Essay: Libya

Chapter One – Libya as a Prelude
(Followed by Chap 2 – Syria, Chap 3 Full comparison and explanation of Russian foreign policy)
I – Events, Who Was Involved, Western Perspective (Support Groups), Regime Change (?)
2.1 – Libyan history before Gadhafi & Gadhafi’s rise to power
Before 1951, Libya experienced a turbulent history, which was characterised by belonging to various ruling empires, including those of Roman, Spanish, Ottoman and Italian influence. In 1951, Libya became an independent kingdom from Italy and was declared as a constitutional monarchy. In 1959, soon after Libya attained freedom and independence, oil was discovered in the region that allowed the nation to increase its previously poor capital. Yet, after unfair distribution of wealth by King Idris al-Senusi, a military coup was devised that targeted removing the pro-western king and Colonel Muammar Gadhafi successfully led the ‘al-Fateh revolution’.
Following the coup, Colonel Gadhafi was established as the de facto leader of the Libyan state and following the movement of the times, Gadhafi, like Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, supported pan-Arabism. Interestingly, Gadhafi outlined his own political theory, which he coined as ‘The Third Universal Way’, and was written about in some detail in his “Green Book” . Within the book, Gadhafi rejected worldwide ideas of Communism and Capitalism and instead based his ideas on a democratic system that combined both socialism and Islam. Additionally, Gadhafi rejected representation based systems that featured in many liberal democracies and he was determined that his system would feature direct democracy, enforced through appointing peoples committees. This formation soon appeared across Libyan governance, known as “Jamahiriya”, which directly translates as the “State of the Masses” . Upon closer examination, Gadhafi’s unique “Jamahiriya” allowed him to exercise a dominative grasp over the state, leading to absolute power over political and economical life.
Not only did Gadhafi exert control over economic and political life, yet as the newly established head of state, he also assumed position of commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces. This position allowed him to exert influence over the “mukhabarat”, which was known as Libya’s national intelligence service. Through acquisition of positions such as these, regime loyalists within the revolutionary committees supported Gadhafi’s ideology, aiding him to uphold his ruling position.
Furthermore, the Jamahiriya establishment combined with his patronage to kin and clan allowed Gadhafi to promote themes of fear, intimidation and loyalty in establishing a four decade long rule. Within this timeframe, Gadhafi’s and his militia would hide Rule of Law and use several socialist claims to mask human rights violations, such as televised hangings and the rape of hundreds of women . Moreover, Gadhafi was subject to international human rights abuses following an attack on a Berlin discothèque on April 5th, 1986, where three people were killed and around 230 injured when La Belle discothèque was bombed in West Berlin. Following this incident, Libya was soon accused by the US government of sponsoring the bombing and US President Ronald Reagan ordered reciprocal strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya ten days later. The strikes reportedly killed 15–30 people, including Colonel Gaddafi’s adopted daughter, and were condemned by the United Nations General Assembly . A 2001 trial in the US found that the Libyan secret service and the Libyan Embassy had planned the bombing.
Just two years on from the discothèque bombing, on 21st December 1988, a terrorist bomb destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, travelling from Heathrow to New York. Following the incident, which killed 243 passengers, the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary conducted a three-year joint investigation alongside the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which eventually issued arrest warrants for two Libyan nationals in November 1991. In 1999, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi handed over the two men for trial at Camp Zeist, Netherlands after long-drawn-out negotiations and UN sanctions. Yet, in 2003, Gaddafi accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and paid compensation to the families of the victims, although he continued to states that he had never given direct order for the attack.
Incidents such as these demonstrated cruel lessons for the Gadhafi administration in the workings of international diplomacy and plagued Libya’s reputation. Here, sanctions placed upon Libya crippled the oil industry and ‘rendered Libya all but inaccessible to the outside world and ratcheted up the international media’s portrayal of Gadhafi as demon dictator’ . Additionally, the separate incidents were also to be seen as ‘proof of his unshakable power’ .
