Essay: Maritime security and Cooperation

Introduction
The importance of the sea goes far beyond its function for transport. It has long been a source of prosperity and political advancement, – providing the quickest and most efficient way to facilitate commercial and political intercourse among countries. The often-discussed “Sea Lines of Communication” (SLOCs) are more than just shipping routes. They give access to renewable resources of the sea, such as fishing stocks and natural resources, which can be extracted from the seabed. But these are merely tips of the iceberg. The sea today continues to evolve rapidly as a crucial geo-political medium for living.
– Today 95 percent of international communications travel via underwater cable.
– Twenty-one of the world’s twenty-eight mega-cities are within 62 miles or roughly 100km of the sea.
– 49 percent of the world’s oil travels through seven major sea chokepoints.
– 50 percent of the world’s population lives within 62 miles, or roughly 100km, of a coast.
– 23,000 ships are underway daily in SLOCs carrying 95 percent of the world’s commerce by sea.
With this, it is no surprise that the South China Sea has half of the globe’s sea tonnage and one-third of its total monetary value. As such, many SLOCS suffer threats from regional conflicts. These include high competition for resources; threats of natural disasters; piracy, social unrest; cyber activity; proliferations of weapons of mass destruction among other things.
The maritime situation in the Southeast Asia continues to be a breeding ground for conflict. With a multiplicity of laws, culture, religion and heritage, it is difficult for ASEAN countries to share an integrated approach to socio-political, economics and environmental issues. With a shared history of colonization, these countries are deviating from traditional maritime practices at different paces – some faster than others – as influenced by major actors outside the region, particularly the United States, China, Japan and India.
Today’s globalized economy is entrenched in dense networks. It is heavily dependent on maritime trade to sustain the movement of energy, raw materials, and industrial products, inter alia. Islands and peninsulas of Southeast Asia, wedged between the Pacific and Indian oceans, border major arteries or Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) of maritime trade. While China and India continues to strong-arm the region with their economic growth, maritime trade through regional SLOCs (especially for Malacca and Singapore) is expected to increase in order to remain competitive. Major economic states and the littoral states of Southeast Asia all have stakes in ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the region, and any disruption in shipping through such passage could have disastrous consequences. Successful response to current maritime security cannot be managed by any littoral state in the region alone because they are transnational in nature . It requires more cooperation between member states of ASEAN and its dialogue partners.
FIGURE 1. Key Shipping Routes
Figure 2. Important numbers and statistics.
Background History
Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Marine Security.
The importance of maritime security in ASEAN came into better focus with the release of the Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security in 2003. This statement gave more light on the resulting tensions and issues surrounding ASEAN waters. Also, it recommended several courses of action for ARF participants to adopt. However, the effectiveness of the statement to mobilize substantial action is questionable, as problems such as crime and territorial threats continue to worsen. Nonetheless, it provided a commendable platform for future discussions and possible resolutions.
The Statement suggested the improvement of broad-based regional efforts that focusses on collaboration and mutual assistance, in order to combat organized crimes and root out crime syndicates. This would involve the contribution of military forces from every member – mainly naval units and coastal patrol – to coordinate and develop capacities against the aforementioned crime. Ultimately, these should boost patrolling and security forces, hence improving the efficiency of capturing criminals and stemming criminal activity. However, such action should be based on voluntary participation, and adhere to the United Nations Law of the Sea and the ASEAN Way, especially non-interference in internal affairs. This might restrict the efficacy of resultant initiatives, hence delaying and limiting possible solutions.
A key emphasis of the statement was that maritime security of ASEAN waters is fundamental for the economic security for ARF members, due to the high stakes ASEAN states possess in the global economy. As such, it is in the best interest of all participants to ensure the eradication of these threats swiftly and effectively, without allowing these threats to escalate further – especially the threat of unilateral advancement of certain countries into ASEAN waters. One way to do so would be stakeholder engagement, to understand each nation’s underlying concerns and foster multilateral cooperation. Currently, ties among ARF participants are predominantly friendly, but may deteriorate should territorial tensions escalate. Strengthened relations may improve current information and technology sharing initiatives, ultimately supporting capacity building and monitoring efforts.
