‘The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win’.
– Henry Kissinger
2.0 : Afghanistan – History, Geography and Demography
Brief History
15. Afghanistan’s history spans five thousand years and the Afghan people have contributed to the emergence of many Central Asian empires. The ancient centers of culture and civilization were influenced by diverse outsiders such as Rome, Greece, Arabia, Iran, Central Asia, India, and China. Great conquerors such as Chenghiz Khan and Timurlane swept through Afghanistan during the 13th and 14th century. These rulers brought with them the desire to establish kingdoms, and founded cultural and scholarly communities in Afghanistan. In particular, during the Timurid dynasty, poetry, architecture and miniature painting reached their zenith. The rise of the great Mughal Empire again lifted Afghanistan to heights of power. The ruler, Babur, had his capital in Kabul in 1512, but as the Mughals extended their power into India, Afghanistan went from being the center of the empire to merely a peripheral part of it. In the 18th and 19th century with European forces eroding the influence of the Mughals on the Indian subcontinent, the kingdom of Afghanistan began to emerge. Ahmad Shah ruled from 1747 and successfully established the concept of a united Afghanistan.
16. In 1919, Afghanistan gained independence from British occupying forces. From 1919-1973 Afghanistan modernized and built extensive infrastructure with the assistance of the international community. This period of relative stability ended in 1973 when King Zahir Shah
was overthrown while away in Europe. In 1978 and 1979, a number of coups brought to power a communist government that drifted increasingly toward the USSR, ending with a Soviet puppet government in Kabul led by Babrak Kamal and an invasion of Soviet forces. Throughout the eighties, an indigenous Afghan resistance movement fought against the invading Soviet forces. With the help of the United States, Afghans successfully resisted the occupation. On February 15, 1989 the last Soviet soldier retreated across Afghanistan’s northern border. As hostilities ceased, more than a million Afghans lay dead and 6.2 million people, over half the world’s refugee population, had fled the country. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 weakened the communist government of President Najibullah, leading to his ousting in April 1992. An interim president was installed and replaced two months later by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a founder of the country’s Islamic political movement, backed by the popular commander Ahmad Shah Massoud.
17. The government remained unstable and unable to form a national consensus amongst its various factions. This instability was exploited by a group of Islamic fighters called the Taliban (‘talib’ means ‘religious student’ or ‘seeker of knowledge’). With the assistance of foreign governments, organizations, and resources, the Taliban seized Kandahar and in September 1998 entered Kabul. Taliban rulers became infamous for their repression of women and dissidents as well as their destruction of the country’s cultural heritage. Showing little interest in trying to govern and rebuild Afghanistan, they instead played host to the radical Al-Qaeda terrorist
network.
Geography
18. Afghanistan is a landlocked mountainous country located within South Asia and Central Asia. ‘ The country is the 41st largest in the world in size. Kabul is the capital and largest city of
Afghanistan, located in the Kabul Province. Strategically located at the crossroads of major trade routes, Afghanistan has attracted a succession of invaders since the sixth century BC.’
The Hindu Kush mountains, running northeast to southwest across the country, divide it into three major regions: the Central Highlands, which form part of the Himalayas and account for roughly two thirds of the country’s area; the Southwestern Plateau, which accounts for one-fourth of the land; and the smaller Northern Plains area, which contains the country’s most fertile soil. Land elevations generally slope from northeast to southwest, following the general shape of the Hindu Kush massif, from its highest point in the Pamir Mountains near the Chinese border to the lower elevations near the border with Iran. To the north, west, and southwest there are no mountain barriers to neighboring countries. The northern plains pass almost imperceptibly into the plains of Turkmenistan. In the west and southwest, the plateaus and deserts merge into those of Iran. Afghanistan is located on the Eurasian Tectonic Plate. The Wakhan Corridor and the rest of northeastern Afghanistan, including Kabul, are situated in a geologically active area. Over a dozen earthquakes occurred there during the twentieth century.
19. The greater part of the northern border and a small section of the border with Pakistan are marked by rivers; the remaining boundary lines are political rather than natural. The northern frontier extends approximately 1,689 km southwestward, from the Pamir Mountains in the northeast to a region of hills and deserts in the west, at the border with Iran. The border with Iran runs generally southward from the Hari River across swamp and desert regions before reaching the northwestern tip of Pakistan. Its southern section crosses the Helmand River.
Six different countries bound Afghanistan. Its longest border is the poorly marked Durand Line, accounting for its entire southern and eastern boundary with Pakistan. The shortest one, bordering China’s Xinjiang province, is a mere 76 km at the end of the Wakhan Corridor (the Afghan Panhandle), a narrow sliver of land 241 km long that extends eastward between
Tajikistan and Pakistan. At its narrowest point it is only 11 km wide. The border with Pakistan runs eastward from Iran through the Chagai Hills and the southern end of the Registan Desert, then northward through mountainous country. It then follows an irregular northeasterly course before reaching the Durand Line, established in 1893. This line continues on through mountainous regions to the Khyber Pass area. Beyond this point it rises to the crest of the
Hindu Kush, which it follows eastward to the Pamir Mountains. The Durand Line divides the Pashtun tribes of the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its creation has caused much dissatisfaction among Afghans and has given rise to political tensions between the two countries. Political map of Afghanistan is at Map 1.
Demography
20. There are seven distinct and ideologically conflicting ethnic groups within Afghanistan. They are the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimack, Turkmen, and Baloch. Each of these groups identifies strongly with a country other than Afghanistan. For example, the Pashtun ethnic group heavily identifies with their Pashtun brethren in neighboring Pakistan. This type of individual association leads to Afghans not seeing themselves as citizens of Afghanistan but rather as members of a specific ethnic group . Exacerbating the situation are further divisions within each major ethnic group. The Pashtun, for example, is divided between the Ghilzai and the Durrani super tribes. These super tribes have ancient conflicts among each another. The tension created by these two tribes alone has been the root of serious internal conflict within Afghanistan. We see recurring evidence of the same type of internal friction among the other main ethnic groups within the country. Warlords and competition amongst smaller elements within the ethnic groups creates this strife. Each conflict contributes to the division of the country. This environment has led to a high degree of ethno- centralism in Afghanistan, causing ethnic groups to look for leadership only from those within their particular ethnic group.
21. In addition to ethno-centralism, the geography of Afghanistan lends itself to further isolation of ethnic groups. Afghanistan is characterized by large mountains and sweeping desert like expanses. These features isolate even smaller groups within the same ethnic group. For example, a Tajik in one mountain valley may live only a couple of miles from another group of Tajiks in a neighboring valley. They most likely do not know each other and may not be able to
understand one another. Many of these enclaves have varying dialects of their ethnic language. Some are discernable to one another, others are not. Many of these sub-ethnic groups have grievances towards one another that lead to sporadic warfare between them. Furthermore, Afghans historically and culturally see themselves in a reverse western order of hierarchy of belonging. Within the western world, people generally see themselves as a member of their country, state, town, and then their family. Afghans understand this in complete reverse order. They see themselves as first belonging to their family, their extended family, their clan, their tribe, their ethnic group, and then part of Afghanistan. This further compounds ethnic divisions within the country and creates an atmosphere necessitating strong local governance. In fact, this has led to local governance and a dislike of external influence upon local authority. The Afghan local governmental system is based upon family, clan, tribal, and ethnic backgrounds. In many of its dynamics, it is very similar to a federal system in its make-up. They have resolution of routine issues at the lowest level of government, raising major issues to a Jirga or meeting of the clan leaders. The ethno-linguistic map of Afghanistan is given at Map 2.
