Criticisms and limitations of the securitization framework
The securitization theory of the Copenhagen School with its framework and objectivity on security threats has generated much academic interest and sparked a number of critiques and debates. Even though the theory\’s main concept, i.e. security and threats as social constructions and not factual realities, seems to have gotten a widespread of agreement in the field of security studies, however several elements of the theory\’s framework is deemed problematic and narrow by many critics in the field. Some of these criticisms are concern about the absence within the analytical framework of the theory of a normative conceptualization of securitization and desecuritization. To others, while the answer of the Copenhagen School to what is securitization is satisfying and acceptable, what poses a contention with and around the theory seems to be as a result of the incomplete and narrow answer to the question of how and by whom the securitization processes come to be established through the speech act,62 considered in its definition and construction as having its focus only on the speech act of dominant actors. Powerful actors who often have particular interest and benefit from politics of “we and them”, fear and unease. This, to the critics, excludes the participation of parties whose involvement in the securitization process is inevitable for a successful and a clear construction and definition of what security has to be, and the threats which can be considered as existential to the society.63 These criticisms forwarded against the securitization theory are from different scholars, mainly of the spectrum of critical security studies.
Three aspects of the criticisms from these different scholars64 can be considered to be of a significant limitation to the securitization theory in its ability to effectively deal with the present security issues, especially in dealing with difficult and risky related phenomena such as immigration-terrorism and security. Firstly, the framework of the concept of securitization is based on an existential threat-security logic, defined solely in opposition to security threats, in terms of from what and from whom. As McDonald points out, the nature of the act of securitization in designating that which is in need of preservation or protection from that which does not keeps the theory narrow, indefinite and less effective in successfully producing a securitization process.65 While its obvious from the writings of the scholars of the Copenhagen School that not every issue can be securitize and not any threat constitutes an existential threat, nevertheless, the structure of the theory\’s framework suggests how easily a referent object can be tagged as “under attack” by an actor, with a minimum of empirical factors and situations to which the actor can make reference in other to win the approval of the relevant audience, legitimating the means used to contrast the threat, thus, strengthening the socio-political image of the actor.66
As Huysmans puts it: “like a promise is an effect of language, that is, of successful making the promise, a security problem results from successfully speaking or writing security. It is the utterance of “security” which politically introduces security questions in a publicly contested policy area. Thus, if successfully performed the speech act makes a security problem”.67
This shows why defining a menace or labeling something a security threat is a political act, of which any actor is accountable and responsible.68 Nevertheless, since not any menace commanded by the objective features of what can be called a “threat” constitutes a threat in reality, and not all claims of security threats can be accepted by the relevant audience, the securitization process can also take a different turn. In defining security solely in opposition to a threat, the question that arises is, under what level of empirical situations can something be considered a threat to a referent object? Is it only when the referent objects existence is threatened? As stated earlier, the nature of the framework, as structured on the security-survival logic and extended beyond the military security to as well as environmental, economic, societal and political security, poses some difficulties to better understand when a threat constitutes a menace for the survival of a referent object, especially in relation to issues like immigration, socio-cultural conflict and unrest where in reality the level of the menace is not “existential”. The existential threat-security logic can also be related the drive of Israel for opacity in terms of nuclear policy related to the claims of living under existential threats could be perfectly understood, supported by a large consensus, during the period when there was no doubt that Israel was facing a concrete threat to its very survival. But, as Shalom asserts, the recent reality of geopolitical transformations makes it doubtful whether a broad agreement exist today on what exactly constitutes an existential threat to Israel. Does the use of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East always constitutes an existential threat or only if its accompanied by intolerable actions and casualties? And at what threshold does casualties constitutes an existential threat? Or they become one just because a securitizing actor, been a political leader, a bureaucrat, a government, a lobbyist or a pressure group, declared that a referent object is existentially threatened, and therefore receiving the relevant audience\’s acceptance?69 The risk therefore is that, by trying to overstretch the definition of security adopting a multi-sectorial approach, everything and nothing in particular ends up becoming a security problem.70 The question also of whether such broadening of the concept of security, to an extent, will not put at risk the very coherence of the concept is crucial, though the Copenhagen School has also contributed to the development of new conceptual tool that match the concept of security through the model of securitization and desecuritization, enhancing the possibility for a systemic, comparative and a coherent analysis of the concept of security.71
As examined by Šulović, “Sometimes it is more effective if security is conceptualized in terms of normative goals that should be achieved or expression of the core values that are in need of being protected, than if it is articulated only in terms of from what and from whom it needs protection. Thus, seeing security as something negative per se does not represent a logical imperative anymore”.72 The structure thus limits the theory to only applying extra political rules in dealing with existential threats without also considering the need for normative preventive policies. In the context of a state been under continues existential menace would mean that the state would have to establish some emergency alert and extraordinary political measures.
