A state is a political organisation that has evolved and been shaped by various revolutions and events such as wars in the history of mankind. This has resulted in the changes in ideas of the state and state form, making the state seem malleable. However, the state did not always exist and there were different forms of political organisations in the past whose characteristics differ greatly from what we understand now as the current state. This makes defining the state difficult. In this essay, we discuss Weber’s (1978: 54) definition of a state, a common starting point in studying the contemporary state. From the quote above, we see that he argues that the state is a mandatory political organisation that has permanence of operations and should be seen in terms of means rather than in terms of its ends, governed by force. Secondly, he defines the state to have total territorial control using coercive force to enforce order through physical means and these ways are valid (Weber 1978: 54). Through this, he explains the elements and structures pertaining to the state which affects the distribution of power in society which creates the struggle for the power to rule and to make the rules by which others live. However, modern academics such as Mann (1984) and Hall and Ikenberry (1989) have critiqued Weber’s definition of the state. Firstly, they argue that states can also be defined by their functions and secondly, unlike Weber who focuses on the importance of physical force, Mann (1984) and Hall and Ikenberry (1989) argue that military power is insufficient and ideological power is just as important. Despite these differences, I believe that there are both strengths and weaknesses of Weber’s definition of the state and his insistence on defining it in terms of means rather than ends.
I will first look at Weber’s argument of the state as having total territorial control to using coercive force to enforce order through physical means as valid ways to understand the state in terms of its means (Weber 1978: 54). While other groups apart from political groups can also use physical force as a legitimate method of enforcement (Weber 1978: 54), Weber argues that these groups omit the necessary condition of using such methods to control a particular territory unlike political organisations (Weber 1978: 55). In addition, within his definition of the state being a political organisation, Weber also defines the state as a ruling organisation where those being ruled are dominated for the greater good according to the long standing commands (Weber 1978: 53). This domination, he adds, is the odds that when an order is prescribed to a group, the group will be compliant without resistance. This is largely due to the discipline instilled in them which gradually becomes a habit, resulting in them being uncritical and unresisting, contributing by allowing a sort of continuity of operation (Weber 1978: 53). This sort of ruling is known as the legal authority where there is mass obedience (Weber 1978: 218). As such, Weber argues that the state controls through violence with its main instruments, the public police and military which allows them to control violence and attain mass obedience. Hence, similar to what Runciman (2014: 12) explains, the common consensus of the people regarding the control of violence through legitimate violence which eliminates random violence, knowing that the state will intervene when it occurs. The state thus acts as a form of deterrence and domination, using its monopoly over violence as a means of control. As such, the state does not rule through force alone but domination and control through and of violence. The state thus uses force as an instrument to achieve other goals it wishes to pursue.
Moving on, Weber also explains that the state cannot be defined by its ends because different states have different end goals in which it wants to reach (Weber 1978: 55). This is because there are many possibilities in which a political association may choose as the ultimate end but out of all these possibilities, no one unique end goal has been agreed upon among the different political associations (Weber 1978: 55). Some states may hope to reach the goal of economic development while others may define the state as an end to reach their goal of attaining political power. The latter may be because the purpose of politics is to preserve and increase power through the capacity to control other’s behaviour and even the most brutal means to achieve this political power would be acceptable (Sabine 1973: 338). Hence, due to the differences in goals, it seems to make more sense to define the state in terms of its means, which was established earlier as force. Force will thus be a crucial part in defining the state as it will be a common trait among political organisations unlike the possibility of having various end goals (Weber 1978: 55).
As states transformed, modern variations of the definition of the state differed from Weber’s. For Mann (1984), he borrowed the Weberian definition of the state and reformulated it, expanding on the institutionalist and functional definition of the state. Having the ‘functional’ element already suggests what the state has to do to achieve its ends. He continues by breaking down the definition of the state into four parts some of which mentioned by Weber. Firstly, it is having various organisations with individuals trained with particular skill sets and knowledge for each unique organisation. This point suggests the multiple functions a state may have. Secondly, centrality implies a specific group of people who makes rules for those who obey which he agrees with Weber that it is over a specific territory. Lastly, it is having a sort of continuity over complete control over rule-making (Mann 1984: 188). These functions of the state come about during the rule-making stage which allows the sovereign to create rules to pursue its ends. In addition, the functionality of the state comes from the entrenchment of routines carried out in his first definition which will make these acts become more predictable and form a sort of permanence. Hence, each of these elements thus serve a function and contributes to the ability of the state to pursue its objectives.