Past Initiatives
i.) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
UNCLOS governs the conduct of maritime affairs, and provides for guidelines regarding the usage of oceans – including trade and business, resource management, and ownership. It generally provides for the technical parameters of territorial claim, and the limits countries should observe when carrying out coastal and maritime activities. However, it is not universally ratified – hence is not followed by some countries such as China, resulting in tensions over conduct and territorial claim.
Furthermore, The United States contends that the South China Sea is international water, and sovereignty in the area should be determined by the United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS states that countries are prohibited from making claims over any land masses that are submerged at high tide, or that were previously submerged but have been raised above high tide level by construction. However, this interventionist initiative is very much criticized for being ineffective and unwelcomed by certain ASEAN countries.
ii. ASEAN Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
The declaration was meant as a guideline for claimants to alleviate tensions and prevent confrontations, has limits in its success. Currently, there are a few aspects, such as communications and navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes, which the countries involved in the territorial dispute may be willing to cooperate on. Nonetheless, none of the claimants are likely to shelve their own claim, and all of them consider their claims to be indisputable, yet they are all equally questionable and have different basis.
iii. Piracy
Southeast Asia was victim to 41% of the world’s pirate attacks between 1995 and 2013. The West Indian Ocean, which includes Somalia, accounted for just 28%, and the West African coast only 18%. During those years, 136 seafarers were killed in Southeast Asian waters as a result of piracy — that’s twice the number in the Horn of Africa, where Somalia lies, and more than those deaths and the fatalities suffered in West Africa combined. Southeast Asian countries have also pursued a second channel for addressing piracy issues and conflicts in the South China Sea more generally. The Indonesia Workshop on Managing Potential Disputes in the South China Sea (commonly referred to as the Jakarta Process) was an informal, non-governmental process that has been working since 1990 to promote practical economic and other cooperation in the South China Sea while avoiding the more difficult issues of sovereignty and hydrocarbon resource exploitation. Funding limitations, however, recently brought this process to a halt.
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
The ADMM is the highest mechanism at ministerial level for defence, security and cooperative consultation in ASEAN. The Working Group on Security Cooperation of the ASEAN Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (Special SOM) in Jogjakarta in 2004 agreed that ADMM would contribute to the objectives of the ASEAN Security Community as stated in the declaration of ASEAN Concord II in 2003. The first ADMM meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur in 2006. The annual ADMM facilitates the ASEAN defence ministers to discuss and exchange views on current defence and security issues and challenges faced. The ADMM also aims to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness. In addition, it continues to exchange views on addressing non-traditional security challenges and discuss the need to strengthen and take more practical steps in defence cooperation in order to make further contribution to regional peace and stability. More details on the ADMM will be detailed below under Key Issues.
Evaluation
It appears that most of these past initiatives share a commonality of promoting increased cooperation and communications. However, such efforts are halted by lack of mutual trust in information sharing; and even finances and resources. Most of all, it seems that territorial disputes were not formally resolved in order to clearly demarcate responsibilities. Perhaps the mere discussion and sharing of defensive strategies were not sufficient. In order to address pressing border disputes and piracy issues, a more centralized hub of information sharing should be established, – coupled with frequent and proactive patrols.