2.1 : Reasons for the American Intervention
Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan
22. During the power vacuum created by the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the country was torn apart by warring mujahideen groups and the ISI of Pakistan grasped the chance to wield power in the region by fostering a previously unknown Kandahari student movement. ‘ They continued to support the Taliban, as Pakistani allies, in their push to conquer Afghanistan in the 1990s.’ Taliban initially enjoyed enormous good will from Afghans weary of
the corruption, brutality, and the incessant fighting of Mujahideen warlords.’ One story is that the rape and murder of boys and girls from a family traveling to Kandahar or a similar outrage by Mujahideen bandits sparked Mohammed Omar (Mullah Omar) and his students to vow to rid Afghanistan of these criminals.” Another motivation was that the Pakistan-based truck
shipping mafia known as the “Afghanistan Transit Trade” and their allies in the Pakistan government, trained, armed, and financed the Taliban to clear the southern road across Afghanistan to the Central Asian Republics of extortionate bandit gangs.’ Many senior leaders of the Afghanistan Taliban were closely associated with and had attended the Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary in Akora Khattak in Pakistan, including Mullah Omar, and its role in supporting the Taliban.’ The seminary is run by Maulana Sami ul Haq of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam who is often referred to as the “Father of the Taliban”.”
23. Although there isn’t any evidence that the CIA directly supported the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, some basis for military support of the Taliban was provided when, in the early 1980s, the CIA and the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency) provided arms to Afghans resisting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the ISI assisted the process of gathering radical Muslims from around the world to fight against the Soviets.” Osama Bin Laden was one of the key players in organizing training camps for the foreign Arab volunteers, although his organization, Maktab al-Khidamat, was exclusively Saudi funded.’ The Taliban were based in the Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan regions and were overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtuns and predominantly Durrani Pashtuns.’ The first major military activity of the Taliban was in October’November 1994 when they marched from Maiwand in southern Afghanistan to capture Kandahar City and the surrounding provinces, losing only a few dozen men.’ Starting with the capture of a border crossing and a huge ammunition dump from warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a few weeks later they freed “a convoy trying to open a trade route from Pakistan to Central Asia” from another group of warlords attempting to extort money.’ In the next three months this hitherto “unknown force” took control of twelve of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, with Mujahideen warlords often surrendering to them without a fight and the “heavily armed population” giving up their weapons. By September 1996 they had captured Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul.
9/11 and Lead Up to the American Intervention in Afghanistan
24. As heinous as their domestic policies were, the worst aspect of Taliban governance was its virtual adoption of the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Osama Bin Laden came back to Afghanistan in 1996, shortly before the Taliban took Kabul. He had fought there with the mujahideen for short periods during the Soviet war. His duties had included a little fighting, much fund-raising in Pakistan, and the supervision of construction efforts. After a few years at home, he was ousted first from Saudi Arabia in 1991 for objecting to the introduction of U.S. forces during the Gulf War, and then from Sudan in 1996 because he had become a threat to the regime. Neither country would put up with his revolutionary activities and radical ways. Osama bin Laden reportedly saw Afghanistan as the first state in a new Islamic caliphate. Although he did not know Mullah Omar beforehand, Bin Laden held him in high regard, and intermarriage took place between the inner circles of al Qaeda and the Taliban. In return for his sanctuary and freedom of action, Bin Laden provided funds, advice, and, most important, trained cadres, Afghan or otherwise, for the Taliban war machine. Pakistan was also generous in support of its allies in Afghanistan, which it saw as a sure bulwark against Indian influence. In 1998 alone, Pakistan provided $6 million to the Taliban.
25. In Afghanistan, bin Laden took over or set up training camps for al Qaeda and Taliban recruits. As many as 20,000 Afghan and foreign recruits may have passed through the camps. Many of these trainees received combat experience in fighting the Northern Alliance, raising Al Qaeda’s value in the eyes of the Taliban leadership. Afghanistan became a prime destination for international terrorists. In February 1998, bin Laden declared war on the United States from his safe haven in Afghanistan. Accusing the Americans of occupying Arabia, plundering its riches, humiliating its leaders, attacking Iraq, and more, Bin Laden claimed that de facto the United States had declared war on Islam and its people. On August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda carried out bombings on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa. Both Embassies were severely damaged. The casualties, mostly African, numbered over 220 killed, and nearly 4,200 wounded. Among other measures, U.S. retaliatory cruise missile strikes were aimed at Al
Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to little effect. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the strikes missed bin Laden by a few hours. Before and after these attacks, a number of plots to capture or kill bin Laden were stillborn due to sensitivities about civilian casualties. In 1999, the 9/11 plotters received screening and initial training inside Afghanistan. Their guidance, funds, concept of the operation, and detailed plans came from Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan. Beginning in 1998, the United States and Saudi Arabia both urged Afghanistan to surrender Osama bin Laden for legal proceedings. The Taliban government resisted repeated efforts to extradite him even after he had blown up two U.S. Embassies and, in October 2000, a U.S. warship off the coast of Yemen. To this day (2011), the Taliban leadership has never disavowed Al Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden.
26. It is not clear what al Qaeda’s leaders thought would happen in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. Perhaps, judging from recent practice, Al Qaeda thought the Bush administration, like some of its predecessors, would conduct a lengthy investigation and be slow to take action. The United States had failed to take significant retaliatory action after other terrorist attacks: the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, and the bombing of USS Cole in 2000. In any case, al Qaeda did not fully understand the passions that they would raise in the United States and among its allies by the murder on 9/11 of 3,000 innocent people from 90 countries. Washington asked the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. Mullah Omar refused again as he had in 1998. The President then went to Congress for support. Congress authorized the President in a Joint Resolution:
‘To use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons’.
27. The US air attacks began on October 7, 2001 signaling commencement of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.
2.2 : US Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO)
28. US military operations in LICO fall into four broad categories of which counter-insurgency (COIN) is also one. The four categories are –
(a) Support for insurgency and counterinsurgency.
(b) Combatting terrorism.
(c) Peacekeeping operations.
(d) Peacetime contingency operations.
Principles of Counterinsurgency (COIN)
29. The principles of COIN are derived from the historical record and recent experience. They are detailed below to provide guideposts for the joint force in COIN. These principles do not replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide focus on how to successfully conduct COIN. They are as under-
(a) Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Operational Environment.
(b) Legitimacy Is The Main Objective.
(c) Unity of Effort is Essential.
(d) Political Factors are Primary.
(e) Intelligence Drives Operations.
(f) Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support.
(g) Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential.
(h) Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment.
(j) Manage Information and Expectations.
