“The twentieth century began with the highest hopes it ended with many parts of the world in pain.” (Sofsky 2013, 223)
This sobering statement is a striking and brutally honest assessment of the 20th-century, one which was characterized by unprecedented violence. Examples globally demonstrate this, including the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 people were systematically massacred and the Cambodian genocide between 1975-8 in which, “The murders of 2.2 million people were orchestrated.” (Etcheson 2005, 118-120) Since the UN’s inception in October 1945, it would appear clear, therefore, that, in a century of unimaginable violence, the unilateral protection of human rights has been an impossible task. This is where the concept of Responsibility to Protect has become increasingly important in preventing, mitigating and stabilising ‘mass conflict’ in the 21st-century.
When assessing this question as a whole it is important to first understand what is meant by the phrase ‘Responsibility to Protect’, hereinafter referred to as R2P. The world summit outcome document of 2005 defines it as entailing that, “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”(World Summit 2005) It is also very clear that the concept of R2P does not solely cover protection but also “prevention of such crimes through appropriate and necessary means.”(Ibid) R2P, as outlined by the UN, rests upon three key pillars, the first being that the state has the primary obligation to protect its citizens from mass atrocities. This is connected to the second pillar which places onus on the international community to assist states in protecting its citizens. The final pillar identifies and clarifies the action which can be taken by the international community in the event that a state is failing to protect its population or indeed is perpetrating acts of mass atrocity, this action includes collective use of force if it is approved by the UN Security Council.
Having understood what is meant by R2P, within this essay, I will explain why the doctrine came about highlighting key events which may have compelled the UN to take action. In addition whilst assessing the impact of the doctrine on 21st-century African conflict, both positive and negative, I will consider some of the criticisms of the doctrine investigating how they can be applied within the context of recent African conflict. Overall this essay will conclude that a united response from the international community in the wake of the events which led up to the implementation of the R2P doctrine was entirely necessary. It will also argue that, in principle, R2P represents a positive development regarding a coherent international response to humanitarian intervention, however, in practice it is difficult concept to implement due to the differing nature of conflict within states. Finally, I will conclude however that despite its conceptual limitations, in the context of 21st-century African conflict, R2P has had a positive effect on mitigating and alleviating developing mass conflict.
The emergence of R2P can be considered through the lens of the unparalleled violence of the 20th-century. Genocidal events within nations such as East Timor, Sri-Lanka, Cambodia and Rwanda are just some of the atrocities which demonstrated that the international community was failing on a fundamental level to recognise and protect citizens from ‘mass conflict’ during the 20th-century. In this vein, there is little debate surrounding the emergence of R2P, it is considered as a UN response to its failure in protecting the human rights of citizens’ from events of 20th-century mass atrocity. More specifically, however, the literature focuses on two main events during the 1990’s which became catalysts for the UN to formulate a more coherent plan for humanitarian intervention.
The first of these events was the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which, estimates suggest that 800,000 people were systematically killed in the space of 100 days by the Hutu majority government against the Tutsi population. Within this conflict, the UN fundamentally failed in protecting the Tutsi population in Rwanda from the ethnic-cleansing of the Hutu regime. The available evidence affirms this claim, as a small force of only 2500 soldiers known as United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was sent to Rwanda in an attempt to alleviate the conflict.(Hehir 2005, p61) This small force however was a futile and unconvincing effort on the part of the UN to palliate the genocide, as, not only did they severely lack arms, but the credible warnings and shocking reports sent by the UNAMIR to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York were ignored or rebuffed, over concerns that the UNAMIR may, “exceed the mandate and endanger the lives of UN peacekeepers.”(Ibid) It certainly could be argued that the United States was particularly culpable and restricted the UN in its ability to act as the Clinton administration had made the conscious decision to stop supporting significant UN missions after the torture and televised death of 18 American soldiers in Somalia during a UN humanitarian assistance programme.(Oppong and Gritzner 2015, p60) However this has not stopped the lack of coherent humanitarian intervention in Rwanda being termed by Paul Kennedy as “the lowest point in the UN’s history” and “the single worst decision the United Nations ever made.”(Kennedy 2006, p103) The lack of action undertaken by the UN in the face of the Rwandan genocide sparked international debate surrounding the merits, legality and necessity of humanitarian intervention. Further to this, it raised the problematic debate surrounding unconditional sovereignty, questioning whether the international community had the right to intervene in the case of a humanitarian disaster. (UN, n.d)
