Essay: Chechnya and Ingushetia

The scholar of passing interest in terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam in Russia could be forgiven for assuming that Chechnya was the hub for the most extreme elements of the post-Soviet Islamic revival of the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, in recent years Dagestan and Ingushetia, have been credited with being the more virulently secessionist republics in the North Caucasus, superseding the prowess of the Chechen revolutionaries primarily due to the undeniably successful, albeit utterly brutal, counter-insurgency and repression inflicted on any Chechens libel to oppose Kadyrov. In many ways, this is a return to type. While the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic did produce and host Salafist debate during the perestroika years, the following accrued here was of considerably limited significance in comparison with neighbouring Dagestan. Why this is the case is uncertain. Although Chechnya opted to secede and then defend its secession through a military campaign, the initial driving force was a form of secular nationalism, led by former Soviet commanders like Dudayev and Maskhadov who were sooner inspired by Baltic state independence movements than an emerging political Islam epitomised by the Taliban and the Sudanese National Islamic Front.
Nevertheless, a burgeoning Salafist movement did receive a minor audience in Chechnya and Ingushetia prior to the outbreak of war in the former in 1994. With the Soviet Union on the brink of collapse, small groups emerged, dedicated to the supplanting of the local Sufi hegemony through a political discourse that put them in line with their neighbouring idealists. The mutual desire of Salafists from Dagestan and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR to cultivate close ties with a view to a political-theological union acted as a precursor for the militant union that succeeded the demise of Chechen militant nationalism in the 2000s. However, in the early 1990s the Chechen branch of the IRP, led by Akhmed Mataev and Islam Khalimov, had to contend with this nationalism and consequently found a considerably meagre following for their cause in Chechnya.
Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia
Radical Islam also developed in a similar manner in the Muslim majority republics of the North Caucasus of lesser note, or rather of less frequent strife: Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. An emphasis should be placed on the context in which Salafist Islam was fostered and nurtured in these two republics, but particularly Kabardino-Balkaria. Here, as in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, a burgeoning class of Middle Eastern educated youth emerged with a steadfast desire to institute their belief system. The chief proponents of this Islamic revival were Anzor Astemirov, Rasul Kudaev and Musa Mukozhev. These three young imams rejected what they saw as imperceptive teachings of Islam, led by a corrupt clergy who colluded with the authorities. Astemirov and Mukozhev repudiated violence as their modus operandi, preferring education and proselytising in an effort to win over the general population to their cause. Although they disagreed with the authority of the central state, they recognised that the preconditions for sharia were not yet present in Kabardino-Balkaria and therefore opted for overt transparency in all their machinations rather than a surreptitious campaign against the state that could lead to conflict. Accordingly, all missionary work was conducted in accordance with the legislature and in 1993 they established an ‘Islamic Centre’ in the capital Nalchik to continue their indoctrination through education. The success in promoting a non-violent interpretation of Salafism led all neofundamentalist communities in the republic to align themselves under Astemirov and Mukozhev, forming the Kabardino-Balkaria jamaat. Their tactic of promotion through peaceful and open means struck a cord with may young followers of this brand of religion, and what emerged was a unified, hierarchically well-structured organisation with the primary goal being the indoctrination through largely pedagogical and sermonising means.
Of the regions concerned in this paper, Salafism was weakest in the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia in the early 1990s. Muhammad Bidzhiev, an Islamic scholar and local representative of the IRP led the Salafist community of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Like his counterparts in Kabardino-Balkaria, Bidzhiev recognised that establishing state functions in line with his beliefs was nigh on impossible in his region of the burgeoning Russian Federation. This was not simply because local Sufi beliefs were too strong, but also for the demographic make-up of the republic whereby just short of 50% of the population adhered to any form of Islamic faith. If Astemirov and Mukozhev were astute in their tactics for the gradual development of their ideology, Bidzhiev offered “how not to” manual of pushing an ideology with an exceedingly limited base in a hostile environment. Rather than focusing on indoctrination, Bidzhiev chose to take control of a given territory with a view to expansion. In November 1991, with the Soviet Union in total collapse Bidzhiev set up his own small fiefdom in the town of Karachaevsk and announced the creation of the Karachai Imamate. While Bidzhiev was popular amongst the youth of the region, his endeavour put him at odds with the central authorities as well as local leaders. As a result, his Imamate was dissolved in 1993 and he was forced to flee. Other groups emerged during the mid 1990s, no doubt influenced by the evolving conflict in Chechnya. However, Salafism remained on the margins in Karachaevo-Cherkessia.
The Chechnya Factor
The First War
If radical Islam had a limited, but nevertheless devout audience in the early 1990s, the two wars fought for the soul of Chechnya from 1994 onwards dramatically altered both the uptake and the financing of this movement. While Chechen nationalism was ostensibly the driving force behind the first war (1994-1996), the very nature of the conflict, whereby a rather indigent Muslim polity was invaded by a ‘western’ military force of considerable might inherently designated the war as a battle between Islam and a crusader. In fact, although the Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev was reticent to play the Muslim card as he maintained an allegiance to the ideas of secularism, he did invoke the idea of a religious war with the notion of gazawat. This was the term used to describe the resistance of the Muslim people of the North Caucasus against the Russian imperial invasion of the 18th and 19th centuries and essentially equates to holy war. Such a petition for mobilisation, whether intentional or accidental, beseeched not only neighbouring Muslim communities for assistance, but also provoked Islamic fighters from the Middle East and Central Asia to migrate to Chechnya and wage their own jihad against the Kremlin forces.