(k) Use the Appropriate Level of Force.
(l) Learn and Adapt.
(m) Empower the Lowest Levels.
(n) Support the Host Nation.
30. The US military doctrine states ‘Insurgency is an internal threat that uses subversion and violence to reach political ends. Typically the insurgents will solicit or be offered some type of support from state or non-state actors, which can include transnational terrorists who take advantage of the situation for their own benefit.’ Affected nations may request US support in countering an insurgency, which is typically the circumstances under which US forces become involved in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Whatever the mix of actors and level of conflict, and despite the broadly applied label of insurgency, the motivation and objectives of the various belligerents must be understood to be effectively countered.
31. The US model states that COIN is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all host nation, US, and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead US efforts. When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required for effective COIN. Ideally, all COIN efforts protect the population, defeat the insurgents, reinforce the HN’s legitimacy, and build HN capabilities. COIN efforts include, but are not limited to, political, diplomatic, economic, health, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, legal, informational, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions. As capable insurgents evolve and adapt, counterinsurgents must evolve and adapt.
32. Post the Vietnam Wars, the American military was primarily involved in only one major conflict, Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, which was absolutely conventional in nature and secured the US led allies a comprehensive victory. The wounds of Vietnam were still fresh in the minds of the US Department of Defence and they did not want to get sucked into a messy LICO campaign in Afghanistan, which was popularly called ‘The Graveyard of Empires’. The Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld initially denied the existence of insurgency in Afghanistan, but the hard realities of war forced a reevaluation. However, once committed to the task in Afghanistan, US officials pin their hopes for success on the effective implementation of the principles of counterinsurgency warfare. The study of counterinsurgency has become a major priority in recent years. Highlighted in the succeeding paragraphs are the principles of COIN as applied by the US led coalition forces in Afghanistan in support of a planned campaign to stabilize Afghanistan.
2.3: Understanding the Operational Environment
33. The US doctrine advocates this as a prime principle of COIN operations wherein the counter-insurgent must endeavor to familiarize himself with the nuances of the operating environment of the area of operations. This would also include acquainting oneself and developing sensitivity to local customs, traditions and culture and avoid imposing their own on the area of operations. Local Religion, if different, would play a major role and forces must possess the requisite awareness levels to avoid alienating the locals.
34. Afghanistan, at the time of the US intervention was dominated by religious fundamentalism laid down by the Taliban, which was an extreme interpretation of Islam. The Pakistani version of the Deobandi schools in Afghan refugee camps were for the most part run by inexperienced, semiliterate mullahs associated with Pakistan’s JUI. Saudi funds in combination with a lack of appreciation on the part of the mullahs of the reformist Deobandi agenda brought the schools’ curricula closer to ultra-conservative Wahhabism. Deobandi
militants shared the Taliban’s restrictive view of women and regarded Shia as non-Muslims. While in power the Taliban executed deliberate anti-Shia programs against Afghanistan’s
ethnic Hazaras, who are predominantly Shia, and led numerous massacres against them, killing tens of thousands. The other ethnic groups too suffered at the hands of the predominantly Pashtun Taliban and the society was split along ethnic fault lines which greatly complicated execution of operations. The counter-insurgent forces had to carefully negotiate a balancing path in the country.
35. Moreover, since the Pashtuns dominated the nation’s leadership as well as that of the Taliban, it was important to delve deeper into their culture. Pashtun culture revolves around the Pashtunwali, their pre-Islamic code of honor . It emphasizes honor, hospitality, protection of women, and revenge. Louis Dupree, the late eminent Western specialist on Afghanistan, described the Pashtunwali this way:
‘ to avenge blood,’to fight to the death for a person who has taken refuge with me
no matter what his lineage,’to defend to the last any property entrusted to me’to be hospitable and provide for the safety of guests,’to refrain from killing a woman, a Hindu, a minstrel, or a boy not yet circumcised,’to pardon an offense on the intercession of a woman of the
offender’s lineage, a Sayyid, or a Mullah, to punish all adulterers with death’to refrain from killing a man who has entered a mosque or a shrine of a holy man . . . also to spare the life of a man who begs for quarter in battle.’
36. Though Pashtun culture has helped to keep Afghanistan independent, but it has also helped to make it a fractious place, rife with internal violence within and between families and clans. Even conflict between cousins is a thread in all too many stories in this part of the world.
. Xenophobia is another aspect of Afghan culture. Throughout Afghanistan, suspicion of foreigners is strong. This no doubt stems from insularity and frequent invasions. Afghans are independence minded. The Pashtun warning to the government and to foreigners says it all:
don’t touch our women, our treasure, or our land. Non-Pashtun Afghans, 58 percent of the population generally share this attitude and have their own set of hard feelings toward the dominant Pashtuns. Afghans of all stripes have a strong sense of personal and national honor. This cultural baggage was a major consideration facing the US led coalition when it inducted into the country. Understanding these tribal nuances and deep undercurrents was a challenge to this US coalition.
37. However, the cultural and historical perspective with which the ISAF arrived was not entirely factually correct. The fact that Afghanistan has always been an unstable state perpetually beleaguered by armed rebels is now taken as a fact. Yet Afghanistan actually experienced relatively few insurgencies that were generated by British invasions and died soon after they were gone. The many violent civil wars in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not insurgencies but rather succession struggles. It was only during the period of resistance against the Soviet occupation (1979-89) that Afghanistan experienced its first national insurgency. The Soviet departure from Afghanistan did not bring an end to the insurgency. One reason for this was that the mujahideen rebels maintained access to their foreign funding and bases in Pakistan, whereas earlier rebels had subsisted entirely on domestic resources. By September 2001, the Taliban were on the verge of expelling the last of their enemies in north-eastern Afghanistan following the assassination of Massud. The US invasion reversed that process dramatically, and within months the Taliban were gone and the new Karzai government was installed. If Afghanistan were truly a land of unending insurrections, one should have arisen somewhere against the United States in 2002. Therefore it is presumed that the American military had already a ‘grey populace’ awaiting them, which had to be weaned away from the insurgents by correct application of the principles of COIN.
38. As assessed by the NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan, Fernando Gentilini after his conversation with the Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels prior to his assuming the appointment: The three important things were that the solution could
not be just military; for the civilian aspects of its international mission NATO had to be coordinated by the United Nations: the military forces of the ISAF mission were supposed to sustain governance and development activities being carried out by the afghans and the rest of the international community. The US military had to perforce open with a military campaign to oust the Taliban, which was firmly entrenched across the country, and towards, that understandably the initial campaign had to primarily be dependent upon application of force. Local sensitivities understandably would suffer collateral damage during this phase. However, what was important was the recovery time that the campaign had factored into its plan, in order to revert to the civilian governance and developmental activities, which would truly determine the final outcome of the LICO campaign.