The second element of the theory that constitutes a significant unclarity and limitation is the notion of relevant audience, and its role. In the securitization process the establishment of consensus through the acceptance of the speech by a relevant audience, been public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, constitutes an essential stage for the success of the securitization process. It\’s only then that measures outside the ordinary political standards can be imposed. Though the intention here is not to give an exhaustive sociological exposition of the theories on audiences, some questions are inescapable. Who are the audience? Is it in terms of all who hear the speech act or an elite? Does the audience always determine the success of a securitizing move, and does contextual factors, the facilitating conditions, as termed by the Copenhagen School, also make some moves more likely to be accepted by the audience, even when the answers to who or what is the existential threat, and how to deal with it are not clear and are in contrast with fundamental principles and rights?73 To many critics these questions and their answers highlight how narrow the securitization theory is framed. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that generally audiences are active participants, not easily influenced, able to filter and interpret political messages to fit their existing ideological and political stances. The theory also gives a set of conditions for a successful speech-act, grouped in two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical, which is to follow the rules of the act, with accepted conventional procedures, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures. (2) The external, contextual and social condition. This has to do with the position from which the act can be made, and the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure.74 The basic problem with the concept of audience as an essential element of a successful securitization process is with the reality of divers political systems, societies and the continues technological transformations. In a democratic system, governments and political elites have the advantage of been the legitimate representative of the people in influencing the audience to accept the claims of the need for extraordinary measures in other to deal with an existential threat.75 The audience also has the advantage of rejecting a speech act and the clam of something posing an existential threat. On the contrary, the role, the rights and the advantages of the audience to decide the success of a securitization process maybe at risk, or, worse still, may not exist in different social and political contexts. In Authoritarian and under developed political and social settings, elites are able to exert a significant control on the content and the dissemination of their messages, manipulating them into the public domain without any open negotiation and an active participation of the audience.76 In many cases, the audience excludes the wider population and consists solely of the political and economical elites and state institutions. A securitization process, however, maybe successful even if the wider population is against the speech act, as long as the restricted elite has approved of it. The abuse and the politicization of facilitating conditions for personal and political interests in these contexts are inevitable. This makes the assumed relevant audience of the securitization theory a problematic issue, considering the fact that even in a single securitization process there can be different relevant audiences.77 The application of the securitization theory outside Europe and in non-liberal democratic political and social systems remains therefore ambiguous.78
Finally, the nature of the act of constructing security, concentrated solely on speech act, is another element of the securitization theory which has attracted much criticism.79
The nature of the securitization process which predisposes the discursive intervention of an institutionally legitimate figure poses the danger of the “commercialization” of the speech act through the manipulation of favorable events to win support and acceptance. The securitizing actor\’s speech act can tap into deeply sedimented social perspectives, also making use of images.80
However, according to McDonald, the narrowly conceived nature of the process of securitization, with excessive focus on speech act excludes other types of practices which also can lead to the understanding of the formation of security. In a world marked by technological developments with high propensity to alternative political and social communications, technical devices and security information systems, images conveyed through the media play an important role in the process of security narrative construction, thus, the theoretical frame by the Copenhagen School cannot be reduced to a linguistic rhetoric.81 With securitization being a performative act and also a social construction, Williams believes that it also relies on other institutional, contextual and symbolic resources, and therefore language is not the only of the aspect responsible for the construction and representation of the social reality of security. He argues that “locating the speech act within a broader commitment to processes of discursive legitimation and practical ethics of dialogue allows the most radical and disturbing elements of securitization theory emerging from Schmittian legacy to be offset”,82 and therefore insulated from many of the most common criticisms. Nevertheless, the question of whether a theory so closely tied to speech for its explanatory and ethical position is capable of addressing the dynamics of security, considering the increasingly influence of image through daily televisual communication on political and communicative actions.83 The limitations of the securitization theory, solely focused on speech act, is that it loses site of the streams of security narratives, representation and conduct of security relations of which modern media is responsible, demonstrated daily around the world through different events. “From the Gulf War to Bosnia and Kosovo, to the events of September 11 and their aftermath”,84 not to mention the recent Syrian war crisis escalated into a refugee and immigration phenomenon. “In this environment, speech-acts are inextricable from the image-dominated context in which they take place and through which meaning is communicated”.85 Thus, “ignoring visual imagery leads to less and less satisfactory work”.86
