Essay: Analysis of Vietnam’s relations with China from the Cold War to now

An analysis of Vietnam’s relations with China from the beginning of the Cold War to the Present

Abstract.

This dissertation examines the relations between Vietnam and China. It proposes that the Sino-Vietnam relationship is one structured by history where occupation by the Chinese for 1000 years meant Vietnam’s culture, society and politics were heavily influenced by the Chinese. Subsequent occupation by the French and the US led to a long period of close friendship, structured by the ideology of communism and the wars for independence. However, a period of conflict between China and Vietnam followed and the relationship seemed to be destined to end in war and bitterness, only for it to become friendly and cooperative through the last two decades. This dissertation examines the history of the Sino-Vietnam relations and the main issues that now structure that relationship.

Chapter 1:

Introduction

The Vietnam and China relationship remains essential to the peace and security of South East Asia and also to the successful future development of both nations. The diplomatic relations stretch back into a history of a 1000 years of colonial possession of Vietnam by China and, in contrast, two decades of support through the Vietnam War which saw Vietnam defeat with the aid of its two superpower allies (China and the Soviet Union) two powerful Western nations (US and France). There is constantly a ‘schizophrenic’ element to the diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam, where they are like two ‘brothers’ who are sharing a deep and close friendship or trying to kill each other (Storey, 2008, p.2). What is more confusing is that this is not always separate time periods, but actually occurs simultaneously, such as in 2009 when open conflict was occurring with Chinese warships in the South China seas while the two Governments were also signing groundbreaking agreements on the border issues. The relationship also affects all areas of cooperation including political, social and economic negotiations and this dissertation will examine each area and how the history of the relations between these two states still structures present outcomes. For example, whilst both states have shared the battle to bring successful communist rule to their nations and confront the capitalist foes, such as in the Cold War and the confrontation with the US, the colonial experience of Vietnam has constantly left a national fear of Chinese expansionism (Hoi Nghi Dien Hong, 2009, p.1-2).

China and Vietnam are geographically linked as neighbours and share deep historical and cultural experiences that means the destiny of both nations is linked together by many political analysts (ex. See Storey, 2008). The relations between China and Vietnam have a long history of conflict and friendship. The contradictory nature of the relationship has meant that the present friendship and increased levels of cooperation are set against a background of either support against common enemies or actual conflict between the two partners, although the conflict has chiefly involved minor skirmishes on the border or in the South China Seas.

Despite the two nations being ideologically linked through their rule by Communist Party’s, and even the end of the Cold War not bringing about the retreat of Communism in either Vietnam or China, the two countries still have significant points of confrontation that retain the potential for open warfare to break out at any point in the future. In recent years regular confrontations in the South China Seas has led to the sinking of Vietnamese fishing boats by Chinese warships and the killing of Vietnamese fishermen, such as in 2009 when ten fishermen were killed by a Chinese warship and a campaign began in Vietnam to protest against Chinese aggression and declared that China should stop all ‘Stop all expansionist and unlawful acts of aggression’ (The Hoi Nghi Dien Hong, ‘Save Vietnam from China’ 8th August 2009). On the other hand the relationship is one seen as a ‘fraternal relationship between an elder and younger brother rather than the normal state to state relationship practiced in Western society’ (Duicker, p.6). This dissertation will show how and why two such close states regularly swing from either close friendship to various levels of conflict. The main reasons are found in the history of the two countries and rest on three areas of contention (border disputes, territorial disputes over sovereignty of the South China Seas and the role and position of Vietnamese citizens who identify themselves as ‘Chinese’).

The extent of the confusion on exactly what the political, social and cultural relationship between the Chinese and Vietnamese is analysed by Storey as:

There is respect, even admiration, for Chinese culture, system of governance and economic reform on the one hand, coexisting with deep resentment, bordering on hatred, of Chinese condescension, bullying, and perceived attempts to control its political destiny. China’s perception of its southern neighbor is equally conflicted: A tenacious fighter of colonialism worthy of massive Chinese support from 1949 until the early 1970s, but a devious, unfilial “puppet” of the USSR during the 1980s (Storey, 2008, p1).

The historical background is analysed in the dissertation and covers over a 1000 years of history between China and Vietnam, culminating in partnership in the Vietnam War and then war between the two nations, even though they were still seen as communist ‘allies’ of the ‘east’ in the Cold War fight with the ‘west’. The end of the Cold War and then the following two decades saw the relationship eventually grow into a close friendship with Chinese ‘smile diplomacy’ helping to see the economies of both countries develop as two of the fastest growing economies in the world (Storey, 2008, p.1).

The dissertation then examines how the diplomatic, economic, cultural and social history has impacted on the present state of relations and demonstrates that ‘history’ is still important in understanding and defining contemporary relations between states.

Thus, the history of relations between China and Vietnam have been moving between conflict and peaceful co-existence for more than a thousand years and the present relationship holds numerous areas of potential for an outbreak of fresh conflict, maybe even full scale war, as both countries build up their naval forces in the South China Seas, with China placing nuclear submarines on patrol in the Seas and Vietnam purchasing its own fleet of conventional submarines to protect its sovereign interests around the Paracel and Spratley islands (Kristensen, 2009). But equally true is the fact that the two nations are inevitably intertwined in an interdependent friendship where the futures of both countries could rely on how ‘brotherly’ they remain to each other, and that while history provides many examples of special cooperation and understanding between them, it also contains examples of them fighting each other and the reasons for those conflicts still remain as points of potential conflict that could easily see both sides ready to go to war.

The growing economic and military power of China would mean that they would have massive advantages in such a conflict and could possibly quickly defeat Vietnam, but as the Americans discovered in the Vietnam War (in Vietnam it is called the ‘American War’), the Vietnamese are capable of surprising even the most powerful nation in the world. General Giap (1970) often noted how it was the Vietnamese ability to suffer more losses, battle against enormous odds and have vastly inferior resources and still defeat the French, Japanese, Americans, Chinese and Southern Vietnam forces. Despite the victories, their enemies constantly underestimate them and assume they can always defeat the Vietnamese.

But in the context of the present global economy, a close relationship with China that is free from historical enmities is more important than at any time in the past, as China is the leading economic force in the worlds’ economy and it is almost certain that the closer as possible the friendship Vietnam has with China, the more likely it is that Vietnam will fully develop its own economy and bring an end to poverty and economic instability.

Chapter 2

Sino-Vietnam relations 208B.C to 1954 A.D

Sino- Vietnam relations are one of the longest geopolitical relationships in the world; it is not only a simple relationship between two nation states. For over one thousand years the Chinese occupied Vietnam. Thus, the similarities in the economical, political, and cultural traditions between these two countries are inevitable. With more than 1400 km of shared frontier, these two neighbouring states have many issues to discuss in regard to the regional security as well as mutual benefits. For much of the Imperial Chinese era the Sino-Vietnamese relations were those of overlord and vassal, but they also involved the development of close cultural ties. Duiker (1989, p.6 ) believed this relationship had produced a “…blend of cultural mimicry and political tension…” between the two countries.

To understand the present relationship it has to be realised that Vietnam was itself not even recognised as a country until the invasion by the Chinese general Trieu Da and the subsequent efforts to completely transform the culture, language and society to reflect the same format as the Ch’in dynasty. Its bureaucratic, administrative, cultural and social systems were all infused by a Confucian Chinese colonialism that still today shapes the thinking and actions of the Vietnamese people. However, the next thousand years was not a time of peaceful co-existence between Chinese and Vietnamese, but rather continual revolts and violent resistance against Chinese rule (Karnow, 1991, p.108-120). The dominance of China only ended with the advent of French rule in IndoChina.

The collapse of the Chinese Imperial system under pressure by Western Imperialism and the colonisation of Vietnam by the French ‘transformed the Sino-Vietnamese relationship into a new and unfamiliar shape” Duiker (1989, p.8).

