Moral philosophy is the backbone of the judgement used in determining what is just, fair and equal. Questioning the value of preserving the Earth and all of its inhabitants is a controversial topic; however, to what extent is it moral to sacrifice one being to save another? This is a question which still lies unanswered in retrospect of society although, many states hold various opinions on this topic. Jonathan Wolff, in his novel Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry provides a unique perspective on the debate, posing the question “Will future human beings look back at contemporary practices of eating meat and using animals for scientific experiments with the horror we have for earlier practices of slavery?” (11). The issue being spoken to in this quote is the current moral philosophical debate around the use of animals for experimentation to develop scientific research. Under which he compares this issue to that of the society’s current view on the enslavement of African-Americans during the British Imperialism era (Wolff 11). Through Wolff’s neutral perspective, readers are able to critically consider the information being presented to come to their own conclusion. Adding to the everlasting amount of opinions that lie within the moral philosophical discussion regarding how the state should legally approach this issue (11). However, in the democratic world that contains freedoms of thought and expression – there can truly never be one ‘right’ answer.
Nevertheless, arguments provided by Degrazia in On the Ethics of Animal Research, suggests that reflection upon the morality of animal experimentation influences the general public to prefer a position somewhere in between an absolute state abolition and a ‘laissez-faire” approach to the practice (689). Throughout the course of this paper, I will be arguing that animal experimentation is only morally justifiable when it results in a greater benefit to the human race then is the damage inflicted upon the animal. After evaluating the lack of an animal’s capacity to consent, as well as the historical abuse of human power over animals, I believe that there must be a strict state policy regarding animal experimentation.
As of late, the topic most North Americans have been engaging in is regarding interpersonal voluntary consent – and the lack thereof. This consent justifies the way humans dictate their physical and verbal actions towards one another. It is morally understood that actions towards another person are only admissible if consent is given; however, in the case of animal experimentation, the capacity to consent has been completely disregarded. Alison Hills’ Do Animals Have Rights? exemplifies the juxtaposition of the ethics concerning voluntary consent of human and animal in experimentation. Hills tests this argument by looking at non-therapeutic experiments. To provide context this experiment is one of which does not benefit the test subject, rather it is one that is used to test ‘subjects’ under various administered substances as well as physical and cognitive circumstances (203). In Do Animals Have Rights? Hills views consent largely through the Nuremberg Code: a legal document drafted following the Nazi human experimentation discovered after the second world war. This document provides an actual example of legislation that reinforces the consent argument (203), expressing that non-therapeutic experiments, when conducted on humans who do not contain the autonomy (self-governing authority) to provide voluntary consent or have had their right to consent stripped from them (in the case of prisoners), are not morally or legally justified (Hills 203). Whereas animals in comparison, do not have a sense of this ‘autonomy’ in any situation. Animals do not contain a cognitive self-governing authority over themselves, in which they are not able to make thoughtful decisions, nor do they hold the ability to understand situations that will benefit or harm their interests. With the same policy of consent from the Nuremberg Code applied, animals must be entitled to the same state protection as not-autonomous humans (Hills 205). Given that in both situations, neither of the two beings are able to comprehend or convey consent to any non-therapeutic experimentation presented to them, which may ultimately result in both groups being left harmed and less well off than before the experiment. However, as not-autonomous humans are still protected from experimentation under the Nuremberg Code, animals of the exact same cognitive state are vulnerable to experimentation that may potentially harm their self-interest. Providing that legislation regarding an animal’s capacity to consent around experimentation is morally unjust, representing flaws within current state policies, demanding for a change.
Although animals are vulnerable to a potential limitation on their existence under various state policy, there is justification in the sense that animals are not of the same ‘Moral Status” as humans, and do not hold self-interests in the broad societal view (Degrazia 690). Degrazia’s ¬On the Ethics of Animal Research stakes that for any creature to possess ‘Moral Status’, suggesting that the creature must be ‘important in its own right’ and must also contain self-interest (691). Yet, the creature’s moral status cannot be derived from how it’s treatment from others may impact peoples’ interest (691). By viewing the case of animals through the ‘no-status view’ from ¬On the Ethics of Animal Research, all animal interests have no moral importance unless the treatment or experimentation of animals impacts human interests (Degrazia 691). It can be found that through this moral status view, the animals’ capacity to consent argument is terminated as the human race is simply not entitled to give any interest to a creature that does not hold moral status. Degrazia in bluntly proclaims in this argument that without any human interest, animals can be compared to nothing more than a rock, where no harm or benefit can be done to it and no one would account for the consent from a rock before experimenting on it (691). When viewing animal interest through this lens, the question that arises is why the state would even bother allocating resources to protect the interests of something that holds no moral value in our society. Judging this allocation of resources as wasteful, and therefore, morally unjust. The moral status view requires that humans should have no concern for the consent of animals and in turn, there should not be a need for a strict state policy on animal experimentation.