In defense of the Copenhagen School, Taureck argues that “…much if this criticism voiced against the securitization theory is actually a result of something that was never intended to be part of the realm of the theory”,87 and therefore they focus on goals it was not meant to address, leading to serious misinterpretations of the theory. For her many of these criticisms are merely based on the absence of ethical and moral goals, which precludes in seen the securitization theory as a theoretical tool which facilitates the actors analysis, rather, its seen as a political method from the point of view of the securitizing actor. To her the scholars of the securitization theory and their critics are in practice talking about two different things, “securitization the theory” and “securitization the normative practice”. 88
The next subsection further reviews and analyzes the issue related to the question of how and by whom the securitization process is established, looking at the role of social norms and cultural identity in securitization process, which seem to have been giving less importance by the scholars of the Copenhagen School, or perhaps “…something that was never intended to be part of the realm of the theory”.89 The concept of security and threat, intended as socially constructed, play an important role in the multiethnic and multicultural identity of contemporary societies, mainly in Europe. In the reality of this context, it\’s understandable that social norms and cultural identities, together with other facilitating conditions, greatly influence the success of a securitization process, able to determine the construction of what security is, what poses an existential threat to a particular society (based on the perception of what constitutes a threat), who the securitizing actor can be or cannot be, regardless of the actor\’s social position,90 and which kind of circumstances or facilitating conditions easily make the referent object-existential threat relation acceptable and successful.91
1.3 The role of social norms and cultural identity in securitization process
The tension between the understanding of securitization as a productive process with the focus on the per-formative power of the speech act, and securitization as an inter-subjective constituted process of construction has giving rise to the so called Second generation of securitization analysts, who argue that proper understanding of securitization is inevitably tied to the level of consideration given to the historic and cultural context in which security discourses take place. Thus, the very meaning of security is contextual.92 With the transformations induced by globalization and the new information and communication technologies, the gap between different contexts, such as local cultural identity and global contexts, is becoming smaller, with spread and uniform systems of symbols, norms and ideologies, lifestyles and stereotypes. Nevertheless, social norms and local cultural identities preserve their uniqueness. This makes social norm and cultural identities, as related concepts, useful when dealing with social constructions, particularly with security issues. To the constructivist perspective, however, these concepts exist only as social constructs in people\’s minds because people tacitly agree to act as if something existed, but don\’t really exist in hardened, material reality. Identities are defined as the ways that individuals label themselves. Cultures are the ways people classify, codify and communicate their experiences, while social norms (or simply norms) are the rules socially enforced, whether written or unwritten. Norms are also seen as system of meanings, or statements which judge, regulate or describe the behavior of a person with a certain identity. Able also to give permission, proscribe, prescribe and discourage, defining what identities exist and what kind of actions are expected in other to validate them.93
As some observers do also suppose in the context of institutional analysis, the distinction between institutional environment of actors and social groups, and their institutional arrangements also highlights how actors of powerful social factions can influence and manipulate social norms in their favor, taking advantage of the human instinct of easily been able to conform to the behavior of people with high status. However, as argued by methodological individualists, social norms also emerge from the purposive interactions of a group\’s individual members, rather than from an informal collective decision by the group.94
What makes the analysis on the role of social norms and cultural identity in securitization processes, especially in Europe, is the nature of European societies. The identity mélange, made up of different cultural identities, seemingly homogenous and well integrated with each other, but which suggests a problematic social coexistence between autochthonous citizens and new arrivals. As the proportion of non-nationals in the population of Member States develops, and with the prospect of further increases, co-ordinated and sustained efforts to ensure the social integration of migrants are more than ever seen as necessary. The European union has been doing a lot through different funds, in order to help EU Member States to improve their ability to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate all integration strategies, policies and measures in respect of nationals of third countries, and also in terms of exchange of information and good practices and cooperation that will allow third country nationals who arrive legally in Europe to fulfill the conditions of residence and to facilitate their integration into host societies. Within the framework of common integration policy development presented by the European Commission in 2001, however, Member States remain responsible for a number of significant issues, particularly with respect to the admission of economic migrants and for developing and implementing integration policies.
