Essay: Niger Delta Master Plan

The Niger Delta Region has witnessed a number of attempts to influence the pace and nature of development in the area and improve the standard of life for its people. For the most part the legacy of these schemes translates into a picture of missed opportunities, low value for money and, not least, enormous disappointment for communities of the Niger Delta whose hopes and aspirations have been raised and then repeatedly shattered. This part of the Master Plan document puts into focus the efforts that have been made so far to put the NDR on the path of sustainable development.
3.9.1 The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB)
The unique characteristics of the Niger Delta Region lay behind Sir Henry Willink\’s Commission (1958) recommendation that the area deserved special developmental attention by the Federal Government of Nigeria. This was even before crude oil became a critical factor in Nigeria\’s development. In response, the Federal Government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960 to manage the developmental needs and challenges of the region. The special area was defined as Yenagoa Province, Degema Province, the Ogoni Division of Port Harcourt and the Western Ijaw Division of Delta Province.
In its seven years of existence, however, the NDDB achieved little before it faded away following the military coup in 1966 and the outbreak of civil war in 1967. After the civil war, the NDDB was not revived and the Government showed no interest in addressing the developmental needs of the region. Rather, it decided to use the substantial revenue accruing from oil production in the region to fund a massive rehabilitation and reconstruction program in various parts of the country. Even with the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the subsequent oil windfall, there was no deliberate attempt to use part of the oil wealth to address the issue of poverty and the developmental needs of the region.
Presidential Task Force (the 1.5% Committee)
Following growing agitation for a renewed focus on the development of the region, the 1979/83 Administration set up a Presidential Task Force (popularly known as the1.5% Committee) in 1980 and 1.5% of the Federation Account was allocated to the Committee to tackle the developmental problems of the region. Although the Committee existed until early years of the 1985/93 regime, it was largely ineffective. There were only a few projects to show for the funding received from the Federation Account and very little visible beneficial impacts on the welfare of the people of the oil producing communities.
3.9.2 Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC)
Further growing discontent and restiveness in the oil producing areas, caused the Babangida regime to set up the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992. Three per cent of federal oil revenue was allocated to the Commission to address the developmental needs of the areas.
Although OMPADEC initially raised the spirit and hopes of the people, inefficiency and corruption in the organisation resulted in yet more disappointment.
Between 1992 and 1999 when it was wound up, OMPADEC between completedseveral projects but bequeathed numerous abandoned or unfinished projects and huge debts.There is no reliable information on the total amount the Commission received from the Federation Account, but what is clear is that OMPADEC suffered from lack of focus, inadequate and irregular funding, official profligacy, corruption, excessive political interference, lack of transparency and accountability, and high overhead expenditure. Most of its projects had little to do with poverty reduction and the vast majority of people did not benefit from its activities. In brief, OMPADEC failed abjectly to abate discontent and restiveness in the Region. Majority of the people did not benefit from its activities. In brief, OMPADEC failed abjectly to abate discontent and restiveness in the Region
Given this background it is hardly surprising that one of the first actions of President Obasanjo, soon after his inauguration in May 1999, was to submit a Bill to the National Assembly for the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace OMPADEC.
One of the challenges facing the Nigeria Nation today is how to ensure that communities in the area in which upstream petroleum activities takes place receive an equitable share of the nation’s revenues from such activities. The struggle by the oil producing areas has continue to grow and this day the activities of the oil companies in the Niger Delta region in Joint venture with NNPC, the national oil company are frequently destructed by activist from these communities seeking redress from a host of grievances against the Nigerian State.
This situation has been aggravated since the 1995 execution of the activist and writer, Ken Saro Wiwa and other Ogoni activist. The root was due to the collision between Saro-Wiwas movement for the survival of ogoni people (MOSPO) and the federal government policies on the right of oil producing areas. So deep are these grievances that some activist now argued that the only permanent solution is a re-configuration of constitutional arrangement in the Nigeria state to give oil producing areas greater control over their (political and economic ) affairs.
Over the years, the Nigerian government and its upstream venture partners, has provided development assistance such as Schools, scholarship, hospitals, jetties etc. tothe oil producing areas but representatives of this areas have often contended that these projects do not match the wealth extracted from their and. It was not until agitations in the Niger Delta begin to threaten oil production that it became clear that those areas were not as powers as they appeared to be. This forced the Nigerian leadership to take another look at the weight to be accorded derivation in revenue allocation and developmental efforts in the Niger Delta region.
