Frank Jackson’s ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ challenges the basic principles of physicalism through the examples of fictional characters named Mary and Fred. Jackson concludes that there are indeed non-physical qualities to experience. In reaching that conclusion, Jackson relies on the Knowledge Argument. The Knowledge Argument, a major component of explaining qualia, provides that complete physical knowledge regarding a conscious being could lack knowledge about “what it’s like” to experience that being. Knowledge of the physical, such as the mechanisms of the brain and the kinds of mental states that exist, does not include comprehensive details of smelling a rose, or, put in the “what it’s like” framework, which is used to support the Knowledge Argument, what it’s like to smell a rose. That is, physical information does not “capture the smell of a rose” (Jackson). Relying on purely physical information is failing to acknowledge that more information can be learned because the information cannot be conceptualized and manifested in terms that most scientific physical information is presented. We know “what it’s like” but cannot accurately and comprehensively describe it in physical terms.
Jackson effectively utilizes the example of Mary to create an anti-physicalist, pro-qualia argument. Mary is a neuroscientist who has studied the extended neurophysiology of vision in a black and white room for her entire life. She learns that material on a black and white television screen. She knows the exact wavelength combinations and mechanisms involved in seeing that “the sky is blue” – highly complex scientific information – and claims she knows the same for experiencing the color red. The debate arises when Mary finally leaves the black and white room and actually experiences seeing red for the first time. Will Mary learn something new when sees the color red? The obvious assumption is that Mary will learn something new about the world when she has the experience of seeing the color red. Jackson’s argument is essentially that Mary has all the physical information regarding color vision before she leaves the black and white room, but she nevertheless lacks important information about color vision. Because of this, it can be argued that not all information is physical. Mary learns “what it is like” to see red. Thus, Jackson is partially basing his argument on the “What it is Like to Be” approach, an argument also supported by Thomas Nagel.
In addition to the Knowledge Argument, Jackson utilizes the Modal Argument and the “What is it Like” Argument (already discussed above) to further prove his conclusion. For the Modal Argument, Jackson relies on the principle that “no amount of physical information about another logically entails that he or she is conscious or feels anything at all” (Jackson). Physicalists and qualia believers alike can agree that there is a possibility of a world identical to ours in every physical respect but different in that the organisms that occupy this identical world have no mental capacity or life at all. As there is something about us that gives us mental capacity that they lack, physicalism must be false because there is more to us than the purely physical.
Although the Modal Argument and the What it is Like Argument are substantial, the depth of Jackson’s argument against physicalism primarily relies on the Knowledge Argument. In order to prevent confusion, Jackson clarifies three things regarding the Knowledge Argument and Mary.
- First, the argument does not claim that you cannot imagine what it is like to see red. Thus, the argument does not rely on the position that Mary cannot imagine what it is like to see red, but that Mary cannot truly know what it is like to see red until she has seen red. She can imagine endlessly, but the knowledge is not there. Jackson claims that “imagination is a faculty that those who lack knowledge need to fall back on” (Jackson).
- Second, Jackson argues that Mary’s learning of the experience of seeing the color red did not rely on logical inferences. After leaving the black and white room and seeing the color red, Mary does not claim that she could have had knowledge of seeing the color red without leaving the room if she could have used more logical inferences while in the room.
- Third, Jackson reiterates that Mary lacked information about the experience of others. Jackson refers to the lack of information as a problem for physicalists because Mary realizes her conception of others’ mental life has been “impoverished” through her existence. Although she knew the physical facts the entire time, she did not have all the information regarding their experiences. Therefore, physicalism is compromised even further.
There are some philosophers who do not necessarily align with Jackson’s perspective. David Lewis has the strongest objection to Jackson’s qualia position. Lewis shapes his objection to Jackson using the Ability Hypothesis and the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information. Lewis argues that Mary leaves the black and white room, she learns she has the ability to know what seeing red is like. Thus, Mary is becoming aware of abilities, not learning new information. That is, Mary learns the ability to see red. Lewis uses the Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information to argue that the new information Mary receives when viewing red is in fact phenomenal information. Lewis’ point relies on the fact that Mary already knows “know-that” information, and that the experience teaches her “know-how” information, which is phenomenal. By learning the “know-how” information, Mary is able to recognize and remember the color red. If the Ability Hypothesis is true, Mary gains the ability to remember the experience of seeing red. After experiencing red for the first time, you can remember the experience, and therefore imagine the recreation of seeing red. Lewis also argues that another important ability gained is t`he ability to recognize. If Mary sees the color red again, she will recognize it immediately. Lewis uses the example of Vegemite. If you taste Vegemite at a later time, you will remember (or recognize) you have tasted it in the past. From this, you will be able to put a name to the taste experience. Lewis also argues that these abilities could originate from essentially anywhere – even magic. His main point is that experience, not lessons, is the best method of learning what a new experience is like. Overall, Lewis agrees that knowledge is gained from experiencing red, but believes the knowledge gained is “know-how” information, which is phenomenal, and therefore physicalism is valid. Lewis argues that information and ability are different physical knowledges – this is why physicalism can be true and consistent with the conclusion that Mary gains new knowledge.