In Gadhafi’s Libya, freedom of expression was often subject to criminalization, where if one was to speak out against the establishment, it was not uncommon for the individual(s) to be tortured, detained or subjected to life imprisonment or death. Furthermore, the political landscape was also affected through Gadhafi’s rule, as many opposition groups were suppressed. Here, if any group unknown to officials were to investigate into human rights and/or political matters they would soon be banned, in accordance to ‘Libyan law 71’, which meant that any opposed to the principles of the al-Fateh Revolution can be punished by death . In the face of criticism, the Libyan government argued that freedom of association and assembly are not required in a political system based on “popular power”. In doing so, a Libyan official declared to Human Rights Watch: “the right to demonstrate is a right in the traditional sense. But that implies there are two sides, the rulers and the ruled. But when we talk about one group, there is no need” .
2.2 Events leading to the Libyan crisis
Colonel Gadhafi’s 40-year reign began to disintegrate as of December 2010, following a series of uprisings, known as the ‘Arab Spring’. Before moving on to an event-based discussion, it is worth noting that Libya had acquired capital that helped the country to becoming one of the richest across Africa . Moreover, Libya boasted the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy on the continent, where somewhat surprisingly Harvard researcher Garikai Chengu advocated that there were less Libyan’s living below the poverty line than in the Netherlands , a position hard to grasp as a third world country trumps the 17th largest economy in the world. However, upon closer inspection, this claim would only hold true through an unfair comparison that includes stark differences in population, with Libya at 6 million compared to seventeen million in the Netherlands. However, this can be disproved again according to the CIA’s world fact book, which places Libyan’s under the poverty line as one-third (≈33%), compared to 9.1% in the Netherlands . In terms of GDP, figure one below reveals how pre war Libya consistently boasted well balanced figures, where in 2010, these statistics peaked at $9494.27 per capita. Following this, it appears that these figures began to change in late 2010/11, where the revolutionary Arab spring led to political turmoil that damaged the economy.
Figure 1: Libya GDP per Capita 2006-2014
(“Data From Central Bank Of Libya”)
Upon closer examination, many official statistics were falsified, yet the above appears to resonate with figures provided by the IMF, which can be seen below. Upon inspection, it appears that the Central Bank of Libya reflects many similarities shown by the World Bank, yet the World Bank figures peak at 12,378 and as a low as 5,859 per capita. Here, the percentage change represented by the Central Bank of Libya between 2010-11 is -62.47, compared to -52.67 by the IMF. Suggestively, the differences here could be explained as events of war fluctuate levels of GDP and the Libyan model has taken in consideration more coarse data, so volatility is not as evident. Statistically, the Libyan government may have covered the actual cost of war, like they did in other outlets outlined below, once again producing unclear figures.
Figure 2: World Bank data for Libyan GDP per Capita
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2016
However, vague documentation and figures were just the beginning, as Libya exerted considerably higher levels of corruption over other key Arab Spring players including Egypt and Tunisia . Moreover, Gadhafi’s claims that Libyan’s received stable incomes also appeared exaggerated, where evidentially 20% of Libyan’s were absent of any form of employment and over 40% of families could only boast that one family member attained a stable income . Once a beacon of hope following the ousting of King Idris al-Senusi, Libya and Gadhafi now replicated the very regime it replaced and could not quell major societal outcry as Benghazians eventually and inevitably questioned Gadhafi’s rule. At this point, a US State Department Cable described Libya as “a kleptocracy in which the regime — either the al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies — has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning” adding that this was sustained through “the wealth that Colonel Qaddafi’s family and his government accumulated with the help of international corporations in the years since the lifting of economic sanctions by the West” .