French colonialism in Vietnam up to 1945

French colonial goals in Vietnam were as much as result of wanting to deny the English taking control there as it was to possess Vietnam themselves. The French believed that they needed to control the region and the best way was to colonise Vietnam/Indo-China. Much of the early French involvement was in the form of Christian missionaries and France believed it had a duty to ‘bring God’ to the people as well as change their political, cultural and social values. However, there was little benevolence in the political and military goals of France in Vietnam and the period of colonial rule was marked by the reduction of the people into complete poverty, starvation and under-development (Karnow, 1991, p.70-78).

The Treaty of 9 June 1885 came as a result of France’s victory over the Chinese in the Sino-French War. The Chinese withdrawal from Tonkin allowed the French to occupy Lang Son and take control of Lao Cai on the Yunnan-Tonkin border. Fierce resistance of the Vietnamese to the French was crushed and the French extended their rule into Annam and Tonkin. In 1887, Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin (the territories which comprise the modern state of Vietnam) and Cambodia were incorporated into French Indochina. After victory of the French in the Franco-Siamese war in 1893, Laos also became a part of French IndoChina. China abandoned its right to control over Vietnam and recognized the protection of France over Vietnam. The 1885 Treaty later became the main source of the present disputes over borders with China and the sovereignty over areas of the South China Seas (Eastman, 1984).

Relations between Vietnam and China from that moment became part of the Franco-China relations. Thus, Vietnam’s relations were part of the global contest between two much larger powers (France and China), just as in later years they became difficult, not only because of their relationship with China, but also because of the difficult relations between the Soviets and China and between the US and China during the Cold War. The period of French colonial rule was again a period of regular revolts against a colonial ruler and resistance against foreign influence became very much part of the cultural psyche of the Vietnamese (Giap, 1970).

1939-1945: Japan invades Vietnam

With the Second World War a new occupier came to Vietnam in the form of the Japanese. Initially, while France was ruled by the Vichy and Japan were allies of the Germans, both countries shared the role of Vietnam’s colonial masters, dividing up the country between them. With the dropping of the Atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the defeat earlier of the Vichy Government and the Germans, promises were made that Vietnam, due to the resistance against occupation and support of the Allies by Ho Chi Minh and his troops, would gain independence. Ho Chi Minh and his generals recorded this belief in many of their later chronicles on the period (Giap, 1970). But the US, France and Japan conspired to retain domination of Vietnam, with the US and the British even appointing the defeated Japanese army soldiers in a security forces/police role (Karnow, 1991, 174-175).

Meanwhile, in July 1945, China’s Nationalist forces were invited in by the Allies to occupy the North. Despite Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh declaring Vietnam independence both Chinese nationalist forces and French forces undertook campaigns of terror, with the killing, raping and plundering of Northern towns and cities, especially Hanoi. This only ended with the decision by Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek to withdraw from Vietnam all troops in 1946. The French remained, refusing to withdraw and regularly committing new atrocities until a full scale war was declared against them by the Vietnamese. General Giap declared ‘The resistance will be long and arduous, but our cause is just and we will surely triumph. If these [people] want a fight, they’ll get it’ (Giap, 1970, p.10).

Chapter 3

Vietnam Prepares for war with the US

The division of Vietnam along the 17th Parallel as drawn up by the Geneva Conference, also marked the beginning of a new d�tente with China as the now Communist China under Chairman Mao rule saw the benefits of having a socialist Vietnamese neighbour in the growing tension of the Cold War. Chairman Mao Zedong recognised the need for support of the Viet Minh and provided China as a vital line for supplies and a major political ally for the Vietnamese in their battle with the French and Americans.

As the war with the French increased so did the support from the Chinese with vast amounts of arms being transported to them and even the provision of thousands of Chinese ‘military advisers’. However, the Soviet Union was also now beginning to lend its support sending its own vast quantities of arms and military advisers. It was inevitable that Vietnam would eventually find itself a ‘pawn’ in the growing tension between the Chinese and the Soviets (Karnow, 1991; Quang, 2002, Windrow, 1998). Morley (1997) notes how Vietnam was becoming the ‘Cuba of the East’. The tension in the Sino-Soviet relations made it inevitable that the Vietnamese receiving aid from both Communist super-powers would increase the tensions between Vietnam and China. Morley notes how China and Vietnam’s ‘historical relations…left a legacy of mutual resentment’ (p.117-120).

However, Zhai (2002) notes that overall, between the 1950s to 1968, ‘the cooperation side of China’s policy was predominant’ (p.217). In some ways the support to the Vietnamese was in recognition of the valuable aid Ho Chi Minh forces gave to the Chinese Communists in defeating the Kai-Shek nationalists (Ha, 2007).

As the war for independence from the French first led to victory and then open hostility with the Americans, the Chinese assistance became even more important. The PRC became the first country to recognise the new Communist Vietnam (DRV) by establishing formal foreign diplomatic relations with Vietnam. The Peoples Republic (PRC), led by Mao, officially supported Vietnam by giving free military and non-military supplies such as medicine, cloths, foods, and a number of weapons including machine guns, rifles and mortars (Zhai, 2002, p15). Crucially important was the sending of an advisory team, which was mostly made up of senior army generals including General Chen Geng, and General Wei Guoqing, who were to help train the Vietnamese military force and give political advice on planning missions. By September 1950, the PRC had trained and equipped five Vietminh divisions. (King Chen, 1969, p 11). Hoang Van Hoan, a founder of the Indochinese Communist Party who then became Ambassador in Beijing in 1960 recalled that: the aid from China was so important that without the artillery sent by China it would not have been possible to destroy the French army corps’ strong points, and without the personal participation of Comrade Wei Guoqing in the frontline command of the battle it would have been difficult to win [the] complete victory’ (King Chen, 1969, p12).

However, the question mark about the actual numbers of Chinese aid as well as the level of the PRC assistance has been a source of historical controversy between these two countries. According to Duiker, Beijing has claimed that their assistance was crucial and vital to the success of Vietminh, while Hanoi only confirmed that it was tiny and not the major factor (Duicker, 1989, p.22). The dispute over the effectiveness of Chinese support not only undermined the relations between the two but also led to accusations of betrayal by Vietnam and in reverse the Vietnamese suspicion of China’s motives. Moreover, the success of the battle of Dien Bien Phu gave the opportunity for Vietnam to go to the Geneva Conference of 1954, where the hostility between the Chinese and Vietnam was openly displayed. Zhou En Lai as the leader of PRC delegation did not show much support for Vietnam and pushed them to accept terms that the Vietnamese were not ready to cede to. It is argued that despite the desire to liberate and unite the country of Vietnam, Zhou and the PRC government feared the possibility of Vietnam expanding power over Laos and Cambodia in order to form a new regional power in Indochina and provide a unity that would challenge Chinese dominance of the region. As noted in Mark Atwood’s (2007) The First Vietnam War, he explained the non-enthusiasm of PRC in the Geneva conference and declared this was because the Chinese did not want a major victory for the Vietnamese and tried to limit their success by only supplying enough aid for Vietnam to avoid losing at Dien Bien Phu, but not leading to a dominant position for Vietnam over Indochina (p 49). Or in King Chen words, ‘China prevented Vietnam from liberating the entire country although they had the ability to do so’ (1969, p15).

However, China argued that they wanted Vietnam to wait and prepare for the US expansion of the war. Mao feared that heavy fighting at this time with the US forces would only weaken Vietnam and eventually lead to its defeat or force China to enter into the war to prevent such a defeat (Zhai, 2002, p.61).

Chapter 4

The Vietnam War

Vietnam became a crucial factor in the growing division between the Soviets and the Chinese. The two superpowers had very different approaches to how the Vietnamese should deal with the Americans. The Geneva Accord in 1954 had divided Vietnam into two separate parts with different political regimes in the North and South. The North of Vietnam was unified under the DRV while the South was supported under a non-communist regime backed by the US. Thus, the Vietnam War against the US to liberate the entire country was inevitable. Despite the argument about the Chinese assistance for Vietnam during Indochina War, both of the two countries had tried to improve bilateral relations in regard to each state’s benefit. The SEATO formation of the US in South Asia and their presence in South Vietnam made China worry about its Southern frontier (Duiker, p35).