Current Issues and Developments
Cooperative efforts
Integration of ASEAN Community
ASEAN have been progressing to strengthen the cooperation and relation among member states since its beginning in 1967. The first significant step for the ASEAN integration is ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement which was proposed by Thailand and signed in Singapore in 1992 by all six member states namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 as well as Cambodia in 1999. The AFTA aims to promote the region’s competitive advantage as a single production unit. In 2002, the ASEAN Heads of Government recommended the creation of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. The following year, in 2003, ASEAN resolved to pursue comprehensive integration towards the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2020 in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in Bali, also known as Bali Concord II. According to the Concord, the ASEAN Community is based on three intertwined and mutually reinforcing pillars, namely an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) among ASEAN member states. It is a historic step towards the ASEAN integration and becomes the cradle of ASEAN Charter, a constitution for the ASEAN, which was adopted in 2007 and came into force in 2008 when it was thirty days after Thailand’s delivery of the final instrument of ratification. This ASEAN Charter would serve as the legal and institutional framework for the ASEAN Community that would impact significantly on the lives of the people in Southeast Asia despite it does not take on any supranational functions. However, the evolution in the ASEAN integration is and will be going hand-in-hand with China, Japan and South Korea in the ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN+3) framework. Moreover, ASEAN+3 has expanded its engagement to India, Australia and New Zealand as ASEAN+6 together with the United States and Russia as ASEAN+8 until now. The benefits of this expansion are from ideas and understanding which are shared and built respectively through multilateral forums. Furthermore, extra-regional powers can promote confidence and increase interoperability through combined exercises as well as can offer technical assistant to build capacity. However, the challenge is that the more the number of players increases the more difficult and complicated it is in decision making. Most of all, it remains a contentious issue as to whether such extra-regional powers should be welcomed. This will be detailed under key issues.
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)
The AMF was also rooted from the declaration of ASEAN Concord II in 2003. It reiterated that maritime issues and concerns are trans-boundary in nature, and therefore should be addressed regionally in a holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Hence, the AMF was established as a follow up to the objectives of the ASEAN Security other broad as well as cross-cutting issues such as the protection of marine environment, illegal fishing, smuggling and maritime transportation. The first AMF was held on 28-29 July 2010 in Surabaya, Indonesia and the second one was held on 17-19 August 2011 in Pattaya, Thailand. Other than the ASEAN Maritime Forum, East Asia does not have a permanent regional body to deal specifically with maritime issues. This is a regional platform for ASEAN leaders to engage in deeper cooperation on issues pertaining to maritime security and activities. Some of the issues discussed include cross-sectoral maritime cooperation, freedom of safety and navigation, sea piracy, environmental protection, fishery regime, and eco-tourism. The forum is guided by the three pillars of ASEAN community building – the ASEAN Political Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Although this appears to be a better initiative, it is still criticized for it’s lack of consensus. This begs the issue as to whether these regional conflicts can ever be resolved, and whether a new maritime organziation beyond ASEAN is needed to step in.
Extra-regional Power Interests
Maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia has been historically limited by extra- regional rivalries. During the Cold war all security arrangements were managed within the context of the Soviet-United States-Chinese bipolar or perhaps tripolar structure. In the post-Cold War era, most regional states find the presence of the United States in the region a stabilizing force. However, rivalry between the United States and China is developing as the latter is an emerging global power. Moreover, Japan, India and Australia, three regional powers with substantial maritime capabilities, have also demonstrated their maritime security interests and commitment in Southeast Asia. Fortunately, extra-regional powers involved have aligned their interests toward ASEAN maritime security cooperation, particularly protecting navigation in strategic SLOCs from transnational threats. It is a challenge towards a multilateral framework to establish the “acceptable-for-all” maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia with the participation by outside actors.