However, some also praised Gadhafi, including South African President Jacob Zuma, who commended Gadhafi’s narratives for a positive welfare policy. Here, Gadhafi was placed on a pedestal for how he seemingly aided the Libyan population through state subsidies funded with oil export sales: boasting the highest standard of living in Africa with free, universal health and education care, and the possibility of studying abroad at state expense and providing $50,000 for each new married couple . Alongside these incentives and policies, Gadhafi pioneered non-interest state loans, subsidizing prices of cars much lower than in Europe coupled with the cheapest gas and bread prices in the world . However, through critical examination it appears that these incentives also have been falsified or exaggerated. Firstly, upon free universal health care, it appears that ‘free’ certainly does not translate as adequate. The government embarked on a variety of institutional reforms but the healthcare system suffered from many deficiencies due to poor capacity, low financial remuneration of healthcare personnel and badly equipped facilities. Due to this many Libyan nationals sought healthcare abroad, primarily in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom and Switzerland .
Secondly, in terms of education, it may be free, yet the system remains outdated, coupled with neglected teachers, who are underpaid and under-trained. Moreover, upon claims stated around non-interest loans, this is categorically untrue. Here, Libyan banks would include a percentage rate charge on all loans, which is comparable to an interest rate, but in the spirit of ‘Islamic ethics’ it is not called interest, it is called an ‘Administrative Expense’ .
Yet, Gadhafi loyalist claim that those who disprove such policies do so as they see large parts of the population excluded from accessing such incentives. Here, loyalists blame the sanctions placed upon Libya in the early 1980’s until 2003 by the US and UN. These sanctions limited Libya’s growing economy, leading to an inevitable smothering of development projects and social welfare schemes. However, even if large parts of the population were to benefit from such proclamations, they were not as good as they were claimed to have been and they could not disguise serious troubles both in society and elsewhere. Hereby, attention will now turn to explaining how the Arab Spring led to Gadhafi’s demise, which gave way for turmoil, civil war, and the slow-motion implosion of the Libyan state.
2.3 The Arab Spring
The Arab Spring is widely believed to have begun through dissatisfaction with the rule of local governments, particularly by the youth. Moreover, mass concentration of wealth in the hands of autocrats in power for decades, corruption, and a refusal of the youth to accept the status quo fuelled mass discontent.
The initial catalyst that placed various voices of discontent into the public eye emerged on the 17th December 2010. On this day, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi was planning to sell fruits and vegetables in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. Bouazizi was the breadwinner for his widowed mother and six siblings, but he did not have a permit to sell his goods. Hereby, when approached by police to hand over his goods, Bouazizi refused and a policewoman allegedly slapped him.
Angered and disillusioned after being publicly humiliated, Bouazizi marched in front of a government building, doused himself with gasoline and set himself alight.
Bouazizi’s act of despair resonated immediately with others in the town and following the incident protests began that day in Sidi Bouzid, seen via phone cameras and shared on the Internet . Within days, more protests started popping up across the country, calling upon President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his regime to step down, where around a month later, he fled. The momentum in Tunisia set off uprisings across the Middle East that became known as the Arab Spring and the young Tunisian became a martyr.
In short, ‘The Arab Spring’ essentially aimed to make the transition away from tyrannical, oppressive governance systems, where in place of overbearing leaders, activists afforded the opportunity to achieve political change. It is necessary to understand that the developments in Libya were part of a broader movement, where waves of protests across Northern African were driven by similar demographic realities, failures of state policies and demands for greater representation. However and most importantly, they failed to effect regime change. The Arab Spring was a historic moment in the politics of the Middle East but its long-term impact remains variable.
In comparison, change was quickly brought about in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, yet when protests also broke in the Libyan city of Benghazi, such changes were not as smooth, coupled with the beginning of the Libyan civil war. Protests in Libya began on 15 February 2011 in front of Benghazi’s police headquarters following the arrest of a human rights attorney who represented the “relatives of more than 1,000 prisoners allegedly massacred by security forces in Tripoli’s Abu Salim jail in 1996” . What had began peacefully, turned into confrontations, which were met with military force. Gadhafi’s military ordered crackdown triggered further demonstrations and spread to several other cities, including Misrata, Darnah, Tobruk, Zintan and Tripoli. Furthermore, in comparison with the Tunisia and Egypt uprisings, these also targeted dictatorial leaders; yet distinctively Libya had no system of political alliances, network of economic associations, or national organizations of any kind. What this is meant for Libya is that even though nonviolent protests emerged similar to those staged in Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya such actions soon led to violence involving various militias and the new state security forces. Such formations included guerrillas, Islamists, and militias who fought against Gaddafi but refused to lay down their arms when the war ended in October 2011. The emergence of these militias shifted from merely delaying the surrender of their weapons to actively asserting a continuing political role as “guardians of the revolution” .