Mao was a major influence on Chinese policy in Vietnam and his views changed significantly over time. Prior to 1957, Mao advocated a policy of non-interference in foreign wars over sovereignty. Mao believed that the war in Indochina was very different from the issues in the Korean Peninsula and that the impact of a war there could affect the whole region (including Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia,

and the Philippines), Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Ceylon. Mao declared “If we are not careful, we will affect 600 million people in ten countries. We should make necessary concessions. We should adhere to the positions that cannot be compromised. In this way, we can isolate the minority (the United States), win over the majority,” and reach a final agreement (Zhai, 2002, p.18-20). Thus, Mao demonstrated a fear that the war in Indochina could expand and draw a major intervention into Indochina by the US.

However, following Krushchev’s speech in the Moscow Conference of 1957 calling for the development of socialism through ‘peaceful transition’, Mao changed his position (Zhai, 2002, p.20). For that reason, at the beginning of Vietnam War, the Chinese assistance from Mao was motivated by a wish to keep the North fighting until liberation was really effective. Meanwhile, according to Duiker, the Soviet’s under Khrushchev still preferred Vietnam accepting a peaceful road to the unification in order to avoid the confrontation with the US (Duiker, p42). Thus, the Chinese assistance at that moment was crucial to Hanoi, while also aggravating the Sino-Soviet relationship. The aid given was extensive. Zhai (2002, p.38) noted that:

‘They helped the DRV resist American air attack, build and repair railways, roads, airfields, communication installations, defense works, and sweep mines off the coast. Beijing instructed Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hunan provinces to help seven provinces in North Vietnam develop their economic construction. Between 1962 and 1966, China provided the DRV with 270,000 guns, 540 cannons, 200 million bullets, 900,000 artillery shells, 700 tons of explosives, 200,000 sets of uniforms, 4 million meters of cloth as well as large quantities of mosquito nets, rain boots, food, communication materials’.

In 1964, the Soviet leadership changed when Khrushchev was overthrown and Leonid Brezhnev took power. This led to the change in Soviet – Vietnamese relations, and in contrast to his predecessor, Brezhnev stressed his interest in Asia, and Vietnam in particular. In February 1965, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Hanoi, where he promised that ‘the Soviet Union would supply free of charge artillery pieces, tanks, and missiles to the DRV’ (Zhai, 2002, p.34).

There are two main reasons for this Soviet involvement; first, to run a competition with the US in promoting its reputation in Asia, and second, to enter into rivalry with China in supporting Vietnam (King Chen, p 22). From that point, Vietnam officially received actual aid from the Soviets. With a triple amount of military aid compared to China, the Soviets actually showed their willingness to militarily support Vietnam and the war. Although the Soviet aid was increasing; the crisis in 1965 is believed to be a turning point in Sino – Vietnamese relations and the Cultural Revolution in 1966 led by Mao in China led to a limiting of the assistance to Vietnam. In 1965, China not only denied the request for more pilots in Vietnam but also turned down the cooperation with the Soviets to provide assistance for the DRV (Duiker, p 49). Because of this unbalance in supporting Vietnam, in addition to the Sino – Soviet split in respect of each side feeling they were the ‘leader’ of Communism in the world, Vietnamese loyalties moved significantly in favour of Moscow (Trong, 2002).

The covert improvement in Sino US relations was also now becoming of direct concern in regard to the position of China, especially concerning the support for Vietnamese against the Americans. In 1972, the visitation of Nixon in Beijing was contrary to the relationship between Vietnam and China. To Vietnam the “US is the enemy number one” and China was accused by Vietnam of betrayal. Although the Soviet’s later also moved to a position of d�tente in diplomatic relations with the US, Vietnam’s attitude towards Moscow was still positive because they believed the Russians were merely trying to maintain a “balance of power” with the US. Whilst closer ties with the US by the Soviet’s were still seen as merely political manoeuvring the new US-China relationship was still seen as a negative outcome for Vietnam, even though Zhou had flown twice to Hanoi to explain about China’ situation. Last but not least, in the Paris conference which took place in 1973, China did not show as much effort in supporting Vietnam as the Vietnamese expected prior to talks, and matters were made worse when the Chinese withdraw a large division from Vietnam (King Chen, p19, 20). These actions of the Chinese were seen as acts of betrayal of the Vietnamese and thus led to an ever greater deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Chapter 5

Sino-Vietnam relations and Cambodia

The deterioration of Chinese-Vietnam relations increased with the Vietnam intervention in Cambodia in 1978 and the subsequent Sino- Vietnam conflict in 1979.

China was constantly concerned with Vietnamese intentions in Indochina, believing that they sought to annex and control large parts of the area, which included Laos and Cambodia. In the Geneva Conference 1954, Zhou pursued Pham Van Dong to withdraw troops from Cambodia and accepted the peaceful settlement of a divided Vietnam. It is argued that China wanted Indochina to stay as weak and divided as possible in order that Chinese domination would later be effective in the area (Duiker, p 28). It was sensible to accept that argument in regard to the Sino- Vietnamese conflict over Cambodia in 1975. On the first hand, this was because of the political distance that had grown between Vietnam and the Chinese. As well as the differences in cultural traditions, China saw Cambodia as an independent state with specific values. On the other hand, Vietnam considered Cambodia as a younger brother in the Indochina family where Vietnam had always taken the dominant role during the anti colonial struggle with the French. Becau

se of the geographical position of Cambodia and Laos to the Vietnamese and the importance of having neighbours that would defend Vietnam’s territorial integrity, Vietnam remained ever watchful and continued with a policy of seeing their role as one where they provided “protection” for Cambodia.

The Chinese claimed that the support of China for the Khmer people during the 1975 conflicts was a ‘paternal’ act, without any benefit but a wish for Cambodia’s total freedom. However, the Vietnamese believed they also had close interests in the welfare of the Khmers of Cambodia and launched their own ‘paternalism policy’ that committed Vietnam to defending Vietnamese interests in the region (Pao, 1979, p.6). Thus the conflict between the Khmers of Cambodia and Vietnamese people was one where the Vietnamese believed they had no choice but to protect their territorial integrity, And subsequently became a central issue in moving the relationship with China from friendship to conflict.

Coming so soon after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and at the same time when Sino Vietnamese relations were weak, the territorial conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia was not an easy case for Vietnam, a new born communist state. Especially, as Khmer and the Pol Pot regime was receiving assistance from China. In May 1975, Pol Pot and his followers invaded Vietnam from Phu Quoc Island (known as Koh Tral by Cambodians), with the conflict lasting for 3 years until 1978 and leading to huge consequences for both sides. After the success of taking back Phnom Penh in April 1975, Cambodians saw the Chinese as the most trusted and powerful friend (King Chen, p 31). China was the first state to recognize the independence of Cambodia as well as giving free aid for the reconstruction of the country. This considerable aid from China during Vietnam- Cambodia war was seen as clear evidence of Chinese support for an anti-Vietnamese policy. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese military were repeatedly receiving requests for withdrawal from the Cambodia border, and were recognized as Cambodians’ number one enemy (King Chen, p32). Vietnam always saw the liberation of Cambodia in the Indochina War as a result of Vietnamese help. The ungrateful attitude towards the role of Vietnam in the War made Vietnam angry and uncomfortable. In addition, the strong support of China to the Khmer Rouge increased the tensions between Vietnam and China.

The background to the worsening relations between Vietnam and Cambodia lay with the growing divide caused between China and Vietnam through the increasing influence of the Soviet Union on Vietnamese politics.