39. The Coalition forces also had to balance out the ‘set in stone’ social practices in Afghanistan. Primary amongst them were conducting LICO to radiate complete lack of bias in the deeply fractured society split along ethnic fault lines, respect religious sentiments which were overbearing in their Islamic beliefs and very much alien to the American way of thinking, especially after the September 11 attacks on US soil and finally value the ‘regressive’ though firmly ensconced place of women in Afghan society without seeming to intrude into personal domains of the ferociously territorial nature of the common citizen. The above factors coupled with the historical lack of an organized central government in the country were a nightmare to any commander orchestrating a LICO campaign and imposed severe restrictions on the rules of engagement of the forces operating on ground.
2.4: Legitimacy of Operations
40. To be successful, counter-insurgents must be perceived as legitimate. Legitimacy often is equated to popular support, however, that term is much too simplistic and the LICO often focus efforts in the wrong directions. Popular legitimacy involves a more complex dynamic than the sort of popularity contest implied by phrases like ‘winning the hearts and minds’. Indeed, most
populations caught in the crossfire of an insurgency merely want to be rid of all sides in the conflict. Instead, legitimacy within the conflict zone occurs when populations and their leaders, understand that the counter-insurgency results benefit them more than any alternatives. It is thus as much a result of actions and structures than information operations, and cuts across all tasks. Although the initial invasion of Afghanistan was not mandated by a specific UN Security Council Resolution, relying on the US justification of self-defence to the September 11 attacks on its soil, the Security Council moved quickly to authorise a military operation to stabilise the country. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 of December 2001 laid down the initial mandate for a 5,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to deploy to the region in and immediately around Kabul, in order to provide security and to assist in the reconstruction of the country under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
41. Having addressed the larger question of not being labeled foreign invaders, the US led coalition had to next radiate the same message at the ground troops level, where the actual combat was and the lives of its service personnel were at stake. Here, their acceptance amongst the locals would mean the difference between life and death, as also affect the overall success of the LICO campaign. The US operational philosophy dictated that ‘Forces engaged in LICO must be backed by a legitimate order, either through its government or a world body edict, in case it is a foreign country. Legitimacy of operations help establish the lawful writ of governance over the area of operations and also help cover the collateral damage which is an inadvertent result of such engagements. According to their philosophy, there are six possible
indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to stability. First, the ability to provide security for the populace, including protection from internal and external threats, is a key indicator of legitimacy. Second, the selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace strengthens the legitimacy of the Host Nation. Other indicators of legitimacy include: a high level of popular participation in or support for political processes; a culturally acceptable level of corruption; a culturally
acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; the existence and acceptance of laws; and a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.’
42. Having identified the above parameters and setting them as guidelines, the coalition had to select a face for their campaign, one that would be amenable to the majority Pashtuns, as also the balance milieu of ethnicities in Afghanistan towards projecting a legitimate governing authority. The challenge was finding a leader having acceptability amongst the largely fractious Pashtuns, for which the direct competition was between the legendary Mujahideen Commander Abdul Haq and the largely aristocratic, Hamid Karzai. The balance tilted in favour of Karzai, largely due to internal politics and the assassination of Haq, allegedly by the Pakistan ISI. Also, in the wake of 9/11, it was the Pashtun clans themselves who had approached Karzai to ask him to return to southern Afghanistan and lead them against the Taliban. In the continuing conflict situation, Karzai would never have emerged to the top. Yet in choosing a national leader the Afghans in the Bonn conference were not looking for an uber-warlord but someone who could successfully deal with the outside world-resources from which would be critical in bringing stability to Afghanistan. And thus the coalition was able to project a face to the Afghan people to commence the process of political engagement, as a prelude to normalizing the war torn country.
43. David Cortright opines whether the war in Afghanistan is a just cause depends on the goals of US policy, and whether these can be achieved through military means. The core US objective was defined in the 2010 US National Security Strategy: to ‘defeat, dismantle, and
disrupt’ Al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. Similar arguments were also made in the March 2009 White Paper justifying President Obama’s policy of military buildup. While the goal of apprehending those responsible for the 9/11 attacks is justified, the key ethical and political question is not whether the mission is just, but rather how it can be achieved. It is a question of means rather than ends. Therefore the fundamental strategic assumptions on which the US military involvement in Afghanistan is
based are highly questionable strategically and pose serious dilemmas ethically. This was compounded by the initial decision of the US government to unilaterally invade Afghanistan, paying scant regard to the United Nations or world opinion.
44. Hence it was imperative for the coalition forces to specifically target the genesis of the present conflict, i.e. Al Qaeda. Taliban leaders or factions actively supporting and abetting them could also be considered legitimate targets and this was generally acceptable to the common man. However, it was equally important to achieve this aim in the shortest possible time frame and avoid dragging the conflict over a long period of time and being termed invaders, which would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the American presence in the country. Hence, locating and eliminating Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants who comprised the decision-making apparatus of Al Qaeda, as also key Taliban leadership, which was seen a tyrant by the general Afghan populace was the key to the entire strategy. The American planners too banked upon these sentiments of the locals and pursued their operational policy vigorously. The socio-economic environment existing in the country at the commencement of the US led operations had reached the lowest possible index in the world, and the common Afghan only saw a ray of hope in the US invasion to uplift his living conditions and perhaps provide a better future for his future generations.
2.5: Unity of Effort
45. All forces engaged in LICO must work towards a common goal and preferably under a single commander. It would greatly help matters if this unified chain lies under the political governance rather than military, as it would help present the face of the government to the fore as any lack of such a united front would present an ideal opportunity for insurgents to exploit. Civil authorities, military commanders, and, equally important, the many civil and non-governmental agencies and organizations, whether indigenous or others, must coordinate to achieve the objectives of the counterinsurgency effort. While ideally, one civil or military
commander may be optimal, the civil-military complexities of counter-insurgency make that largely impractical. Nonetheless, unity of purpose can be achieved through the use of coordination centers and processes, integration of civil and military organizations. Counter-insurgency demands clearly defined, unambiguous political and military goals. The pathway to resolution should be identified at both strategic and operational levels. The strategic goal must remain constant and not be swayed by the inevitable tactical and operational changes that will occur. It is not enough that the goals be stated by political leaders, they must also be communicated to all levels and all units, organizations, and agencies involved in the counterinsurgency.
46. Though it appears that coalition forces began operations in Afghanistan with a clearly defined objective, it is difficult to conclude that every ally contributed to the campaign with similar motivations or strategies. For instance, it has been widely suggested that a number of allies have contributed simply to satisfy the United States, in an attempt to maintain healthy relations with NATO’s most powerful member state. Given the competing motivations of those NATO members involved in operations in Afghanistan, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has also been a distinct lack of coherent strategy that has, arguably, hampered operational effectiveness. Fundamentally, there appears to be differing perceptions between allies as to the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan and the ways in which NATO should conduct its operations in response. More specifically, there is a debate within the alliance surrounding the apparent importance of counter-insurgency (COIN) for achieving ISAF’s goals. Most countries who made up the ISAF did not possess the same motivation levels as the US as they had not been directly targeted by the September 11 attacks and were merely there to fulfill their obligations towards NATO.