Relaxing Sovereignty Sensitivities
Traditionally, sovereignty sensitivities are extremely high among Southeast Asian states, and they play dominating roles in the foreign policy formulations of these states. These sensitivities have made the principle of nonintervention the bedrock of intraregional state relations which are undoubtedly the single most powerful inhibitor of maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia. Even cooperative activities that do not directly undermine sovereignty, such as joint exercises or voluntary information sharing, are viewed with caution as fearing that they might lead to creeping infringement. In some cases, sovereignty interference is viewed as decreasing state security. Leaders fear that cooperation might expose to their domestic constituencies problems that they desire to downplay. However, there are signs that sovereignty sensitivities may be relaxing towards the roadmap for an ASEAN Community by 2015 after Southeast Asian states signed the ASEAN Charter, at least in the maritime area. In recent years regional states have been increasingly willing to allow infringement upon or qualification of their sovereignty for the sake of improved maritime security. For example perhaps most significantly, in 2008 Singapore and Malaysia requested the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the ownership of Pedra Branca or Batu Puteh, several islets at the eastern entrance to the Singapore Strait, and Malaysia accepted a ruling in favor of Singapore. In addition, Singapore and Malaysia have accepted what they might have considered infringement of their sovereignty by allowing the stationing of American personnel in their ports to ensure the fulfillment of International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United States security standards. Thailand has also accepted similar arrangements in principle. It is noticed that sovereignty sensitivities can be relaxed and remain central as regional states perceive higher benefits from cooperation particularly in maritime area.
Increasing the Prevalence of Cooperative Regimes
The blossoming of Confidence Building Measures and various cooperation agreements have established such cooperative regimes and made the operationalizing of future endeavors much easier. Examples of dialogue norms which have established procedures and rules that become institutions are the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the ARF, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Working Group on Maritime Security. Although obligating member states to consistently reaffirming the “ASEAN way” norms of sovereignty preservation and nonintervention, the mutual confidence has been built gradually by cooperative activities. It is found that sovereignty sensitivities are relaxing with incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all obligating member states. Regular cooperation improves the information available to member states, builds familiarity, lowers transaction costs, reduces distrust, and creates habits of consultation. Therefore, it starts the prospect of maritime confidence and security building that would enable the rapid development of maritime cooperation in ASEAN in the near future.
Building Aggregated Maritime Security Cooperation Mechanism
Good mechanism makes a system function properly and effectively. In order to make maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia work effectively, it needs maritime security cooperation mechanism that must be built by ASEAN member states from current ASEAN security cooperation. All disaggregated maritime working groups such as the ANCM, the ASEAN Maritime Transport Working Group (MTWG), the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA), the Federation of ASEAN Shippers Council (FASC), and the ASEAN Port Association (APA) can be aggregated under a special maritime commission umbrella, “ASEAN Maritime Council” for an example. Moreover, an “ASEAN Maritime Commissioner” can be appointed by such “ASEAN Maritime Council” to work as one of the ASEAN executive body in responsibility for proposing maritime legislation, implementing maritime decision, upholding the ASEAN maritime treaties and cooperation as well as the day-to-day running of ASEAN maritime security issues. This mechanism is the most important prospect for maritime security cooperation in ASEAN.
Key Issues
Broadly speaking, the need for foreign influence has received mixed responses. In response to the tense situation in the South China Sea, the US is keen to send over naval ships to the area, in a bid to promote stability and unity among ASEAN countries. While some countries recognize the need for foreign intervention, others do not want external parties to determine the region’s future. A representative sentiment of the latter is held firmly by the Malaysia’s Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, who stated, “I don’t welcome anything that can disrupt the stability of the region. This is our region. We cannot allow other parties to determine our future”. With this in mind, it is challenging for the ARF to move forward with its various policies.
Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP)
In March 2015, Commander of the US Seventh fleet – Vice Adminral Robert Thomas proposed an “ASEAN-led maritime force” in the South China Sea last year. Amidst the context of maritime territorial disputes with China, it is unclear as to what motivations each country may have in their involvement. It is therefore, difficult in discerning betweem issues of maritime security from military strategy in the South China Sea. This “ambiguity problem” has also reinforced Southeast Asian countries’ caution about embracing maritime security initiatives at a collective level in the South China Sea for fear of “offending” China, or raising mutual sensitivities around sovereignty.
As a result, like-minded ASEAN states have tended to pursue maritime capacity building and cooperation, while others travel at a slower pace, reflecting their less acute threat perceptions. US efforts to boost maritime security and domain awareness in Southeast Asia are broadly tailored to reflect this patchwork reality, with HADR providing a common denominator template for defence-led engagement across ASEAN’s various multilateral security forums. There is no indication that the US Navy is promoting a new maritime patrol initiative in the region, though “ASEAN-led” efforts towards a more concerted region-wide approach are generally welcomed and encouraged.