In a direct response to the agitation in the oil producing area, the Nigerian government through a federal military decree in 1992 established the oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) with a primary mandate ofundertaking development project in the oil producing area alongside the increase in the special allocation to oil producing state to 3%.
OMPADEC Key Main Functions Were:
(a) To receive and administer the monthly sums from the allocation of the federal account in accordance with confirmed ratio of oil production in each state;
(i) For the rehabilitation and development of oil producing area,
(ii) For tacking ecological problem that have arisen from the exploitation of oil mineral.
(b) To determine and identify through the commission and there spective oil mineral producing state, the actual mineral producing area and embark on the development of projects properly agreed upon with the local communities at the oil mineral producing area.
(c) OMPADEC of each state and local government to the nation’s oil production and to use the basis for the equitable distribution of projects and services and as a basis for the employment of personnel’s.
This development mark a turning point as it’s acknowledge in many years of how unjustly the oil minerals producing areas has been treaded in revenue allocation and development efforts. Prior to its establishment, special allocation to oil producing areas were channeled through the state government with jurisdiction over these areas. In many state, oil production takes place only in certain communities and there had been complains from such communities that state government does not spend these allocation sin developing the oil producing communities.
Therefore, by requiring the commission ascertain the level of oil produced by each community and distribute projects accordingly, the commission’s decree sought to address this situation.
However, it soon began apparently that the 3% of revenue allocation was viewed grossly inadequate compensation for the years of neglect in that there was an almost complete absence of basic infrastructure in the area where the nation makes its wealth. Immediately OMPADEC was established, it was overwhelmed with demand for roads, bridges, jetties, water supply etc. these demands were obviously greater than the expected allocation for the commission.
The clamor for development project was so great that OMPADECS other major function of baffling ecological problem was all but forgotten. Other issues that sabotage the success of OMPADEC initiatives includes the location of the commission headquarter at the Nation’s capital which is far from the Niger Delta region, this president to appoint the members of the commission from each state without the approval of the people of the oil producing communities created the perception of the commission as an alien body which militate against its acceptance by the people of the oil producing region.
Also, issues such as ethic struggle among the people of the oil producing region, corruption, bureaucracy and struggle for contracts and appointment greatly hampered the success of OMPADEC. Mere from birth in controversy, regularly accused of corruption and in competency, OMPADEC has if anything increased the level of frustration and anger in the oil producing region. These inherent lapses of OMPADEC later led to its disbandment and subsequent establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) on June 5, 2000 under the democratic government handed by president Olusegun Obasanjo (GCFR).
3.9.3 Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES)
The Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES) was set up to reconcile industry, environment and community interest in the Niger Delta. The initiative was prompted by increasing pressure from rapid deteriorating ecological and economic conditions, social dislocation and tension in communities, which were not being addressed by policies and action. A study of the region by the World Bank (1995) warned that: \’\’An urgent need exists to implement mechanism to protect the life and health of the region\’s inhabitants and its ecological system from further deterioration\’\’ It was against this backdrop that the Niger Delta environmental Survey (NDES) was initiated in February 1995, by ShellPetroleum Development Company (SPDC) on behalf of its joint partners (NNPC, ELF and AGIP) to undertake an environmental study of the region and to provide the required database.
The Survey is now almost entirely funded by Oil Companies in Nigeria under the umbrella of the Oil Producers Trade Section (OPTS) of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce.
NDES therefore created a steering committee in 1996 and engaged Euro Consult, a Dutch firm as the managing consultants for the execution of:
• A cartographic definition of the Niger Delta
• A preliminary description of the features of the region
• An overview and evaluation of existing information and data on the region
• The identification of major issues to be addressed
• The identification of additional data requirements and
• The preparation of a detailed tor and scope of work to be carried out in phases
The NDES objective has been:
To describe and quantify the renewable and non- renewable resources of the Niger Delta, identify and assess the positive and negative Factors of resources use in the area and the manner in which they serve and affect local, regional and national interest;
• To stimulate pro-actively and encourage relevant stakeholders to address and solve specific current social and environmental problems identified in the course of the survey and propose an indicative plan for future management of the region;
• To appraise how the present state of the region has evolved over time and assess the present conditions of social and economic under – development; and
• Generate data and information on the Niger Delta, including the formulating strategies and plans for effective natural management towards the sustainable use of resources in order to protect the environment and the livelihood of the people in the region.
