Until recently the British army was perceived as having significant expertise in, and a reputation for, successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. While other nations like France had suffered colonial defeats in Indo-China and Algeria, and the United States had been forced to withdraw from Vietnam, the British had waged a successful COIN campaign in Malaya. Consequently, the British response to the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 is widely considered to have been the birth of modern counter-insurgency tactics and it certainly became a paradigm for future COIN operations, from Vietnam to Afghanistan. The Emergency has consistently been studied, analysed and cited as a useful source of lessons in counter-insurgency, and particularly so in regard to four areas: population control, winning ‘hearts and minds’, unified leadership, and treating security forces as learning organisations.
Over the course of this essay I will examine these four core lessons from Malaya and explore the reasons why the Emergency is considered the birth of modern COIN, and then question whether its reputation is justified. For while there is little doubt that the tactics used in Malaya have been widely adopted since, there is legitimate debate over whether their universal applicability might not be an ongoing fallacy.
What was the Malayan Emergency:
In 1948 Malaya was a British Colony rich in strategic resources such as tin and rubber of considerable importance to the Empire. The primary ethnic groups were the Malays (46% in 1941), the Chinese (37%) as well as an Indian minority. The Emergency was a guerrilla war fought between Britain (along with Commonwealth armed forces) and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) which was the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MRLA had its roots in the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army and drew its support from the disenfranchised, landless and mainly communist Chinese ‘squatters’ that predominantly lived in the dense jungle interior. More than 90% of their forces were ethnic Chinese, but there was a minority of Malays and Indians. Fearing that they would become a minority with further Chinese immigration, most Malays looked to the British and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to protect them. By setting up bases in the country’s dense jungle interior, the MRLA became an insurgency with the goal of attacking government and military infrastructure, disrupting the country’s important rubber industry (a key British economic interest) and establishing areas of Communist influence and control.
The ‘Emergency’ was officially declared in 1948 after three European rubber plantation managers were murdered and public utilities and local police officers were attacked. At the height of the campaign the police and army reached 60,000 and 40,000 respectively in 1952 and emergency powers were introduced that included arrest and detention without trial, restricted movement and curfews, and individual and collective group punishment for people or communities believed to be supporting rebels. The British dealt a devastating blow to the MCP as a large-scale insurgency between 1950 and 1954, and by 1955 the Communists were attempting unsuccessfully to negotiate an end to the insurgency. They were defeated in 1960, though later insurgencies were sporadically renewed from the Thai-Malaysian border until a peace deal was struck in 1989.
The birth of modern COIN:
Historically, counterinsurgency strategy had been based on the assumption that the way to win was to annihilate the insurgents. The British conduct of the Emergency represented a fundamental shift in COIN mindset in that emphasis was placed on seeking to gain the trust and loyalty of the local populace to achieve strategic and political aims. These two approaches to COIN are now termed ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methods respectively. In the early phases of the Malayan Emergency, the campaign seemed to resemble more the direct, annihilation approach, with large military forces pursuing insurgents through the jungle seeking to oust them, large-scale detentions, collective punishments and increasing troop build up. Due to its relative lack of success, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Rawdon Briggs – the director of operations in Malaya – implemented the ‘Briggs Plan’ which was predicated on gaining the support and trust of the indigenous Malay people in order to cut the supply and support network from the rebels and their supporters. It was a fundamental shift in the nature of the campaign and it is because of this initiative that Malaya been so often heralded as the birth of modern COIN. It was based around the four tactical principles mentioned above.
Population control:
Population control in Malaya was essentially an emergency provision the central tenet of which was the relocation of around 500,000 rural Malayans – almost all of them ethnic Chinese – into new, guarded camps well removed from the insurgents. The aim was to cut the fighters off from their support, and by 1950 a whole raft of measures had been brought in to support this initiative. The British could detain people without trial for up to two years, punish communities collectively for aiding MCP guerrillas, centralise food control, issue identity cards and censor printed materials which hindered the spread of Communist propaganda and hampered guerrilla recruitment.