The National Conference declared a “Day of Rage” for 17 February for the Libyan Opposition. The “Day of Rage” was a term coined by Libyan protesters who were seeking to oust longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi and through defying his brutal crackdown and many took to the streets. In response, the Libyan military and security forces fired live ammunition on protesters and on the following day, security forces withdrew from Benghazi after being overwhelmed by protesters and some security personnel also joined the protesters. The protests spread across the country and anti-Gaddafi forces established a provisional government based in Benghazi, called the National Transitional Council with the goal to overthrow the Gaddafi government in Tripoli.
Likewise and critical to further discussion in this paper, Gadhafi’s response to the popular Arab Spring as demonstrated above validated his far-stretching disregard for human rights. Moreover, upon firing at the protestors, ‘Gaddafi’s cruelty against his own people disgusted even longtime cronies and set off a wave of defections that, within a week of the first demonstrations on Feb. 15, left the regime deeply — perhaps fatally — wounded’ . The violence descended from anti-government protestors into a fully-fledged civil war between rebel forces and pro-governmental militias. Due to this escalation, on the 26th February 2011, an initial United Nations intervention was triggered to protect civilians. Additionally, in response to Gadhafi’s reaction and his authorised attacks on civilians, the UN Security Council passed a resolution referring the purge-like behaviour and human rights abuses to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution.
Amidst the chaos, defected soldiers from Gaddafi’s army and civilians came together from different cities, took up arms, and formed the “Free Libyan Army”, also known as the “National Libyan Army”. Additionally, opposition forces established the National Transitional Council (NTC), originally known as the Libyan Interim National Council with the aim to provide political and military leadership. The NTC was formed in Benghazi on 27 February 2011 and pledged to lead the uprising and oversee the transition period to an elected government after the liberation of Libya.
2.4 Initial responses to the Libyan Crisis from the International community
Now that we understand how the Arab Spring came about and how it initially impacted upon the Gadhafi regime and the Libyan state, it is now necessary to follow events in a chronological order that spawned out of the spring. As we already know Gadhafi adopted a violent approach towards the rebels, which sparked international outrage and this peaked as of March 2011, where the UN Security Council authorized a no-fly zone over Libya and air strikes to protect civilians, over which NATO assumed command. Within the Security Council, Britain and France initially began to consider intervention because they felt that the emergent norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ applied to the Libyan case and they believed the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence were a threat to their border own security. Here, both groups pursued military intervention, seeing it as succeeding at relatively low cost and that if they did not intervene the problem would not be solved. Upon such developments, Nicolas Sarkozy put France at the front of the Western War Effort suggesting ‘What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians’ .
Meanwhile, British Prime Minister David Cameron outlined what he would consider a successful outcome to the military telling the House of Commons: “A successful outcome is the enforcement of the will of the UN, which is the ceasing of attacks on civilians. That is what we are aiming at. But let me be absolutely frank about this: it is a more difficult question, in many ways, than the question over Iraq, because in Iraq we had been prepared to go into a country, knock over its Government and put something else in place. That is not the approach we are taking here” .
From this statement, Mr. Cameron remained rather vague on whether Gadhafi himself is a target, and beyond the immediate aim of protecting civilians, some commentators have said that it is not clear what the coalition’s preferred outcome is. Of course, no one doubts that coalition leaders would be happy if there were a “palace coup” and Gadhafi was removed from within the regime. A spokesman for the US State Department said on 21 March: “What we are trying to do is convince Gaddafi and his regime to step down from power . . . that remains our ultimate goal” .
However, if that does not happen, what did the coalition intend to happen?