Singapore has been exploring the possibility of introducing coordinated patrols east of the Singapore Strait including the nearby reaches of the South China Sea. This initiative was raised in response to a rise in attacks on shipping including a spate of fuel syphoning incidents in the waters north of Indonesia’s Bintan island – a region near Singapore.
A major shortcoming of the MSP’s geographical limitation is that the deterrent value of the sea patrols does not extend much beyond the Straits themselves. Since piracy is inherently mobile the threat may be displaced to the South China Sea. Singapore has received support from Malaysia and Vietnam, both of which have broader reasons for cross-bracing maritime security relations with their ASEAN partners in the South China Sea – underlining the blurring of non-state and inter-state factors there.
However, Indonesia is unlikely to agree to an expansion of the MSP for two reasons. First, piracy continues to occupy a lower niche in Jakarta’s threat perceptions. Diverting resources to chase pirates in the near reaches of the South China Sea would be viewed as a distraction from the priority tasks associated with President Joko Widodo’s ‘Maritime Fulcrum’ aspirations, especially thwarting illegal foreign fishing in the archipelago.
Communication between member countries in the ARF.
Direct Communications Link (Nov 2015)
The ASEAN has proposed to set up a hotline to resolve maritime disputes and to ensure communication lines remain open between member countries during a crisis. The Direct Communications Link proposal was unveiled at the ASEAN defence minister’s meeting in Subang, in the outskirts of the capital Kuala Lumpur. The move to finally set up the hotline, a proposal that was first brought up two years ago, comes as defence ministers continue to grapple with the differences between member countries over how to tackle the South China Sea maritime and territorial spat with China, as it is an ongoing problem that several ASEAN countries remain in dispute with China over the South China Sea territory.
Maritime Juridiction
The conflicting sovereignty of maritime boundaries between neighbouring states continues to pose a problem in enforcing maritime jurisdiction. With strong sentiments of nationalism at play, coupled with the competition for scarce resources, it has been increasingly difficult for countries to negotiate disputes.
Maritime law and sea practices.
Good Order at Sea
“Good order at Sea in Southeast Asia: Policy Recommendations” states good order at sea ensures the safety and security of shipping and permits countries to pursue their maritime interests and develop their marine resources in an ecologically sustainable and peaceful manner in accordance with international law. A lack of good order at sea is evident if there is illegal activity at sea or inadequate arrangements for the safety and security of shipping.
The aforementioned UNCLOS provides the framework for such good order at sea. This is supported by numerous other international conventions that provide subsidiary regimes for maritime security, safety and marine environmental protection. These include the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, which includes the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code; the 1979 Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR): and the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). However, there are many gaps in the level of ratification of these important conventions in the region, as some countries which may have ratified them have not given domestic effect tot them.
As mentioned, the UNCLOS mandates a relatively high level of cooperation between countries bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, such as the East and South China seas, but cooperation so far in these seas remain far from even a minimal level of effectiveness, especially when all the seas of East Asia are ‘semi-enclosed seas”.
Marine Resources Security
Southeast Asia is a region that is rich in gas, oil and mineral resources. A lot of offshore energy installations are operating in many countries in the region. Companies extracting oil, gas or other natural resources depend on offshore platforms or terminals along the coast from which the extracted goods are shipped to various destinations around the world. A large number of those mining sites and oil or gas fields in Southeast Asia are located in economically less developed or politically volatile areas, some with ongoing armed conflict. The exploitation of these fields is therefore only possible with efficient security arrangements in place.