47. COIN operations in the initial stages dictate maximum military strength to be deployed to clear target areas from the influence of insurgents. This stage is perhaps the most important for establishing the foundation for future success and hence required troop contribution from all
allies to undertake tactical level operations. However it was revealed that NATO allies encountered disparity over the sharing of risks at the tactical level. Operational restrictions placed on deployed forces by national capitals arguably posed one of the biggest threats to alliance unity and operational success. Crucially, these ‘caveats’ have been described by a NATO commander as having ‘the same practical effect as having fewer forces deployed.’ Not only, therefore, has the Afghanistan mission been conducted with far fewer forces than the alliance has declared required, but the forces that have been deployed are of reduced utility to commanders. Often a single successful step forward was hampered by taking two steps back due to the complex nature of coalition politics. It also appeared that it was only the US and a few close allies like the UK which actively pursued insurgents while the others were simply there to make up the numbers. Body bags though unpopular back on US soil, were still acceptable to the nation, seen as price to be paid for exacting just vengeance for the attacks on home soil, however; they were unacceptable to the other NATO allies as the numbers began to pile up, as they were considered to have been dragged into someone else’s war.
48. Another lack of coordination between allies operating in Afghanistan was clearly evident from the composition and tasking. There were two military missions in Afghanistan. One was American and the other was international. The first (Operation Enduring Freedom) focused on seeking out terrorists and had approximately 25,000 staff; the other (The International Security
Assistance Force) supports Afghan security forces and acts pursuant to a mandate issued by the United Nations. While the US forces received or rather took orders only from their own headquarters, they expected ISAF to follow suit. The overall commander of ISAF was generally from one of the allied nations, and this was done with the purpose of projecting a face of unity amongst ISAF and trying to achieve synergy between its various multinational components.
49. Yet another coordination issue to achieving unity of command in a LICO environment was with regard to arriving at a balance between the civilian and military components in the
mission areas. While the operational philosophy largely recognized the end state as primarily being in the civilian domain, the actual synergizing of efforts needed to be enforced in order to derive maximum benefit of an orchestrated counter-insurgency strategy. The initial period of operations did not provide a safe environment for deployment of the civilian apparatus and all developmental activities towards winning hearts and minds (WHAM) were understandably undertaken by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) composed primarily of military personnel. However, to gain greater acceptance amongst the general population, it was imperative that this task be gradually and completely be taken over by civilians who were the velvet side of the iron fist. Though attacks, kidnappings and even massacres of the civilian personnel engaged in WHAM activities did take place, they gradually began to establish their presence in areas cleared of insurgents by the friendly forces.
2.6: Intelligence Drives Operations
50. Effective LICO are shaped by specific and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and disseminated throughout the chain of command. Intelligence operations form the bedrock of LICO and it is imperative that continuity be maintained in this respect to keep the insurgents on the defensive and thwart their offensive intentions. Few challenge the idea that accurate and timely intelligence is crucial to successful counter-insurgency. However,
intelligence comprises far more than determining locations or movements of insurgents and suspect individuals, or developing targeting data. It extends beyond the realm of military concerns to encompass a wide range of information and intelligence related to political, social, economic, and security issues. Indigenous attitudes, perceptions, social hierarchies and community needs may be more important than the location of a particular insurgent or group. Insurgents care little for these elements, however those conducting counter-insurgencies are required to do so. And, like all aspects of counter-insurgency, intelligence must be fully integrated, not only between military and government forces, but also with civilian agencies and, if at all possible, with indigenous leaders and the non-governmental actors throughout the conflict zone.
51. The US military, an alien force to the peculiarities of Afghan culture, had to adapt to the local customs and norms to begin gathering intelligence at the grass roots. A facet specific to the country’s culture has been local assembly or ‘Jirga’ at all levels wherein the elders and those entrusted with responsibility discussed issues to find a solution. When face-to-face communication takes place within the context of Pashtun norms of hospitality, with mutual obligations and expectations for guests and hosts, it proved very effective. The Taliban used the population to support nearly all of their operations and through these conversations with the locals, the U.S. military gathered information about these operations and to lay groundwork to stop them. This was generation of HUMINT at the very basic level and formed the mainstay of local intelligence operations executed by the US forces in Afghanistan.
52. Outside forces lack the natural connections with local communities that make it easier to win hearts and minds and obtain effective intelligence about insurgents. These and other factors reduce the prospect of success. This is why the ISAF mission was in urgent need of more Dari and Pashtun speakers who knew Afghan culture and traditions and would be able to interact with locals in the villages. Afghanistan was probably far off the radar for any future operations
by NATO and the sudden attacks on New York caught them by surprise. There was heavy dependence on locals who acted as interpreters and also Pakistan, which posed as a frontline ally in the GWOT. This dependence on outside sources to gather intelligence, establish working communication with the locals and also to carry out day-to-day operations was of particular importance for success of the ground operations.
53. Robert Beljan opines ‘In order to include cultural and human aspects of the operational environment, it was necessary for ISAF to use a different approach in its intelligence gathering. A key aspect was the strong reliance on human intelligence (HUMINT) gained from the population and then fusing this with other information gathering disciplines to produce intelligence products.’ The technology available to the allied forces was far superior to
anything that had ever been fielded in any operational theatre of the world. However, here again, the human element to fully fructify the force multiplier effects of these electronic devices was of paramount importance. As pointed out previously, one intelligence gathering and processing technique mastered in ISAF was the organization of company level intelligence teams called Company Intelligence Support Teams (COIST). Most of the company level units in ISAF are organized for conventional combat and do not possess an Intelligence operations capability. The company’s higher headquarters normally provides intelligence for company operations. However, this intelligence often arrives late and is not focused enough and therefore may be of little direct value to the company’s pending operation. One of COIST’s goals was to provide a company level unit with information on the effects of the weather, enemy, terrain, and local population on the company’s operations, to reduce uncertainty and aid the company commander in decision making.
54. To their credit, both the US and ISAF introduced new concepts to ‘Intelligence’ specifically to cater to the Afghanistan theatre. Some of these measures were as follows. Each Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) has an Intelligence Advisor who provided training, advice, and assistance to the intelligence officer and section of the advised Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) element. These Intelligence Advisors are a key element in the ANSF counter-insurgency campaign. This provides a unique opportunity to the SFAAT Intelligence Advisor at the brigade, corps, battalion level to both train their intelligence
counterparts and to provide timely actionable intelligence on the insurgents to the ANSF so that the targeting of insurgent networks can continue. Another was one of the more evolving concepts in the intelligence field, which was the use of ‘reachback’ from Afghanistan to the United States for intelligence products and services. It is cheaper to keep an analyst in the U.S. than Afghanistan; especially if the analyst is sitting in front of a computer reading and writing reports than to maintain one in the operations area. Their invaluable contribution to analyses resulted in big gains for the COIN forces. Also they made use of the NGOs, who in many
respects, have been ‘in-country’ longer than military personnel and some for several years. These NGO workers understand the culture, ‘human domain’, interact with the populace and
community leaders a lot, and are great sources of information (if not intelligence). Although many humanitarians do not favor working with the military in areas of conflict; some will (some have to).