These questions would yet again be raised by a second event which proved to be a further catalyst for the emergence of the responsibility to protect doctrine, was the so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ undertaken by NATO in Kosovo during 1999. Unlike in Rwanda the international community or more specifically NATO undertook military action. This action first started with international condemnation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as seen through Security Council resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1998 which compelled the FRY to find a political resolution to the matter. However, when this was not achieved NATO initiated military action, manifesting itself in an eleven-week programme of systematic bombing in Kosovo in order to cease the, “humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the excessive force being used by the FRY.”(Abomo 2018, p73) This NATO intervention can be seen as controversial as whilst it was vital in both ending the conflict and halting the mass killings and rights violations, it is considered by some as a violation of the prohibition of use of violence and a dramatic breach of state sovereignty. (GSDRC, n.d) This criticism is summarised by Weiss, Evans and Hubert who state that “the moral, legal, operational and political dimensions of humanitarian intervention had never before come under such scrutiny.”(Weiss, Evans, Hubert 2001 p.114) The opposing side to this argument is that NATO did not intervene to impose a new democratic government in Yugoslavia, but to protect the Albanian population of Kosovo from a regime of ethnic cleansing. (Di Lellio 2006, p124) Both of these viewpoints demonstrate the debate which proved essential to the emergence and development of R2P.
This international debate combined with problematic legal frailties exposed within the UN’s policy on intervention after events transpired in Kosovo led to General Secretary of the UN Kofi Annan to call for a reconsideration of the thinking surrounding the concept of humanitarian intervention. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a group of independent experts, responded publishing a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. It was aimed at addressing the points of contention surrounding humanitarian intervention, whilst also upholding a moral responsibility of both states and the international community to respond to ‘mass conflict’. (Weiss, Evans, Hubert 2001) The ICISS report also suggested that, at first, it is the responsibility of the state itself to act to protect its citizens, however, if the state itself is failing in those actions as a perpetrator or is simply unable to counteract mass atrocities, then the responsibility falls upon the international community to take action.(Ibid) The report also alludes to the fact that whilst methods of conflict resolution should be employed, the possibility of military action whilst seen as an ‘exceptional measure’, it was in no way discounted. A final important concept of the ICISS’s report was to extend humanitarian intervention further than military action, incorporating a responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild, concepts which are described as ‘emerging guiding principles’ by the report itself. (Ibid) Between 2001 and 2005, R2P was both endorsed and referred to as an ‘emerging norm’ by many including Kofi Annan within a report entitled, Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. (Donald and Michael 2014, p10) The UN world summit held in September 2005, became a seminal event for the emergence of R2P however, as it was incorporated into the summit outcome document. Furthermore, its adoption was ratified by each UN member enforcing the concept of R2P as an ‘emerging norm’ within the global sphere not solely an empty political principle. The 2009 General Assembly debate surrounding a report written by UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon on its implementation globally has spread the culture of R2P further. Whilst within the debate, as Hehir argues, there was “little clarification of the criteria for intervention”, the fact that the report does not retract from any of the principles adopted in 2005, and outlined within the introduction, but constructively builds upon them, shows a level of global recognition for the importance of the R2P doctrine.(Hehir 2012, p54), (Badescu 2010, p8) It is clear, therefore, that R2P emerged from UN mistakes and frail international law surrounding humanitarian intervention, its subsequent conceptual development and its recognition by the international community has seen it evolve from an emerging political policy to a predominant international norm.
Having established both why and how R2P emerged to become an internationally accepted norm, the assessment of how it has affected African conflict over the 21st-century, merits analytical focus. It must be said that each of the case studies that will be discussed are dramatically different situations, this makes the application of Responsibility to Protect different in each case and thus the dimension and nature of how intervention is applied must be viewed through this perspective of situational difference.