Another resource security issue is more problematic. It is the issue of fisheries: a main source of food security in the region. The need for food and economic income leads to rapid depletion of fish stocks in the region, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand. With the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and archipelagic states jurisdictions established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, there are no more high seas in Southeast Asia. Many traditional ‘ free for all’ fishing grounds have been converted into either Archipelagic waters or EEZ where the littoral state has the sole jurisdiction over living resources. Although the UNCLOS 1982 calls upon the coastal and archipelagic states to respect traditional fishing rights, no proper provision is made in the Southeast Asian waters and fishermen fishing in traditional fishing ground are often considered to be engaged in illegal fishing. There is also the related issue of fishery disputes, including the passage of fishing vessels through the EEZ of a third country. Thailand has many problems with its neighbors such as Malaysia, Myanmar, Cambodia and Indonesia. So far, there is no regional mechanism to settle such disputes.
Maritime Security Issues
Maritime Boundary Disputes
The most contentious maritime boundary disputes are those in the region of the South China Sea., where countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, China, and Taiwan claim sovereignty to sea and island territories. These archipelagic seas promise oil resources, while the numerous islets are strategically positioned for support of sea-lanes control or amphibious warfare. On several occasions, such claims can escalate to military clashes. Examples of the clashes in the South China Sea are; a clash between Chinese and Vietnamese navies at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands which caused several Vietnamese boats sunk and over 70 sailors killed in 1988, a clash between China and the Philippines after China occupied Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef when Philippine forces evicted the Chinese and destroyed Chinese markers in 1995, and a clash between the Philippines and Vietnam when Vietnamese soldiers fire on a Philippine fishing boat near Pigeon Reef in 1998. The possibility of renewed clashes clearly exists because the current situation is still volatile as a resolution for each maritime boundary dispute is still pending. Although the ASEAN member states and China indicated their desire to minimize the risk by agreeing to a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, the declaration is something less than a binding code of conduct or a consensus about the way forward.
SLOCs Security
As mentioned, International sea-lanes through Southeast Asia, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Sunda as well as Lombok, are important to the economic and political well being of billions of people throughout the world. They are the lifeline of East Asian economies that heavily depend on access to raw materials and market as well as investment opportunities throughout the region. And as the interdependence of nations continues to grow, the issue of concrete cooperation and communication for the management and safeguarding of these passages has become indispensable in the political agenda of different states and institutions. Regional and greater powers, in term of regional maritime security, stability and seaborne trade, consider the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as well as the sea lanes passing the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea to be the most important. Threats to such sea-lanes throughout Southeast Asia may arise from environmental conditions such as grounding and collision. In addition, they may arise from domestic instability of the littoral states and the policies they pursue that affect the freedom of navigation such as piracy, armed robbery, their policies to control the shipping passage, and territorial disputes among the littoral states. Given the possibility of mutual or common perception and understanding of the forms of such threats to the security of the sea-lanes in Southeast Asia, it may help to determine not only the forms of interstate maritime security cooperation, but also the possible areas to be covered and the states to be involved accordingly. In fact, it is precisely in the basic requirement of mutuality or commonality in perception that is lacking among the ASEAN member states.
Transnational Maritime Crimes
With the advent of globalization, all movements and activities at sea are increasing significantly. They cause the sea to be more porous and vulnerable for shipping. Hence, it benefits many transnational maritime crimes such as piracy, armed robbery, weapons smuggling, narcotics smuggling, and human smuggling. All littoral states concerned agreed that the issued should be cooperatively tackled. However, there are diverse perspectives and solutions that still needed to be discussed and resolved.
Maritime Environmental Security
It is without doubt that natural disasters are more frequent in our era. The most important issue concerning shipping is the navigational safety and the environmental security of narrow passages particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. On average more than two hundred vessels of various types pass through the Straits everyday. These include deep-draft vessels, the Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), other merchant ships, warships and fishing vessels. Such conditions have contributed increasingly to ships groundings and vessel collisions which cause oil spills and finally pollution in the sea. In addition to crude oil and fuel oil, marine pollution also arises from land-based activities such as industries, agriculture, land use and coastal construction, sewage discharge, solid waste disposals, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Although many international conventions on the maritime environment have been produced by related organizations under the United Nations, there is little commonality among regional states of the conventions that they have ratified. This is due to differences in the legal systems in each state, different interpretations of the conventions, different interests, and different views of the existing situations and conditions on maritime environment security.