2.7: Insurgents Must Be Isolated From Their Cause and Support
55. Insurgency thrives on local support for intelligence, logistics, protection and legitimacy. It is the core belief of LICO that the insurgent be separated from this support base either by military or non-military action to isolate him and thereby denude the movement of critical base. This action is the lead up to establishing governance in population centres and providing an opportunity to the people to experience development without coercion. Insurgencies, whether classical or contemporary, tend to be protracted conflicts where the insurgents bet their assets, support and will against a weak government’s staying power, its generally superior resources, and outside support. Rather than force-on-force conventional operations, where combatants
fight to destroy one another, capture terrain, or break alliances, opponents in insurgencies fight for the support some would say control of the populace.
56. At times, the hand of foreign powers for vested interests also needs to be factored into the COIN strategy. In the case of Afghanistan ‘As the mujahideen factions and warlords were fighting each other for power, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the region, most notably funding madrassas (religious boarding schools) in Pakistan that sought to spread the conservative Wahhabi version of Islam practiced in the Saudi kingdom. Pakistan’s Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami (JUI) party built a network of its own to extend the influence of the indigenous Deobandi School of Islamic thought. These madrassas would come to serve as an important
educational alternative for the numerous displaced refugees from the anti-Soviet jihad and Afghan civil war as well as for poor families along the frontier who could not afford the secular schools. With the oversight of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which had grown weary of their favorite Afghan mujahideen leader, Hekmatyar, the Taliban emerged from the madrassas of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the federally administered tribal area (FATA), not to mention kinship networks inside the remaining Afghan refugee camps’. The connivance and deliberate ignorance of Pakistan to Taliban and Al Qaeda
fighters using its territory to stage attacks on Afghan soil and again seeking shelter across the border, was a complication the US forces had to contend with. This lack of cooperation similarly frustrated the United States. As Henry A. Crumpton, the U.S. Department of State coordinator for counter- terrorism, asserts:
‘The Americans are finding the Pakistanis much more reluctant to face down the Taliban’who are brethren from the Pashtun ethnic group that dominates in Afghanistan’than they have been to confront Al Qaeda, who are largely outsiders. Has Pakistan done enough? I think the answer is no. . . . Not only Al Qaeda, but Taliban leadership are primarily in Pakistan, and the Pakistanis know that’.
57. The next factor is the symbol behind which the entire insurgent movement rallies and the armed fighters take orders from. The US forces in this regard had to contend with the supreme authority of the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, whose writ over all mujahideen was absolute. The cloak of the Prophet Mohammed was folded and padlocked in a series of chests in a crypt in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar; ”myth had it that the padlocks to the crypt could be opened only when touched by a true Amir-ul Momineen.” The event was Omar’s removal in 1994 of a sacred garment believed by many Afghans to be the original cloak worn by the Prophet Mohammed from its sanctuary in Kandahar, and his wearing it while standing atop a mosque in the city. Whereas Omar had been a non-entity before this piece of religious theatre, the audacious stunt catapulted him to a level of mystical power (at least among the 90 percent of Pashtuns who are illiterate) and resulted in his being locally proclaimed Amir-ul
Momineen (the Leader of the Faithful). The Talibs were ready to perform any task, whatsoever; on the call given by Mullah Omar and the US forces rightly identified targeting the epicenter of the Taliban leadership.
58. The most important distinction required to be drawn out by the counter-insurgent forces was to specifically categorise the ‘enemy’ in Afghanistan, so as to limit the adversarial strata it
needed to target and prevent alienation of the population. Al-Qaeda and Taliban have been extremely closely intertwined over the years. Both are rooted in extremist jihadi ideology and are fiercely opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Muslim communities. They are interdependent militarily, financially and politically. Yet important distinctions exist between the two. Al-Qaeda is an Arab based movement with a global agenda of attacking corrupt Arab regimes and the Western interests that support them. The Taliban is a complex, diverse network of Pashtun nationalists, dispossessed tribes and Islamist extremists seeking to control the Pashtun majority parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban’s internationalist rhetoric has not translated into transnational action. And unlike the militants of Al-Qaeda, Pashtun fighters are not engaged in attacks beyond their homeland. No Afghans participate in Al-Qaeda’s
hierarchy and no Arabs are in the Taliban’s command structure. The US military planners identified exploiting this divide in the insurgent cohesiveness.
59. As is true with any guerilla force, The Taliban’s survival depends on the consent of surrounding communities. The Taliban method of fighting requires an ability to melt seamlessly into the local population. Insurgents could not withstand the superior firepower and technology of US and NATO forces without the cover provided by surrounding communities. Intimidation no doubt plays a role, and Taliban militants have been ruthless in terrorizing those who betray them, but the insurgency has undeniable public appeal. A substantial part of the Pashtun population supports armed resistance against foreign forces and the Kabul regime.
This support to the Taliban stems mainly from the perceived failures and biases of the ruling elite in Kabul, who through their lack of effective governance managed to alienate even the fringe population towards the insurgents. In fact, the very origin and existence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan can be directly attributed to failures of Kabul to provide a corruption free and development based administration, acceptable to the majority population. Thus the primary task facing the American military was to convince the general population that the end state of their military campaign would eventually be a harbinger to a better future for the country, different than what they had experienced previously.
2.8: Security Under Rule of Law Is Essential
60. Beginning locally and extending to the national level, effective counterinsurgency operations must nurture the development and sustainment of political and legal institutions capable of providing governance within the rule of law, meeting the basic social needs of the populace, and providing both internal and external security to the country. Maintaining stability provided an environment in which governance, political and economic development, and rebuilding occurred without threat of political turmoil, violence, crime, or social conflict. Stability not only requires that insurgents be neutralized, it also established local governance and security capacities, prevented of crime, resettled populations, protected freedom of movement for commerce and travel, enforced human rights, and empowered civil authorities.
61. The culminating aim of LICO is to transition from military action to law and order environment. The faster a force achieves this, the faster the writ of the insurgent runs down and helps establish faith in the government among the populace. Insurgents tried by security forces in the eyes of law are far likely to be accepted by the local population than those neutralized through force. Governments and administration established through legitimate means will have a much higher chance of acceptability that that done by rule of force. President Karzai’s 12 predecessors have led tough lives: all of them have been forced from office, with seven being killed in the process. Still, the periods 1901’1919 and 1933’1973 were times of relative stability, proof positive that good governance in Afghanistan is problematical but not
impossible. Instability has been common but is in no sense preordained. However the root of the problem was to establish the credibility of the newly elected Karzai Government, which had its own limitations. The weakness and corruption of the government and the limitations of its coalition partners reinforced the Taliban’s efforts and gave credence to its cause. The Taliban’s ability to use its version of sharia law and its ubiquitous mullahs to settle disputes is a further help. The government’s inability to control narcotics not only mocked its power and authority, but it paid the Taliban handsomely and fueled corruption throughout the country.
