Essay: Libya & Benghazi

Chapter One – Libya & Benghazi
What is Russia’s Stance on Intervention? Do they side with the West?
Additionally should R2P still be used? If so, why in Libya & Not Syria
The Twilight of Humanitarian Intervention?
Resistance to Western Domination
State sovereignty v humanitarian concerns
LIBYA AS A PRELUDE
Introduction
Now that the relevant theories and concepts have been explored in regards to humanitarian intervention, focus will now briefly turn away from Russia and theoretical considerations, towards chronologically discussing the events of the Libyan crisis. The Libyan crisis will be seen as the prelude to which influenced Russia to cast its veto power regarding Syria and this chapter will decipher whether the crisis in Libya reaffirmed or altered Russia’s stance on intervention. Discussion surrounding the Libyan crisis will aim to understand and conceptualise how events produced a humanitarian situation that required outside intervention. In doing so, Libya will be considered in accordance to the events that took place, moving on to discussing what decisions were made and the role of the security council, and finally evaluating these factors back to their influence in shaping Russian foreign policy and what lessons have been learnt.
I – Events, Who Was Involved, Western Perspective (Support Groups), Regime Change
To begin, the Libyan crisis emerged as a far cry from the diplomatic relations the country had achieved through Colonel Gadhafi’s 40 year reign, of which began to disintegrate as of December 2010, following a series of uprisings, known as the ‘Arab Spring’. Before moving on to an event-based discussion, it is worth noting that the millennial Libya had acquired relations that aligned the country considerably well with the outside world and many sought to achieve positive relations with one of the richest African states . Remarkably, Gadhafi positioned Libya alongside major national liberation movements all over the world, offering logistic, military and economic aid. Moreover, Libya boasted the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy on the continent, where upon such feats somewhat surprisingly Harvard researcher Garikai Chengu advocated that there were less Libyan’s living below the poverty line than in the Netherlands . In terms of GDP, figure one below reveals how the pre war Libya consistently boasted well balanced figures, where in 2010, these statistics peaked at $9494.27. Following this, it appears that these figures began to change in late 2010/11, where the revolutionary Arab spring ignited and highlighted Libya’s serious faults causing a sharp decline.
Upon closer examination, such faults could have been seen from afar, where corruption ran riot, leaving Libya with considerably higher levels of corruption over other key Arab Spring players including Egypt and Tunisia . Moreover, Gadhafi’s claims that Libyan’s received stable incomes also appeared to prove false, where evidentially 20% of Libyan’s were absent of any form of employment and over 40% of families could only boast that one family member attained a stable income . Once a beacon for all of Africa to follow, Libya and Gadhafi could now not quell major societal outcry as Gadhafi’s tyrannical rule was eventually and inevitably questioned. Coupled with the rise of inequality, a US State Department Cable described Libya as “a kleptocracy in which the regime — either the al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies — has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning” adding that this was sustained through “the wealth that Colonel Qaddafi’s family and his government accumulated with the help of international corporations in the years since the lifting of economic sanctions by the West helped fortify his hold on his country” .
Moreover, before Libya gained the attention of the world, Libya & Gaddafi belonged to several organisations, including the Arab League, the Arab Magharibi Union, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the conference of non-Aligned states, where collectively strives were made to heighten economic and political foreign relations. Belonging to such groups appeared positive as it also allowed Libya to gain a footing in Northern African relations, where close relationships blossomed between the two, ultimately allowing for Libyan influence in Africa to act as an incentive to improve relations with the EU, as they were satisfied by Libyan investment into Africa, including domestic economic reforms. Whilst discussing Libyan relations with Africa, it is worth noting that Gadhafi had plans to connect all of Africa, ‘dreaming of a United Africa’, which included plans to centralise all banks, introducing the Dinar & putting forward Libyan New neo-liberal socio-economic policies that would reflect the successes of the Gadhafi government . Here, Gadhafi was seen by some as a visionary, where individuals praised how Gadhafi provided for the Libyan population through state subsidies funded with oil export sales: boasting the highest standard of living in Africa with free, universal health and education care, and the possibility of studying abroad at state expense and providing $50,000 for each new married couple to get started with. Alongside these incentives and policies, Gadhafi pioneered non-interest state loans; subsidizing prices of cars much lower than in Europe with the cheapest gasoline and bread prices in the world, of which all were attained with no taxes for those working in certain walks of life such as agriculture. However, such advantages as these could not disguise serious troubles both in society and elsewhere. Hereby, attention will now turn to explaining how Gadhafi’s demise gave way for chaos, civil war, and the slow-motion implosion of the Libyan state.