Soviet Influence on Vietnam and the invasion of Cambodia

The involvement of the Soviet Union in Vietnam can be traced back to January 1950 when the USSR gave diplomatic recognition to the newly established North Vietnam. The onset of the Korean war led to a focus of the major world powers on this, and the Soviet Union did not focus again on Vietnam until Geneva Accord of 1954, when they were instrumental in encouraging the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to sign an accord that divided Vietnam across the 17th Parallel and meant the Communists won only ‘half a victory’ (Rupen and Farrell, 1967, p.45).

Rupen and Farrell (1966) argue that the reasons for only a limited support of Vietnam by the USSR was a Soviet fear of US aggression and a desire for closer Soviet and French relations. However, Soviet aid increased after the Bucharest Conference of 1960, as Krushchev sought support from the DRV in its own problem of increasingly antagonist Sino-Soviet relations. As the war with the US forces now situated in the South of Vietnam increased with the bombing of Hanoi, the Pravda newspaper declared ‘The Vietnamese are not alone in their struggle against imperialist aggression. They have on their side the Soviet Union’ (Rupen and Farrell, 1967, p.48). The Soviet Presidium went even further in 1966 when they declared the Communist forces in South Vietnam led by the National Liberation Front as ‘the only lawful representative of the South Vietnamese people’ (p.49). By 1967 the Soviets were supplying arms, surface to air missiles and MIG-21’s to the North Vietnam forces (p.59).

Soviet aid continued in conjunction with Chinese support for the North Vietnamese throughout the next decade. But, by 1976, Indochina had polarized into Pro-Soviet and Pro-China blocs, the domestic politics of China was now in turmoil with the death of Mao Zedong, the ousting of the Gang of Four and the conflict between Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai (Ross, 1988, p.80-83). The Soviet Union used the crisis to promote further its aim of hegemony in Asia, with the main aim of a Soviet control of ‘China’s southern periphery’ (Ross, 1988, p.86) raising Beijing’s fears of Soviet encirclement. The focus of the Soviet Union and China on an increasing level of antagonism between them increased with the Helsinki Conference which saw China accuse America of using the talks to improve Soviet-US relations at the expense of the PRC (Ross, 1988, p.56-57).

A Moscow and Hanoi economic pact signed in 1976 marked yet even more improvement in the relations between the two states, whilst the USSR was also increasing its influence in near Asian neighbours such as Laos and Thailand. In contrast to increasingly tense relations between China and Vietnam, the PRC was only making matters worse by development of links with Pol Pot and Cambodia, despite the growing alarm in global opinion for the Pol Pot leaderships atrocities against the Khmer people. The situation became even more polarized as the border conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam increased and the world powers now focused their Asian hegemonic ambitions on bi-lateral partnerships with China- Cambodia confronting a Soviet-Vietnam partnership. Vietnam further aligned itself with the Soviet Union with its entry into COMECON in April 1977 (Ross, 1988).

Tensions increased as Vietnam deepened its relations with Laos with strong support from the Soviets. The incidents of the tensions breaking out into violence increased as for example with over 800 violent confrontations recorded in the border area between China and Vietnam throughout 1977 (Ross, 1988, p.127). By May 1977, China and Vietnam relations were declining rapidly and the arguments between them now also included sovereignty over the islands in the South China seas. The Kampuchean-Vietnamese relationship worsened and numerous attacks on Vietnamese forces were being recorded (Ross, 1988, p.33). However, Kampuchean attacks were repelled and the Vietnam forces moved onto the offensive, with shelling of the Kampuchean positions. In 1978 the battle-hardened and experienced troops of Vietnam defeated the Cambodian forces.

China now identified Vietnam as a clear enemy and claimed that ethnic cleansing of Chinese in Vietnam plus occupation of the South Sea Islands by Vietnamese forces were a clear invasion of Chinese sovereignty and placed 1,500,000 troops alongside the border with the Soviet Union, warning them that they were about to invade Vietnam and any assistance from Russia would be deemed an act of war. Meanwhile, 600,000 troops faced 70,000 Vietnamese, but despite superior forces in men and equipment, the Vietnamese defeated the Chinese (Scalapino, 1986, p.28).

With the already strained relationship, the Sino- Vietnamese territorial conflict in 1979 worsened the situation. For the Chinese the war was also a lesson to punish Vietnam and in retribution for the stubbornness of Vietnam over the Vietnamese- Cambodian conflict, where China supported Cambodia. Moreover, Chinese- US relations were increasing more friendly as ‘ping pong’ diplomacy brought new cooperation, and the Chinese attacking Vietnam would be a proof for this new friendship of the commitment of the Chinese to support American interests ( Duiker, 1989, p84). However, after bitter fighting, that goal was not met. The aftermath of this short-term war brought about a vast loss for both countries, especially in the Vietnamese economy; the country had been continually fighting wars since the 1940s. By the end of this war the tensions in Sino Vietnamese relations seemed to have reached a new low point and beyond rescue. Thousands of lives were lost on both sides but Chinese forces were forced to withdraw and carried out a scorched earth policy, destroying as much as possible in their retreat. The conflict continued on into 1980, with numerous border clashes between the Vietnamese and Chinese forces (Zhang, 2005, p.851-874).

The South China Islands

A major reason for the deterioration of relations between China and Vietnam was the Territorial dispute between the two countries on the border between them in the North and in the South China Seas. It is argued that territorial issues were not the main reason for the main disputes between China and Vietnam, but the Sino Vietnamese border conflict in 1979 and disputes over the South China Seas were a major influence on future relations.

The issues here were the: 797-mile long border, the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel and Spratly islands. (King Chen, p39) Since 1887, in the French reign over Indochina, the French and Chinese had signed a Convention which declared more than 300 markers erected to indicate the boundary of the border. After two great wars, the Indochina and Vietnam War, the territorial management of Vietnam over its border with China was in dispute. Vietnam claimed that China had occupied more than 100 meters inside Vietnamese territory (cited by Pao, 1989, p 12). For the Gulf of Tonkin Issue, although the division of the water area was declared in the Convention in 1887, both China and French disputed sovereignty over the territory. Both Vietnam and China made use of the ambiguity and tried to interpret the agreement in their favour (King Chen, 1969, p40). As a major sea-lane connecting China to Vietnam and vice versa, the sovereignty over Gulf of Tonkin held direct advantages for the owner. Thus, once again, this led to the dispute in Sino-Vietnam relations and undermined any opportunity for a closer relationship. However, the main focus of the South China Seas dispute between Vietnam and China was over the sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly islands, which still continues today to be a delicate and dangerous issue that constantly threatens to cause conflict between the two nations.

These are two vitally important island groups that concerns issues not only in politics but also in respect of economics as it is a main shipping route for the countries connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and a vast area of oil and gas reserves. The competition with China to recognise the Vietnamese sovereignty over these islands was chiefly taken up by the new South Vietnam administration. In 1974, not long after the occupation of China of the Paracel islands, the Vietnam military under the guidance of the South Vietnam forces invaded and claimed sovereignty over six parts of the Spratly islands. Although North Vietnam -Hanoi did not get directly involved in these events, their silence was seen as support to South Vietnam (Stephen, p 172). The decline of relations between Vietnam and China reached new levels of antagonism and the mixture of both political and economic differences meant that both sides saw their interests as vital to their survival, and thus the two countries relationship declined to even lower levels, threatening to explode into open warfare at any moment. With the relationship steadily declining a number of other issues became of major concern. Not least was the position of ‘Overseas Chinese’ in Vietnam.

