The problem of freedom of the will is one that tries to decipher the limits of human freedom. In trying to solve this problem, several questions come to light concerning how to properly designate praise and punishment as well as how to deal with the confusing feelings of guilt and remorse. The question itself is of utmost importance because everyone can testify to feeling in control when they recollect their past thoughts and deliberative processes; however, through the theory of causality, one can also see that it is plausible to consider that none of our actions are truly free. The definition of freedom and its limits has a great effect on us as human beings, because it directly influences our views on morality, actions, beliefs, and how the world is perceived.
There are three stances on the problem of free will, namely, Libertarianism, Determinism and Compatibilism. Libertarianism is the theory stating that we do have free wills . It contends that an agent has the freedom to choose between a presented variety of options, and that these deliberative processes are not governed by heredity or environment. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument from Libertarianism in support of freedom of the will is not fully justified and rational.
Libertarians argue for the freedom of will with two main arguments, the argument from deliberation and introspection, and the argument from moral responsibility. The argument from deliberation/introspection can be stated as follows:
1. When we pay attention to our deliberative and decision-making processes, in many cases it seems like we could have done otherwise; as if we freely choose what to do.
Therefore, probably,
2. Many of our actions are free.
It is doubtful that premise 1 is fully justified; although it may seem like we could have done otherwise we really couldn’t have at that particular time. The reason is simply because all our actions are determined by things outside our control. For instance, Alice goes to the supermarket to get oranges, but upon reaching there she realizes that there are no oranges. Faced with two options of either buying grapes or going further to find a new market, Alice decides to buy grapes instead. This scenario exhibits a case where Alice’s change in desire shows the exercising of her freedom, and also is a case where the strongest of Alice’s desires (the desire to buy grapes) won out over the weaker desire (the desire to go to new market looking for oranges).
Now the question of how Alice’s actions are determined can be answered by simply stating that the physical brain states of Alice directly caused her to reason that she didn’t want to go to a different market, which affected her mental decision-making processes thus leading to her final actions. This shows reason acting as a cause , and proves the deterministic process of Alice’s decision to buy grapes instead of oranges. Furthermore, Alice’s freedom of will in choosing among a plethora of other fruits and grapes makes it also plausible to assume that the choice of grapes was determined by Alice’s second-order desire for grapes. According to Harry Frankfurt, persons have first-order and second-order desires . First-order desires are defined as the desires that all conscious beings possess, which may motivate a person to action or not . Second-order desires are defined as the desires that either a person wants to have or one that they make into his/her will . Alice’s decision to buy grapes is thus classified as a second-order desire, because firstly, it wasn’t her first-order (original) desire and the idea of grapes was sort of willed into being an important desire to replace her need for oranges. In this scenario, deliberation plays a role of being a conscious process that leads us to believe that we can do either of presented options. It is very easy to relate the deliberative thought processes that one undergoes to a state of being free, rather, one can decide to look at deliberation as the battle between the first-order and second-order desires of an individual. Moreover, our thought processes which are governed by events, external factors, and internal pressures, contribute to these deliberative thought processes. These events, out of our control, work by solidifying the deterministic nature of our actions by attaching an illusory feeling of freedom to a change in a person’s will. More so, Libertarians normally associate freedom of will with freedom of action , but this isn’t always the case, because we are not free to undertake every action that we have a will to. Rather, it seems more sensible to view freedom of will as the ability of one to choose the will they want regardless of if they are able to carry out their will into actions .
