Essay: Coalition building in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu

In 2014, there were a total of 1687 political parties, both national and regional, contesting in the Lok Sabha elections in India. These elections decide the members of the lower house of the Parliament and hence the Prime Minister of India. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which went on to win the elections, currently consists of 40 of those political parties, and is helmed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). There has not been a single party government at the center since 1989. Even the official opposition —the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), is a major coalition, composed of 8 member parties. As it stands, coalition politics are the norm in India.
This paper discusses coalition building in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu (TN), with particular focus on the rise of the People’s Welfare Alliance (PWA) in the run up to TN General Elections 2016. The TN General Elections will be held in May 2016 and is likely to see three major coalitions fighting it out in 234 constituencies. The last date to register as a candidate is April 29. Within the PWA, the events surrounding the addition of two parties: DMDK and TMC are especially interesting. Before discussing the negotiations that made this coalition possible, it is important to set the context of the political system in India and Tamil Nadu. Attached in the index is a list of abbreviations of political parties that might be useful while reading this paper.
Former Chief Justice of India M.N. Venkatachalaiah remarked, in 2012, that coalition politics was the sign of the “degeneration of democracy.” According to him, coalitions lead to a dilution in the supremacy of prime ministerial and chief ministerial leadership. He is not alone in his disgust for coalition politics. However, the culture of coalition politics is so established in the Indian political consciousness that in 2014, despite being able to secure a majority alone, BJP chose to form the government as part of the NDA.
Christophe Jaffrelot, from Carnegie, attributes the rise of coalitions in India to three factors: (a) “the state of the states,” (b) rise of regional parties, (c) and apparent end of national parties. Due to the Indian political system’s distribution of power between the central and the state government, state governments are much more influential and prominent in the day-to-day lives of people in the state. National parties try to take advantage of this relationship between regional political parties and their constituencies. They form coalitions with regional parties so that they can establish higher numbers without having to establish their presence from the group up. It is also a way to get their message across to sections of the population who are otherwise unreachable due to geographical, ethnic and linguistic barriers.
These coalitions usually take the form of pre-electoral alliances, although post-poll alliances are not uncommon. In a plurality-majority system like India, pre-electoral alliances usually mean that parties in a coalition agree not to compete against each other in the same constituencies. Therefore, seat-sharing and the distribution of constituencies play a large role during the negotiations of these coalitions. Some consider post-poll alliances to be a breach of trust and it has gained a rather bad rap in recent times. Therefore, it is usually used as a last resort in case of a hung election. Although pre-electoral coalitions imply a concession of seats to allies, parties consider this worth the potential benefit of not having to build up a voter base from scratch. This is a strategy that scholars credit the BJP for being able to leverage particularly well.
In a lot of Indian states, the governments in power are usually also formed as a coalition of smaller parties and often with the support of a national party. In turn, their allies are able to offer them support to form the national government. In order to strategise the formation of a coalition government at the centre, national parties thus have to cognizant of local and state politics. BJP is allied with the ruling parties of 14 states and union territories out of a total of 29 states and 7 union territories.
The case of Tamil Nadu is particularly interesting because the political battle in Tamil Nadu is not ideological but ethnic. Since 1967, power in the state has alternated between the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). The DMK and AIADMK were both borne out of a movement asserting Dravidian identity against the perceived imposition of North Indian and Brahmanical values by national parties. Ideologically, the two parties are nearly identical — they are leftist, populist parties that aim to eradicate the ills of religion such as the caste system.
The Indian National Congress (INC) which was in power in erstwhile Madras State since India’s independence in 1947 faced a massive defeat in 1967 at the hands of DMK lead by C.M. Annadurai. The election was held in the aftermath of the violent protests against the imposition of Hindi as the official language of India replacing English. The winning coalition, led by DMK and consisting of 9 other smaller parties, won 179 out of 234 seats leaving the Indian National Congress (which contested alone) with 51 and others with 4. Tamil Nadu was the second state in the newly formed Indian republic where the dominance of the Indian National Congress was challenged and ended by local parties. This marked the beginning of Dravidian politics in the state.