Bloc Positions
China
In recent times, China has been embroiled in debate with multiple nations over issues of sovereignty in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Despite having implemented a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea(DoC) back in 2002, China has time over time dragged the agreement of a formal Code of Conduct (CoC) and has expressed her preference for negotiations with the 4 member states involved in the South China Sea dispute rather than with ASEAN as a whole, resulting in additional difficulties in resolving the issue of disputes over the territories on both Paracels and Spratly Islands. Tensions between the United States of America and China are rising in recent times, especially since both nations have been accusing each other of “going back on their own words”.
ASEAN
4 of ASEAN nations are currently embroiled in disputes with China over areas in the South China Sea. With the need to project unity and solidarity, ASEAN finds itself in conflict internally as not all nations are involved in the conflict; as well as the fact that China contributes to a significant 12% of all ASEAN trade. Especially concerning was the fact that in the 2012 Ministerial level meetings held in Cambodia, consensus could not be reached on a proposal on how to come up with a COC (code of conduct) on the issue of the South China Sea dispute, dissolving the meeting without even the customary diplomatic communiqué.
ASEAN needs to sort out this internal conflict and form a common understanding among all 10 member states in order to generate sufficient political power to negotiate with China effectively over the disputes.
United States of America
In alignment with the Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific foreign policy, the USA has been very involved in matters of security and freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years. China has time and time complained about the freedom of navigation exercises conducted by the USA such as the flying of B-52 bombers 12 nautical miles off man-made islands claimed by China in December 2015 as well as sailing guided missile destroyers 12 nautical miles off disputed islands in both October 2015 and in January 2016.
USA has re-affirmed her will to “fly, sail and operate wherever international law permits and whenever our operational needs require.” However, with the presidential election looming ahead, it will be unclear on the future direction the USA will take with matters on protecting the interests of her allies in the South China Sea dispute.
Japan
Whilst in recent years, the dispute that Japan has with China over the Senkaku Islands are progressively become quieter due to the wide-spread reporting by the media on the South China Sea dispute, Japan still sees China’s aggression as a threat to her own sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Recently, Japan has announced a record 5.05 trillion Yen defence budget to build up her defence capabilities by building radar stations and missile silos at off-shore islands and buying the latest military technologies such as the F-35 next-generation fighter jets and Osprays from the United States.
Conclusion
From the very brief overview above we can see that the current maritime security issues and problems in Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly vital. In the South China Sea, multiple claimant states are locked into a complex wrangle for which there is no immediate or fast solution. Each unilateral move or bilateral confrontation can upset the precarious peace. The SLOCs is increasingly vulnerable to many forms of threats particularly by pirate and armed robbery attacks. Adequate contingency to safeguard the environmental security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is suspended over a long- drawn debate of responsibilities and contributions. Fortunately, the ASEAN is moving towards deeper integration as agreements and cooperative arrangements are hammered out. The ASEAN member states realize that regional cooperation together with its dialogue partners may be the only way out for ASEAN maritime security. Given the diversity among the involved states, regional leadership and multilateral approach are necessary. As a result, the prospects of maritime security cooperation in ASEAN depends heavily on relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, increasing the prevalence of cooperative regime, and the most importantly building aggregated maritime security cooperation mechanism.
Consider why countries find it difficult or challenging to give domestic effect to such laws.
1) Transnational border issues
2) Sovereignty of countries vs Respect for multinational efforts of Law Enforcement
Final Comments:
Overall, a good study guide that just needs some tweaking here and there. Please refer to Jacelyn’s study guide example and follow the format stipulated. Also please cite in Chicago format…you don’t have citations.