It is important to consider Lewis’ anti-qualia argument. Although the Ability Hypothesis may seem persuasive to David Lewis, there are several weaknesses. First, when we are shown an unfamiliar color, we actually do learn information about its relative properties compared to other colors (i.e. similarities and compatibilities). For example, we are able to evaluate how red is similar to orange and how it is different. We also learn its impact on our mental states. Physicalism overestimates human cognitive abilities. We have over a million neurons in our brain, and we are nowhere near to gaining a comprehensive view of human cognitive abilities. As any cognitive science major (such as me) knows, understanding what each and every neuron in our brain does is, at a minimum, a long way off. Yet, physicalism assumes we have the power to fully articulate all elements of the world around us and the complexity of our environment. This is not supportable and is a major flaw in his argument.
Both Lewis and Jackson agree that some things cannot be learned in a black and white room. The weakness of Lewis’ argument is that he fails to acknowledge the cognitive differences between us and those who do not share similar obdurate mental states. Despite this weakness, there are some strengths for Lewis’ materialistic argument. Lewis removes the inability to assure the non-physical exists. Because he emphasizes the learning of abilities rather than new experiences, his theory relies on the physical and validates that physicalism could be correct. His opponents, dualists, believe that mind and body are separate entities, which is anti-physical. The largest problem with dualism is that it cannot be measured in any shape or form because it is not physical matter. There is no certainty that physicalists and neuroscientists might learn more about the neurophysiology of the brain and discover that indeed there are physical structures supporting experiential sensations that as of now cannot be defined. Until such discoveries, non-physicalist views are valid.
Even though dualism cannot be completely defined, the biggest strength for Jackson’s argument is that it aligns with dualism. If we reduce our philosophy and theory of mind to one excluding mental, we deduct the importance of experience in understanding a phenomenon. Jackson explains that “mental states are inefficacious in respect to the physical world” (Jackson). Qualia only impact other mental states rather than physical states. Jackson reiterates this by providing three reasons. The first being causality. Just because A follows B does not mean B can follow A. The B follows A hypothesis can be refuted by proving there is a common underlying causal process for each distinct effect. Second, Jackson uses evolution to prove his dualism. Polar bears have evolved to have a thick coat. This thickness makes the coat heavy. Thus, the polar bears experience what it is like to carry a heavy coat. This is clearly not conducive to survival. Therefore, from Darwin’s Theory we know that any evolved characteristics are either conducive to survival or a by-product of an evolutionary action that is conducive to survival. Jackson uses this support his argument against physicalism: “qualia are a by-product of certain brain processes that are conducive to survival” (Jackson). Third, Jackson emphasizes the relationships between how we know our minds through behavior. We only know about others’ minds through observing their behavior. So, we must ask: how can a person’s behavior accurately reflect that he has qualia unless they conclude that behavior is an outcome of qualia? This gives rise to the main weakness of Jackson’s view – there is no proper evidence for the refutation of epiphenomenal qualia. Another weakness of Jackson’s view is the lack of clarity of source. Where do these qualia come from? If not physical, then where? This brings into questions spirits and “upper powers,” such as God, the existence of which are heavily debated in the scientific community. Despite this, the validity of dualism (and the lack of proving dualism to be incorrect), is a strong argument and will continue to allow Jackson’s argument to be considered valid.
Because Jackson clearly refutes any existence of physicalism in his explanation of phenomenal qualia, and his argument is overall less problematic than the arguments of his opponents, I align more with Jackson’s knowledge argument than that of Lewis. Until the existence of the actual physical matter behind “what it is like” information is found, Jackson’s argument proves to be more valid than that of Lewis. Although I would like to think that everything involving humans can be linked back to the brain, I do believe that some things may never be explained.
28.2.2019