62. Though the initial operations launched by the US forces achieved initial successes, Taliban penetration of many areas deepened. Subversion, terrorism, and night letters from the local Taliban ruled many apparently safe districts by night. In areas with scant Pashtun populations, the Taliban also used motorcycle squads and IEDs for controlling the population. Since 2006, Taliban judges have administered sharia-based judgments; trumping Karzai’s slow and sometimes corrupt civil courts. The Afghan people have had little love for the Taliban, but insecurity has made them hesitant to act against them. Breaking hold of the Taliban over the countryside was a priority task for the counter-insurgent force, but it needed the full support of the local government. Having lost out once to Mullah Omar and company, the traditional
leadership had good reason not to accommodate the Taliban again if it thought the insurgents would be defeated. Southern areas of Afghanistan therefore came under Taliban domination only in the absence of significant Kabul government or international forces to oppose it. And it was the failure of the Kabul government to provide economic benefits; security and justice that made the Taliban look like an attractive alternative, rather than any sympathy for their ideology.
63. Daily law and order issues, so very important to gauge the effectiveness of governance were the basic concern of the common man, who for the past three decades had seen it in complete shambles. Organised crime played an important destabilizing role in post 2001 Afghanistan. Protecting and taxing the opium trade helped fund the Taliban resurgence, and intensified the conflict in Afghanistan’s south by bringing both militants and corrupt state actors significant wealth and access to weapons and explosives. Kidnappings, attacks on supply convoys and widespread protection rackets also dramatically increased security and other costs for the coalition, local governments and international organisations working in the region,
slowing the pace of development and reconstruction, and spreading the perception that the Afghan government is weak and ineffective.
2.9: Manage Information and Expectations
64. Effective counter-insurgents understand local norms and use locally tailored approaches to control expectations. Managing expectations also involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Expectation management is a process that enforces reasonable expectations, and is intended to prevent unrealistic expectations. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN. Foremost amongst perception management was to give the LICO campaign acceptance within the country and this started off on a disastrous note. This was particularly apparent in the first phase of ‘the military build-up’
to respond to the attacks of 9/11, which led to international troops entering Afghanistan. The initial phrase used to frame the campaign, ‘Operation Infinite Justice’ which caused Muslim groups to protest because in the Islamic faith ‘infinite justice’ can only be provided by God, and therefore the operational campaign was promptly replaced with a less controversial name ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, so as to circumvent fierce opposition in the Muslim world.
65. Perception management and media management are important tools of a successful LICO campaign and forces engaged in these operations must realize the intricacies of orchestrating a successful strategy to project own gains, discredit the insurgent movement while highlighting their excesses and failure to the populace while eulogizing the achievements of the administration to mitigate popular apprehensions. In some cultures, failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, rather than good intentions gone awry. For example, it was the biggest challenge for the allied public relations machinery to make the common Afghan understand that the US led ISAF was not another occupation force. What complicated matters was the fund inflow for reconstruction after the Taliban had been thrown out. In Afghanistan in 2002, there were two salient conditions: it was socio-economically in the bottom 10 countries in the world, and it had almost no human capital to build upon. The international community soon pledged over $5 billion in aid and began the tough work of helping to rebuild a devastated country. The aid did not meet Afghanistan’s needs. Even more damaging to the effort to stabilize Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban was the shockingly low level of committed funding to rebuild a country laid waste by twenty-five years of war. The Karzai government was well into its third year in office before cumulative U.S. expenditures on reconstruction and development passed the $1 billion mark. The aid budget for Afghanistan for 2006 was less than $700 million. After subtracting the one major reconstruction project undertaken, the repaving of the Kabul to Kandahar road, annual U.S. aid to Afghanistan over the last five years has averaged just $13 per Afghan. The United
States was spending more money every 72 hours on the war in Iraq than it was spending on Afghan reconstruction that year . The reconstruction of Afghanistan and ensuring it’s economic independence was never an American priority, which should logically have been the preferred end state to the conflict and this perhaps is the reason for the failure of the WHAM sub-set of the campaign. The Bush administration had a limited appetite for nation building and only wanted a small presence for counterterrorism and limited aid. Around 8,000 U.S. and
allied troops mostly based at either Bagram Airbase, north of Kabul, or near Kandahar conducted counter-terrorist operations across the country. Lead nations the United States for the Afghan National Army, the British for counter-narcotics, the Italians for the Justice sector, the Germans for police training, and the Japanese for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants moved out to help in their respective areas but at a very slow pace. The U.S. Department of Defense did not want to talk about its efforts there as counter-insurgency. Some in the Bush administration were concerned specifically about limiting expectations for nation-building, which was not a Presidential priority in the first Bush administration, especially after its main focus shifted to preparation for war in Iraq. In all, the Bush administration was not in favor of using the U.S. Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations and long-term post conflict commitments.
66. Today, military operations have more to do with communicating a story than ever before; to secure widespread popular support. Coupled with advances in communication technology, the military acknowledge that the media are now able to obtain a diverse array of information about campaign activity and, therefore, do not always have to rely on official military storylines or have to accept the messaging promoted as part of the strategic narratives. In light of this, and as a result of increased patterns of access, the military put in place a wide range of information management structure and vehicles that, while they shift responsibility onto the media, hand initiative to the military . Perception management of the LICO campaign was an arduous task
for the counterinsurgency forces as they had to constantly battle the misinformation drive, so thoroughly perfected by the adversary. In Afghanistan, the word gets out quickly, aided by nationwide cell phone service and many radio stations. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are favorite enemy propaganda themes, even though the Taliban was responsible for over 70 percent of civilian casualties in 2010. Among the most pernicious messages used by Al
Qaeda and the Taliban is that the United States and its coalition partners were occupying forces that are in Afghanistan to make war on Islam or Afghan culture.
67. In order to target the mind of the population against the Taliban and win them over, ground level PSYOPs were launched, with mixed results. Several examples can be provided of PSYOPs initiatives that failed because of lack of understanding of cultural norms and sensibilities. To highlight the un-Islamic ideology and behavior of the terrorists, various leaflets were designed with Koranic verses printed on them, admonishing the faithful to avoid violence and maintain peaceful relations with everyone. Although the messages themselves were perfectly acceptable, it was questionable in the eyes of the target audience whether unbelievers should be quoting the Koran. Worst of all, these Koranic verses being printed on a leaflet to be dropped from an airplane or a helicopter was not acceptable. It was considered blasphemous to drop pieces of paper with Koranic verses on the ground, because the holy verses of revelation were sullied with dirt. Likewise, US PSYOPs personnel dropped colorful soccer balls from low-flying Blackhawk helicopters depicting the flags of coalition nations. However, the Saudi flag has the shuhada (declaration of Islamic faith) written on it. Some Afghans and Arabs felt that kicking the holy statement was blasphemy, and the military reportedly apologized to the Saudis and the Afghans for the gaffe. To take a stock of the effectiveness of the campaign, the US forces carried out several surveys. Both interviews and the polls suggested that PSYOP products blaming the Taliban exclusively for violence in the countryside were likely not being well received by some sectors of the target audience because there is such a strong feeling that the US military itself is responsible for much of the violence and for what the locals consider to
be terrorist acts that is, dropping bombs on civilians from the sky and breaking into homes at night to kill people in their beds. Likewise, PSYOPs products extolling the progress that has been brought about by democracy and the new government were undercut by the widely reported, intense disillusionment with the Karzai administration.