Gadhafi’s ground forces are much better trained and equipped than the rebels and there is a strong chance that he will hold on to power, at least in the western part of the country. The resolution does not call for regime change and the coalition could be faced with a situation where an extremely hostile Gadhafi regime, supported by sales from the country’s western oil fields, could for years mount attacks on shipping in the Mediterranean or resume its policy of supporting terrorist groups that target western interests.
Even if the rebels were to topple the Gadhafi regime, it is not clear that they would be capable of administering the country or that the resulting regime would be better for the Libyan population, more in line with western ideals such as human rights, or more supportive of western interests.
Furthermore, Italy notably along with The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Spain sided with the U.S. chartered ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’ . Operation Odyssey dawn concentrated on preventing further attacks by regime forces on Libyan citizens and opposition groups, especially in and around Benghazi. In doing so, the operation also sought to limit the Gadhafi regimes potential attempts to resist the no-fly zone.
Following implementation, groups of Libyan rebels were able to make territorial progress, however, these gains were soon forced back by well-equipped pro-Gadhafi forces. Markedly, the aggressive French air strike campaign revealed the first apparent features of Russian geopolitical discourse in response to the Libyan crisis. Here, through “formal geopolitics” Russia can be seen to of used UNSC resolution 1973 as a means for undermining the role of NATO, coupled with a condemnation of NATO’s actions to launch air strikes. NATO’s involvement soon escalated and was coined as ‘Operation Unified Protector’, which the Russian federation responded by stating that Russia “strongly believes that it is unacceptable to use the mandate derived from UNSC resolution 1973, the adoption of which was quite an ambiguous step, in order to achieve goals that go far beyond its provisions, which only provide for actions for the protection of civilians” . This discussion will be magnified latterly in this thesis, towards discussing initial responses to the decisions made by the UNSC, to then place Russia in accordance to a geopolitically charged discussion of how Libya shaped Russian foreign policy and how events were viewed by other major states.
By July of 2011, the rebels continued to target Gadhafi and his dismantling grip upon the state and they forced Gadhafi into hiding, as rebels were now viewing Gadhafi’s government as totally illegitimate and rebels duly took control in Tripoli. Eventually, on the 20th October – Gadhafi is captured and killed as rebel fighters take his hometown Sirte. Three days later, the NTC declares Libya to be officially “liberated” and announced plans to hold elections within eight months and one month later, Saif al-Islam, the fugitive son Gadhafi, is captured, becoming the last key Gaddafi family member to be seized or killed.
The death of Gadhafi surprisingly however, did not solve Libya’s immediate issues, and widespread violence and major clashes between the former rebel forces broke out in the already beleaguered city of Benghazi. In the wake of the New Year (2012), rebel forces began to grow in dissatisfaction that the killing of Gadhafi had not stabilized the status of Governance in Libya. Hereby, the new NTC government was criticized for being ‘slow to bring about any formal change and still remained corrupt in form and nature’ , and Abdel Hafiz Ghoga swiftly resigned. Additionally, by March, Benghazi once again became the battleground of the rebel forces, where contestations over the acquisition of oil further increased tension and pressure on the NTC in Tripoli.
A further three months passed, where little progress appeared to be made, and the interim NTC Government struggled to control local militias, especially in Zintan in the West. Here, the notable Al-Awfea Brigade briefly exerted control over Tripoli International Airport and raided the election commission building in Benghazi.
By August, the NTC government shifted power to the General National Congress (GNC), of which was elected in July.
Now that events that followed the outbreak of violence in the nations capital have been explored, it proves necessary to discuss the various groups/rebels and militias who were involved and their importance in the developing crisis. To improve understanding, this thesis will consider both those involved inside and outside of the state.