The ‘Moral Status’ argument holds that animal self-interest is not to be regarded in any circumstance such as in the case of animal experimentation, it stands as an unrealistic view and perpetuates a violent belief within a political system. A justified state’s duty must be to protect all of those (humans) living under the state’s protection, nonetheless, I believe that preservation of all non-human sectors within a state territory is in the best interests of the humans. In this state that holds no societal concern over the personal interest of animals, Jonathan Wolff in Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry argues that ‘if human beings and other animals all have lives, yet human life is treated with reverence while animal life is treated as of no value, then, prima facie, there is unjustified partiality in favour of human beings’ (29). Here, Wolff is seeking to exploit this sense of societal ‘ignorance’ towards the lack of an animal’s ability to consent, where this ignorance leads to an unjustified societal bias in the interests of humans only. I argue a state that includes this partiality in its regime would support animal experimentation with minimal state intervention. However, if animals are vital to experimentation that brings benefits to humans, then animals must be of human interest. Indeed, by this logic they must be moral-beings.
Where animal consent is a morally regarded issue that is constantly debated, one would expect great consideration into the legal intervention that a government would take historically and currently in regard to animal experimentation.
When drafting and implementing state policy around experimentation, one must consider how humans have treated animals in the past to determine the degree of intervention necessary. It should be noted that it is not difficult to find various cases of abuse of human power over other animals. For instance, in the case of the Head Trauma Research Centre University of Pennsylvania, Do Animals Have Rights? explains that video-tape footage was stolen from this centre, which resulted in the public distribution of experiments regarding head injuries in Baboons (Hills 199). However, what was eventually evident was that the baboons were ‘strapped into helmets as a hydraulic piston hit the animals head’ which was reported to deliver brain damage and paralysis, all of which these experiments were done while the animal was in a ‘conscious state’ (Hills 199). The actions to continue experimentation without concern of animal consciousness and the disregard to humane practices of experimentation are examples of moral justification in these experiments. Wolff, in Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry outlines Peter Singer’s opinion where “If a creature is capable of feeling pain then there is an absolute moral requirement not to inflict pain or allow infliction of pain” (23). Singer’s opinion contradicts the entire practice of non-therapeutic animal experiments by valuing the argument that if animals do feel pain, then experiments that inflict prolonged or deliberate pain like that of the University of Pennsylvania Head Trauma Research Centre provides context into the history of extreme human abuse of power over animals.
Despite the evidence that supports the human injustice on animal experimentation throughout history which has required a high level of state intervention, the degree of beneficial outcomes from medical research could lean legislators to continue their current state policy. The medical and scientific research acquired through animal experimentation holds a reasonable argument within the controversy on debate of the strength of the state policy. This argument is highlighted in The Ethics of Research Involving Animals, claiming that there are ‘biological similarities between animals and humans, in principle, animals can be useful models for studying specific aspects of human biology and disease and the likely effects of chemicals and medicines in humans” (Short Guide 3). The Nuffield Council on Bioethics outlines that the use of animals for tests such as the development of side effects and effectiveness of pharmaceutical products, as well as administration of a disease to an animal for research, has spawned beneficiary factors towards the survival of the human race. Specific examples outlined by Hills evaluate the worldwide impact of animal medical research. Examples such as the discovery of insulin by Banting & Best, in which they used dog and rabbit testing to discover a treatment for diabetes (215). When evaluating the medical benefit of this practice, moral justification in animal experimentation is more then found, which has the effect of decreased state intervention to generate as much benefit possible to the human race as plausible.
The medical benefits of animal experimentation do show that this may be a moral practice, in consideration to the exaggerated view on the actual benefit received from the medical research experimentation of animals there could be a counter argument to the morality of the practice. Despite the medical triumphs gained, Hills believes that the medical failures are hidden by the limited yet, glorified medical breakthroughs from animal experimentation (212). In Do Animals Have Rights? Hills lays out four arguments that contradict the morality of the practice, claiming that scientists usually never can predict the outcome of experiments, the experimentation process may be unjust, the suffering administered to animals may outweigh that of the actual medical benefit received to humans and that in various cases, the animal biology does not correlate with human health (Hills 213-214). In these medical experimentations, the infliction of damage done to animals, regardless of the outcome from the medical experiment, is still apparent – thus the potential to harm animals despite an actual value is existent. Therefore, despite the marginal medical benefit from animal experimentation, the abuse that humans have had on animals is undebatable and consequently deserving of a strict state policy.
It has been clearly accepted among researchers within the field that animals have a lack of capacity to consent, resulting in many species being suspect to absurd and unfair experimentation without any knowledge of what is being conducted on them. Moreover, the undeserving and unnecessary violence bestowed upon animals by humans within the history of animal experimentation supports that there needs to be a greater sense of state authority in this field. These arguments I have presented do contradict the legality of animal experimentation, yet one cannot ignore the benefits gained for humans from animal experimentation. Thus, the greatest collective benefit from animal experimentation is found in a strong state policy which fosters a balance between animal welfare and human development.
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