Arguably the most prominent case in which Responsibility to Protect can be seen to have been enacted upon in the 21st-century is that of the 2011 Libyan civil conflict. Over the period February 2011-12, 21,490 Libyans were killed at a rate of 5.1 per 1000 people per year, a further 19,700 were injured and 435,000 were displaced. (Daw, Dau and El-Buzedi 2015, pp101-107) The extent to which this can be considered a mass atrocity can be measured by the UN’s response. This UN response came rapidly on the 26th of February 2011, just three days after the conflict began, as the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970. The resolution expressed a “grave concern for the situation in Libya,” at the “gross and systematic violation of human rights,” crucially it is also explicit in calling upon the Libyan authorities for their “responsibility to protect its population,” and the need to “respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly.” (UN, n.d) Resolution 1970 also imposed sanctions upon the Libyan state such as the freezing of economic resources on Libyan territory. This action was reinforced by the UN adoption of resolution 1973 on March 17th 2011, which “reiterated responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population,” and that all armed parties within the conflict “take all feasible steps to protect civilians,” yet again reaffirming language of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In addition resolution 1973 called for an immediate ceasefire and a no-fly zone over Libya. Two days after this resolution a NATO-led coalition force began bombing governmental forces which resulted in a military victory for the NATO coalition. The extent to which this is seen as an appropriate use of R2P however is debated. A realist concept that whilst a primary objective of the mandate in Libya was ‘civilian protection’, this changed over the course of the conflict towards regime change, a goal which is unlikely to have had the uncontested support of the Security Council. (Abomo 2018, p244) The opposition to this is put forward by Amstutz, who argues that the principal goal of the intervention was to “prevent the slaughter of civilians” in support of the R2P doctrine, as a result of this aim and the military intervention to achieve it, “the downfall of a lunatic,” was necessary.(Amstutz 2018, p161) This is an argument I would tend to concur with as, in my view, the Libyan government failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens, and whilst regime change came as a result of necessary humanitarian intervention, the principal goal was the protection of human rights. A further argument which is made against the intervention in Libya is one which is also levelled against the concept of the R2P doctrine itself, whether it indeed unacceptably breaches a level of sovereignty. In a polemic article regarding Libyan intervention, Keeler argues “it seemed clear that for many politicians, humanitarian intervention has become no more than an inappropriate violation of national sovereignty.” (Keeler, 2011) However, the question still remains at what point does national sovereignty have to be breached to protect human rights? In this case, and in accordance with R2P it was at the point that the Libyan state had failed in its obligation to protect its citizens forcing the intervention of the International community. Collins indeed argues that “not since Rwanda had a regime signalled its intent to commit crimes against humanity so clearly.” (Collins, 2013, p302) The Libyan case could, therefore, be seen as an exceptional circumstance of extreme importance for the UN to avoid a situation which ominously resembled Rwanda. R2P, therefore, was implemented decisively to achieve its principle aim, alleviating the Libyan human rights crisis. Whilst, due to the hostilities of international politics, criticism of policy and action was inevitable, I would consider the implementation of R2P in Libya as both a positive attempt to learn from the past and a necessary breach of sovereignty.
A second case in which it is clear the UN and the international community saw it fit to implement R2P is that of the Cote D’Ivoire after its presidential elections in November 2010. This occurred after opposing candidates Gbagbo and Ouattara declared themselves, individually, winners of a shambolic election process resulting in both men establishing government in the same city of Abidjan. (ICRtoP, n.d) The ensuing violence between the forces of both Ouattara and Gbagbo created a humanitarian crisis, which was reported by the UN to have killed over 1000 people, directly forcibly displaced nearly 500,000 people and led to the fleeing of 94,000 more to neighbouring Liberia. (Ibid) The international community did not shirk their ‘Responsibility to Protect’, the mandate of the United Nations operation in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI) was extended by passing resolution 1962. This resolution urged all parties to accept the UN’s review suggesting Ouattara’s election victory, it also weakened Gbagbo’s power by comprehensively freezing his assets in a similar manner to the Libyan conflict. (Daddieh 2016, p151) On January 19th, 2011 the UN Security Council enhanced measures against Gbagbo by unanimously voting to send in an additional 2000 UNOCI forces into the country. Sanctions were augmented by the UN through the passing of resolution 1975 on the 30th of March 2011, which urged Gbagbo to “step aside,” and supported the UNOCI in using “all means necessary,” to protect civilian life. (UN 2011) Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011 putting an end to the conflict. The impact of R2P would seem clear here as, simply without its concept, whilst one can only assume, the violent trajectory of the conflict would infer that there was a real possibility for mass atrocity. In this sense not only did R2P play a key role in shaping and alleviating the conflict, but also was vital in preventing greater human tragedy and protecting human rights.