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)
The NDDC was officially inaugurated on December 21, 2000 with a vision “to offer lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region” and a mission “to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful”
The NDDC Act provided for generous funding sources, including:
• Federal Government contribution, which was to be equivalent to 15% of the monthly statutory allocation due to member States of the Commission from the Federation Account.
• Oil and gas processing companies\’ contribution of 3% of their total budget.
• 50% of the Ecological Fund Allocations due to the member States.
• Proceeds from NDDC Assets and miscellaneous sources, including grants-in-aid, gifts, loans and donations.
The Act also provides for a Governing Board of twenty members. Ten of the members are appointed by the Federal Government (The Presidency) including the Chairman, the MD/CEO, the two Executive Directors, three Representatives of non-oil producing states, one representative each from the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Ministry of Environment and one representative of the oil companies. Each of the nine oil producing states appoints one member each while the oil companies appoint one member to represent them.
The Commission\’s initial task was to review a n d complete some of the abandoned/unfinished projects of the defunct OMPADEC and embark on some new ones whilst preparing a comprehensive Master Plan for the development of the Niger Delta region.
With offices in each of the nine oil-producing states, during the first three years of its existence (January 2001 to January 2003), the NDDC:
• Received N47 billion from all its funding sources.
• Awarded about 700 contracts of which 358 had been completed by June 2003.
• Undertook the construction of 40 road projects, 90 water projects, 129 electrification projects, 47 shore protection/jetty projects, 50 health Centre’s, 25 new blocks of six classrooms each. In the relatively short time since its creation the NDDC is therefore beginning to deliver some of the benefits to the people that it is clear and demanding agenda requires.
The NDDC was established with a vision of offering a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta region and a mission of facilitating the even sustainable development of the Niger Delta region into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful. The mandate of the commission includes:
(i) The formation of polices and guidelines for the development of the region.
(ii) Conception, planning and implementation in accordance with set rules and regulations of projects and program for sustainable development of Niger Delta region in the field of transportation, health, employment,industrialization, agriculture, housing and urban development, water supply electricity and telecommunication.
(iii) Surveying the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic development.
(iv) Preparation of master plan scheme designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta region and the estimation of the member state of the commission for the development of the Niger Delta region by the federal government and the state commission.
(iv) Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta region and assists the member state in the formulation and development of policies to ensure efficient management of the resources of the Niger Delta region.
(v) Accessing and reporting on any project being founded or carried out in the region by oil and gas companies and any other company including non-governmental organization as well as ensuring that funds releases for such project are properly utilize.
(vi) Tacking an ecological and environmental problem which arises from the exploration of oil minerals in the Niger Delta region the advising the federal government and the member state on the prevention and control of oil spillage gas flaring and environmental pollution.
(vii) Liaising with the various oil minerals and gas producing companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control.
(viii) Executing such other works and performing such other functions which in the opinion of the commission are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta region and its people.
The NDDC is more excusive mandate couple with other features such as the compilation of a master plan to serve as a guiding framework for its actions and the more encompassing nature of a law establishing it; it appeared to be more equipped to tackle the challenges of the Niger Delta region than OMPADEC.
Other basic advantage of NDDC over OMPADEC includes:
1. E unlike the remote citing of The location of its headquarter in Port Harcourt river State, a major oil producing state unlike the remote citing of OMPADECS headquarter in the nation’s capital.
2. Legal provision that allows the member state government rather than the federal government as in the case of OMPADEC to nominate the members of management of the commission.
3. Subjects to ratification of the national assembly and the rotation of the commission’s Chairman among the nine member state in alphabetical order (i.e), Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Balyesa, Cross rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers state.
4. Increased statutory funding of NDDC coupled with the increase in the revenue allocation to oil producing state to 13% as oppose to the 3% obtainable during the OMPADECS era.