In the view of the European Commission it is not possible to develop an integrated approach to immigrants without considering the impact of migration policies on the recipient society and on migrants themselves. The social conditions which migrants face, the attitudes of the host population and the presentation by political leaders of the benefits of diversity and of pluralistic societies are all seen as vital to the success of immigration and integration policies. The development of appropriate integration strategies is therefore the responsibility of Member States, with authorities and other actors at the local and municipal level having a very important role to play, with the adoption of an open method of co-ordination alongside appropriate integration policies.95 Integration, nevertheless, also means selection, which depends on the key norms used in codifying and shaping the society,96 of which the minority identities inevitably become victims. “The claim that the concept of societal security errs in assuming that “society” simply has an “identity” risks missing the radicality of the Copenhagen School\’s understanding of security. Within the specific term of security as a speech act (existential threat, authoritative decision) it is precisely under the conditions of an attempted securitizations that a reified, monolithic form of identity is declared. It\’s when identities are securitized that their negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied or suppressed”.97 The work of Keohane and Nye throws more light on the fact that the desire for integration are more often trigged by a security crises and trivial conflicts than the quest for more culture and identity.98 Its therefore inescapable that a securitization process involving issues of cultural identity, immigration, terrorism ecc., in Europe are likely to take different forms, conditioned by the audience\’s biased judgment, based on social norms, the identity of the predominant group, and the identities involved in the securitization process.
The question is how an audience, members a group with a common identity and shared social norms, decide that something is threatening their existence, and therefore the speech act that presented the issue has to be approved? This question seems to have received less attention from the Copenhagen School. Mechanisms of evaluation of whether the audience\’s choice of acceptance and approval of a speech act constitutes a rational move or perhaps based on fear and influenced by social norms and the identity, both of the referent object and/or the securitizing actor are therefore needed to analyze securitization processes in complex contexts as the European society. As McAdams supposes, if an audience conceivably could confer esteem or approval in infinite quantity to a speech act, just by the influence of the actor\’s social position and other facilitating conditions, this would make it valueless and costless, thus, an indication that a securitization process is never successful, as a successful process is defined and intended by the Copenhagen school. This means that the Copenhagen school has to include a better conception of how members of an audience budget the giving out of their acceptance and approval of a speech act in a securitization process.
The studies of social Psychology contribute to the understanding of how people normally assess the truthfulness or correctness of something by processes of social comparison and attribution, these processes are however subject to error and bias. The integrated threat theory, developed by Walter Stephan, is particularly significant in explaining the variables that can influence such actions by audiences.99 According to the original version of the intergroup threat theory, labeled as integrated threat theory, four types of threats, as variables, trigger different in-group reactions.100
The four threats can be diagram as shown below:
Table 1. The integrated threat model of Stephan, Stephan and Gudykunst, 1999.
The diagram above shows the original version of Stephan\’s integrated threats theory where the four threats are constructed by intergroup knowledge, perception and contact, which leads the behavior and actions of the group, and consequently to the possible securitization of the threat by an actor. However, in the revised version of the theory, the number of threats have been reduced to only two basic types of threats, realistic threats and symbolic threats.101 Negative stereotyping and intergroup anxiety threats are considered to be a subtype and causes of other threats, helping in identifying and predicting both realistic and symbolic threats. Realistic threats are considered as threats to the welfare, power, and resources of a group according to knowledgeable assessment of security needs. Symbolic threats are threats to a group\’s religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview. Realistic threats are perceived as any action from an “outsider” against the group which causes pain, torture, or death, as well as economic loss, deprivation of valued resources, and threats to health or personal security. Symbolic threats however, have to deal with attacks on the identity of the group, loss of face or honor and the undermining of an individual\’s self-identity or self-esteem.102
This approach opens up new and wider variety of threats, a broader vistas for ways of seeing things, and ways to better understand the concept of securitization, especially new types of fear-driven and anxiety-laden threats, and how they become securitized even though they don\’t constitute real security existential threats. The integrated threat theory is much concerned with how threats are perceived by audiences or groups,103 and how the facilitating conditions involved influence this perception. Perceived threats are therefore considered as having real consequences, thus, it doesn\’t matter whether the threat is real or not, what makes the different is what the audience perceive. The integrated threat theory contributes to the understanding of the securitization of issues based on the feelings and perceptions of an audience, in a particular cultural and historic context, on an eminent existential threat, inducing a process whereby actors compete, fairly or unfairly, good or bad, for the right to declare and legitimize it as one. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of this broadening is the danger of casting negativity over any attempts at generalizing, and seeing cultural conflicts where identity differences and integration are the pattern.