The DMK was later fractured by the departure of M.G. Ramachandran (MGR) – prominent party member and influential actor who created the AIADMK party and wrested the elections from DMK in 1977. He stayed in power as the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu till his death in 1987, after which neither party has ever been able to win consecutive elections in the state.
Any discussion about Tamil Nadu politics must also discuss the connections between the Tamil film industry and the Tamil political sphere. MGR was one of the most celebrated actors of his time and his protegee J Jayalalithaa was his leading lady in several films. DMK chief Karunanidhi is a poet and writer and has written the script for several movies. DMDK which will play a central role in the 2016 elections is headed by Vijayakant, a former actor. Several other smaller parties are also headed by former movie stars and those involved in the Tamil firm industry. Hero worship is a literal phenomena in Tamil Nadu and movie stars are often granted demi God status and respect. It is a natural transition from movie stardom to the political sphere where they are given the same kind of respect along with political power.
In the 2011 legislative elections, the AIADMK swept into power lead by MGR’s protegee J Jayalalitha. The previous government’s bid for power was marred by various controversies and corruption scandals including the 2G Spectrum Scandal which changed the discourse about corruption in India. The major issues that shaped the 2011 TN General elections were: (a) dissatisfaction with the parties in power at the Centre (Congress led UPA), (b) corruption scandals that rocked the UPA-DMK coalition and (c) India’s response to the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka.
That year, AIADMK allied with several parties including the Communist Parties and then up and coming DMDK, effectively ruling out a possibility of a third front. Although relations between DMK and UPA were strained, AIADMK smartly chose not to engage with the UPA government or any central party. This coalition won 203 out of 234 seats in Tamil Nadu.
Prior to the elections, AIADMK chose to assert its dominance over its allies by publicly announcing the list of 160 constituencies it will be contesting from even as negotiations were still going on with its allies. However, this backfired as its allies predictably did not react well to not being consulted about the allotment of constituencies. After allies threatened to walk out and form a third front, AIADAM acceded to their initial demands. However, a negotiation breakdown caused a souring of the relationship between MDMK and AIADMK and the latter neglected to fulfill the demands of MDMK which proceeded to leave the coalition.
This has shown itself to be gross error on AIADMK’s part as MDMK is now the central force behind the creation of the People’s Welfare Front – a third bloc contesting the 2016 elections and threatening to upend the supremacy of the two Dravidian parties. Interestingly, MDMK was earlier aligned with the DMK party before 2011 and it left that alliance due to a disagreement with DMK leadership.
While third front coalitions have emerged in Tamil Nadu before, none have been successful in garnering popularity among the Tamil electorate. The unprecedented popularity of PWF as a third front has been attributed to the rise of educated young voices in the electorate and their frustration with the rock and a hard place dilemma that most Tamilians feel themselves put in, every election season. Jayalalithaa has also seen her fair share of controversies during her years in power as Chief Minister. She was found guilty, sentenced to four years in jail, and later acquitted of tax fraud and holding disproportionate assets in 2014. During the December 2015 Chennai floods, AIADMK party goons were found plastering stickers of Jayalalitha on aid and goods being sourced and transported by civilian relief workers. This received social and mainstream media attention and the party faced public backlash.
The PWF consolidated its status as a pre-electoral coalition in October 2015 and renamed itself the People’s Welfare Alliance (PWA). PWA initially consisted of MDMK, which was scorned by AIADMK in 2011, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI(M)) and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK). The PWA rejected all possibilities of an alliance with both AIADMK and DMK. Interestingly, they have also rejected the possibility of allying with the national parties – INC and BJP. They want to remove all connections to corruption on both the state and national fronts.