Another factor this argument fails to take into consideration is the relationship between choice and freedom. People’s actions are ultimately influenced by the choices they make, but to understand if an action is truly free it is important to take a look at the influences affecting the choice made. There are two factors that affect the choices made by an agent, the first are personal beliefs, and second are desires or wants that the agent holds in high esteem. Beliefs and desires are developed throughout one’s life, they help shape how a person may observe the world, and are dictated by the several experiences and cultural norms that one may face in his/her life. Beliefs show how a person makes sense of their world, while desires (wants) may stem from the type of environment and interpersonal relations a person undergoes throughout their lifetime. An example would be comparing the African and European beliefs on marriage proposals. An African would believe that it is necessary for the spouse to ask for the parents’ blessing before proposing. However, an European may prefer to break the news of marriage to the parents much later. To the African, the European may be considered disrespectful to the parents of the bride, while the European may think of the African custom as a way of cultural control of the African woman. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to point out that one has no control over the experiences one may encounter, or the culture/environment one is born into. These factors, which are out of human control, contribute greatly to the decision making and deliberative thought processes that influence our actions.
Another argument against determinism argues from the stance of moral responsibility. This can be stated as follows:
1. If determinism were true and libertarianism false we would not be morally responsible for any of our actions.
2. But we are morally responsible for at least some of our actions.
Therefore, (from 1&2),
3. Determinism is false and Libertarianism is true.
It is true that causal determinism assumes that all our actions are determined by actions outside our control. However, the compatibilist theory doesn’t refute the existence of alternate choices, and so doesn’t exclude the opportunity of moral responsibility. Compatibilism instead acknowledges the possibilities of alternate choices as variations of the original, true choice. A final, true choice is always made in the direction of the strongest desire/belief or external pressure at the time, hence solidifying the compatibilist idea that the motives of choices made by individuals originate from antecedent causes.
Moral responsibility arises when an individual is presented with the opportunity to choose from more than two options, for instance, if a young boy undergoing daily sexual abuse by his father kills his abuser; is he said to be held morally responsible? From a deterministic objective, it seems we can view the young boy’s actions as a result of past events which led to his ill action; hence we cannot say that the young boy is to be held responsible or punished for killing his father. Furthermore, from a compatibilist point of view, the boy cannot be held morally responsible, because he had no other better options; meaning, he was presented with only two options of either staying with his abusive father or setting himself free of that abusive father. This scenario can be reversed in cases where individuals are obviously presented with good choices, but still decide to purposely choose things that are deemed morally reprehensible. A simple scenario would be observing people who consciously decide to steal to make a livelihood rather than do humble work. These people are often plagued by terrible conditions and determining factors, however, in comparison to the previous scenario, it is obvious that the actions of the latter were involuntary and the other voluntary and purposeful.
Once more the question of how to know what a truly free action and appropriately designate moral responsibility arises. Well the distinction seems to lie within voluntary and involuntary behaviour. Voluntary behaviour is governed by reasoning , it is normally the end product of several antecedent causes which lead an agent to perform. The reasoning in this case is not limited to good reasoning, but it also differs from involuntary action in the sense that involuntary action is done without reasoning, and is erratic, irrational, arbitrary motivated action . Freedom has to do with acts done voluntarily so that we may be held responsible for them, and voluntary acts are as a result of reasons. It can therefore be resolved that an agent is free if they acted accordingly to reason rather than internal neurotic and external coercive pressure . Reasoning helps distinguish which actions are voluntary and involuntary, as voluntary actions are truly the acts that we do freely because we have reasons for them .
Libertarians suggest that some of our actions are uncaused by antecedent causes to support the notion of free will, but this paper has aimed to show how the libertarian argument is flawed. Firstly, the libertarian theory suggests a randomness to the thinking and deliberative thought processes of individuals and the world. It also assumes that freedom of will is the same thing as freedom of action which is not always the case. Compatibilism however, believes that all actions are ultimately determined, but we still have moral responsibilities. It argues that the basis of the distinction lies within involuntary and voluntary actions, which are differentiated on the basis that the latter involves reasoning. These are strong arguments that try to show that freedom of will and determinism are compatible, as well as adequately trying to combat the libertarian argument from moral responsibility. In conclusion, freedom of will may be defined as a personal, internal, factor, which is subjective to changes in response to external or internal determining events. This definition of freedom of the will supports the notion that freedom of will and determinism are compatible.