Bibliography
1. “MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN ASEAN: CHALLENGES AND …” Accessed May 8, 2016. http://www.navy.mi.th/ians/acd/ACADEMY/story-vichakarn/Maritime-Security-Cooperation-ASEAN.pdf.
2. “Maritime Security Academic Topic Guide.” doi:http://nushsdyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/Guides/SDYC2015_ASEAN-RF.pdf.
3. “ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook 2014.” doi:http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/ARF-Publication/ARF-Annual-Security-Outlook/ARF Annual Security Outlook 2014.pdf.
4. Lieutenant John F. Bradford, U.S. Navy. “THE GROWING PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.” doi:https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e1be03ba-65dc-4cf8-bee5-1ff6539417fb/Growing-Prospects-for-Maritime-Security-Cooperatio.
5. John Bradford. “SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERROR: THREATS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CHARTING THE COURSE FORWARD.” doi:https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP75.pdf.
6. Euan Graham. doi:https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co15082-expanding-maritime-patrols-in-southeast-asia/#.Vy7ZYWP1_dk.
7. Joshua H. Ho, and Sam Bateman. “MARITIME CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES IN ASIA.” doi:http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781136298219_sample_491771.pdf.
8. “GOOD ORDER AT SEA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.” Accessed May 8, 2016. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PR090427_Good_Order_at_Sea_in_SEA.pdf.
9. MOM Ravin. “LAW OF THE SEA MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS.” doi:http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/mom_0506_cambodia.pdf.
10. Ashley J Tellis, and Sean Mirski. “CRUX OF ASIA China, India, and the Emerging Global Order.” doi:http://carnegieendowment.org/files/crux_of_asia.pdf.
11. Christopher Freise. “By Invitation, Mostly: The International Politics of the US Security Presence, China, and the South China Sea.” doi:https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP247.pdf.
12. Defence Science Library, New Delhi. “Yet to Walk the Extra Mile with ‘consistent’ Friend.” doi:http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/npc/2015/december/28Dec2015.pdf.
13. Chia, Siow Yue. “The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects.” doi:http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156295/adbi-wp440.pdf.
14. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345#by-the-numbers.
15. Guerrero, Rosabel B. “Regional Integration: The ASEAN Vision in 2020.” doi:http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb32c.pdf.
16. Hoong, Khong Kim, and Abdul Razak Abdullah. “Security Co‑operation in ASEAN.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 9, no. 2 (1987): 129-39. doi:10.1355/cs9-2f.
17. “Asean Countries Agree to Set up a Hotline to Deal with Maritime Issues in the Region.” International Business Times RSS. 2015. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/asean-countries-agree-set-hotline-deal-maritime-issues-region-1527071.
18. “Peace and Freedom.” Peace and Freedom. Accessed May 08, 2016. https://johnib.wordpress.com/tag/de-facto-control/.
19. Rattanasevee, Pattharapong. “Towards Institutionalised Regionalism: The Role of Institutions and Prospects for Institutionalisation in ASEAN.” SpringerPlus. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4182320/.
20. “Growing Maritime Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: A Greater Need for Further Regional Cooperation.” The National Interest. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/growing-maritime-security-concerns-southeast-asia-greater-13145.
21. “U.S. Energy Information Administration – EIA – Independent Statistics and Analysis.” The South China Sea Is an Important World Energy Trade Route. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10671.
22. “Asean-led Maritime Force? Not so Fast.” The Straits Times. 2015. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-led-maritime-force-not-so-fast.
23. “The Most Dangerous Waters in The World.” Time. Accessed May 08, 2016. doi:http://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/.
24. Tibor Kovács. “MARITIME SECURITY IN THE STRAITS OF MALACA: RISKS AND RESPONSES.” Https://www.uam.es/centros/economicas/doctorado/deri/publicaciones/WorkingPapers/DWP12-2005.pdf. doi:https://www.uam.es/centros/economicas/doctorado/deri/publicaciones/WorkingPapers/DWP12-2005.pdf.