Following the trend of most democratic regimes around the globe, Brazil transitioned from an authoritarian governing system to a democratic system after rectifying the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. Currently, Brazil is considered to be a democratic republic with a bicameral legislative system of an upper house chamber and a lower house chamber, whose seats are filled based on federalist electoral rules. While these rules were created with the purpose of representative equality, the results have stirred controversy over Brazil’s electoral efficiency and effectiveness. Since Brazil’s democracy is fairly young, it is difficult to discern what the long-term effects of the electoral system will be. Some political scientists pose the question of what consequences an open-list proportional system would impose on the United States if they adopted a parallel election system. Yet, this hypothetical question means questioning one form of democracy over another, despite the fact that the term “democracy” has yet to obtain a firm definition, leads scholars to tip-toe around the subject. While one must walk on eggshells, it is a question worth asking and can provide interesting insights into future democratic possibilities.
As previously stated, Brazilian legislature is comprised of an upper chamber, the Senate, or Senado, and a lower Chamber of Deputies, or Câmara dos Deputados. Formally, the Senate contains 81 seats, where three senators are chosen from each of the 27 federal states to ensure equal representation. In the Chamber of Deputies, 513 seats are chosen based on the open-list proportional representation, or open-list PR, the electoral system instituted within Brazilian politics. As stated by J. Tyler Dickovick and Jonathan Eastwood in Comparative Politics, “this system allows each voter to select a specific candidate and then attempts to achieve proportionality by aggregating the votes across parties,” (Dickovick/Eastwood, 209). In Brazil and European nations, open-list PR features the opportunity for political parties to gain house support from the various states while allowing citizens to actively seat candidates they believe will benefit their regional constituency. Furthermore, PR systems give political access to minority parties even if they do not receive a majority of the vote, meaning that to some extent everyone is being represented. Additionally, these weaker political parties can form coalitions with larger, more prominent parties to form coalitions that sway chamber voting. Coalitions aid smaller, weaker parties to combat social dominance theory as “the dominators in order to continue domination, and the disadvantaged group to try to change the status quo,” (Aguilar/Barone/Cunow/Desposato, 180). In this way, power sharing between parties, and even interest groups become more apparent to citizens so they know who is responsible for the policies being enacted, which influences the next election cycle. Overall, open-list PR produces a number of advantages permitting a level of transparency between the governing bodies and the populace at large.
On the other side of the aisle, there are a handful of disadvantages associated with the relationship of open-list PR. In traditional PR, party leaders would have the power to allocate seats to their parties candidates as they deem appropriate, taking away political influence from citizens. Candidates in both systems have incentives to garner political party support as it allocates more party power within the upper and lower chambers of the legislature. However, since candidates have more personal power in making a name for themselves without necessarily following party principles, this can lead to a weakening of political parties. Lack of faith in political parties leads to what is known as floor crossing, political figures would change party affiliation, “in an attempt to jockey for the best positions for future elections,” (Dickovick/Eastwood, 409). Only causing faith in open-list PR to further disintegrate, political leaders would offer bribes to legislators to maintain a majority vote on specific pieces of legislation. Also, due to legislators loyalty to their federal states, they do not always have Brazil’s interests in mind when enacting legislation, as only the members of their respective state ensure re-election. What’s more, Brazil contains a multi-party, fragmented party, system where “voters may face as many as one thousand candidates in a single district… [caused by] high-magnitude legislative districts, low costs for candidates’ entry, and high thresholds for the number of candidates per party list,” (Aguilar/Barone/Cunow/Desposato, 181). Withal, the disadvantages of open-list PR in Brazil have led citizens to lose trust in their government, such as the impeachment of Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff in August 2016.
Altogether, the interesting question arises of how an open-list PR system would affect a less fragmented, strong party alliance system in a democracy such as the United States. The transition from a strict first-past-the-post system, which has been the building blocks for American society for 250 years, would certainly cause an uproar from conservatives and libertarians alike. While it would have little to no effect on the Senate retaining two seats per state, the institution of voting proportionment would likely result in smaller parties becoming more prevalent in the House of Representatives. Potential effects of such an institutional realignment pose short, medium, and long-term socio-political consequences.
Before we discuss the potential consequences, an even more interesting series of events needs to be considered. After witnessing the recent election of Donald J. Trump as president-elect, it closely parallels the social uprisings leading to Dilma’s impeachment. According to Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos, “the outcome of the last [Brazilian] presidential election revealed a polarized country, divided between regions (North-Northeast versus Center-South) and income groups (rich versus poor). Protests from every side were organized by and spread through social networks, spilling into the streets during the campaign and immediately after the election. This led some eager observers to argue that Dilma would rule a country split in two,” (Bastos, 148). Since the 2008 housing market crash, income inequality, the 99% versus 1% argument such as the Occupy Wall Street movement, have caused rifts in the United States trust in governmental regulations. Moreover, congressional gridlock between Democrats and Republicans has only increased the social tension void. Now, the country has been faced with countless protests denouncing Donald J. Trump’s presidential legitimacy, especially through the Twitter #NotMyPresident movement. As reported by Christopher Mele and Annie Correal of The New York Times on November 9, 2016, “thousands of people across the country marched, shut down highways, burned effigies and shouted angry slogans…to protest the election of Donald J. Trump as president,” while more demonstrations resonated in town squares and college campuses around the nation. Even more strikingly, Fabrício Bastos proclaims that in Brazil the “urban middle-class youth (most of them around 25 to 34 years old),” (Bastos, 153) is disenchanted with the current government and will continue to be the source of political protest in the coming years, similar to what is being demonstrated by U.S. middle-class youth. As the United States continues to wait in solemn observation of presidential cabinet nominees, and the first policies to be announced under the Trump administration, we may well see presidential impeachment ourselves.