From a theoretical view point, these analyses may constitutes mere moral and ethical criticisms, and therefore of no relevance to securitization theory,104 however, giving these concepts the deserved relevance in securitization studies, taking into consideration norms, historic and cultural contexts, would create a room for a wider applicability of the securitization theory.
References
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2 Janet Adamski, Mary Troy Johnson, Christina M. Schweiss, Old Europe, new security: evolution for a complex world (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, c2006), p. 32.
3 David A. Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War\’, World Politics, vol.48, no.1, October 1995, p.134.
4 The State, as an equivalent to an organized political community or human community as intended also by Max Weber\’s Politics as avocation (1946, p.78).
5 Baldwin, David A. “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War\’, World Politics, vol.48, no.1, October 1995, p.122-124.
6 Booth, K. Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
7 Baldwin, David A. “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War\’, p.118.
8 Ibid.
9 William T.R. Fox, “Civil-Military Relations Research: The SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey\’, vol.6, no.2, January 1954, p.279.
10 Baldwin, Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, p.118.
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12 Baldwin, Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, p.118.
13 Wolfers, A. “”national Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol”. Political Science Quarterly 67.4, 1952, p. 484.
14 It can be argued, however, that the so called old fashioned security model or the realist approach, though it was greatly challenged after the cold war, with the arising of new concepts, it has always been the core frame of the concept of security, even in the contemporary international political system. See Mearsheimer, John J.. “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy,” in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, eds., Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 23-33; Hough, P., Malik, S., Moran, A., Pilbeam, B. International Security Studies: Theory and Practice. Routledge, 2015; p.19.
15 Walter Lippmann, U. S foreign policy (Boston, 1943), p.51 in Wolfers, p. 484.
16 Morgenthau, paraphrased, but mostly 1972:32.
17 The term “national interest” or the interests of a state seems to be a broader way of defining what the people of a state consider as core vital values. Paradoxically, not always does the “interests of the state” coincide with that of the people. The state is sometimes accused of having at heart only the interests of the elite or merely political interest, with little or without the people benefiting from it. This makes it difficult to understand when and how some “core values and interest” of a state, for example, security and maximizing of power, can be considered also as of the people, i.e. national interests. As Wæver puts it: “Treating some as a security issue is always a matter of political choice”. In this aspect the securitization theory seems to provide much tools for analysis, on whether what the elite considers as a ” Threat” to certain ” core values or national interests” are likewise to the people. Wæver, Ole. “The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders”. In Morten Kelstrup and Williams eds. International Relations Theory and the Politics of European integration: Power, Security and Community. London: Routledge, 2000, p.251. Also see Taureck, Rita. “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies.” Journal of International Relations and Development 9.1 (2006): 53-61. Palgrave Macmillan Journals.
18 Walt, S. (1991). “The renaissance of security studies.” International Studies, Quarterly 35(1):211-239.
19 Wolfers, A., National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol, p.482-485.
20 Ibid.
21 Baldwin, Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, p.126.
22 Šulović, Vladimir. “Meaning of security and theory of securitization.” 2010, p.1.
23 Ibid.
24 Taikeff, Stanley, Metamorphosis (MAXNotes Literature Guides). Research & Education Association, 2015; Nabokov, Vladimir, “Frank Kafka: The Metamorphosis,” in Vladimir Nabokov\’s Lectures on Literature, ed. Fredson Bowers (New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, 251-283.
25 Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 4, 2003, pp. 515-521.