The ‘Overseas Chinese’ issue

With the largest population in the world, the appearances of Chinese people living and working in other countries were not strange, especially, in some neighbouring states, such as in Vietnam. In 1954, there were already more than two million Chinese people living in Vietnam, but the Chinese insisted on retaining every their cultural tradition and incorporating that into their living style in Vietnam. The Vietnamese government was aware of the expansion of the Chinese ethnic culture in Vietnam. According to the research of King Chen (1969), there were three main reasons that led to concern of the Vietnamese for the growing influence of Chinese residents. First, the Chinese people who lived in Vietnam were often quite successful in economics, their trading bringing great wealth to them but often the profits were transferred back to China, thus bringing little benefits to Vietnam. Second, the Chinese people tried to retain their traditional living values such as establishing Chinese only schools, newspapers in Chinese, and especially restricting marriage to Chinese people only. Third, they were obsessed with their lack of political power (King Chen, 1969, p51). These factors caused many Vietnamese to criticize the Chinese people for their lack of willingness to fully integrate into Vietnam society, and the lack of loyalty to Vietnam by resident Chinese caused the Vietnamese to constantly see them as a threat to the security of the nation. Such situations only antagonized China-Vietnam relations and created even greater hostility between them. What has to be understood about the role of the Chinese in Vietnam is that they were aligned with each invader, especially as they retained the ‘Mandarin’ culture of their homeland and often assumed the role as the main driver and beneficiary of entrepreneurship and capitalism in Vietnam. They set themselves as a class above the Vietnamese and were the main wealth owners, assuming not just roles in business but often the vanguard of governmental and administrative positions awarded to them by Chinese, French and other foreign occupiers. When communism came to Vietnam, the overseas Chinese were seen as the obvious ‘traitor’ within the country, ready to oppose an ideology completely opposite to their own capitalist style. The advent of Communism in China did not end this fear, but only made it a more confusing and contradictory issue (Carino, 1980).

After the end of the Indochina war, marked by the division of Vietnam into two separate parts, most of Chinese people moved towards the South to seek for a better chance for economic development. In 1955, an agreement was signed by both parties that noted those Chinese who were living in North Vietnam should be supported to participate more in Vietnamese society, and in return, DRV should not reject them if they did not voluntarily join in.( Duiker, p 40) However, a year after this agreement, the movement of thousands of Chinese to the South, caused the Vietnamese government to change policy towards the ethnic Chinese, and compel the Chinese people to assume Vietnamese citizenship and get rid of their Chinese nationality. The further difficulties remained for those still wanting to live in Vietnam. In 1975, as the Northern forces succeeded in taking over the South, the new government carried out a policy of socioeconomic transformation and ‘re-education’ in southern Vietnam, which had the main intention of creating a more unified and balanced system for the whole country. For example: The anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement (1975), currency reforms (1975,1978) and the socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce (1978). The Chinese were nearly always adversely affected by these reforms as a majority were the very same rich businessmen whose wealth the Vietnamese now wanted to re-distribute ( King Chen, p 41).

To China the Vietnamese policies in Vietnam towards its resident Chinese were seen as directly antagonistic and gravely affected the view of the Chinese of the Vietnam Government. Although both were communist, the relations between them were continuing to deteriorate. The disputes over territorial sovereignty, the global strategic situation, the issue of overseas and the recent conflicts caused a growing deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations. However, rather than leading to war, the relationship has now reached a new d�tente and both are determined to improve future cooperation between the two historically, geographically and culturally connected neighbours. The struggles for independence and subsequent closeness of Sino-Vietnam relations followed by conflict and antagonism over territorial sovereignty, overseas Chinese and the friendship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam gradually gave way to a new period of close cooperation and attempts to resolve existing issues through peaceful means. The high point of this new period in Sino-Vietnam was the last two decades.

Chapter 6

1990 To The Present

The last two decades have seen the relationship between China and Vietnam chiefly affected by global influences as both states have sought to support their economic development by becoming part of the global free trade system, and accepted as ‘friendly’ states rather than Communist enemies as was the case in the Cold War period.

Although still remaining Communist, whilst in the Soviet Union the collapse of Communism took place, both China and Vietnam have sought to be accepted by international society as ‘partners’ rather than enemies. In Vietnam the process began with the policy of Doi Moi (or ‘renovation’ policy) introduced in 1987 and the movement from a centrally planned economy to a transition economy promoting free markets (Bui, 1999).

Doi Moi policy

The integration of Vietnam into the global economy through its transition to a market economy model began with the introduction of the policy of Doi Moi. The extent of the transformation needed was radical and the theme for the transition was clearly identified by the main policy being identified simply as Doi Moi, which literally translates as “changing into something new”, but is more commonly referred to as ‘renovation’. Doi Moi involved a policy of restructuring State cooperatives and shifting production away from a ‘household economy’ to the ‘private sector’, while also making the state-owned sector compete in a market economy format (Do, 1994, Dang, 1996). Essential to this policy was Vietnam competing in a globalised economy by first improving its trade with regional neighbours and later expand to compete with international markets.

Thus, the renovation policy started with the 6th Congress of the Communist Party in 1986 (Chu, 1987; Dang, 1996, Do, 1994), with its basic aims being: developing a multi-sectoral economy; shifting the economy from the bureaucratic planned centralised and State-subsidised mechanism to the socialist-oriented market economy under State management; opening the diversified and multilateral economy as well as enhancing foreign economic efficiency on the basis of expanding economic co-operation to the countries in the region and all over the world; democratising all fields of the socio-economic life, implementing administration reforms and building a state governed by law (Fforde, 1997, Dang, 1996).

Over the next two decades, China was also reforming its own economy and also moving towards acceptance as a market economy, which meant the the focus of their own cooperation with Vietnam now had to chiefly be set alongside their policies for economic development.

Chinese Economic Development

For China the policy stemmed from its earlier opening up and improved d�tente with the US, through initially ‘ping pong’ diplomacy and the visit of President Nixon, but gaining its main point of departure from centrally controlling the economy with the decision in 1978 of the Chinese Communist party to reject Maoist ideas and policies. For both China and Vietnam the ideology of Communism was being replaced by the practical demands of economics and development. Communism gradually became merely a mechanism for maintaining government rather than a set of principles based on ideology. But the process for both countries has been difficult and it has been over two decades before both countries are recognised as having ‘free markets’ by the international community. Nevertheless, what is certain is that Vietnam’s identity as a ‘communist’ country, its shared borders with China and the social, cultural and political links built up between China and Vietnam means that Vietnamese development cannot be examined in isolation from China. In some ways it is that they are like two brothers in different rooms but living in the same house. What happens in the ‘house’ (South East Asia) is directly linked to the futures of both brothers.

Thus, we can see that Chinas development and acceptance not as a ‘rogue’ state or the ‘evil empire’ but a trusted and respected member of the international community is aligned with the same process for Vietnam. China normalized its own diplomatic relations with the ASEAN countries in 1991 and became a member of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting- AMM. By 1996 China was a full Dialogue Partner and after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 all the countries in the Asian region was very aware that China was vital to the future development of themselves. The Asian crisis was handled by China in a benevolent mode and demonstrated that they were concerned not only for their welfare but the welfare of their Asian partners. Khanh (2007) notes that for China ‘every country was a friend’ and it began to contribute to expanding international cooperation by recommending the Asian crisis be followed by the formation of a Asian Monetary Fund. The military threat of China to its neighbours was dealt with by a new ‘smile’ diplomacy and the increased participation of China in actively trying to control military aggression through international organisations and peaceful means. This was demonstrated by its signing of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) in 1996 and the active participation in creating bilateral relations with its Asian partners that promoted peace and dialogue (Khanh, 2007). By 1999 the partnership between Vietnam and China and its format for developing greater links was summed up in an official description containing sixteen words ‘friendly neighbourliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability, towards the future'(Sam, 2009). China’s own economy was rapidly developing and the USD 8.3 million of ASEAN-China trade in 1991 had become USD 15.85 by 1996 and USD 80 million by 2003. Thus, for any country in the South East Asian region, good relations between China and themselves was vital and it was clearly time for deeper brotherly love’ rather than hate between China and Vietnam.

Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty

Obviously the first area of most crucial need for cooperation and dialogue was on border and sovereignty issues. In 1994, China and Vietnam established a specific ‘discussion’ forum for debates between the two sides on territorial issues (Thayer, 2008, p3). Its first major success from this was the signing of a land border treaty. The Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty (LBT), settled many differences over the demarcation of much of the 1,400 km border. This was joined later in 2000 by the signing of an Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf and Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Beibu Gulf.

The movement towards diplomatic agreement was being promoted on the basis that the end of the Cold War had brought about a new international environment where resolution of disagreements through force was no longer acceptable and that border nations needed to find the similarities between them and try to avoid the differences. As Vietnam’s Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung told Chinese Foreign Minister in 2008 ‘The mountains and rivers of Vietnam and China are adjacent, cultures similar, ideologies shared and destinies interrelated’ (Thuy, 2009, p.8).

But past episodes of violent confrontation was not easily forgotten and the LBT could not progress immediately into trying to solve the major territorial issues, so the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared they would proceed by solving problems through the principle of ‘tackle the easy things first, leave the difficult ones later'(Thuy, 2009, p.8). The brotherly love between the two was to be fostered by ‘mutual complement, mutual benefit and win-win solutions’. Thus, the very basis of the talks was not about either one side or the other gaining an advantage or ‘winning’ but rather leaving alone completely the issues that could not yet be solved and concentrating on issues that were easy to find a solution to (Thuy, 2009).

However, in the first few years the LBT development was slow and at times dangerous as minor clashes and the clearing of the landmines of both sides led to numerous deaths among soldiers and workers. Alongside this was the fact the terrain itself was difficult to demarcate and the border clashes of the late 1970s had meant there was considerable confusion on where the actual ‘border’ lay (Thuy, 2009, p.11). The problems led to the two sides establishing a Joint Committee for Demarcation of the Land Border in 2000, and annual meetings took place to arrive at incremental decisions on where the border lay and who was responsible for clearing landmines, and providing border posts, signs, etc. The decisions were finally collated into one document when in 2007 the ‘Border Control Regulation’ was agreed (Thuy, 2009,, p.12). However, despite the high-level political agreement, there was severe public criticism of the agreements, especially from overseas Vietnamese. The Government was finally forced to react by Foreign Minister Phung declaring that opposition was ‘groundless’ and the agreements ensured ‘fairness’ and ‘satisfaction’ on both sides (Thuy, 2009, p.14).

The Paracel and Spratly Islands

The territorial disputes over the South China Seas has also been significantly resolved through cooperative agreements between the Chinese and Vietnamese, although the bi-lateral talks had been under-pinned both cooperation of both countries with forums within ASEAN. This is inevitable if talks are to be successful as the South China Seas problem is not one limited to their bi-lateral relations and territorial claims, as equally strong claims are made by adjacent countries like Malaysia and the Philippines. But the discovery of large oil and gas reserves and the subsequent interest of the major oil international oil companies gave fresh impetus to searching for a solution.

In 2005 the need for political agreement was made clear as the Vietnam Petroleum Corporation (PetroVietnam) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation made their own agreement to begin joint exploration of the region. Yet again it was economics that was dominating politics as the potential riches of the future made agreement on territorial sovereignty vital, or at least agreement not to disagree at the moment (Thayer, 2008 p.17-19).

British Petroleum (BP) became involved in 2007 , pledging USD 2 billion for investment in exploration in the region, an investment neither China or Vietnam would have received if they had not first agreed to cooperate between themselves in the region. However, Vietnam continued to claim the dominate right over vital areas of the territory, especially the Spratly and Paracel islands, and strongly declared that territorial sovereignty in these areas was not only through Vietnamese laws, but also ‘international laws’, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea. Even in the last couple of years the dispute has stood on the brink of breaking out into war as Chinese warships have attacked Vietnamese boats and killed fishermen on a number of occasions (Thayer, 2008, p.20). Equally dangerous are the claims by the Chinese that Vietnamese vessels have attacked and killed Chinese fishermen in the same area.

The “Boat People”

Following the end of the war with America and unification of Vietnam many overseas Chinese fled the country as a result of policies of the new Vietnam government. Many fled by sea alongside Southern Vietnamese ‘collaborators’ and groups that felt they would either be killed or ‘re-educated’ by the Communists of the North. These became collectively known as the ‘boat people’. The reduction in actual overseas Chinese in Vietnam actually lessened to some extent the friction between Vietnamese authorities and the Chinese, but in the first years following the war the Vietnam government could see the only sure way of problems with their own remaining Chinese Diaspora was to get them to declare their first allegiance to Vietnam. As mentioned earlier in the dissertation the policy chosen was to issue regulations forcing the Chinese in Vietnam to renounce their Chinese identity and become fully fledged Vietnam citizens. Re-education policies were amongst the strategies to bring the Chinese into line and subsequently even more fled the country until the census of 1999 shown that a mere 1% of the population identified themselves as Chinese, although they are still the 6th largest minority group in Vietnam and by 2004 they were believed to still control 22% of the Vietnam economy (Gernet, 2006).

The Chinese community was still seen as the ‘backbone’ of the capitalist sector in Vietnam and post-1975 was thus, seen as the most likely source of resistance to the new Vietnam governments ‘sovietisation’ of the economy (Carino, 1980). Although the government tried to convince the Chinese that the new economic measures were not specifically directed at the Chinese, they felt otherwise and many fled. The war in Kampuchea and the clashes on the border only increased the distrust of the Vietnamese of the Chinese and subsequently the fear of the Chinese of the Vietnamese. Carino (1980, p.154 noted that ‘By the end of 1978 and early 1979, Vietnam’s Chinese problem had begun to hit Asian shores as un-seaworthy junks crammed with ethnic Chinese left Vietnam. For all of these refugees, political and economic conditions in Vietnam had reached a point where flight seemed the best and only solution’. However, in 1986, Doi Moi meant not only a change in economic policies but also led to a different attitude towards the Chinese, whose traditional flair for successful capitalism in Vietnam could be seen as a vital asset to the countries future development. In the next chapter we will see how that has manifested itself so that the Chinese-Vietnam friendship has helped produce an economic ‘miracle’ for the Vietnam economy.

Chapter 7

Sino-Vietnam relations- development, partnership and agreement

The relations between China and Vietnam are often symbolised by the concept of ‘brotherhood’ and thus there is a suggestion that the two are somehow inevitably linked beyond something more than inter-state relations or geographical neighbourhood. This dissertation proposes that history is the main source of this ‘closer’ relationship than one would for instance apply to Sino-Soviet or Sino-India relations where there is also a long shared history and adjacent borders. A thousand years of colonialism plus partnership in war against France, Japan and the US, added to the support for the overthrow of Chinese Nationalists by Mao’s Communist Red Army has produced a merging of not only the politics of the two countries, but also the culture, religion, traditions and destinies. In this chapter we look at the present state of affairs and see that the ‘love’ for each brother is presently far more than the levels of ‘hate’ although there still remains the potential for the two countries to again face each other in open warfare.

Economic Cooperation and Sino-Vietnam relations

China has become the largest economy in Asia and now is challenging even the well-developed economies of the US and Europe. In line with the growth of the Chinese economy there has been an increasing profitable trade relationship between Vietnam and China. For example, the total import-export value of trade in 2000 was USD 3 million but had grown to USD 10.4 billion by 2006. An average growth of this trade today of over 33 per cent means that China is now Vietnam’s number one trading partner, overtaking the long time leader for this position- Japan (Ha and Sam, 2009, p.3). By 2008 import-export value was nearly USD 18 billion. However, nearly USD 14 billion of that were imports from China and the trade balance is definitely in favour of China (ibid). China imports are cheaper and more plentiful, so trade continues the historic structure of China being the ‘big brother’ and Vietnam the ‘small one’.

