Part A Question 2
We are sometimes taken in by illusions.
It doesn’t matter whether thick illusions are possible.
It already follows by the Frequency Principle that we are sometimes taken in by illusions.
We can never be completely certain that we are not under illusion.
Before we discuss the argument in question, I would like to review some concepts from Bouwsma’s assertion on illusion and Ian Hacking’s Frequency Principle. In “Descartes’ Evil Genius”, Bouwsma defines illusion as something that we might easily mistake for what it is not (144). He then continues to explain that illusion may be defined as thin or thick, depending on how complete the illusion is. In Bouwsma’s defense, the completeness of an illusion is tied to our senses, perceptions, and observations. Everything that we can see but cannot smell or touch using our senses is considered as a thin illusion. Meanwhile, an illusion that has all the complete parts of the real object that we can perceived through our senses, such as smell or touch, is considered as a thick illusion. Yet, Bouwsma argues that thick illusions are impossible because we always end up explaining duplicates and that we will not be able distinguish the illusion from the real thing. For example, suppose we have both various kinds of substitutes for ordinary table salt and a hologram of salt. According to Bouwsma, the hologram of salt is considered as a thin illusion because we can see that it looks like real salt, yet we cannot smell, touch and taste it using our senses. Meanwhile, Bouwsma would consider the various substitutes for salt as salt because they have all the properties of salt that we can smell, touch, and taste.
In An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic, Ian Hacking defines the Frequency Principle as a rule of thumb for switching perspectives from frequency-type probabilities to belief-type probabilities. To understand this principle, we should first define both types of the probability explained in his book. Frequency-type probabilities is the probability of a factual statement about a material object, such as “the probability of getting 1 in a fair dice is 1/6” and “the probability of getting heads in a fair coin is 1/2”. Meanwhile, belief-type probability measures the level of confidence a person should believe in light of the evidence. The Frequency Principle is in motion when we take the frequency-type probability as the belief-type probability of a single case (Hacking, 137). In other words, considering that all we know are chances, then the known chances measure degrees of support. In Bouwsma’ case, we states that “the probability of thick illusions of salt is zero”. After that, when we say “it is impossible to have thick illusions”, we are applying the Frequency Principle because we have taken a frequency-type of a single case, of which it is the thick illusions of salt, as a belief-type probability for all thick illusions.
After defining all the important definitions, let us go back to the argument in question. There are several faults that cause this argument to fail as a good argument for radical skepticisim. First, the argument doesn’t have a good basis by saying that “it doesn’t matter whether thick illusions are possible”. Yet, I believe that whether thick illusions are possible matters because the argument will only hold when thick illusions are possible. I would like to point out that the person builds this argument using Bouwsma’s definition of thin and thick illusion. Thus, the person limits his argument to Bouwsma’s definitions of both thin illusion, which is applied to immaterial objects, and thick illusion, which is applied to all material objects. Now suppose that Bouwsma is right and that thick illusions are impossible, resulting in us having only thin illusions. Yet, thin illusion is easily detectable. For example, when we see a hologram of salt or our reflections in the mirror, we can easily understand that they are illusions. Because we can detect the illusion, the illusion will cease to be an illusion. As a result, we can be certain that we are not under illusion because we already know that they are just illusions. Hence, the argument fails to hold because it matters whether thick illusions are possible.
Second, the argument uses Frequency Principle as a basis to the statement “we can never be completely certain that we are not under illusion”. Yet, I believe that the person has misused the term Frequency Principle to produce such statement. First, the person just states that “we are sometimes taken in by illusions”, without providing any justifications on the word “sometimes”. It is not clear to me what the person means by “sometimes” because we do not know anything about the evidence that can explain the degree of confidence we should have to be certain that we are not under illusion. Second, since the person uses Bouwsma’s definition of thick and thin illusion and says that it does not matter whether thick illusions are possible, let us suppose once again that Bouwsma is right. In other words, thick illusions are impossible. Going back to our example about the hologram of salt, Bouwsma will argue that “the probability for thick illusions of salt is zero”. Applying the Frequency Principle, Bouwsma will then say that “the probability of thick illusion is zero” because of the frequency-type probability of a single case he knows, particularly the thick illusion of the hologram of salt. As a result, the statement “… but it already follows by the Frequency Principle that we are sometimes taken in by illusions” is false because now we are now absolutely certain that we are not under any illusions. In this case, the statement should be that “… by the Frequency Principle, we are never taken in by illusions”.
Part B Question 4
It is possible any of our opinions are erroneous.
If it is possible for any of our opinions to be erroneous, then any of our opinions may for all we know require revision in the future.