Their strategy was to unite several small parties under the banner with a majority of their star power being provided by heavy hitters like DMDK and TMC. While their manifesto is not significantly different from the DMK or AIADMK, their novelty and consequently, their lack of controversies work in their favor. For the 65% of the Tamil population which remains unaffiliated with either party, the PWF provides an alternative that did not always exist.
PWA can also be considered a good example of the weak banding together. The parties that make up the PWA are all small, especially compared to the Dravidian behemoths. The four parties that initially pulled the coalition together makeup less than 10% of the vote-share in the state. While the possibility of the third front sweeping elections remains unlikely, they are expected to make a significant dent and even displace one of the big Dravidian parties as the government’s opposition.
There were three major milestones that mark the journey of PWA from PWF to a legitimate third front in the 2016 TN General elections:
Announcement of entry into the TN General Elections and release of Common Minimum Programme — a mini manifesto.
Induction of DMDK into alliance
Induction of TMC into alliance
From a negotiation perspective, the last two are most interesting.
Induction of DMDK
The DMDK entered the arena with a lot to offer, regardless of which side they picked. The party was formed in 2005 by Tamil actor Vijayakanth along the same lines as the other Dravidian Parties. It has maintained a consistent vote share since its first election in 2006 and emerged as a formidably opponent to the other Dravidian parties. The DMDK made waves in its first election despite not winning any of the seats in which it contested. It wrought an alliance with AIADMK in the 2011 TN General Elections solely to keep DMK which worked. The alliance with AIADMK was wrought with the intention of keeping DMK out of the running and this worked. For the first time since 1967, a party other than DMK or AIADMK became the official opposition party in the state.
DMDK brought a lot to the table: star power in the form of its actor leader Vijayakant; proven popularity in the electorate; and novelty. It was being wooed by all the major coalitions in the state including those lead by the AIADMK, DMK and the PWA. Eventually, DMDK chose to part ways with previous ally AIADMK and ensconced itself with the PWA. However, this happened pretty late in the game. PWA co-ordinator and head of MDMK – Vaiko publicly announced well before the alliance that PWA was willing to go the extra mile to heed DMDK’s wishes. In return for its contributions, DMDK was given 124 constituencies with the other PWA parties sharing 110 amongst each other. The name of the alliance was changed to DMDK-PWA and DMDK chief Vijayakant was announced as the Chief Ministerial candidate. Other PWA leaders would become kingmakers and PWA would finally get a face for their party.
While we cannot know the parallel negotiations that were conducted between DMDK leadership and the two big parties, Vijayakant claimed that he did not approach any of the other parties for an alliance. It displayed realistic overconfidence by waiting until the last minute and even floating the idea of entering the fray on its own. DMDK was able to position itself as a party that was being sought after by others. It also helped that DMK and BJP both made public announcements of a likely partnership with DMDK. It took full advantage of its popularity to choose what it considered its best option. So, when the announcement was made about DMDK joining PWA, it seemed like a coup for the young front. It was the principle of social proof carried to fruition. “Everyone wanted DMDK on their side, so they must be important. DMDK chose to side with PWA, which means tat PWA has something valuable to offer to the people.” In return for Vijayakant changing his mind about entering the elections alone, the PWA gave DMDK pretty much everything they wanted. DMDK clearly had the upper hand.
However, by choosing to side with the PWA, DMDK has given up the option of having the backing of DMK or AIADMK, either of which could mean a surer win for DMDK in several constituencies due to their combined popularity. This was demonstrated in the earlier elections contested by DMDK. It chose to stand alone in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections and failed to win any of the 39 seats it contested in the state. In the 2011 TN General elections, DMDK contested as part of the AIADMK coalition and won 29 of the 41 seats contested. Due to this reason, this alliance with PWF hasn’t been universally well-received by the DMDK party cadres. More than 10 district secretaries have defected from the DMDK since the announcement of this alliance.