With these events in mind, it is time to consider the short-term consequences of transitioning from a winner-take-all system to a proportional representation system in the United States of America. To begin, it would create a more diverse Congress with smaller parties such as the Tea Party and the Green Party earning a seat at the congressional table. While they may finally be in prominent public office, the chances that they would hold any real power are slim to none as the Democrats and Republicans would continue to remain dominant. Also, politicians would have more incentives to campaign across their whole state, instead of simply campaigning in their lone districts as the state vote would determine proportional seating. On a positive note, Niel Franzese of the Connecticut Law Review points out “such a situation might motivate voters to participate in primaries that they had not in the past in hopes of taking advantage of a renewed chance to have their voices heard in a new type of primary election,” (Franzese, 274).
Moving to medium term consequences, political parties would become more fragmented as varying political parties would form to capture a piece of the voting allotment. Adding to the fragmentation, parties that were once strong may begin to weaken such as how the Tea Party has begun to take strength away from the Republican Party. On October 29, 2015, Stephanie Schriock of The Hill, claims the Tea Party has already been “rigging the congressional map with safe Republican districts,” securing seats they normally would not have a chance at winning. This trend could stretch across political party boundaries as “floor crossing” and inter-party coalitions formed to produce certain election outcomes.
Finally, the long-term implications of applying Brazilian electoral policies to the United States could prove disastrous. With an already weakening party system, the chances of collusion and bribery will rise exponentially. Furthermore, as the United States continues to experience a withering middle class, there would be cause for greater social uprisings. Adding into the class structure assessment, “class structures have become far more polarized in advanced capitalist countries,” (Bastos, 153), and with improbable representation as a whole, the polarization would continue to worsen.
Now the issue with this hypothetical scenario is just that, it is hypothetical. The various implications that have been stated lead one down a slippery slope that breeds pessimism and neglects the possibility of a positive outcome. For as far as any political scientist can discern, a proportional system may very well be the answer to cure the United States polarization, allowing for better representation of areas such as the “forgotten” conservative Rust Belt, the outspoken liberal West Coast, and the mixed progressive/conservative East Coast. So, when analyzing a hypothetical situation such as this, it important to take note that there simply is not enough evidence to support which form of democracy will be more productive than another. There are many factors that come into play including culture, recent political and social history, and willingness to change to name a few. In support, Niel Franzese takes into account that “a lack of conclusive studies with findings undermining the open primary system is reason enough to give the proposed new system a chance,” (Franzese, 274).
While we may never know if open-list proportional representation would be conducive to the United States political environment, what we do know is clear. Currently, the open-list PR is causing problems within Brazil’s government and is resulting in social demonstrations against the government. This has been more than highlighted by the impeachment of their president Dilma Rousseff, whose political situation also sheds light on what president-elect Trump may face in the near future. Additionally, socio-political turmoil is rising within the United States, giving a reason that it may indeed be time for a change, one way or another. What else is clear, is that posing these comparative analysis hypotheticals is the only way to discuss the potential outcomes by using current case studies, and at the very least, creates a stimulating discussion.
Works Cited
- Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow, Scott Desposato, and Leonardo Sangali Barone. “Ballot Structure, Candidate Race, and Vote Choice in Brazil.” Latin American Research Review 50.3 (2015): 175-202. Web. 13 Dec. 2016.
- Bastos, Fabrício H. Chagas. “Electoral Realignment and Economic Change Among Brazil’s “New Middle Classes”.” Latin American Politics and Society 57.3 (2015): 147-54. Web. 13 Dec. 2016.
- Dickovick, James Tyler, and Jonathan Eastwood. Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories, Methods, and Cases. New York: Oxford UP, 2013. Print.
- Franzese, Niel. “The Open Our Democracy Act: A Proposal for Effective Election Reform.” Connecticut Law Review 48.1 (2015): n. pag. Web. 13 Dec. 2016.
- Mele, Christopher, and Annie Correal. “Not Our President’: Protests Spread After Donald Trump’s Election.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Nov. 2016. Web. 13 Dec. 2016.
- Schriock, Stephanie. “GOP Plagued by Tea Party Monster It Created.” TheHill. N.p., 10 Oct. 2015. Web. 13 Dec. 2016.
Originally published 15.10.2019