Figure 3: Political Map of Libya
Inside Libya
Instead of simply discussing the role of differing groups through a competitive lens, it is worth making the distinction that ‘the important story about the 2011 Arab revolts…is not how the globalization of the norms of civic engagement shaped the protesters’ aspirations. Nor is it about how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics. Instead, the critical issue is how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their various local contexts’ . Yet, this statement remains unclear upon these “Local Contexts”, as it is not explained if this reflects contestations between states such as Tunisia v Libya, or contestations within cities such as Tripoli v Benghazi. Upon such assertions, this paper will evaluate how each group established their own footing regarding the crisis, targeting specific forms of support, from militant violent aggressors, to groups who received funding from to initiate regime change. Through this evaluation, I share Lisa Anderson’s vision that events in Libya, stemmed from ‘ragtag bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces who ignited protests, revealing the tribal and regional cleavages that have beset the country for decades’ . Furthermore, in regards to comparisons with other states, major groupings in Libya characteristically ‘shared a common call for personal dignity and responsive government, where the revolution reflected divergent economic grievances and social dynamics-legacies of their diverse encounters with modern Europe and decades under unique regimes’ .
Government
The first and most obvious actor present can be seen through the Libyan government, the NTC, who from the perspective of outsiders appeared weak and fragile. At this juncture, Islamists and their allies had captured the capital, Tripoli, and most of Benghazi, the country’s second city. Following this, Derna, the next town up the coast, was declared as an Islamic caliphate and the front line begins at Tobruk airport. Tobruk is a small port, where seemingly the remains of Libya’s sovereign power were based. On one side of the bay, a hotel conference hall acts as chamber to the House of Representatives, circled by troops in US-made Humvee troop carriers. Such actions of these fugitive individuals left behind a government in Tripoli that exerted a feeble grasp on state affairs. Libya’s ‘runaway parliament’ had only been elected two months prior, where the elected MP’s had replaced the so-called ‘Islamist’ dominated assembly. Even though the fugitive-like government exerted almost little to no control over events in the capital, the international community recognised it as the official government and when addressing the Islamist formation in Tripoli, Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdel Aziz said the Islamist militias are “stronger than the government itself, and now possess arms even more sophisticated than the government” ; a worrying position indeed.
In summary, the government failed to promote further democracy with the fall of Gadhafi and fell subordinate to the GNC and power politics of the rival militias and other factions. Notably, in the following years, Islamists lobbied for a law “banning virtually everyone who had participated in Qaddafi’s government from holding public office”. Here, “Armed militiamen” stormed government ministries to demand the law’s passage. This law allowed Islamists to take power, removing from power several of their “key rivals”, mostly political moderates and technocrats who “had served at the end of Qaddafi’s reign”. Several months later in December, the GNC endorsed Sharia law and voted to extend its mandate.
Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the “Libyan National Army”
Within the factions that emerged with the disintegration of the establishment, Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the “Libyan National Army” can be seen as pivotal in upholding the battle against the government. Haftar graduated from the Benghazi Military Academy and went on to receive military training in both the Soviet Union and Egypt. From this position, Haftar found himself serving in the Libyan army under Gadhafi, and took part in the coup that brought Gaddafi to power in 1969. However, the formal general fell out with the dictator and he adopted a senior position in the forces, which overthrew Gaddafi in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. Interestingly, Haftar also is a U.S. citizen, after he spent two decades of exile in Virginia, where his significance wavered as the CIA in Langley ostensibly trained him . During Haftar’s time spent in the U.S., according to a New York Times report from 1991, American intelligence services under the approval of then resident Ronald Reagan funded and assisted the training of Haftar and his 350-strong contingent of troops in “sabotage and other guerrilla skills” in Chad as part of efforts to bring about the overthrow of Gaddafi. However, as the Chadian government was itself overthrown in 1990, the US sought a new home for Haftar and his troops, said the report. After a failed attempt to settle them in Kenya, Washington was eventually forced to grant them asylum and bring them back to the US.
As time moved on, Haftar’s life in the U.S. would remain vague, as he spent the next 20 years living a seemingly quiet life with his family in suburban Virginia. This prompted additional speculation of his involvement with the CIA. Haftar resided only a few miles away from the CIA’s headquarters in Langley. According to the New York Times, Haftar himself has said he often spoke to the CIA during his time in Virginia.