The outbreak of hostilities resulted in the arrival of radical religious figures from Dagestan and further afield who came with the intention of offering military assistance as well as proselytising the indigenous population and establishing centres of education and theological guidance. One of the chief ideologues to arrive during this period was the Jordanian of Chechen extraction Sheikh al-Fathi al-Shishani. Due to his capacity to converse in Chechen, al-Fathi al-Shishani was able to establish with relative ease several Salafi jamaats and accrue considerable popularity amongst the youth of Chechnya. Bagauddin Kebedov also opted to spread his ideology after fleeing to Chechnya from Dagestan in 1998. Based in the Urus-Martan area of Chechnya, Kebedov and his followers set about preaching the principles of Salafi Islam, while also cultivating links with influential local players like Zelimkhan Yandarbiev.
During this period, arguably the most influential vagabond to land in Chechnya was Ibn al-Khattab, a jihadist in every sense of the word from Saudi Arabia. Khattab began his career in Afghanistan in 1988, ironically fighting military units of the Soviet Union. The conflict in Afghanistan with the USSR was in some ways a precursor to what we are witnessing in Syria today. Then, thousands of Muslim volunteers flocked in order to defend Afghanistan from the onslaught of the godless Soviets. Buoyed by the rallying call of scholars like the Palestinian theologian Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, units of fighters from varying backgrounds and nationalities were trained in Pakistan and formed a coherent opposition to the Soviet forces. In 1989, with the retreat of the Soviets confirmed, Azzam who would later found Al Qaeda with Osama bin Laden, advocated the establishment of trans-national brigades that would defend Muslim communities and provoke a bellicose interpretation of jihad around the world. Khattab was very much a disciple of Azzam, believing that jihad as a defence of Islam was the responsibility of every able bodied Muslim male. Furthermore, Khattab followed Azzam’s interpretation of belligerent jihad in conjunction dawa (proselytising) as necessary tactics in the expansion of Islam beyond its traditional homelands. In Chechnya in this period of significant unrest, Khattab found support in influential Chechen Salafist ideologues like Movladi Udugov and popular warlords like Shamil Basaev, Salman Raduev and Arbi Baraev who either espoused similar goals or were willing to cede ideological ground in order to benefit from the financial benefits and an influx of experienced personnel that Khattab’s presence guaranteed.
The nominal Chechen victory in the first war should have ushered in a period of harmony and consolidation. However, the conflict had destroyed the infrastructure of an already impoverished region. Furthermore, the Khasavyurt Accords did not implicitly signify a Chechen independence, meaning the burgeoning polity remained in the murky Russian sphere of influence and was unable to necessarily access global funding for the reconstruction of the cities and towns. Moreover, the Kremlin was far from forthcoming with aid, especially considering the casualties incurred at the hands of the Chechen military. This situation of destitution meant that Salafism was ripe for consumption. Not satisfied with subverting the secular nationalism previously advocated, Udugov, Basaev and Khattab drew up plans for the unification of the Caucasian Muslim republics under the Black Standard flag of Islam. The first step was uniting Chechnya and Dagestan. In 1997, Udugov established the movement Islamskaya Natsiya which endeavoured to bring about an Islamic State on the territories of Dagestan and Chechnya. Udugov stated that “Ichkeria (Chechnya) is an integral part of Dagestan […] historically our peoples have had very close ties, so it is quite natural for the nations of Dagestan and Chechnya to wish to live in one united Islamic state.” Following on from this, the Congress of Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan (CPID) was inaugurated in April 1998 with Basaev as the head of the organisation. In what can only be described as an unintentionally facetious appellation, the military wing of the CPID was entitled the Islamic Peace-making Battalion.
These machinations were not simply manifestations of an expansionist Chechen agenda. Bagauddin Kebedov and his Dagestani Salafi compatriots were also in favour of unifying Islam and installing sharia on much of the North Caucasian region, with a Chechen-Dagestani unification the logical first step. The failure to bring about an extensive adoption of Salafism and consequent societal change through peaceful means, forced Kebedov to alter his stance on violent insurrection. In 1998, in the Buinaksk district of Dagestan, a jamaat under the command of Djarulla Radjbaddinov unified and took over four villages in central Dagestan – Kadar, Durangi, Chabanmakhi and Karamakhi – removing the juridical authority of the central government and installing their interpretation of sharia. Khattab and Basaev played a significant role in the arming and defensive organisation of this burgeoning independent entity through the CPID. Emboldened by the untrammelled success of this initial move for sedition, Khattab and Basaev made a significant attempt to couple Dagestan and Chechnya with a minor invasion of sorts from Chechnya into the Botlikh district of Dagestan in August 1999. Basaev was steadfast in his interpretation of events:
“What is going on in Dagestan is a mighty ‘jihad’, a holy war to expel the infidels from an Islamic land, which has been in the Islamic fold for thirteen centuries. […] We are fighting for the proclamation of an Islamic republic and the establishment of a greater Chechen empire in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia.”
Despite this gradual acclivity towards the more militant neofundamentalist dogma in Dagestan and Chechnya, Sufism remained the dominant credenda of the Muslim communities. Even Salafists in the other republics remained relatively pacifistic. In Chechnya itself, the leader of the republic, Aslan Maskhadov, was abhorred by the actions of the band of pugnacious warlords led by Basaev and Khattab. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the duo of Astemirov and Mukozhev remained reticent to violent insurrection and strongly canvassed their flocks to remain ardent in their support for placid proselytising. While the ‘moderates’ broadly succeeded in upholding non-violent opposition, some youthful radicals nevertheless absconded from all reaches of the Northern Caucasus, and indeed from other Muslim communities of the Russian Federation, to Chechnya in order to join the sedition and acquire both military and ideological instruction at training camps set up by Khattab and Basaev.