Events
In short, ‘The Arab Spring’ can be seen to of essentially provided a power transition away from tyrannical, generational governance systems, where in place of dictator-esque leaders, activists afforded the opportunity to achieve significant positive political and economic change. The Arab Spring began with several protests across the region and notably in Northern Africa protests reached extraordinary scales. Here, regime change was quickly brought about in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, where markedly on February 15, 2011, protests also broke out and followed in the Libyan city of Benghazi, marking the beginning of the Libyan civil war.
Despite the more than admirable claims of Gadhafi’s rule that I have highlighted above, claims were almost as far as Gadhafi’s positive governance went, where in reality his reign quickly appeared to reveal a shamelessly tyrannical dictatorship. Here, closer examination showcases that Gadhafi only consolidated power through patronage to kin and clan, where in fact little care was exerted towards his inhabitants and artificial induced scarcity corruption reigned supreme. Moreover, ‘Gaddafi\’s cruelty against his own people disgusted even longtime cronies and set off a wave of defections that, within a week of the first demonstrations on Feb. 15, left the regime deeply — perhaps fatally — wounded’ . Such cruelty included numerous human rights abuses and state-sponsored acts of terrorism, including a role in the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the infamous 1988 Lockerbie bombing . The outside world adopted a firm position on these abuses and criminal acts, issuing international reprisals, including both military intervention and economic sanctions. Upon receiving such damning reprisals, Gadhafi did not worry himself all too much and continued a belligerent-like attitude, however this was not always the case as faced with international pressure in 2003, Gadhafi abandoned the Libyan nuclear program.
Likewise and critical to further discussion in this paper, his response to the popular Arab Spring uprising demonstrated his far-stretching disregard for human rights. Appallingly, when opposition accumulated from the Arab Spring, Gadhafi’s attempts to quell dissent were all too similar to previous attempts, where Gadhafi and his regime engaged in a methodical campaign of violence. Here, the violence descended from localised attacks into a fully-fledged civil war, triggering the insertion of a United Nations intervention to protect the numerous civilians under threat. Additionally, in response to Gadhafi’s reaction and his authorised attacks on civilians, the UN Security Council passed a resolution referring the alleged human rights abuses to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution. These deliberations will be focused upon in some detail later in this chapter, when discussing the roles of the Security Council, implementation and introducing Libya as an important precedent of Russian foreign policy.
Continuing with this preliminary event-based discussion, it becomes easy to draw comparisons between other Arab Spring states. Here, states such as Tunisia and Egypt, similarly were combating dictatorial regimes, yet distinctively Libya had no system of political alliances, network of economic associations, or national organizations of any kind. What this is meant for Libya is that even though nonviolent protests emerged similar to those staged in Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya such actions soon led to all-out secession-or multiple separate secessions- from a failed state . Coupled with a hint of Italian fascism, Libya reproduced colonial days in the present, where extravagance, dogmatism, and brutality ruled. Furthermore, unlike the other Arab states, Gadhafi had coined a ‘revolution of permanence’, of which ‘prohibited private ownership and retail trade, banned a free press, and subverted the civil service and the military leadership’ . Thus, without the formation of a trustworthy police force and/or public sector bureaucracy, Gadhafi was protected and could acquire a safety net through his kin networking and control over goods and services. Moreover, it has been said that ‘it was along such networks that Libyan society fractured when the regime\’s capacity to divide and rule began to unravel at the beginning of the protests’ . Hereby, this state formation meant that Libya was required to ‘construct a coherent national identity and public administration out of Qaddafi\’s shambles’ .
When looking at the conflict in detail, the eastern city of Benghazi remains to be the most important in explaining the Libyan conflict due to the amount of attacks here and the various militias located in the city, of which we shall see further on in this chapter. Benghazi is situated along the Mediterranean Sea on Africa’s northern coast and geographically borders with Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia. Historically, the region has been inhabited by a variety of rulers and since the Bronze Age the native Berber population occupied it. Following on from this, the region was then ruled by Persians, Egyptians and existed under the rulings of the Roman and Ottoman Empires. Aside from Benghazi, the nations capital of Tripoli lies west of Benghazi, and remains home to more than one million of the nation’s roughly six million residents.