Haftar announced his return in 2011 and decided to appear in a televised announcement to outline his plans to thwart the controversial Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC). The GNC remained Islamist based in correspondence to the law passed that banned all Gadhafi affiliated members. In place of said ‘rogue’ formation, Haftar designated the formation of a caretaker government to oversee new elections. However, such proclamations did not go ahead unquestioned, as critics quickly dismissed his ideals with great skepticism, including a damning condemnation by the then acting Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who personally targeted Haftar’s actions, labeling them as a pathetic “coup attempt” and “ridiculous” in magnitude .
However, after initial successes Haftar’s GNC offensive ultimately stalled, allegedly emerging from suspicions about his political affiliations and the fact that his unconfirmed links to the CIA remained. Haftar was seen as ‘anti-Islamic’ in nature, which stemmed from his overly aggressive stance against Islamist groups. Furthermore, Haftar’s return remains stained by the essence of regime change, coupled with his unclear ambitions in the runaway NTC Tobruk Government. Suggestively, the fact that Haftar returned from the US to topple Gadhafi evokes suspicion of Western backed regime change and Gamel Salin adds that when the Transitional National Congress was recognized as the legitimate government in Libya, not only was Gen. Haftar seen with close links to the U.S., as many of the TNC leaders were reported to have close connections with the United States including Mahmoud Jibril, who acted as the interim prime minister. The NTC governed Libya for a period of ten months after the end of the war, holding elections to a General National Congress on 7 July 2012, and handing power to the newly elected assembly on 8 August.
However, as NATO went beyond the terms mandated by the UN resolution, failing to fully prevent civilian casualties through “the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence,” NATO intervened on the side of the Libya Dawn Coalition and other pro GNC formations, these actions unilaterally shifted the mission in the direction of regime change by force. This led Amr Moussa, the then Secretary-General of the Arab League, to accuse Gen. Haftar of state sponsored regime change, adding that the United States violated the UN resolution, stressing that “what is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians” . Moussa’s 21st March 2011 declaration suggested that some of the 22 Arab League members were taken aback by what they have seen and wanted to modify their approval lest they be perceived as accepting outright Western military intervention in Libya, thus condemning the unclear actions of Haftar.
Furthermore, when looking at Gen. Haftar’s actions, he and his fellows can be said to have repelled the Islamist groups within Libya. However, the formations of these Islamist groups are certainly not simple to pin down, as the militias proved diverse and varied in radicalisation. Hereby, discussion will now focus upon the formation of the opposing Islamist groups and deciphering differing factions within them. Notably, Western Media has a knack of painting all these factions under the banner of being ‘Islamist’ in form, where they often ignore the varying requests and forms of conduct.
The Islamists – Who they are & what do they want?
During Gadhafi’s 42 year long ruling, Libya’s Islamists were imprisoned, forced underground or fled into exile, however, they soon rose in numbers again after his capture in October 2011. In terms of evaluating the numerous splinter groups and ideological formations, it proves necessary to view these Islamist groups as spanning the ideological spectrum, from moderates who embrace democracy to militants with a global vision linked to al Qaeda.
Western Militias
As the 2011 rebellion continued, various militias emerged out of the eastern and western Libyan cities, yet notably in the west these cities included the larger cities such as Zintan, Misurate and Tripoli. These militias emerged from two decisive factors that contributed to the escalation of the uprising. The first was due to the violent response of the Gadhafi government upon protestors and as more protesters were killed, the more quickly political, military and tribal leaders joined in to protect their fellow compatriots and cities. Hereby, local council and militia groups appeared on a city-to-city basis to contest the regime. Many of the networks relied on pre-existing groups within Libyan society, based upon principles of loyalty, regionalism, ideology and tribe . Many individuals who joined said organisations would self-fund their purchase of arms and quite literally get in their cars to join the fight. Worth noting here before we proceed relates to the fact that the local dynamics of the militias varied from region to region. For example, in the Western regions of Tripolitania, many were autonomous, self-armed and self-trained, aided by large numbers of civilians who often lacked sufficient military training. In the eastern region of Cyrenaica, the situation varied immensely, as notably in Benghazi much of the anti-regime activity stemmed from army defectors. In doing so, the ‘Eastern rebellion was built on a strong core of experienced regime opponents and commanders who found a safe haven to defect to’ . Benghazi represented a stark contrast, as militias were well organised and well trained, opposed to the more offensive based Tripoli militias, who reflected admirable efforts put together by local residents and various militias across the country that went into Tripoli with the main aim to topple the regime.