So any of our opinions may for all we know require revision in the future
First, I would like to assert that the argument suggested by Christopher Hookway’s article is valid and sound. According to Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, an argument is considered valid when the conclusion follows with certainty from its premises. In other words, when presented with “if p then q” statement, with p stands for premise and q stands for conclusion, a valid deductive argument follows the logical structure in an order that we have p, so q happens. In this argument, the premise p is that “it is possible any of our opinions are erroneous”. After that, we are presented with “if p then q” statement. Drawing from these premises, we have a conclusion q, which is “so any of our opinions may for all we know require revision in the future”. In this argument, the premises guarantee the conclusion. Thus the argument suggested by Christopher Hookway’s article is a valid deductive argument. Furthermore, we know that human minds have cognitive limitations that make us prone to errors. Thus the premise in this argument is true. Therefore, the argument suggested by Christopher Hookway’s article is a valid and sound deductive argument.
Second, I would like to assert that Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism support this argument. Yet, in order to understand the reason why Peirce arguments for his form of fallibilism support the argument suggested by Christopher Hookway’s article, we first need to understand Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism. In “The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism”, Peirce introduces us to fallibilism- the view that it is impossible for a person to be absolutely certain about his or her beliefs. According to Peirce, we can never attain certainty, exactitude, and universality by reasoning (58) and that there will remain a possible doubt to the truth of our beliefs.
There are several things that we need to consider when discussing Peirce’s assertion about fallibilism. First, when presenting the doctrine of fallibilism, Peirce does not talk about the impossibility of knowledge. He never mentions in his article that we cannot have knowledge just because we cannot be certain about it. Thus, I believe that Peirce’s assertion about fallibilism is not that we cannot have knowledge but that we can have knowledge without having conclusive justifications and certainty. Second, by pointing out that both absolute assertion and the belief that truth has found its last and perfect formulation are things that block the way of inquiry, I believe that Peirce is implying that uncertainty is a necessary antecedent of all knowledge. Finally, based on the two previous reasons, I believe that when Peirce says “we cannot be absolutely certain”, he means that a person should proportion their beliefs regarding the evidence presented to them.
The first premise from the argument suggested by Christopher Hookway’s article first is that “it is possible any of our opinions are erroneous”. I believe that this premise corresponds to Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism in several ways. First, it may simply be similar to Peirce’s fallibilism because this premise can be used as a way to paraphrase Peirce’ arguments. Since opinions can be considered as a type of belief, we can consider this argument as an example of Peirce’s assertion. Second, the reasoning behind this premise can be drawn from the same reasoning behind Peirce’s fallibilism. Although this premise does not provide evidence, let us suppose that this premise is true. Then it is true because of how the world is, especially how human minds are. The reason why this argument is true is similar to the example Ian Hacking provides in An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. In his book, Hacking explains that if the statement “this coin is biased toward heads. The probability of getting heads is about 0.6.” is true, it is because of how the world is, especially how the coin and tossing device are (128). Similarly, I believe that if the premise “it is possible that our opinions are erroneous” is true, it is because as humans, we know that our mind has cognitive limitations that may distort the way we construct our opinions. Thus, this argument is parallel to Peirce’s fallibilism because in order to understand the reasoning behind Peirce’s assertion, we need to be aware of not only our cognitive limitations but also our proneness to cognitive errors.
The second premise from the argument suggested by Hookway’s article is that “if it is possible for any of our opinions to be erroneous, then any of our opinions may for all we know require revision in the future”. In other words, it implies that when we are aware of the fallacies in our opinions, we can revise our opinions to make them right. I believe that this second statement refers to the self-corrective inquiry from Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism. According to Joseph Margolis in his article titled “Peirce Fallibilism”, self-corrective inquiry happens when “for any mistaken belief, a society of inquirers can, in a pertinently finite interval of time, discern its own mistakes and progress toward discovering the true state of affairs” (537). From my understanding of Peirce’s fallabilism, the uncertainty of our beliefs becomes an admission that they can be revised by further observation. Yet, any further observations happen because any beliefs we have may turn out to be false. Therefore, in my opinion, this second statement implies a self-corrective inquiry to our opinions, which is narrowed down from the self-corrective inquiry of Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism and which makes us be what Christopher Hookway defines as ‘contrite fallibilists’.
Based on the two previous statements, the argument suggested by Hookway’s article finally concludes that “so any of our opinions may for all we know require revision in the future”. For us to achieve this conclusion, I believe that we may have established some evidence that point out the fallacies in our opinions. I say this because if we do not have evidence that our opinions are wrong, then we will not know that our opinions are wrong at the first place. Knowing that our opinions may be wrong, it is only logical that we should revise our opinions. This is an example of proportioning our beliefs based on the evidence we have, just as like what Peirce means when he say “we cannot be absolutely certain”. Thus this argument draws on Peirce’s fallibilism to point out the essence of good thinking. Based on Peirce’s fallabilism, any beliefs we have might be wrong and uncertain. Yet, some ideas are more likely to be true than the others. In the end, all we can do is to proportion their beliefs to the evidence we have.