Now that we understand how the Arab Spring came about and how it initially impacted upon the Gadhafi regime and the Libyan state, it is now necessary to follow events in a chronological order that spawned out of the spring. As we already know Gadhafi adopted a no holds barred approach towards his dissidents, of which sparked international outrage and this peaked as of March 2011, where the UN Security Council authorized a no-fly zone over Libya and air strikes to protect civilians, over which NATO assumed command. Following this, groups of Libyan rebels were able to make territorial progress, however, these gains were soon forced back by well-equipped pro-Gaddafi forces. Markedly, the air strike campaign revealed the first apparent features of Russian geopolitical discourse in response to the Libyan crisis. Here, through “formal geopolitics” Russia can be seen to of used UNSC resolution 1973 as a means for undermining the role of NATO, coupled with a condemnation of NATO’s actions to launch air strikes. NATO’s involvement was soon coined as ‘Operation Unified Protector’, of which the Russian federation responded by stating that Russia “strongly believes that it is unacceptable to use the mandate derived from UNSC resolution 1973, the adoption of which was quite an ambiguous step, in order to achieve goals that go far beyond its provisions, which only provide for actions for the protection of civilians” . This brief discussion will be magnified latterly in this chapter, towards discussing initial responses to the decisions made by the UNSC, to then place Russia in accordance to a geopolitically charged discussion of how Libya shaped Russian foreign policy and how events were viewed by other major states.
By July of 2011, the so called ‘dissident’ process continued to target Col Gadhafi and his dismantling grip upon the state, where the international Contact Group on Libya formally recognized the main opposition group the National Transitional Council (NTC), as the legitimate government of Libya. This recognition then forced Gadhafi into hiding, as rebels were now viewing Col Gadhafi’s government as totally illegitimate and rebels duly took control of his fortress in Tripoli. In the months that followed, the African Union expanded to 60 countries that all recognized the NTC as the new Libyan authority, and on the 20th October – Col Gaddafi is captured and killed as rebel fighters take his hometown Sirte. Three days later, the NTC declares Libya to be officially “liberated” and announces plans to hold elections within eight months. A month later, in November – Saif al-Islam, the fugitive son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, is captured, becoming the last key Gaddafi family member to be seized or killed.
The death of Gadhafi surprisingly however, did not solve Libya’s immediate issues, and widespread violence and major clashes between the former rebel forces broke out in the already beleaguered city of Benghazi. In the wake of the New Year (2012), rebel forces began to grow in dissatisfaction that the killing of Gadhafi brought about such little change. Hereby, the new NTC government was attacked for being ‘slow to bring about any formal change and still remained corrupt in form and nature’ , here; new deputy Abdel Hafiz Ghoga swiftly resigned. Additionally, by March of the same year, Benghazi once again became the battleground of the rebel forces, where contestations over the acquisition of oil further increased tension and pressure of the NTC in Tripoli.
A further three months passed, where little progress appeared to be made, and the interim Government struggled to control local militias, especially in Zintan in the West. Here, the notable Al-Awfea Brigade briefly commands control over Tripoli International Airport, and a pro-autonomy mob ransacks the election commission building in Benghazi. By August, the NTC government shifted power back to the General National Congress (GNC), of which was elected in July. Moreover, Congress elects Mohammed Magarief of the liberal National Front Party as its chairman, thereby making him interim head of state.
Now that events that followed the outbreak of violence in the nations capital have been explored, it proves necessary to discuss the various groups/rebels and militias who were involved and their importance in the developing crisis. To improve understanding, this thesis will consider both those involved inside and outside of the state.