It was an idea that spread quickly. For instance, just after the end of the Emergency Sir Robert Thompson (a WWII ‘Chindit’ in Burma, and later Permanent Secretary for Defence, Malaya) was sent to lead the British International Advisory Mission to South Vietnam between 1961 and 1965. While there he argued that the (still fledgling) US Army was failing in its counterinsurgency efforts because it lacked understanding of the Malayan example. According to Thompson, the Americans ‘did not have adequate unified control, and did not properly consolidate and protect resettlement areas.’ Almost as soon as it was over, the Malayan example was being applied to different theatres. A decade later, during the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland, population control was used in the forms of mass surveillance, patrolling of strategic zones, use of physical barriers as well as forced detainment without trial. As part of Operation Demetrius in 1971, the British Army and Northern Irish Government arrested and interned 342 people suspected of involvement in the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Theses tactics derive from ‘population control’ used in Malaya, designed to separate rebel sympathisers from the general populous.
Hearts and minds:
A politicians’ cliché now, ‘hearts and minds’ is nevertheless the most pervasive and important legacy from Malaya in the modern day. The concept of winning the sympathy of the broader population in an insurgency has become an integral component of counterinsurgency campaigns ever since General Templar declared it would be the key to beating the communists in Malaya. Templar’s strategy was a plan to win the loyalty of the Malay people in the fight against the communist insurgents. This was achieved through appealing to local anti-Chinese sentiment and encouraging the already present nationalist drive for independence amongst the Malay people. The British acknowledged this was the only way they could achieve a lasting victory and used a host of economic, social and political measures designed to prepare the local people and the Malay political elite for eventual self-governance. These ranged from the giving of food and medical aid to more progressive citizens rights, the establishment of regional governments through democratic elections, the institution of a federal legislative council and the country’s first national elections. It was an undoubtedly successful strategy which effectively countered the MCP’s hopes of recruiting more fighters and in
stead convinced the local populace of the ‘better choice’: to support the government.
Today, the United States has clearly attempted to integrate lessons from Malaya into their post 9/11 examination of COIN doctrine, particularly in Afghanistan but also in Iraq. General Stanley A. McChrystal (Commander of ISAF and commander of US forces in Afghanistan) stated the need for heightened protection for the local populous, in order to build trust between the Afghan civilian population and US security forces as well as fostering a climate of greater cooperation between US and Afghan security forces. This rhetoric underpinned the US strategy in Afghanistan and clearly demonstrates that the lessons learned from the Malayan emergency still have significant sway over modern US COIN tactics and doctrine.
In the British Military, the concept that there can be no military solution to COIN campaigns and that instead victory must be sought in the political, economic and social arenas, is a cornerstone of modern COIN strategy. In Afghanistan they proved the doctrine endures by restructuring from a peace support mission for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-International Security Assistance Forces (NATO-ISAF) to a British COIN strategy of ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people through enhancing local security, and strengthening the Afghan government’s administration and reconstruction efforts’. Additionally, the entire modern British approach to counterinsurgency is based on a ‘multi-agency’ approach that recognises that the army is only one part of a much larger operational solution that must include engagement with the local populous and seek political solutions. The British Army counterinsurgency field manual acknowledges that both the insurgents and counterinsurgent forces are locked in a battle to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populous – that this is as real a battlefield as the more conventional kind – and that one of the primary roles of the military is to change the minds of those to whom the insurgents’ ideas appeal, to offer protection to those that insurgents target, and reinforce the strength and legitimacy of the national government.
Unified leadership:
One of the key lessons drawn from the Malayan Emergency was the need for unified leadership in a military/civil command structure. In the early days of the Emergency this need was not particularly evident amongst the British command, but after two years of stagnation a civil/military form of unified management by committee was developed. From the very start of the campaign there had been an understanding that it would remain under the remit of the civil government structure and not be delegated to a special military command. As Komer says inThe Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: ‘at no time during the Emergency did the senior British military hierarchy in the far east or Malaya itself have directing authority over operations’. However, as events unfolded it became apparent that the existing arrangements needed greater clarity. Briggs’ solution was to maintain civilian control of the operation by the Government of Malaya but by asking London to nominate a civilian to act as the Director of Operations under the High Commissioner. Brigg’s ostensible role was not to command but only coordinate the operations of the police and military forces. This was a colonial sleight of hand, perhaps, but it meant both government and military were united of purpose, and is hardly more devious than the more recent use of puppet presidents in pursuit of the same ends. Building on the British committee system as a means of unifying all state actors to a single aim, the creation of the Director of Operations allowed the British to overcome logistical hurdles that were holding them back and deal the insurgents a crushing blow. Sir Gerald Templar, who took over the positions of DoO and High Commissioner in 1952, is the man who famously said ‘The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people’.