On the other hand, this way, DMDK gets to lead an alliance, a lion’s share of seats in the elections, as well as a shot at the Chief Minister’s seat. This was the conundrum Vijayakanth posed to his followers in late February. “Do you want me to be king or kingmaker?” he asked them and “King,” they shouted back. DMDK’s BATNA would be to side with either one of the big Dravidian parties. In this case, it would take a hit in the number of seats contested as well as its leadership position in the alliance. This might also alienate the section of the party that wants to support PWA and Vijayakanth would lose all chances of becoming Chief Minister in this election. However, the chances of winning constituencies is higher with a powerful ally than if DMDK were to contest alone. In either case, DMDK is not in a bad position this election cycle.
Induction of TMC
The other party that PWF coordinator Vaiko expressed interest in pulling in was the Tamil Manila Congress (TMC). TMC has a tumultuous history with the Indian National Congress. It was launched as a breakaway party from the INC in Tamil Nadu in 1995 in protest of INC’s decision to ally with AIADMK. It was re-merged with the INC in 2001 by the current leader of TMC (G.K. Vasan). The reputation of INC and UPA plummeted in the state after corruption scandals broke out during the previous central government. Vasan decided to split from the INC in 2014 again and relaunched the TMC party to focus more exclusively on Tamil issues, something that he felt was lacking in the INC. This is TMC’s first election since 2001 and thus it is relatively untested.
Coming into the elections, TMC has neither the star power nor the proven strength of DMDK. This didn’t stop them from succumbing to the overconfidence trap like the DMDK did. Unlike the DMDK however, their overconfidence was more optimistic than realistic. The INC party is plagued by factional splits and the one led by G.K. Vasan was one of the most prominent ones in the party. G.K. Vasan fell into the trap of expecting the same kind of treatment from outside the INC as well. He expected to be invited by AIADMK or maybe the DMK to be a part of their alliance. This did not happen.
Here, TMC demonstrated a lack of situational awareness. They did not do a good enough job of getting to know their potential negotiation counterparts or opponents; in this case—the DMK or AIADMK. AIADMK leader Jayalalitha has never been one to take perceived slights lightly, and Vasan campaigned ruthlessly against her as part of the DMK alliance only 5 years earlier. When the INC party allied with the DMK and got more than 40 seats, partnership with the DMK was ruled out by the TMC. Due to a combination of overestimating their value and not reading their opponents right, TMC expected to be approached about a potential alliance. This turned out to be a huge mistake and reduced the value of TMC’s BATNA as time went on without negotiations.
Finally, in early April, AIADMK invited Vasan to hold talks with party leadership regarding an alliance. Earlier, news had leaked that AIADMK was only willing to offer TMC less than 10 seats which, while way out of the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), I believe anchored negotiations. Before this, TMC party cadres expected to get as many seats out of its alliance with AIADMK as the INC did out of its alliance with DMK. When the meeting was finally held, they were grudgingly willing to start bargaining with 25 seats as their baseline while AIADMK upped its limit to 15-20. With no ZOPA, it was up to either side to move their limits. AIADMK clearly had a better BATNA: they could walk out of the negotiations with little lost. At the same time, Vasan was caught by the consistency principle. He had earlier claimed that at least 80% of INC’s Tamil Nadu wing had walked out with him in 2014 to form TMC. With those numbers, settling for anything less than what INC had managed to wrangle out of their allies would have been an insult.
There was also another caveat to this alliance. TMC would have to campaign and contest under the AIADMK party symbol of two leaves instead of its own symbol. TMC could not reconcile with having to settle for so much less than they had started with, so they decided to walk out of the negotiations without an agreement.
Their BATNA was clearly to take up the PWF on their earlier invitation to join them. However, their bargaining power was drastically reduced by the breakdown in their negotiation with AIADMK. Due to the sequence of events that transpired between PWF’s initial invitation and TMC’s acceptance to meet, the nature of negotiations also changed. While it was the PWF that approached the TMC, they were no longer the only ones under pressure to come to a negotiated agreement. Their BATNA now would be to contest the elections alone, which would have been disastrous in more ways than one.