26 Ibid.
27 Mearsheimer, John J.. “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy”, p. 30.
28 Baldwin, D., (1997) “The Concept of Security”, in Review of International Studies, No.23, pp. 5-26.
29 Buzan, People, States, pp. 16, 374; and \’Peace, Power\’, p. 125.
30 Wolfers. National security p. 491-2.
31 Ibid.
32 Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, p.10.
33 Wastl-Walter, D. (eds.): The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies. Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2012, p.255.
34 Booth, K. Theory of World Security, p. 53.
35 Baldwin, D., (1997) “The Concept of Security”, in Review of International Studies, No.23, 5-26; Medina, R.M., Hepner, G.F. The Geography of International Terrorism: An Introduction to Spaces and Places of Violent Non-State Groups, CRC Press, 2013.
36 Burke, Anthony. 2002. Aporias of Security. Alternatives, 27:1, 1-27.
37 It\’s undeniable that states or some states still pose military security threats, however, when talking about contemporary security threats the understanding of the nature of threats and their targets have been broadened, making citizens and their social life the prime aim of attacks, different from how its intended by the realist approach. The social life of citizens now constitutes the core source of (In)security actions. Unlike military threats, mainly to weaken the political and the military structure of a state, the recent security threats are tactically planed in such a way to kill as many citizens it can in other to intimidate the state and spread fear. Ulrich Beck, \’Living in the world risk Society\’, Economy and society 35:3 (2006), 329-45, 330; Ulrich Beck, \’The terrorist threat: the world risk society revisited\’, Theory Culture and Society 19:4(199), 50.
38 Šulović, Vladimir. “Meaning of security and theory of securitization.” Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2010; Williams, words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 4, 2003, pp. 511-512.
39 Wæver, Ole. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In On Security, edited by R. Lipschutz, pp. 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
40 Baldwin, D., (1997) “The Concept of Security”, in Review of International Studies, No.23, pp. 5-26.
41 Barry Buzan , Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 1998, p.21.
42 In Šulović, Vladimir. “Meaning of security and theory of securitization.” P.3.
43 Ibid., p.55
44 Wæver, Ole , “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New School in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery”, Montreal: ISA Conference, March 2004, p. 13.
45 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 1998.
46 In Šulović, Vladimir. “Meaning of security and theory of securitization.” Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2010.
47 Wendt, Alexander (1992). “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics.” International Organization 46: 391-425.
48 Ibid. p.405.
49 Jeff Coulter, “Remarks on the Conceptualization of Social Structure,” Philosophy of the
Social Sciences 12 (March 1982), pp. 42-43., In Wendt, Alexander (1992)., p.406.
50 McDonald, Matt. Securitization and the construction of security. European Journal of International Relations, Vol.14 (No.4). 2008, pp. 26-27.
51 Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics, p. 511.
52 Ibid. p.513. ; Mearsheimer, John J.. “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy,” in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, eds., Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 23-33.
53 Williams C. Michael, 2003, p.511.
54 Emmers, Ralf, the securitization of transnational crime in ASEAN, The Pacific Review. Vol. 16, Iss. 3, 2003.
This work also throws more light on the false cause and effect relation analyses made by many between crime in many states of the European Union and immigration. Little is the evidence on the fact that the increase of immigrants also increases the rate of crime, drug trafficking and robbery. See Rob Hanser, Immigration and Crime in Europe Crime and Justice International Volume: 18 Issue: 62, 2002, p.7-8-25; Nunziata, L., Immigration and Crime: New Empirical Evidence from European Victimization Data. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8632, 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529341.
55 Fox, Jonathan; Akbaba, Yasemin, Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western Democracies, 1990-2008. Comparative European Politics, 13, 2015, PP.175-197.
56 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. New York: Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 491.
57 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 1998, p.27.
58 Wæver, Ole, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New School in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery”, p.13.
59 In Taureck, Rita. “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies.” p.53-61.
60 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, p.29.
61 Ibid.
62Matt McDonald. Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal of International Relations, v.14, n.4, 2008, p.563-587. Available at: <<http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/14/4/563.full.pdf+html>>; Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, v.27, 2002. Available in: <<http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5002461855>>; Also Diez, Thomas and Atsuko Higashino (2004) \'(De) Securitisation, Politicization and European Union Enlargement\’, Coventry: University of Warwick, paper presented at the BISA 29th Annual Conference, 20-22 December.