Security Forces as ‘learning institutions’:
Although the British army was not particularly effective in combating the MCP in the early stages of the emergency, the army did adapt both its tactics and structure over time to form a more malleable and successful counterinsurgency force. In How to Eat Soup with a Knife, John A. Nagl argues that it was the ‘organisational culture of the British Army that allowed it to learn counterinsurgency principles effectively during the Malayan Emergency.’ Nagl stresses that the British military in Malaya was an ‘effective learning organisation,’ capable of learning from mistakes and experiences, and so gaining flexibility to adapt doctrine mid-campaign according to changing environments and scenarios. Feedback and suggestions were encouraged from the lower ranks, giving rise to systems such as the Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM) which included ‘an efficient system for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of best practice methods.’ Local training facilities enhanced the British army’s capabilities to train and hone their security force skills in the native environment as the army developed its ability to be a highly versatile military organisation capable of engaging with the local populous, taking suggestions from the ‘bottom up,’ reworking its strategy, training, and doctrine as circumstances on the ground required, and all without compromising its own objectives or that of the Malay government.
Again, this insight is still very much alive today. The US Field Manual ‘Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies’ states the need for security forces to become more adaptable and efficient ‘learning organisations through: developing doctrine in host nation, establishing fast and effective lines of transferring lessons and information, setting up local training facilities, listening to advice from local people, and advocating for ‘bottom up’ suggestions from the theatre.’
It was a success:
There is no doubting that one of the principle reasons Malaya is held up as a COIN paradigm is the simple fact that it was a rare example of a counterinsurgency success that was especially impressive given the impenetrable jungle terrain it was conducted in. Despite the conflict lasting from 1948 to 1954, the UK and government of Malaya learned from their early mistakes and adapted their strategy to a civil-military counterinsurgency campaign that allowed both parties to achieve their goals. As David H. Ucko says in his article ‘The Malayan Emergency,’ ‘The campaign led to the military defeat of the MRLA, the Malayan declaration of independence in 1957 and the political reconciliation of the previously divided ethnic-Chinese and the ethnic-Malay communities.’ Ultimately, Malaya stands as a paradigm for COIN and the birth of its modern application as it demonstrated that a multinational and civil-military mix could achieve counterinsurgency success, and these lessons have extreme relevance in our modern world.
s Malaya overstated as the birth of Modern COIN?
It can be argued that the situation in Malaya was particular and that care must be taken in wider extrapolation. After the outbreak of war in Vietnam, the Malayan paradigm was ransacked for lessons learned, but eventual failure led many to question the universality of its example. Malaya was unique for a variety of reasons, not least of which was the fact the local population was on the side of the British from the start, and indeed had only recently fought alongside them against the Japanese. The British had been there a long time, spoke the languages and understood the culture they were fighting in to a degree rare today. Colonial policy respected the local social institutions and structures, as well as the political position of the Islamic rulers, or Sultans, of the Mala
y states. This meant the British were to some extent viewed more as invited guests than colonial masters. The sultans in turn were steadfast in their commitment to fighting the communist threat, and the fact that most Malay’s were loyal to their respective sultan meant that the British could rely upon the support of 40-49% of the population, most of whom also felt threatened by communism and the ethnic Chinese. Furthermore, racially, the ethnic Chinese and the Malays had very different physiology, allowing the British to distinguish between the two communities. This combined with the rebels’ lack of equipment and external support, no friendly neighbours amongst whom to seek shelter as they were pushed further north (Thailand was anti-communist), and an overwhelming force advantage enjoyed by the British, created unique preconditions for success. Malaya was certainly a unique situation in which the British enjoyed many advantages that are rarely seen in modern counterinsurgencies, and their victory there gave rise to the idea that they are especially adept at this kind of warfare. However, it’s reputation has been somewhat undone recently, after failures in Basra and Helmand.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the relative success of Malaya as a counterinsurgency campaign in conjunction with the lessons learned have made it a paradigm for and ultimately the birth of modern COIN thinking. The core four lessons that are drawn from this campaign are all alive and well in modern COIN doctrine and are held up as an example of how to wage effective COIN campaigns. However, we must be cautious when applying lessons learned from Malaya to future counter Insurgency campaigns. The pre-conditions, circumstances and operational obstacles in Malaya were unique and arguably extremely favourable to a British victory. COIN trends and tactics in the modern day are constantly evolving and becoming extremely complex, and there is no one counterinsurgency example that can provide a universal blueprint for success. What remains clear is that as long as they are contextualised appropriately, some valuable lessons can be drawn that can help nations achieve success in modern counterinsurgencies.
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