The establishment of the ministry of Niger Delta on September 8, 2008 by President Umaru Musa Yar Adua (GCFR) with NDDC to function as a parastatal under it has been described as a commendable effort of strengthening the NDDC and largely the development of the Niger Delta region. Although, since inception, NDDC has embarked on various developmental project which include: roads construction, waste management, environmental protection, wealth and educational project, development of basic infrastructure and likewise serving as an essential organ in the implementation of the federal government Amnesty program to mention but few. NDDC is not without its inherent challenges and lapses which only time will tell on how satisfactory it will facilitate the development of the Niger Delta region in the face of these inherent challenges.
3.10 The Stages of Amnesty Program
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is one of the most important ways of resolving conflicts and managing post – conflicts situation in the world to ensure peace. This has been variously used by the United Nations and other similar bodies as an instrument for achieving sustainable peace (Ibaba, 2011). This was adopted by the Nigerian government in its amnesty program in the Niger Delta. There are three phases to the amnesty program, viz, the disarmament and demobilization of militants, the rehabilitation and integration of ex-militants and the final stage is the post-Amnesty package of huge infrastructural development. The disarmed militants were Six Niger Delta States, with a promise of a payment of N65, 000 (Approximately 407USD) monthly, the payment of rent and offering of Vocational training (Oluwaniyi, 2011). During the first phase which has already been implemented several militants turned in several arms and ammunitions (Kuku, 2011). Indeed, it was recorded that about 26,358 ex-militants accepted the Amnesty offer (first phase – 20,192 militants representing those that accepted the offer on or before 4th October 2009, while the second phase of the Amnesty Program that occurred in November 2010 comprises of 6,616 militants representing those that accepted the offer post 4 October 2009). This appeared to have reduced the incidence of conflict and the accumulation and influx of arms by militants in the region. Some rehabilitation centers were provided for the second stage which was tailored to meet training needs of the ex-militants. The trainings were to be done in batches as the centers could only accommodate few numbers of registered ex-militants. It is expected that each batch would spend four weeks in the rehabilitation program which involves re-orientage, counseling and moral/Spiritual regeneration of the ex-militants (Akinwale, 2010). A survey of the career aspiration of the ex-militants reveals a great preference for about Ten (10) sectors ranging from Oil/Gas, maritime services, Fabrication and welding Technology, Exploration and Production and Processing Engineering which duration of training program is projected to last between 3–18 months (Akinwale, 2010). Those desires of going back to school for further education is also given the opportunity under this program.
3.10.1 Disarmament
Disarmament entails the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents
(weapons, ammunition, etc.). Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. The United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) defines disarmament as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population (http:www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php).
According to UNDPKO, DDR activities are crucial components of both the initial
stabilization of war-torn societies as well as their long-term development. As such, need for disarmament. The UNDPKO notes that the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of the military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process.
Fusato (2003) argues that the three phases of DDR are interconnected, and the successful completion of each phase is essential to the success of the others. According to him, the goals of DDR are both short term and long term. The immediate short-term goal is the restoration of security and stability, through the disarmament of warring parties. Progressive disarmament reduces the mistrust that fuels a security dilemma between the fighting factions, allows aid workers to intervene more effectively, and allows peaceful social and economic activities to resume.
By the expiration of the October 4, 2009, deadline which the Federal Government gave
the militants to disarm, virtually all the militants and their key leaders had embraced the
Amnesty deal. Among the militants leaders who came out of the creeks and surrendered their arms are Victor Ben Ebikabowei, alias Boyloaf, former leader of MEND, in the Bayelsa axis; Government Ekpemupolo, alias Tompolo, Leader of Camp 5, Ateke Tom among others.
3.10.1.1 Disarmament of Militants
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world, averaging 2.5 million barrels per day in 2004 (Okonta and Douglas, 2004). The rise of Nigeria as a strategic player in the world of oil geo- politics has been dramatic and has occurred largely in the wake of the civil war that ended in 1970. Since then, Nigeria’s oil sector has remained a vast domestic industrial infrastructure with more than three hundred oil fields, 5,284 wells 7,000 kilometers of pipelines, ten export terminals, and 275 flow-stations. This accounts for over 80 per cent of government revenues, 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, 96 per cent of export
revenues (Ikelegbe, 2006).