However, despite the ‘close’ relationship it is surprising that China’s FDI record in Vietnam is up to now very poor, with them investing only USD 2,198 million of Vietnam’s total FDI of USD 150 billion. With a mere 1% of the total FDI, Vietnam hopes Chinese investment interest in Vietnam will grow significantly over the next few years (ibid, p.4).

The border between China is a vital economic link between the two nations and has provided means to contribute significantly to the growth of the Vietnam economy. Cooperative agreements to build a better transport infrastructure on the border and open new trading centres has significantly contributed toward reduction of poverty levels, especially amongst formerly isolated communities in the border regions. Meanwhile, the easier access to Vietnam has helped increase the rich rewards from Chinese tourism as shown in 2004 when 778,000 Chinese visited Vietnam and 167,700 Vietnamese travelled to China. Improved customs procedures as well as special treatment for tourists from both countries applying for visas has meant that the trend is growing rapidly and providing a rich source of new funds for the Vietnam economy. The economic exchanges have become vital to both states and this was recognised in establishing a joint agreement specifically to deal with promoting more trade on the borders between the two countries. The policy ‘Two Corridors, One Economic Belt’ was established in 2004 and was aimed at jointly dealing with development in ethnic and low-developed rural and mountainous areas (Thuy, 2008, p.20-24).

This was a significant step forward as in the past these tribes were fostered by either side to ferment conflict with the enemy and now they are jointly being supported to provide benefits for both China and Vietnam. This is sure to remove one of the factors that have contributed in the past to the outbreak of violence in the border areas. The benefits of this economic partnership created through the new policies were extended to the Tonkin Gulf as the Two Corridors policy promotes the same cooperation between ports on the coast lines of Vietnam and China. The new policies are not merely concerned with economic matters as they are designed to promote improvements in the security and social stability of the border areas through ‘dynamic development’ (Thuy, 2009, p.23).

The Two Corridors, One Economic Belt policy

The ‘Two Corridors, One Economic Belt’ (TCOEB) is a reflection of the ‘schizophrenic’ relationship between Vietnam and China. It is also an example how a dispute between two states can be simultaneously the subject of policies that follow both realist and liberalist approaches. While China is sending nuclear submarines into the South China Seas and warships that are firing on Vietnamese boats, and the Vietnamese have a strong military presence on the borders to match the equally threatening large numbers of Chinese troops, the two countries are also negotiating through economic forums and reaching ground-breaking agreements to promote closer friendship, trade and cooperation in the same two disputed territorial regions. While the ‘hate’ of the first policies are threatening to break out in warfare, the later policies are gradually making it impossible for them to ignore the economic costs of any fresh conflict between them. Vice Director of the Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investments, Nguyen Ba An, declared that Vietnam and China would cooperate to ensure that there was a focus on opening up the border with ‘speeding up of the cooperation on building socio-economic infrastructure networks, including expressways, rail routes, seaports, power plants, telecommunications networks, wastewater treatments plants and the infrastructure of the border areas’ (Thuy, 2008, p.25). Trade alone on the border areas has increased from USD 30 million in 1991 to USD 15.85 billion in 2007. The ‘two brothers’ would seem to not be able to afford to resort back to the antagonisms of the past, and have created an economic reason for both sides to avoid forcing their historical territorial rights on each other.

Although the borders are relatively free from the problems of terrorism, a significant problem is present in crime. Smuggling of goods and people, prostitution networks involving women and children and gambling threatens the social security of both nations. Thus, Vietnam and China are finding themselves combining and cooperating to counter these illegal activities which are given added incentive by the opening up of the border areas. Aids, drug addiction and the trafficking of women and children tends to be problems that ignore borders and the police of Vietnam and China find that they need to increase cooperation to counter the worrying impact that the growth in these crimes have on their public health and social stability . An equally serious problem has been the need for more cooperation to counter the environmental problems of fast economic development, for example, the oil, soil and water pollution brought about by incorrect use of pesticides and fertilizers, and the illegal trade in timber and forest products (Ha and Sam, 2009, p.25-30).

Thus, despite the history of political and military rivalry between Vietnam and China, the growth in economic prosperity and the insensitive to increase the growth through cooperation has meant that the two Asian ‘brothers’ have increasingly combined and agreed to work together to solve the problems and improve the potential of all new economic activities. Underpinning this has been the improvement in diplomatic relations.

Diplomatic /politics

Chinese Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr Son Quoqiang summarises the diplomatic relations between Vietnam and China as being successful because they are based on three major foundations: ‘mutual respect and understanding, equality and mutual benefit and an emphasis on main common goals'(Vietnam News ‘China confirms cooperative relations with Vietnam.’ Jan 1st 2010). In 2009, the two countries saw 286 senior ministerial delegations’ visit each other and trade reach over USD 20 billion. On November 18th 2009 the signing of three final accord on the settlement of demarcation issues on the border areas and the ending of 35 years of negotiations was marked as a major success for diplomatic relations between Vietnam and China.

The success of the border negotiations has added fresh impetus and encouragement to reach agreement on the South China Seas. But in contrast to the border issues, Vietnam and China have chosen the ASEAN as the forum to reach agreement through the Declaration of Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the East Sea. There is no doubt that this is because China and Vietnam are not the only South East Asia countries laying numerous claim of sovereignty over parts of the South China Seas.

However, Thayer (2006. P.25) finds that diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam are a ‘mix of engagement, omni-enmeshment and hedging strategies towards China’. The meaning of this is that the merging of the realities of development and the need for cooperation is encouraging China and Vietnam to become close partners in a number of economic and social sectors, yet history and its legacy of uncertainty over border issues and sovereignty mean the Sino-Vietnam relationship can sometimes only move forward in a slow and sometimes suspicious manner. There is a need to cooperate but not all the memories of perceived ‘betrayal’ and conflict can be forgotten. It is also an example of the Asian culture of both nations, which is by its nature suspicious and slow to trust the motives of others.

What is also clear is that Vietnam and China try to find international forums within which to institutionalise their diplomatic relations. As Thayer notes ‘China is one of ASEAN dialogue partners’ and has promoted the relations between Vietnam, ASEAN and China by institutionalising their relations through ‘strategic partnership involving annual summit meetings of heads of state/government, the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee, ASEAN- China Senior Officials Meeting process, ASEAN-China political-security consultations, ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the South China Sea and other mechanisms’ (p.250.

However, despite the closeness of relations with China and the affinity borne from shared culture, ideologies and history, Vietnam is aware that it also has to keep a degree of distance and independence from China. As the Deputy Head of Vietnam’s National assembly External Relations Committee said, ‘everyone knows that we have to keep a fine balance, neither leaning over toward the United States or bowing to China’ (Thayer, 2008, p.25). Thus, the Vietnam Minister, Nong Duc Manh focuses on the main methods of continuing improvement in diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam, and declares they should be through constant dialogue and communication and agreement to ‘build an exchange and co-operation mechanism between concerned agencies of the two Parties…and foster an effective cooperation mechanism between foreign ministries and agencies, national defence, public security and security forces’ (Thayer, 2008, p.24).

Social/ cultural

The relationship between China and Vietnam goes far beyond just diplomatic ties. China and Vietnam are successfully sharing in a variety of cultural and social activities to promote partnership and friendship. As Thuy (2008, p.20) notes, there is ‘cooperation in the fields of education, training, sports and culture… and every year, China receives a considerable number of Vietnamese students, interns and sports delegations for study and training. At the same time Chinese experts and trainers come to Vietnam to help’. Regular cultural exchanges occur and in addition to this the identification of Vietnam as a prime destination for Chinese tourists is fully established with their number increasing significantly each year. It is clear that the Chinese find a warm welcome in Vietnam and the climate of socialism, Confucianism and shared likes and dislikes in food, entertainment, culture and habits provides an environment that they feel safe and relaxed in. Chinese investment is increasing in supporting the arts and literature in Vietnam, building and running galleries and museums and sharing the everyday cultural experience of being two ‘close brothers’. The hatreds and problems of the past may now be largely a thing of the past, but as we see in the conclusion, there still remain some points of dispute and concern that could mean the brotherly love turns to hate again in the future.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The transition of Vietnam’s economy in 1987 (through Doi Moi) and China from 1978 onwards (with a policy of rejection of Maoist policies) towards free market economies might also be seen as a substantial plus for liberalism against the realists in international relation theory. Subsequently, the major reasons for the growth in friendly partnership and relations between China and Vietnam might also be seen as evidence of economics over military power. Economic development has seen China develop its military might and easily have the power to solve many of its problems with Vietnam through force. And yet, the last two decades have seen far more efforts to peacefully solve disputes within international organisations and political d�tente.