However, worth noting is that soon militias became increasingly politicized. What this meant is that political forces, and elected representatives within the General National Congress (GNC), would target the support of specific militias to extend their own legitimacy and power. In summary, these actions can also be seen as vices of politicians, who feel as if increasing support from militias will push forward their own personal agendas, coupled by militias providing security for the government or ministries to consolidate power .
Dawn of Libya
Dawn of Libya encompasses an alliance between a coalition of Islamist forces and militia groups from Misrata. As General Haftar’s campaign posed an existential threat to Islamic formations, coupled with encouragement from the Qatari-Turkish axis supporting regional political Islam, these groups launched operation Fajr Libya (Libyan Dawn) on July 13, 2014. Within this formation, included are Islamist militias featuring the prominent February 17th Martyrs. Dawn of Libya also deny any relationship with the notorious Ansar al-Sharia , who have held responsibility for various terrorist actions, including the 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. In distancing themselves from Ansar al-Sharia, Dawn of Libya claim they do not affiliate with terrorist groups and are apparently focused upon charitable works in Libyan communities . In terms of military feats, they managed to capture and seize the international airport in Tripoli, which is controlled by the Qaaqaa and Sawaq brigades, which are linked to Al-Zintan tribe and allied with Haftar. In fact, the naming of Libya Dawn originally referred to the militias’ operation to seize Tripoli but soon came to refer to the various groupings that are under its umbrella. However, seen with the seizure of Tripoli airport, Libya dawn was successful in exerting their operational goal in seizing Tripoli from Pro Government and Gadhafi forces.
Misratan militias
In Misrata, ‘Misratan militias’, occupied the city with more than 200 militias with 40,000 fighters. Misratan militias were aided by monetary injections by private businessmen, coupled with ideological links to Muslim Brotherhood politicians. Here, the militia has received funding from one of Libya’s most successful businessmen in Mohammed Raed . The brigades located in Misrata can also be seen to be included as a part of the Libya Dawn coalition, which seized Tripoli in August. In summary, a coalition with the Libya Dawn allowed for the Misratan militias to support the rival parliament under Omar al Hassi.
The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR)
The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) is a militia, which answers to the Libyan parliament, the GNC. Furthermore, with their open approach for coalition, the group sided with Libya Dawn and the above Misratan militias. Hereby, the LROR featured heavily over Libya Dawn’s warring acquisition of Tripoli International airport, battling drug dealers, human traffickers and liberal politicians who once were Gadhafi loyalists. Upon the attack by Islamist militias on the international airport in Tripoli, the LROR issued a warning to Gen. Haftar, stating that this is a “Last warning to whoever joined or has been manipulated into the operation of evil led by the retired criminal Haftar” .
The group’s growing membership and influence shows the perils of Libya’s security vacuum, which allows armed extremists to shape the political future.
Two Islamists, Shaaban Hadia and Adel Gharyani lead LROR. Furthermore, in addition to their attempts to rebuild security, the LROR actively aims to pay higher salaries, which attracts recruits from the police force to join their ranks . Analysts in Washington have affiliated the group with terrorist group al-Qaeda, yet the group itself vehemently denies any links. In interviews during a visit to Camp 27, which is known as LROR’s stronghold, Borzou Daragahi labels the group as a secretive, hardline Islamist organisation with a political and security agenda .
A primary goal of the LROR is to extract power from GNC Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and the group was responsible for his brief abduction. The LROR have supported other elements of the GNC, where leader Nouri Abusahmain used his power as GNC president to form the LROR by uniting existing militias.