In August 2004, the then Nigerian Finance Minister announced government plans to produce 2.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2005 and to increase it to 3 million barrel per day (bpd) in 2006 and finally to 4 million bpd in 2010. Such aspiration led to disputes with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as the country frequently exceeded its production quota at 2,265,000 bpd compared 2,220,000 bpd, the quota set in September 2004 (NNPC, 2009). However, the simultaneous growth of militancy and oil disruption which commenced in the late 1990s compromised oil production such that instead of increasing, oil production dropped by no fewer than 750,000 barrels per day (Watts, 2007).
3.10.1.2 Pre-Disarmament
In late 2005, militancy in the Niger Delta worsened with frequent attacks on oil
Installations and the taking of hostages. In December 2005 and early 2006, a hitherto unknown group of insurgents from Warri, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) began calling for international community to evacuate their nationals from Niger Delta by February or “face violent attack” (Watts, 2007). In the last nine month of 2006, the attacks degenerated to the use of electronically detonated car bombings, attack on government building and massive disruption of oil installations, deploying of sophisticated military equipment and the kidnapping of workers sometimes from platforms 40-60km offshore.
Following the incidence of pipeline vandalism and deterioration of insecurity in the Niger Delta region many oil companies withdrew their personnel and oil production drop as low as 900,000 barrel per day (NNPC, 2009). Commenting on the beginning of the drop in oil production in Nigeria, Tanimu (2009) noted that immediately after election, violence in the Niger Delta region drop Nigeria’s crude oil output by nearly 1 million barrel per day, plunging production to its lowest level since early 2003. The Managing Director of NNPC Funsho Kupolokun disclosed that the country was losing 600,000 barrels of oil daily because of conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta (Punch, May, 2008). The Technical committee on Niger Delta reported that the average of 700,000 barrel of oil was lost per day (TCND Report, 2008). The committee highlighted that these losses were recorded each time the militants attacked oil installations.
Oil losses on account of militancy amounted to over $1 billion annually. The department
of petroleum resources claims this figure represent 32% of the revenue the country generated that year (NNPC, 2009). In 2006, MEND claimed to have achieved a goal of cutting Nigerian output by 30% and has apparently succeeded (Watts, 2007). These destructions have reduced both export revenue amount going to the Federation Account. Furthermore, due to the Niger Delta crises, merchandise trade for the second quarter of 2007 stood at 2.74 trillion ($19.8 billion), that is a decrease of N208.4 billion ($1.7 billion, 7.8 per cent) from the year’s first quarter (Watts, 2007). In spite of the soaring price of oil in the international market, the value of oil exports for the second quarter of 2007 was N1.61 trillion ($12.9 billion) a decrease of 5.8 per cent over the first quarter (PENGASSAN, 2009).
The Technical Committee on Niger Delta (TCND), reportedthat country lost about N8.84 trillion ($66,746,526,000 billion) to oil vandalism and sabotage in the volatile region between 2006 and 2008. (TCND Quarterly Report (1) 2009: 10)
3.10.1.3 Post-Disarmament
Given the number of militants that turned in their weapons, it is no accident that the
government considers the amnesty program via disarmament a huge success. The Amnesty has been hailed by many as successful, given the quality of arms surrendered by the militants. The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) even proposed a public rally and celebration to mark the success of the program (leadership, October, 2009). In the same vein, the upper chamber of the parliament also passed a resolution commending the success of the amnesty deal. Ojo Madukwe observed that “ the disarmament of the militants has yield positive result for the government of Nigeria, the participation of the militants in the amnesty offer is producing some benefits for Nigerian government, he observed the increase in oil and gas production as against the sharp decrease witnessed in the first quarter of 2009” (Guardian, December, 2009).
Ekwuruke (2009) emphasizing on the outcome of the benefits of the Amnesty program via disarmament of the militants states as follows:
1. With the cessation of hostilities in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria can once again fill its OPEC quota and be trusted by major nations to meet its contracted obligation.
2. Contractors handling projects in the region are now fast tracking the repairs of oil and gas infrastructure. This will in turn boost the production level of oil companies.
Report from the Government indicate that following the relative peace ushered in by the
Cease- fire as a result of the amnesty declaration, the country’s oil output had risen to 2.3million barrels a day from 800,000 barrels a day in (2006-2008) as a result of the improvement in security in the oil region. An increment of 1.5million barrels per day indicates 120.45million dollars of revenue to national coffers every (Igwe, 2010).
