CBI is an example of this, as he worked to disprove the negative predictions of the CBI and repeat the facts that Britain is ‘the fifth biggest economy in the world’ and ‘the 4th largest military power in the world’, just as Priti Patel and Boris Johnson stated. The repetition of these facts consistently was meant to convey that the UK was still a dominant power in the world. British foreign policy to Europe, even when in the EU, has always aimed to show the UK as a leader. The British were the ones who saved France from Hitler and at one point dominated half of the world. There is no doubt that there has been a sense of superiority over the Europeans by the British. This can be shown during the formation of European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 where the British refused to join the ECSC because they had not led the initiative and were not willing to cede sovereignty. Philip Thody states that Attlee was not going to let Britain ‘join a group of nations in which we have just saved four of them from the other two’ (Thody, 2002). The Leave campaign chose to portray the UK as a strong, independent nation which could survive without the EU, and this worked well to an extent as it did quell some fears of those on the fence. By arguing that the UK was still a dominant power in the world the Leave campaign was then able to introduce the historical tradition of thought of Britain fighting for its future.
From the offset, the Leave campaign in all of its publications and interactions referred to the UK as Us and the EU as them, creating a right vs wrong battle. The famous ‘Take back control’ slogan evidently suggests that the EU are controlling the UK, and by voting Leave the UK will take back control of its future. This slogan was short, snappy and straight to the point, but also resonated with the public as it was a flashback to the era of grand statesman who stood up against Europe. The idea of Britain fighting for freedom and democracy in the world is a theme which runs across modern British history and is a historical tradition of thought. In Thatcher’s Winston Churchill Memorial speech in 1979, she took a stand against ‘unjust’ situation Britain was in due to the EC budget contribution and eventually won the UK rebate in 1984. This example of the UK standing for what is ‘right’ and winning is what the Leave campaign subtly referred to throughout the campaign. Key to point out the lack of voice and power Britain holds within the EU, by stating how ‘we are outvoted far more than any other country – 72 times in the last 20 years’ , Johnson created an image of Britain being held captive essentially by the European Union and how you vote is a choice between ‘getting dragged ever further into a federal superstate, or taking a stand now’. By finishing on such a dramatic and strong note Johnson consolidated the line between choosing Britain first over the European Union. He drew upon Britain’s historical tradition of thought that the country fights for freedom and stands up to evil by portraying this referendum as ‘a fight for freedom’ and that ‘we will be vindicated by history’ to evoke the same patriotism Churchill did in 1938 when he announced to the House of Commons that Britain will ‘take our stand for freedom as in the olden time’ . Yet in 1938 when Churchill gave his speech, Britain was a global power with a massive empire and could call on the best navy in the world. Even in 1988 when Thatcher spoke in Bruges, Britain was still a global power, although not to the same extent as 1938, showing her strength in Falklands and the Cold War. However, in 2016 Britain was nowhere near as powerful in the world or dominant as it was in 1938 or 1988. Combining the loss of power from Westminster and the inability to hold EU officials accountable, Michael Gove stated that ‘The EU is built to keep power and control with the elites rather than the people’ (Gove, 2016). This sentence is telling considering Gove recounts the establishment of democracy in the UK was ‘secured for us in the past by radicals and liberals who took power from unaccountable elites’. The implication therefore is that this is another chance for Britain to bring back democracy from the EU. Gove further states the importance of Britain for democracy by explaining that ‘we developed, and exported to nations like the US, India, Canada and Australia a system of democratic self-government’ (Gove, 2016). Gove was suggestive of a significant historical tradition of thought in British foreign policy in that Britain has a history of leading the world and is known for its support of democracy. Lord Howard’s speech to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) focused on the democratic deficit within the EU due to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Lord Howard attacked the ECJ’s rulings on UK legislation and actions by the Home Secretary which were deemed inconsistent with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, despite the UK having opted out of the Charter. The purpose of discussing the ECJ was to show how ‘entirely unaccountable’ judges are intervening the measures ‘fully scrutinised and approved by our democratically elected Parliament’. This point plainly showed the audience how an institution of the European Union was undemocratic, and again was against the ‘long and illustrious tradition of democratic self-government’ that the UK holds. Gove and Lord Howard both pointed to the history of democracy and the pointed to the lack of democracy in the EU to imply that Britain’s membership of such an institution goes against British history and its role for implementing democracy across the world. By calling on historical tradition of thought on Britain’s role in the world and evoking the same sense of patriotism Churchill and Thatcher did, the Leave campaign was able to strongly argue that the principles and values shown in British history meant that voting leave was the main option to keep it in tact.
To conclude, the Leave campaigners emerged successful from the EU referendum to the surprise of many. However, unlike the Remain campaign, the Leave campaigns were strategic and coherent in its opposition to the EU. Throughout the campaign the key issues such as the economy, immigration, cost of membership and the failures of the EU were well publicised, however the use of historical tradition of thought in British foreign policy to back up and emphasise their reasons was critical to its success. While in many ways it was a poorly executed campaign, damaged by the fabrication of facts, the constant patriotic undertone to each speech and interaction with the electorate played well. The reminders of the past achievements of Britain and its history proved genius, particularly to voters who were old enough to remember Britain before 1971. The specific historical traditions of thought in British foreign policy found within the Leave campaign showed the voters that Britain was better off out of the EU. The historical traditions presented a strong Britain as an outsider to the EU, an institution which challenges British democracy and freedom, and that there was a better alternative in the Commonwealth and the rest of the world, where Britain has a history of prospering.
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