Inside Libya
In simple terms, one can look at the Libyan crisis as an ideological battleground between Islamist groups and Arab nationalists, of which echo sentiments widely held in the Arab world. However, instead of simply discussing the role of differing groups through a competitive lens, it is worth making the distinction that ‘the important story about the 2011 Arab revolts…is not how the globalization of the norms of civic engagement shaped the protesters’ aspirations. Nor is it about how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics. Instead, the critical issue is how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts’ . Upon such assertions, this paper will evaluate how each group established their own footing regarding the crisis, targeting specific forms of support, from militant violent aggressors, to groups who can be said to of received funding from the Western world to initiate regime change. Through this evaluation, I share Lisa Anderson’s vision that events in Libya, stemmed from ‘ragtag bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces who ignited protests, revealing the tribal and regional cleavages that have beset the country for decades’ . Furthermore, in regards to comparisons with other states, major groupings in Libya characteristically ‘shared a common call for personal dignity and responsive government, where the revolution reflected divergent economic grievances and social dynamics-legacies of their diverse encounters with modem Europe and decades under unique regimes’ .
Government
The first and perhaps most obvious actor present can be seen through the Libyan government, who from the perspective of outsiders appeared weak, fragile and seemingly acted as the first domino in producing a myriad of factions adjacent to it. When the violence broke out, the Libyan government acted with no callus or dignity, where evidentially major deputies fled in August to the easternmost bubble-like haven of Tobruk . Such actions of these individuals left behind a fugitive government, of which exerted a feeble grasp on state affairs. Libya’s ‘runaway parliament’ had only been elected two months prior, where the elected MP’s had replaced the so called ‘Islamist’ dominated assembly, of which formed a rival ‘parallel rump government’ in Tripoli, suggestively controlled by Islamist rebels. Even though the fugitive-like government exerted almost little to no control over events in the capital, the international community recognised it as the official government and when addressing the Islamist formation in Tripoli, Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdel Aziz said the Islamist militias are “stronger than the government itself, and now possess arms even more sophisticated than the government” ; a worrying position indeed. In summary, the government seemingly failed to promote further democracy with the fall of central commander Gadhafi and fell subordinate to power politics of the rival militias and other factions.
Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the “Libyan National Army”
Within the following factions that emerged with the disintegration of the establishment, Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the “Libyan National Army” can be seen as pivotal in upholding the battle against the government. Firstly, you may ask who General Haftar is and he certainly can be denoted as the highest profile ranking individual who actively combated the many Islamist militias who have seemingly came out from the woodwork following the dismissal of Col. Gadhafi to the front lines of a civil war. Haftar graduated from the Benghazi Military Academy and then went on to receive military training in both the Soviet Union and Egypt. From this position, Haftar found himself serving in the Libyan army under Gadhafi, and took part in the coup that brought Gaddafi to power in 1969. More recently, however, the formal general fell out with the dictator and he adopted a senior position in the forces, which overthrew Gaddafi in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. Interestingly, Haftar also is a U.S. citizen, after he spent two decades of exile in Virginia, where his significance wavered as the CIA in Langley ostensibly trained him. Here, we are able to first entertain the role of the U.S. government and security forces in promoting regime change in Libya, additionally state sponsored regime change will also be considered as a factor in shaping the Russian stance.
Haftar’s return to significance restored himself at the forefront of Libyan affairs when he returned to Libya following the outbreak of the civil war, where he re-aligned with his self-declared Libyan National Army and launched ‘operation dignity’, of which targeted the Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia. After a promising start and a sharp increase in support, Haftar’s formation not only targeted Ansar al-Sharia, but also now broadly targeted all Islamist groups operating within Libya.
Haftar announced his return and decided to appear in a televised announcement to outline his plans to thwart the controversial Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC). Here, even though the GNC unilaterally extended its mandate, Haftar soon announced that such a formation would soon to be dissolved. In place of said ‘rogue’ formation, Haftar designated the formation of a caretaker government to oversee new elections. However, such proclamations did not go ahead unquestioned, as critics quickly dismissed his ideals with great skepticism, including a damning condemnation by the then acting Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who personally targeted Haftar\’s actions, labeling them as a pathetic “coup attempt” and “ridiculous” in magnitude .
However, after initial successes Haftar’s offensive ultimately stalled, allegedly emerging from suspicions about his political affiliations and the fact that his unconfirmed links to the CIA remained vague. Moreover, Haftar was seen as ‘anti-Islamic’ in nature, of which stemmed from his overly aggressive stance against even relatively moderate Islamist groups as seen above, when targeting the GNC. Furthermore, Haftar’s return remains ambiguous, coupled with his unclear ambitions in the Tobruk Government. Suggestively, the fact that Haftar returned from the U.S. to topple Gadhafi evokes suspicion and Gamel Salin adds that when the TNC was recognized as the legitimate government in Libya, not only was Gen. Haftar seen with close links to the U.S. as many of the TNC leaders were reported to have close connections with the United States. Alongside, Gen Haftar, Mahmoud Jibril, who acted as the interim prime minister in the TNC, also ties with the U.S.