Mann (1984) also elaborates on two types of state power to understand how different states may rule. One would be despotic power and the other, infrastructural power. Despotic power is defined as the ability of the state elite to act without the negotiation of the people. This power thus has the capacity to inflict damage and kill with a lack of obligation to the people and lack of checks and balances. Infrastructural power on the other hand is the capacity of the state to penetrate society to make rules, occurring in consultation with the population (Mann 1984: 188). The presence of these institutional elements which arises from an organisation allows for a degree of permanence and predictability in social life which arises from the established procedures. However, there is a relationship between these two powers because while infrastructural power allows the organisation of activities, the greater amount of this power would increase the volume of binding rule-making which results in the higher likelihood of despotic power being exercised on those who deviate (Mann 1984: 190). Hence, the use of despotic power in the end to re-establish the existing order suggests that the state has the means to use brutal means to achieve their goals (ends justify the means) similar to Machiavelli (Sabine 1973: 338). Mann (1984) thus argues that states can be defined in terms of its ends as there are common goals to achieve, unlike Weber’s argument. In addition, besides arguing that the state can be defined by its ends as well, Mann also further improves on the Weber’s definition of the states as its means in suggesting that infrastructural power also ensures the force used by the state can be maintained and continued.
Moving on, Hall and Ikenberry (1989) also reintroduces the Weberian definition of the state by probing deeper. While they believe that Mann’s (1984) reformulated definition of the state is quite crucial and powerful analytically, they believe that some of the components suggested by Mann can be underlined differently as this does not portray the whole story. Hall and Ikenberry (1989) thus present three elements similar to that of Mann’s however, they stress different aspects regarding the definition of the state. Their definition of the state also includes both institutional and functional elements. Firstly, among the different institutions that make up the state, they believe that the most important institution is the military as it wields coercive power, brute force and control, a necessary condition for territorial and administrative centrality. They believe that without military power, administrative power can always be challenged, similar to Weber’s idea of the state having monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. However, while it is a necessary condition, they argue that military control is insufficient and must be coupled with bureaucracy and sets of institutions that participate in administrative tasks which have the ability to rule in the internal and external dimensions of a centralised area. Furthermore, Mann’s (1984) Weberian definition insists on the monopoly over rule-making and over coercive power. Hall and Ikenberry (1989) argue that military power and administrative centrality are not sufficient in ensuring monopoly over ruling. Instead, having a shared political culture is a necessary condition which acts like a shared language for the people to attain consensus. This can then increase the probability of obedience required to attain monopoly over legitimate and binding rule-making which people often take for granted. Hence, Hall and Ikenberry (1989) further expand on Weber’s definition of the state in terms of its means, arguing that ideological power is just as important as physical power. In addition, they focus largely on internal relations and made a clear distinction between organisational and functional definitions of the state – the centrality of state and rule-making respectively, unlike Weber who defines the state only by its means.
Hall and Ikenberry (1989) supports Weber’s argument that the state should be defined by its means by examining three classical approaches to understanding the state – liberalism, Marxism and realism. Their arguments are centered to the state as being able to affect internal relations within society and as a social actor with international community. Unfortunately, in light of the essay length, I will elaborate only on one approach, the Marxist approach which analyses state-society relations through class. It thus examines the power struggle and power distribution in society from a structural, relational and historical point of view. It presents the state as an institution being structured by mode of production, mode of accumulation and class structure in society. In such states, there was an uneven distribution of power where those who owned the means of production were more powerful than those without, resulting in their need to labour for owners. The state in this case is not a neutral force acting in the interest of the people but instead, follows the interests of the dominant class who are owners of production, also known as the bourgeoise. As such, we see how states have different end goals depending on the dominating group and it can be seen from liberalism where the goal is attain more rights and freedom to achieve diverse viewpoints in society or realism where the state attains power so as to achieve national interests. In the latter case, these interests can both be in the form of larger economic or geopolitical goals. There are also other approaches to understanding the state however, these three examples show clearly and reinforces that states do not have a common end goal. Hence, suggesting the state cannot be defined by its ends but instead through its means to reach their preferred ends.
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