From a cursory look, “the post amnesty program via disarmament of the Niger Delta
militants has yielded considerable outcomes. In terms of favorable outcomes, the spate of violence-including kidnappings and killings has been reduced, while the production of Oil has increased from 700,000 barrels to 2.4million barrels per day”.
According to Energy Information Administration, (EIA), that oil production in Nigeria significantly increased after the disarmament program granted to the militants in Niger Delta.
Tanimu (2009:13) observed “gains from the disarmament program to include:
1. Rise in the nation’s crude oil export,
2. Rise in oil and gas infrastructure to the three tier of government as well as the return of oil companies to the Niger Delta region,
3. Repair of oil and gas infrastructure destroyed during the pre-amnesty periods.”
The success of the disarmament programme of the militants spawned immediate results as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) announced that the countries crude production per day has increased to 2.4 million barrels (NNPC Report, 2009). From the foregoing evidence, we accepted our first hypothesis; hence the Disarmament of Niger Delta militants increased crude oil production in Nigeria.
3.10.2 Demobilization
Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed
forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (Nwachukwu and pepple, 2011). According to him, Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short term education, training, employment and tools. Demobilization of armed groups is another fundamental short step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of an armed conflict.
The role of demobilization in any post-conflict scenario is always to bring back ex-militants to purely civilian life. After disarmament, ex-militants received a stipend of N65000 monthly allowance (at 1500 per day) and the payment would last till the end of their reintegration, depending on the careers opted for (Amnesty office, 2010). The allowance serves as reinsertion package to divert their minds away from militant attitudes. In addition to the payment of allowances, accommodation arrangements were made for registration and training purposes in six designated areas in the region (collection of personal information), namely; two in Aluu, Rivers State, two in Agbarho, Delta State and two in Uyo, Akwa Ibom State. Beyond their role as rehabilitation/training centres, the sites also served as a refuge to most ex-militants
ostracized in their communities. In all, no separate arrangement was made for the under-aged (less than 18) ex-militants among them (Oluwaniyi, 2011).
Due to the incapability of the camps to take in the whole of 20,192 ex-militants
simultaneously, decisions were made at the initial stage to divide them into batches, with each batch spending four weeks on reorientation, counselling and spiritual regeneration of the ex-militants. Registration for ex-militants included data capturing, certification of the eligibility for benefits, allocation of cards, receipt of reinsertion allowances, and preparation for full demobilization. The registration was extremely important to know the number of ex-militants to be rehabilitated, their career aspirations, the costs and other logistic issues necessary for successful rehabilitation and reintegration (Oluwaniyi, 2011).
3.10.2.1 The Demobilization Program at the Obubra Camp
It was planned to last for three months with centres proposed in Plateau, Adamawa, Taraba, Kwara, Lagos, Enugu and Cross River State but the government decided, later to use the Obubra camp in Cross River State because it was safer, tidier and cost-effective. The essence of the rehabilitation program was to re-orientate and transform their minds towards productive civilian life. The rehabilitation program of ex-militants took-off on Monday 28 June, 2010. The training was aimed at changing the mind set of ex-militants and makes them responsible and productive citizens in life. It was also meant to instill in them the knowledge of peace process and conflict resolution through dialogue as well as educate them in non-violent communication, civil education and family responsibility (The Punch, 2010). An analysis of the training cum rehabilitation program can be broken into various categories namely:
• Arrival and Documentation Process
• Daily Routine
• Training Sessions
3.10.2.2 Post Demobilization
Addressing newsmen in a press conference in Abuja on Feb 9th 2012, the Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Program Hon. Kingsley Kuku outlined the benefits of the Amnesty Program to include:
• Entrenching peace in the Creeks,
• Drastically reducing the menace of kidnapping
He attributed the success achieved in the Presidential Amnesty Program to the determination of President Jonathan to sustain peace and security of lives and property in the Country, while at the same time creating a conducive environment for oil production and foreign direct investment (Ajaji, 2012).