However, as NATO went beyond the terms mandated by the UN resolution. Instead of preventing civilian casualties through “the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence,” NATO intervened on the side of rebel forces and unilaterally shifted the mission in the direction of regime change by force. This led Amr Moussa, the then Secretary-General of the Arab League, to accuse Gen. Haftar of state sponsored regime change, adding that the United States of violating the UN resolution, stressing that “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians”
http://iacenter.org/africa/libya-cia-m16-040911/
Seemingly, three months passed without Haftar making any profound steps towards eliminating the Islamist formations, however, soon this changed as he charted ‘Operation Dignity’ on the 16th May. Here, Haftar and his followers repelled the pro-islamist militias though a series of air and ground assaults in Benghazi. Here, the significance of Benghazi was propelled to the upmost of importance, where his assault endangered his own safety, yet his continued determination accumulated together on 20 May 2014, where the GNC announced that it had finally scheduled the long postponed elections that were meant to result in the dissolution of the GNC and its replacement by a new representative assembly, to be known as the House of Representatives. These elections were scheduled for 25 June 2014.
Interestingly, such actions led former critics to now support Haftar’s movement, where notably high-raking ousted official Ali Zeidan then endorsed his actions, creating widespread support across parliament, the navy, the air force and the land army.
Haftar’s actions soon received widespread notice, to the extent where in eastern Libya, Haftar\’s was able to keep forces in place, of which at the same time only helped to garner more overall support. From here on in, Haftar’s group only grew in size and in the June 25 elections; his secularists gained a clear mandate over and against the Islamist agenda.
Furthermore, when looking at Gen. Haftar’s actions, he and his fellows can be said to have repelled the Islamist groups within Libya. However, the formations of these Islamist groups are certainly not simple to pin down, as the militias proved diverse and varied in radicalisation. Hereby, discussion will now focus upon the formation of these opposing Islamist groups and deciphering the differing factions within Islamist groups. Notably, Western Media has a knack of painting all these factions under the banner of being ‘Islamist’ in form, where they often ignore the varying requests and forms of conduct.
The Islamists – Who they are & what do they want?
During Gadhafi’s 42 year long ruling, Libya’s Islamists were imprisoned, forced underground or fled into exile, however, they soon emerged again after his capture in October 2011. In terms of evaluating the numerous splinter groups and ideological formations, it proves necessary to view these Islamist groups as spanning the ideological spectrum, from moderates who embrace democracy to militants with a global vision linked to al Qaeda. Within the formations of said groups, some factions have ties towards both major political parties, envisioned through the readings of the Muslim Brotherhood and smaller Salafi. Although significant Islamist militias are tied to political parties, those militias who conducted the bulk of the fighting do not have such political ties.
Western Militias
As the 2011 rebellion continued, various militias emerged out of the notable Libyan cities, including Benghazi, Zintan, Misurate and Tripoli. Within these cities, fighting units formed, comprised of various tribes, who all suggestively formed truces between one another as they collectively ousted the disparate Libyan government and supported NATO’s bombing campaign. However, worth noting is that soon militias became increasingly politicized. What this meant is that political forces, and elected representatives within the General National Congress (GNC), would target the support of specific militias to extend their own legitimacy and power. In summary, these actions can also be seen as vices of politicians, who feel as if increasing support from militias will push forward their own personal agendas, coupled by militias providing security for supporters in the government or ministries to consolidate power .
Dawn of Libya
Dawn of Libya encompasses an alliance between various groupings of which Gen. Haftar is targeting. Within this formation, included are Islamist militias featuring the prominent February 17th Martyrs. Dawn of Libya also deny any relationship with the notorious Ansar al-Sharia , who have held responsibility for various terrorist actions, including the 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. In distancing themselves from Ansar al-Sharia, Dawn of Libya claim they do not affiliate with terrorist groups and are focused upon charitable works in Libyan communities .
