Ray, a veteran, sought a compensation payment of $25,000 under the One-Off Payments to War Veterans Act 2015 (Cth) in July 2018. On 14 April 1941, Ray’s military unit surrendered to German military forces, an enemy state, in Greece, where they were taken to an open countryside near sea. The surrender area had no physical barriers, therefore was able to leave the area by sea after two hours. However, Ray was denied compensation on the grounds that he had not been ‘interned’ in accordance to the meaning in the One-Off Payments to War Veterans Act 2015 (Cth) by the Commonwealth Department.
The main issue is the statutory definition of ‘interned’, specifically ‘other place’ within the 2015 Act. There are four main approaches to interpreting statutes. The literal, golden, mischief and purposive approach. The starting point of statutory interpretation is to use the literal rule, in which the ordinary meaning of words is utilised. In the case of Fisher v Bell, a shopkeeper displayed a flick knife with a price tag. According to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, it was a criminal offence to ‘offer’ such weapons for sale. However, the court used the literal rule to interpret ‘offer of sale’ and held that it was an invitation to deal. If the literal rule were to be applied to Ray’s case, the court would use the ordinary meaning of ‘interned’ which is to be confined within physical barriers. The open countryside lacked physical barriers; thus, Ray was not interned in the literal sense. The literal meaning of ‘residing’ would also be used, ‘to permanently live’, Ray spent two hours in the designated surrender area, therefore did not reside in the specific area.
The golden rule is an extension of the literal rule and is used where the literal rule creates absurdity. The rule was used in of Adler v George to avoid an absurdity. Under the Official Secrets Act 1920 (UK), it was an offence to obstruct Her Majesty’s Forces in the ‘vicinity of a prohibited place’. Adler had been arrested while obstructing Her Majesty’s forces within a prohibited place. He argued that he was not in the vicinity of a prohibited place as he was actually in a prohibited place. The court applied the golden rule to widen the literal wording of the statute. If the literal rule had been applied, it would have created absurdity, as someone within the vicinity would be committing an offence whilst someone in a prohibited place would not. However, in Ray’s case the golden rule would narrow the literal meaning of ‘other place’ as it would be absurd to have a person interned in a place with no physical limitations. Therefore, the open countryside does not constitute a place of internment.
The mischief rule allows for more leeway in statutory interpretation. It focuses on the gaps the statute intended to cover. In Corkery v Carpenter, the Licensing Act 1872 stipulated that it was an offence to be drunk while operating a carriage. Although the Act did not specifically stipulate bicycles, the court found that Corkery was guilty as the term ‘carriage’ could also be applied to a bicycle. For Ray, this would mean that the term ‘other place’ is interpreted in context of the legislation which has the purpose of compensating interned veterans.
Courts may also apply maxims and use intrinsic and extrinsic aids to interpret statutes. There are three main maxims. These are ejusdem generis meaning ‘of the same kind’, Noscitur a sociis meaning a word is ‘known by the company it keeps’, and expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where the ‘express mention of one thing excludes others’. Intrinsic aids are within the Act itself while extrinsic aids consist of cases, dictionaries and official reports.
In line with the Act Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s15AA, a provision of an act is to be interpreted in a manner that would best achieve the objective underlying the act, to reimburse veterans who have suffered a loss as a result of being interned by an enemy state. In Ray’s situation, the interpretation of ‘interned’ would help promote the objective of paying compensation to veterans. Through the use of maxims, a word can be interpreted with reference to accompanying words. The maxim noscitur a sociis helps to interpret the words ‘camp’, ‘building, ‘prison’, ‘cave’ and ‘other place’. The words proceeding other place in the One-Off Payments to War Veterans Act 2015 (Cth) all have similar meanings when placed next to each other, confined within physical barriers. ‘camp’ on its own has various meanings, however in association with ‘building’, prison’, and ‘cave’, it interpreted as a place with physical confines only. Therefore, in accordance with noscitur a sociis, ‘other places’ can be interpreted to places with physical barriers. Hence if noscitur a sociis is applied, Ray was not interned.
An ulterior maxim is ejusdem generis which places associated words in a particular genus. All words present in the definition of interned provided by the One-Off Payments to War Veterans Act 2015 (Cth) are categorised in reference to physical detainment by tangible barriers. As the words commonly reference physical detainment, ‘other places’ can have a similar interpretation.
Through extrinsic materials, such as similar legislation, meanings of words and their intent can be deduced. The Veterans Entitlement Act 1986 and the Social Security and Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (One off Payments and Other 2007 Budget Measures) Act 2007 both contain sections offering payments to interned world war two veterans. The two above acts and the One-Off Payments to War Veterans Act 2015 (Cth) all contain the word ‘confined’ in the definition of ‘interned’. According to the Macquarie Dictionary, confined is defined as ‘to enclose within bounds, limit or restrict and to shut or keep in; imprison.’ If a person is in a camp, building, prison or cave, they are enclosed within, therefore ‘other place’ is assumed to be somewhere enclosed. Hence, with the aid of other existing legislation and dictionary definition, the meaning of interned can be ascertained. The open countryside in which Ray was kept lack physical barriers, which is not in accordance to the interpretation that can be deduced using the above extrinsic materials. The open countryside was not enclosed within bounds, therefore by definition, Ray was not interned.
Section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) allows the use of extrinsic materials in the interpretation of an act. Extrinsic materials such as precedent can aid in the interpretation. Collett v Repatriation Commission mirrors Rays situation. Collett sought compensation payment under the Social Security and Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (One-off Payments and Other 2007 Budget Measures) Act 2007 (Cth) which made veterans interned by a European enemy state eligible for a one-off payment. During World War Two, the applicant was an Australian soldier serving in Greece. His unit was surrendered to the German military and was ‘ordered to remain in a designated surrender area, being part of the shore of mainland Greece without any relevant physical barrier.’ He did not pass into a prisoner of war camp or was held under guard. After about two hours in the surrender area, he escaped by sea. The Federal Court of Australia held that Collett had not been confined within the meaning of the definition of interned and was not eligible for payment. Logan J used a dictionary to define ‘confine’ to aid the interpretation. Accordingly, he held that Collett had not been confined as remaining for two hours was not sufficient. The word ‘reside’ was also defined and maxims noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis were utilised.
It would be best to advise Ray that he would be unsuccessful in receiving compensation under the One-Off Payments to War Veterans Act 2015 (Cth). In assessing the respective legislation with the literal, golden and mischief rules, purposive approach and maxims, the Court is likely to interpret that ‘interned’, ‘other place’, ‘confined’ and ‘reside’ do not apply to Ray’s situation. With Collett v Repatriation Commission as persuasive precedent, it is highly unlikely that Ray is eligible for the compensation payment of $25,000.
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