Acceptance by the international community and entry into the global free market has been critical to both China and Vietnam in ensuring their economic development. Both rejected the principles of pure Communism and moved away from strict Marxist-Leninist ideology to ‘market socialism (White, 1993) and in the process largely reject the solution of territorial disputes by force. However, history cannot be totally rejected and the psyche’s of both nations and governments are still shaped by a history of conflict and confrontation which has left some degree of distrust remaining about the intentions towards each other of each partner (Ha, 2007).

Thus, whilst the leaders of both countries meet and agree through diplomatic channels peaceful solutions to economic and political problems, there are still regular incidents where the armed forces of each country meet, for instance in the South China Seas, and quickly descend into open warfare. Fortunately the incidents so far are only minor and deaths (although almost solely suffered on the part of the Vietnamese side) are kept to a minimum, which means that the ‘two brothers’ can quickly return to peacefully talking about and solving the problems between them.

One of the ‘bonds’ between these two brothers is Communism. But it is a very different and dynamic form of Communism to the past. Through their policies of reform both countries are redefining on the same lines what Communism is and moving towards economic liberalism in a socialist form, where all disputes are solved through negotiation and the most important policy to protect and defend is economic development rather than a realist based military hegemony. White, (1993) talks about it being a movement towards a form of Keynesianism, where capitalism and its focus on the interests of the capitalist has also to be mediated by a government’s concern not only for the rich, but also for the poor. It is capitalism with elements of socialism in its policies.

A major factor taken into account in discussing disputes is what the economic cost could be of the two brothers fighting each other rather than defending the principle of sovereignty over particular areas of territory (Ha, 2007, Khanh, 2007). However, as areas like the South China Seas increase in importance as new resources such as oil and gas are discovered, it becomes possible that sovereignty over territory and the principle of defending it could mean that a dispute falls into open warfare because of economics.

As Storey (2008, p.1) warns ‘Among the 10 members of ASEAN, Vietnam’s relationship with the PRC is without question the most complicated, multifarious, tense, and conflict-prone’ , and he stresses that from ‘from Vietnam’s perspective, it is also the most laden by historical baggage. Two millennia of Chinese overlordship–first as a formal part of the Chinese empire from the first century BC to 938 AD, then as a tributary state until 1885, combined with an intense relationship over the past 60 years characterized by periods of amity and enmity, have shaped Vietnam’s China psyche to be almost schizophrenic’. The main point is that economic development, especially in the sense of access to energy resources such as oil and gas supplies, is now very much related to the historical dispute over sovereignty of the South China Seas islands, and that both ‘brothers’ are beginning to see a clear zero-sum calculation where ‘ownership’ of the territory could decide the economic future of either nation.

International security experts (Brown, 2009)also fear that the disputes in the South China Seas are not only linked to economics but are part of a new global military strategy of China where they seek increased military power and want to dominate the seas through positioning of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). As one expert, Richard Fisher stated ‘China wants] to make it into a heavily protected territorial zone for the operation of SSBNs until such a time as Taiwan comes to provide a better base for SSBN operations,” said Fisher. “China may base up to half of its nuclear missiles on SSBNs, meaning that China will only settle for dictating future regimes for the SCS’. (Brown, 2009, p.2). Such a scenario will not be acceptable on either political, military or economic grounds for Vietnam and their commitment to defend their own sovereignty of the South China Seas is one they will defend at all costs (Storey, 2008).

Both of the above views of China (namely that it wants to use its economic might to increase its military power and seek domination of the region, and the idea that it will seek to enforce sovereign aspirations over territory to ‘capture; the regions rich resources of oil and gas) may be based on foreign misconception of the Chinese intentions. But international relations history is full of examples of major wars started through misconceptions of the opponents’ intentions. History is the primary resource for trying to understand the relationship between Vietnam and China, and the Century’s have witnessed a constant movement back and forwards from close friendship reaching almost brotherly love proportions to being mortal enemies. At times the hatred has resulted in vicious war, while in other periods the friendship has seen Vietnam assume many of the religious, cultural and social habits of the Chinese.

Both Vietnam and China share many major challenges in the future, not least in the fact that they are one-Party ruled states still aligning with Communist ideology and still remain to a degree separate, or at least significantly ‘different’ from the rest of the international society. They seem sure to remain Communist for the immediate future, as that maintains their stability and security (which is essential to attracting economic investment), whilst the rest of the region suffers new threats to their stability in the age of the ‘war on terror’.

They are also both enjoying unprecedented levels of constant economic growth, even while a major part of the rest of the world suffers from the recent ‘financial crisis’ of the banks and insurance companies. Whilst the times are ‘good’ and there is prosperity and wealth to be shared out, the brothers are less likely to fall out and argue. However, the world still fears a future of scarce supplies of oil, gas and energy and the dispute in the South East Asia region could quickly switch to outright confrontation if a time comes when energy supplies are critical to the survival of either state.

The growth in crime, smuggling, prostitution and various other activities on the border could also become a major element of controversy between the states. If one is seen to try to export the problem to the other state or dilute efforts to prevent, detect and punish the problems, the potential is there for the ‘friendship’ to again become conflict. However, with both economies improving, the problems left over from history being solved through negotiation and diplomacy and the two states enjoying more benefits from friendship than costs, the two brothers are likely to continue a loving partnership, rather than hating each other and being determined to fight each other to the death.

It is clear that the China-Vietnam relationship has been vital to the development of Vietnam and that future success in developing the economy of Vietnam relies on maintaining a close friendship with the Chinese. For example, in economics, generous aid support provides needed funds to reform the structures of the economy and relieve the still present levels of unacceptable poverty, while partnership in ASEAN provides stability and security to the South East Asian region.

The geographical position of Vietnam means that it is seen as a ‘backdoor’ into China whilst also providing China with an alternative route into economies such as the EU (Tran Khanh, 2008, p.1-5). The China and Vietnam relationships is especially important as the political stability of the South East Asian region is upset by conflicts in neighbouring states such as Indonesia and Thailand and Vietnam remains an ‘island’ of peace in the present era of problems with Islamic fundamentalism and the ‘war on terror’. Vietnam is almost unique in being a South East Asian nation free from the problems of Islamic fundamentalism, whereas even China has increasing problems with its Islamic diasporas, such as with the Uyghur in Urumqi. However, that stability is threatened by the underlying problems that still exist over territorial disputes on the border and in the South China Seas, especially the Spratly islands, and the still problematic relationship over Cambodia.

Socially the existence of a large Chinese diasporas, which has helped complement the cultural development of the Vietnamese, such as in the food, the art and the literature of Vietnam, also remains an historical area of contention, with many Vietnamese fearing that the Chinese diasporas is an ever present ‘fifth column’ in Vietnam waiting to support any Chinese aspirations in Vietnam.

History and present relations show China providing financial support in Vietnam to build and run cinemas, libraries and museums, and cultural exchanges to develop further numerous areas of the arts and educational partnerships to develop science, technology and friendship (Do Tien Sam, 2008, p.1-10) . The social, economic and cultural links between China and Vietnam grow increasingly stronger and it now seems they both may enjoy the benefits of ‘tiger’ economies, with the shared rewards of development ensuring the Sino-Vietnam relationship becomes a major positive feature of the global economy.

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