R2P has not been unilaterally successful in its application within recent African conflict, however. Indeed Hilpold argues that in Darfur, the DRC and Yemen the concept of R2P has only been applied in an abstract fashion by using new terminology without greatly affecting the decisions made by the international community. (Hillpold 2014, p242) Darfur is a clear demonstration of how the rhetoric of R2P has far outweighed action taken on the ground. Darfur is a conflict which has taken the lives of nearly 300,000 people and displaced a further 2.7 million. (BBC, 2010) In comparison to both the Lybian and Ivorian conflicts, both death toll and population displacement would appear to constitute ‘mass atrocity’. It would appear, therefore, that the UN and the international community has failed to protect the citizens of Darfur in an appropriate manner. It would be unfair to say that the UN has not taken action as the UN and African Union has established a 26,000 personnel strong mission for the alleviation of the conflict in Sudan. (ICRtoP, n.d) Between 2007 and 2012 their mandate was extended 4 times however each mandate affirms the UN’s “determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty.” (Ibid) This would seem to clarify why there has been no direct military action to resolve the conflict, however, this highlights a major criticism levelled at R2P Protect regarding 21st-century African conflict, why is it deemed acceptable to breach national sovereignty in some cases but not others which could be deemed as a greater humanitarian threat? In a generalised sense the literature can be summarised as treating “Darfur and R2P as coterminous with failure” with “inaction underscoring its limitations to protect civilian populations.” (Verhoeven and Jaganathan 2015, pp21-37) I believe, however, it is difficult to analyse R2P as one concept across 21st-century African conflict as a whole. I would argue that the manner in which R2P is applied has to be considered through the spectrum of the conflict itself. Both Libya and Cote D’Ivoire represented conflicts which were both time sensitive and feasibly resolvable with military action, in the eyes of the international community. Conversely, Sudan, represented a hugely complex situation with a series of militia groups undertaking attacks over a longer period of time, making mediation, possibly, the most likely resolution due to the embedded nature of conflict. This is to say that in the case of Darfur it could be argued that the UN applied the concept of R2P in the manner they saw to be most fit as it is argued that simple military intervention would have been “dangerous reductionism” of the situations complexity. (Hassan and Ray 2009, p295)
The R2P doctrine in itself is incredibility difficult to assess as a whole, due to inherent differences between conflicts, its application is virtually impossible to standardize. As a concept, however, it both presents an attempt to formulate a coherent plan regarding humanitarian intervention, and an attempt to learn from the costly mistakes of the past. This is a sentiment echoed by UN General Secretary Ban-Ki Moon who defines R2P as “a concept whose time has come. For many millions of victims, it should have come much earlier.” (Moon 2012) With regard to 21st-century African conflict, I would argue that the impact has been broadly positive. Of course, the criticisms of R2P which can be applied to African conflict, such as the seeming inconsistency of its application, or the problematic issues regarding sovereignty breaches, are undeniable. However, the ability of the international community to undertake a coordinated humanitarian response under the framework of R2P in both Libya and the Ivory Coast demonstrate the intended impact of R2P on conflict in general, that being to protect the human rights of citizens when a state fails in its duty. R2P is in no way a perfect solution, however, it should be considered as a developmental process by which an improved coherent framework on humanitarian intervention, which, whilst not unilateral, has had success in its application in both protecting citizens’ rights and halting developing ‘mass atrocities’.