Animal rights have been and continue to be heavily debated. Specifically, there has been a focus on whether or not it is morally permissible to eat meat or conduct biomedical research on animals. There are many disagreements on what treatment can be considered inhumane by moral definitions, whether animals actually have rights, and whether certain human needs surpass these rights. In an article titled “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”, Carl Cohen argues that animals have no rights. He offers several points supporting his argument that will be discussed in the following paragraphs. In a separate piece, Alastair Norcross describes marginal cases in which Cohen’s argument would not be morally suitable as a response to his argument.
Cohen’s argument that animals do not have rights is justified by his definition of rights. He explains that rights are moral claims that only humans can possess because humans are the only species that have the capability to make moral claims against one another. His argument also mainly lies on the notion that only moral agents can have rights and that moral agents are morally autonomous. Being morally autonomous means that the being can exercise and respond to moral claims, and since this is not true of non-human animals, Cohen believes that they cannot have rights. This kind of thinking demonstrates speciesism, which supports treating species differently based on their species alone, and is another large underlying theme in Cohen’s argument.
In Norcross’ writing, he responds to Cohen’s argument with marginal cases. These marginal cases refute Cohen’s argument about a moral agent needing to have a rational capability to argue moral claims in order to possess rights. According to Norcross, if this were the case, then humans who are not capable of making rational moral claims would not have rights. Examples of such cases that Norcross highlights include infants and people with severe head trauma or other mental illnesses that would impair that person’s ability to be qualified as a moral agent under Cohen’s terms. Norcross’ cases directly counter the speciesist ideas presented by Cohen because there is now a problem with having to either accept that rationality is not morally relevant or accept that humans under these circumstances, in fact, do not have rights.
Cohen responds to this dilemma with the argument that because a capacity for moral agency is “essential” to humans, humans in the marginal cases are still human beings, so they are still considered moral agents. He also claims that the capacity is lacking in non-human animals. However, I believe that this is not a sufficient response to the issue at hand. The argument is lacking in support. The key words in his argument (“essential” and “necessarily lacking”) do not do enough to clarify the moral status of humans in the marginal cases. It should not matter if the capacity is essential or not. If it does, and the humans in marginal cases cannot be a rational moral agent, then there is still the issue of what separates them from non-human animals in this sense. It could definitely be argued that humans outside of the norm are lacking the capacity, so Cohen’s response does not actually respond to the dilemma. His adherence to these speciesist ideas comes across as almost arrogant and I feel that the arrogance is what keeps Cohen from fully justifying his claims.
Cohen’s response is also lacking because of his misinterpretation of anti-speciesist ideas. He believes that if they do not agree with speciesism, then they do not see moral differences between different species and want non-human animals to be treated equal to humans in terms of possessing rights. This, however, is not true. Anti-speciesists simply believe that there are other morally relevant factors, such as communication or an ability to feel, that contribute to the animal rights argument. Species should not be the sole determinant of how an animal is treated. Because Cohen responded to the former, misinterpreted claim, his argument does not make sense in the minds of those who believe the latter.
It would be ridiculous to apply all human rights to animals, but animals should have some basic rights, if not for the interests of their species, then for the interests of our own. A lack of rights for nonhuman animals could easily lead to their exploitation and because of the dependent nature of human beings on other species, this would not be in our best interest. There are also environmental concerns in cases with factory farming and biomedical research that may have potential impacts on human life. It is also in our moral values as a society to care about other species. If these values are ignored, it can set a precedent for a hypothetical (although unlikely) situation where humans are put in the same position as nonhuman animals are in now.
There are many reasons why animals should have rights, but the main reason that Carl Cohen’s argument against animals having rights falls through is because of his failure to adequately support his responses to criticisms.
Works Cited
- Cohen, Carl. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research.” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 315, no. 14, Feb. 1986, pp. 865–870., doi:10.1056/nejm198610023151405.
- Norcross, Alastair. “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 1, Jan. 2004, pp. 229–245., doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00027.x.