It was clear that TMC was holding out on negotiations with PWF to see if there was a better deal that came around. This was a mistake. Delaying the negotiation only made their BATNA worse over time. “TMC could have easily negotiated 50 seats from the PWA if they had gotten in early. Now, however, they are stuck with 26 which is not impressive especially since they are not affiliated with either Dravidian party.” 20 of those seats came from the DMDK share, reducing it to 104 and the remaining came from the other PWA parties. PWF agreed to rename the alliance to PWA-DMDK-TMC to soothe any hurt sentiments that emerged out of this deal which was a superficial but effective gesture. The third front was finalized and their seat allotments were announced on April 15, 2 weeks before the deadline for candidate nomination.
Being a young alliance, joining the PWF comes with all sorts of uncertainties: would your party members be able to reconcile their ideological beliefs with that of the new parties? Without an established ally, how much would your chances of winning seats reduce? Would the people of Tamil Nadu overcome the inertia of voting for either the DMK or AIADMK to try something new?
According to many pundits, the PWF has no chance of winning in the state. The election is between the DMK and AIADMK fronts. However, with a consistent effort to recruit more players and effective campaigning, PWF could make enough of a dent in the voter base of both DMK and AIADMK to become the official opposition.
While talking about Tamil or even Indian politics, it is important to keep in mind the influence of caste on the voting process. Despite their claims of abolishing the caste system and equalizing the Tamil community, even Dravidian parties rely on caste-based vote banks. Certain castes are guaranteed to vote for AIADMK while others are guaranteed for DMK. These vote banks exist due to the strategic induction of prominent members of the caste into the parties. There are also political parties formed solely on the basis of caste. VCK was formed to promote Dalit progress and PMK was formed to represent the Vanniyars (another backward caste) of northern Tamil Nadu. These caste politics make elections predominantly identity based instead os issue or ideology based.
This kind of politicking easily explains why smaller parties have been unable to break through the Dravidian Parties’ barriers. As they are often formed to represent a specific identity, they do not appeal to a cross-section of castes in the same way that the term “Dravidian” does. It started as an anti-Brahmin movement and retains that narrative to this day. This is another way in which PWF differs from the two main parties. Due to the involvement of the Communist parties – CPI/CPI(M) – it has a clear ideological basis in leftist politics. There are Dravidian parties involved in it (MDMK AND DMDK) to appeal to more castes. TMC, however, doesn’t add much to the all-round appeal of the party and brings nothing new to the table except for the political experience of G.K. Vasan.
The core parties of PWF have also set a rhythm for themselves that comes into play when they are negotiating with new players. For such a new alliance, not much discord has been publicized. In fact, while negotiating with TMC, the core parties held initial discussions with Vasan before taking it to DMDK – the purported leader of the alliance. In an interview, senior party leaders said, about the TMC-PWA alliance, “Earlier in the day, PWF leaders Vaiko, G Ramakrishnan (CPI-M), R Mutharasan (CPI) and VCK’s Thol.Thirumavalavan held parleys with Vasan at his Alwarpet residence here. Later, all of them drove to the DMDK headquarters at Koyambedu where the poll pact was clinched following talks with Vijayakanth.”
Coalition poltics are messy, complicated and enormously fascinating. A lot of the time, the talks happen behind closed doors and the public is never really aware of the discussions. If pre-electoral alliances are this shadowy, post-poll alliances are a whole other level. Parties that ran vicious campaigns against each other before polls find common ground if they need to, after it. At this point, the ZOPA is tiny but their BATNA is to go through the entire polling process once again. It would be interesting to see if the PWA would have enough of an effect on the 2016 elections to necessitate a post-poll alliance with the winning party.