63 Ibid.
64See Šulović, Vladimir. “Meaning of security and theory of securitization.” 2010; Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, v.27, 2002. Available in: <<http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5002461855>>; and also Matt McDonald. Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal of International Relations, v.14, n.4, 2008.
65 Matt McDonald. Securitization and the Construction of Security, 2008.
66 Buzan et al, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 1998.
67Huysmans, Jef (1999) \’Language and the Mobilization of Security Expectations: The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security\’, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Mannheim, 26-31 March.
68 In talking about the responsibility and accountability of defining security and threats, it has to be outline that is not intended from the point of view who writes about security, i.e. the analyst, as many critics assume, based on the idea that in writing and speaking about security the analyst helps constitute a political reality, and therefore never neutral. An in-depth responds to this criticism is giving by Taureck in “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies”, 2006.
69 Shalom, Zaki. Israel\’s Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy Between Dimona and Washington. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2005, p. 174-178.
70 Collins, Alan. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007, p. 132-137; Taureck, Rita. Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies, 2006, p.55.
71 Ibid.
72 Šulović, Vladimir. “Meaning of security and theory of securitization.” 2010, p.5.
73 Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics, 2003.
74 Buzan et al., 1998, p.32.
75 Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies, 2003, p.525.
76 Collins, Allan, Securitization, Frankenstein’s monster and Malaysia education. The Pacific Review 18, (4): 2005, 567-88.
77 Mak, Jun Nam. 2006. Securitizing piracy in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, the International Maritime Bureau and Singapore. In Non-Traditional Security in Asia, Dilemmas in Securitisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitay Acharya, 66-92. Ashgate: Ashgate.
78 Wilkinson 2007; and Vuori 2008 in: Collins, Allan, Contemporary Security Studies, 2007, p.137.
79 Matt McDonald. Securitization and the Construction of Security, 2008; Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics, 2003; Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration, 2002.
80Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics, 2003, p.527.
81 Ibid; Thierry Balzacq.The Policy Tools of Securitization, 2008, p.76. In: Thierry Balzacq. The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies. Journal of Common Market Studies, v.46, n.1, 2008, p.75-100. Available in: <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00768.x/abstract>>.
82 Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies, 2003, p.524.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, p.525.
86 Dauber, C. Image as Argument: The impact of Mogadishu on U.S. Military Intervention. Armed Forces and Society (Winter): 205-229 In Williams C. Michael, words, Images, Enemies, 2003, p.525-526.
87Taureck, Rita. Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies, 2006, p.56.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 The concept of who is likely to succeed as a securitizing actor because of cultural identity and the dominant social norms, may not be formal and explicit, but can be seen as part of the numerous subconscious implicit social and cultural norms present in any society, contained in human behavior which guides the establishment and reinforcement of formal norms. Thus, whenever a formal norm is in contradiction with a social norm the reinforcement of the first lacks support, becoming only useful to arbitrary applications. Critto, Adolfo. Choosing Models of Society and Social Norms: Improving Choices and Quality of Life. Lanham, MD: U of America, 1999. This explains why an aspiring securitizing actor whose cultural identity is considered by the majority of the audience as “not part of us, and therefore cannot be”, based on some social norms, is likely to fail regardless of the actor\’s social position and the facilitating conditions of his or speech act. Nevertheless, the contrary may not be necessarily proven true. Thus, a process of securitization may be influenced by different factors including the cultural identity of the securitizing actors and the ruling social norms of the dominant audience within the general audience.
91 Balzacq, T. “The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience, and context.” European Journal of International Relations 11.2 (2005): 171-201.
93 Hechter, Michael. And Opp, Karl-Dieter. Social Norms. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005, p.35. For a discussion of different definitions of social norms, see Opp, Karl-Dieter.”Norms.” International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Paul B. Baltes and Neil J Smelser, editors,. Elsevier, 2001, Pp.10714-20; and Elster, Jon. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge University Press, 1989; for a current review on social norms, see Rauhut, Heiko, and Ivar Krumpal. “Die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen in Low-Cost und High-Cost Situationen.” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 5.5 (2008):380-402.
94 Hechter, Michael. And Opp, Karl-Dieter. Social Norms. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005, p.35.
95 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment (COM (2003) 336); Brussels; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy (COM (2001) 387); Brussels.