According to Effiong (2011) the relative peace in the entire Niger Delta region, has
undoubtedly been the result of the sustained and diligent implementation of the Federal
Government\’s Amnesty Program for former militant youths in the region. Peace in the Niger Delta is also creating an environment for revival of economic activities, return of foreign investment and improvement of economic security. By 2009, the conflict in the region had greatly eroded the confidence of both foreign and even local investors. But with the effective end of armed conflict and the progress in peace building, that confidence has been greatly restored, and is now attracting new investment, particularly to the upstream sector of the nation\’s oil industry. Perhaps the most critical indicator of its impact beyond that mandate is the improvement in public safety and security which it has brought to the Niger Delta. Prior to the program, kidnapping and hostage taking targeting both expatriate and local workers, as well as sabotage and outright damage of oil and gas infrastructure, were rampant across the region. The sustained implementation of the Amnesty program and the non-violence transformation of many former members of cults and gangs have had a calming effect on the region. The improved climate of public safety and security contributed significantly to curbing electoral violence in the region, in the run-up to the April 2011 polls.
Four years down the line, I do not think it will be wrong to say that the introduction of the amnesty program by the late President, fully supported by his then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan and now President, has really paid off. The amnesty proclamation is seen to have made momentous impact in the return of peace to the Niger Delta, an area that was previously known to be the imprint of violence and massive destruction with the conducts of the agitators.
Another important gain of the demobilization program has to do with the fact that
contractors handling developmental projects in the region now have a lee-way to fast track their efforts so as to assure the ex-militants of government determination to bring about sustainable development in the Niger Delta. The kidnapping of local and international workers which was rampant and which was used by the militants as one of their bargaining strategies has almost ebbed away in the region. Overall, one can observe that the demobilization program reduced kidnapping in the Niger Delta region.
3.10.3 Reintegration
Reintegration: It is the process by which ex-combatants acquire full civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates longer-term external assistance (Oluwaniyi, 2011).
Furthermore, reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at local level. It is part of the general development of a country and national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (http:www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php, accessed on 3rd March, 2013).
Reintegration of ex militants started with their absorption into the society, training and community empowerment. At this juncture, it is important to point out that leaders of ex-militant groups were reintegrated into the society immediately after the disarmament phase. They were given reinsertion allowances and awarded sumptuous contracts in the Niger Delta region and Abuja in order to keep them financially buoyant tills the end of the reintegration process, which is about 5-6years. But for their members, they had to pass through all the phases of the DDR process. Immediately after the two weeks’ demobilization at the Obubra camp, names were submitted to the Amnesty Office in Abuja where preparations were made to start off with their reintegration into the society. Based on the skills selected by the rehabilitated ex-militants, interested training centre’s pick trainees for real reintegration (oluwaniyi, 2011). As part of government’s efforts in facilitating ex-militants’ reintegration in terms of training and empowerment, it had discussions with other partners to participate meaningfully in a program that would have a life span of three years. Different organizations work under these groups to train ex-militants in fish production, poultry farming, wielding, marine, baking and hairdressing to mention but a few.
According to Oluwaniyi (2011:44) “Three major groups handle the individual reintegration of ex-militants and they include the federal government (carried out by the Amnesty office), Post-Amnesty Oil and Gas Foundation and the NDDC”.
3.10.3.1 Amnesty Office
This is the government arm responsible for demobilizing and reintegrating ex-militants. It absorbs majority of the rehabilitated ex-militants. Based on the vocations chosen at the Presidential Amnesty camp, vocation centers are sourced both in Nigeria and abroad through the partner organizations working under their authority, and ex-militants are deployed to these centers as part of their reintegration into the pre-militancy society. Their program is not limited to vocational skills training but includes formal education up to tertiary level (Oluwaniyi, 2011).
The amnesty office has successfully placed a total of 17,500 out of the 26,358 ex-militants who accepted amnesty and have been enrolled for degree and vocational skills acquisition training program in Nigeria and abroad (Mbalisi, et al, 2012). The vocational and technical training program include: seaman training, welding, aviation, computer technology, leadership training, marine technology, entrepreneurial skills, information technology, employment/placement opportunities development activities and so on.
Kuku (2012) the amnesty chief, states that 2299 delegates are currently undergoing various forms of skills acquisition in Nigeria and other parts of the world. For vocational training, beneficiaries of the amnesty program are in France, United States of America, Italy, Greece, Poland, South Korea, Israel, Belarus, Romania, United Kingdom, Croatia, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, Ghana, Jordan, India, Vietnam and the Philippines.