Misratan militias
In Misrata, ‘Misratan militias’, occupied the city with more than 200 militias with a total of 40,000 fighters. These Misratan militias were aided by monetary injections by the General National Congress, coupled with ideological links to Muslim Brotherhood politicians. The brigades located in Misrata can be seen to be included as a part of the Libya Dawn coalition, which seized Tripoli in August. In summary, a coalition with the Libya Dawn allowed for the Misratan militias to support the rival parliament under Prime Minister Omar al Hassi.
The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR)
The LROR was established much later than the regionalised militias, in May 2013. The LROR has been stated to be the most influential of the politicised militia groups, where the LROR has contributed to stabilising the country. The LROR as a formation has usurped power from a varying coalition of armed factions that was established for the purpose to pass the Political Isolation Law and to oust the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan from power. Here, the group were responsible for kidnapping Ali Zeidan and also in July of 2014 the LROR declared war on Gen Haftar’s forces in Benghazi. Moreover, with their open approach for coalition, the group also sided with the Libya Dawn coalition and the above Misratan militias during the raids on Tripoli. The groupings formation is Misratan-dominated and anti-Zintan as well as anti- federalist. Within the make-up of the LROR, their recruitment policy uniquely draws from an array of ethnic groups, including Tubu in Kufra and the Amazigh in the west. Furthermore, in addition to their attempts to rebuild security, the LROR actively aims to pay higher salaries, which attracts recruits from the police force to join their ranks .
Eastern Militias
Islamic State (IS)
On the ground, IS have charted a major development, as of 2015. IS begun in Derna, where in this long-time Jihadist environment, the group has been able to attain gradual support, leading to occupying local administrative buildings and drumming up local support. At the time of the imposition of resolution 1970 and 1973, IS were not seen as one of the most prominent groupings, yet after high profile attacks across Europe, including Paris and Brussels, the group has now achieved a widely-recognized world position. In terms of their involvement in Libya, IS were often driven out of towns, yet they declared in July 2015 it would assume and seize “complete control” of the central coastal city of Sirte, the birthplace of former leader Muammar Gaddafi. In June, the group\’s official radio station, al-Bayan, which is already operating in Syria and Iraq, reportedly began broadcasting from Sirte.
IS has claimed that it has captured the coastal town of Bin-Jawad, as well as having a “strong presence” in Nofilia, Sidra and Ra\’s Lanuf, putting it significantly closer to installations in Libya\’s oil rich region, and leading to repeated clashes with the Petroleum Facilities Guard (see above).
IS has managed to strike in Tripoli and Benghazi by launching high-profile one-off attacks, for example those targeting embassies and hotels in Tripoli in January and February 2015, and most recently on a police training base in Zliten, near the capital.
The group is also present in Benghazi and has cells in Tripoli.
IS has divided Libya geographically into three “provinces”: Barqah (Cyrenaica) in the east, Tripoli (referring to wider Tripolitania) in the west, and Fezzan in the centre and south.
According to a UN report issued in December, IS has between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters in Libya, including 1,500 in Sirte. The group seems to be attracting fighters from sub-Saharan countries.
The main armed militias in the fight against IS in the city are the Derna Mujahidin Shura Council and the Abu-Salim Martyrs Brigade, which are known for their ties to Ansar al-Sharia (see below).
17th February Martyrs Brigade
On the Eastern coast of Libya, according to the BBC, is where one of the “biggest and best armed militias” is located . The formation of this brigade marked the coined “day of rage”, of which included members of the Muslim brotherhood, who collated together during the 2011 uprising. This brigade can be seen to of received funding from Libya’s Defense Ministry, allowing the group to gain some from of authority, whilst conducting enforcement functions in southern and eastern Libya. The brigade is also located in Benghazi and has constantly waged war against Gen Haftar’s pro governmental forces in 2014. Moreover, it has said that many fighters from the martyrs brigade merged into ulterior faction Ansar al Sharia in 2012.