68. The US military, fresh from its experience in Operation Desert Storm and the Vietnam Wars prior to that, placed great reliance and emphasis of perception management. However the target audience that it faced in Afghanistan was steeped in radical Islamic culture and needed a complete change in approach to the conduct of PSYOPs, from the traditional US way. While the population generally disliked the Taliban, it was not because they implemented the Sharia system of living, but because they tried to impose their will across tribal lines, which were looked upon with suspicion. Additionally, though no development took place, they were considered a known factor in comparison to previous Kabul regimes, which were systemically corrupt and ethnically biased. A major factor, which had worked in favour of the Taliban, was that government forces had failed to effectively counter them in military engagements, and this was the biggest symbol of power and strength in a male dominated society. The US military thus had its tasks clearly cut out in managing the above perceptions, if it had to run an effective PSYOPs strategy to trump the Taliban. However, the planners were also aware that all military gains had to be supplemented by civilian funding and corresponding developmental activity to consolidate these military gains and wean away the population from the Taliban.
2.10: Use of Appropriate Level of Force
69. Many current concepts and doctrines of counter-insurgency proclaim that an essential element must be the minimal use of force. While generally true in a strategic sense, the level and type of force used is a more complex issue and largely situation dependent. Random and indiscriminate use of force, or the use of improper and unnecessarily destructive means, can be counter-productive; especially when the damage inflicted excessively affects the civil population. This is particularly critical when conducting military operations in urban areas,
where even the slightest mistakes can be catastrophic in terms of lives lost and, in the long run, strategic harm. At times, however, overwhelming force at the tactical and operational levels may be entirely appropriate, even necessary. An effective counter-insurgency strategy does not avoid combat or the use of force, nor should combat become the primary tool; the use of force must be weighed in each situation, anticipating the long-term effects on all aspects of the
counter-insurgency effort. Likewise, rules of engagement and use of minimum force must be unequivocally clear to all troops and maximum restraint must be exercised in the course of active operations, so as not to fritter away hard earned advantages by careless use of excessive force. An operational success is only fully leveraged if no collateral damage has occurred and the resulting action has not driven further recruits toward the insurgency movement. In the present case, the US troops had to exercise tremendous restraint under extremely challenging circumstances due to the nature of the enemy they faced. Afghans are superb fighters. Long experience fighting conventional armies and other tribes has made them expert warriors .
70. Another major irritant contributing to the poor image of the US led forces were the night raids by elite counter-terrorism units which stoked local anger, because if you burst into anybody’s house in the middle of the night in Kandahar, you’re almost guaranteed to stir up trouble; if the homeowner wasn’t already an insurgent, after the violation of the sanctity of his home, he’s likely to become one. The fact is again reiterated by Cortright ‘ Civilian casualties are poisonous to a counterinsurgency campaign that hopes to win the hearts and minds. When
civilians are killed by US / NATO forces, family and community members tend to seek revenge and may join or support the insurgency.
71. In early September 2008 Human Rights Watch published one of its intermittent reports on civilian casualties in Afghanistan. It was a delicate moment. In the last two months, apart from Shindand, Afghan policemen had been killed by friendly fire in Farah and there had been the infamous American bombing of a wedding in Nangarhar. According to Human Rights
Watch, the number of civilian casualties in 2007 had tripled compared to the previous year, but the report also recognized a decrease in victims in the second half of the year, tying this to a series of measures taken by ISAF. These included use of lighter ammunition; postponement of operations where there was a risk to civilians; and making greater use of the Afghan Army in searches of private homes and other operations in densely populated areas. It was a known fact
that civilian casualties were primarily due to air support fire, but in this case the report came to significant conclusions, stating that civilian casualties were rare in the course of planned air operations, whereas large numbers of civilian casualties were generated by ‘Troops in Contact’ situations (air operations authorized at the last moment, to bail out ground forces that had encountered enemy troops).
72. Reducing collateral damage, whilst achieving precision strikes on Al Qaeda and Taliban forces was identified as the key to effectiveness of the entire campaign, which would project a favourable image in the minds of the locals. The initial phase of the campaign witnessed a larger number of casualties’ vis-”-vis the later part of the US engagements, they were largely the result of insurgents using human shields or committing atrocities themselves. However, these were surprisingly accepted by the general public, as something unavoidable. It is towards the later part of the LICO campaign that the civilian casualties began to really anger public opinion against the counter-insurgents, as the population could not comprehend loss of civilian lives once the Taliban had been vanquished. This was the delicate balance posing a firm challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the entire operation campaign.
2.11: Empower the Lowest Levels
73. This principle of COIN operations followed by the US military was central to the effectiveness of their war-fighters and the administrative machinery they created in the conflict areas after clearing them of insurgents. At the operational level it meant empowering the lower administrative echelons of the Afghan government who could then establish a semblance of governance and presence in insurgency affected areas. The US approach to fighting LICO too
favoured empowering the local population and dealing with their community leaders directly. However, in this regard they ran into strong opposition from the Karzai administration as this was against the political interest of a centralized Kabul government that sought to reduce the autonomy of local communities and marginalize their leaders. On this score the United States could easily find itself pleasing no one: local communities could object to US support of Kabul
appointed officials over whom they had no control; Kabul could complain that the United States was undermining it by encouraging alternative models of governance that bypassed the formal state structure.
74. Successful COIN is normally conducted with decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and concise rules for the use of force and Rules of engagement . Successful decentralized execution results from exercise, by subordinate leaders at all echelons, of disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding and is the preferred method for commanding and controlling COIN forces. Commanders must provide subordinates with a mission, commander’s intent, a concept of operations, and resources adequate to accomplish the mission. It has to be clearly understood that the overall effectiveness of the campaign can only be truly grasped at the grass roots level, wherein mistakes get magnified manifold and adversely reflect on the ground operations. Hence it is imperative that each individual soldier deployed in the area of operations in fully conversant and sensitized to the force commander’s plan.
75. This principle of LICO is perhaps the most divisive in interpretation as it propagates empowering the executing troops to enforce the mandate within the overall confines of strategy while working towards handing over the control eventually to civilian administrative echelons, to thereafter run things. It has been observed over numerous such LICO campaigns, that military personnel get intimately and emotionally involved with all aspects of the area of operations, understandably so in the absence of civilian administrative elements in the initial
phases. However, when the conditions for return of these civilian staff are adequate, the military often finds it difficult to readily part with these functions from under their control. This is one of the main reasons for friction between the two essential counterparts of a LICO module. The civilian functionaries too are used to protection provided by the military, but do not find it prudent to keep them in the know of things, thus further exacerbating issues. There is
also the problem of higher military headquarters disconnect with the ground troops and their actual operating conditions which lead to varied interpretations of promulgated orders. Thus, it so happens that several times, orders are passed in complete ignorance of local conditions, thereby complicating day-to-day operations. Conversely, ignorance of the overall strategy often leads to small tactical gains, but reverses in the greater operational picture due to mishandling of small issues having greater strategic ramifications.