Ansar al Sharia
Ansar al Sharia is commonly known as a more extreme formation, aiming to impose strict Sharia law across Libya and the group stemmed out of the militants who fought in the 2011 uprising. As of 2012, the group began and remained to be questioned surrounding their potential links to terrorist group Al Qaeda; these claims however, have been denied by prominent figures within the group . Mohammad al Zahawi who heads the group, also denotes that they exert reasonable levels of power in Benghazi, Derna, and Sirte, leading to an increase in size and weaponry. Ansar al Sharia was linked to the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi and the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens on September 11, 2012. The group has been battling Gen. Heftar’s forces since May 2014.
Islamic Shura Youth Council
The Islamic Shura Youth Council was formed in April 2014 by a group of ISIS fighters after they returned to Derna from Syria. The group declared its allegiance to ISIS in October 2014. It has since mobilized support for ISIS among other Islamist brigades in Derna, including Ansar al Sharia. It has fought the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade and reportedly seized full control of the eastern city in November 2014.
The Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade
The Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade was formed by Islamists detained in the Abu Salim prison under Qaddafi. It was the most powerful militia in Derna until IS-linked groups were formed in 2014. The Brigade calls for strict enforcement of Sharia, but it has refused to join ISIS. It instead advocates Libyan nationalism. It has battled ISIS-linked militias for control of Derna.
II. Initial response to the crisis in Libya
a. Civil Society – Crisis warranted urgent response
b. Security Council – 1973
c. Western Responses
Russian interpretation
d. UN: Special Advisers, Human Rights Commission, General Assembly and Security Council
e. The International Criminal Court
Now that the Gadhafi regime and the Libyan crisis has been explored in relation to the Arab Spring and the events that followed, discussion is now able to revert back to Russia and determining their involvement following the decisions made upon the worrying humanitarian situation that emerged. To do so, this area of consideration will interpret the Security Council 1973 documentation, that Russia refused to veto, yet abstained from the vote, moreover, reasoning behind such decisions and the arguments put forward by the council will be looked at. Following this evaluation, this paper will contrast western interpretation of the document against the Russian interpretation, hopefully to reveal how such large-scale decisions are made and to which grounds they are based.
When Gaddafi’s forces conducted a brutal military campaign, in order to regain control of lost territory and to neutralize the opposition, many scholars drew comparisons to acts of genocide. Gadhafi declared that he intended to “clear the streets of vermin” and Bellamy and Williams describe the developments as direct echoes of the Rwandan genocide, such declarations are drawn from Gadhafi’s quotes as “soldiers have been deployed to all regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches and any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed” (Bellamy and Williams 2011:838). Furthermore, alongside residential areas being victim to relentless air attacks of bombing and mortars, the ground forces operated by “shooting anything that moves”, thus killing residents who tried to escape the bombardments. Tens of thousands of civilians fled in fear of reprisals for having supported, or for being perceived as having supported, the revolt (AI, 2011:34).
Developments such as these caused widespread concern within the international community, where early calls to intervene from Human Rights groups and regional organisations like the African Union (AU), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League were finally acted upon. Hereby, On 26 February 2011, members of the Security Council unanimously voted for the implementation of resolution 1970. Resolution 1970 was heralded with the task of thwarting the arms trade into Libya, whilst also imposing direct sanctions upon the Gadhafi family and his government. Such sanctions included travel bans and the freezing of personal assets. Furthermore, when the Security Council commented upon the imposition, they stated, “it would keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and would be prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the prescribed measures in light of compliance or no-compliance with the resolution”
Moreover, as Resolution 1970 was passed and implemented without much deliberation from the international community, the non-military sanctions certainly did not quell on-going violence nor protect Libyan civilians. Here, you could suggest that the Security Councils’ Secretary General Ban Ki-moon foresaw such failures, when he previously suggested that ‘even bolder action may become necessary’ (Ban 23-02-2011), adding that the positions of relevant states on potential ‘bolder action’ have become clear .
However, when entertaining the Russian position at this stage, you could suggest that they openly disagreed with Ki-Moon’s progressive position, as they regarded that the limits of forceful intervention had already been reached with resolution 1970. In doing so, Russia initially revealed itself to be against further action and/or military action stating that, “a settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In fact, that is the purpose of the resolution (…) it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which could make the situation worse” (Bellamy and Williams 2012, p. 840). Moreover, positioning them as aligning with Russia, The Chinese permanent representation to the UN was also quick to make clear that the only way forward in the Libyan peace progress was ‘Through peaceful means, such as dialogue’ (Li 26-02-2011).