Poor Governance and Civil War in Syria
Introduction
The nature of war has changed markedly in recent decades. While interstate wars have largely decreased, intrastate conflicts have dramatically increased (Cortright, 2008), in a point that civil wars around the world since 1945 have killed approximately 20 million people and displaced at least 67 million (Collier, 2005). As Smith put it, the new paradigm is “war amongst the people” (Smith, 2008, p. 3), in where the communities divided by ethnicity, language, religion and geography (Harbom, Högbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006). Despite this massive scale of human misery resulted from civil war, the academic community has not concentrated much attention on the problem of civil war. The urgency to prevent genocide, oppression, and terrorism has started a new wave of actions and inquiries, and has increasingly led to search for ways to prevent and resolve civil war.
In contrast with the Cold War era in which power concentration was one of its main characteristics, in the post-cold war era we are witnessing diffusion of power, creation of multipolar/nonpolar order which have caused international system to be fluctuated and transitional. In such a new era, ability and will of great powers for direct engagement in regional affairs has been decreased and consequently has provided regional/newly emerging powers with more space for playing active role in the regions. In this situation, regional powers are converted to new active actors and try to promote their power and influence in the regional context. This situation is resulted in “order- lack of order”, “stability- instability”, and “prosperity and collapse” in the regions. Where regional order is not stablished, the main part of regional powers potentialities is allocated to avert each other actions which pave the way for collapsing regional states and growth of terrorism and fundamentalism.
In such a context, situation in the Middle East is more complicated. From political and geopolitical perspective the US is not intended to engage in the region directly. The following power vacuum is resulted in regional powers rivalries, and they neither have power resources to stablish their desired single hegemony, nor needed capacity for regional cooperation to create a corporative regional order. This situation along with poor governance have paved the way for growth of fundamentalism, terrorism and collapse of weak states.
Syria where is rife with massive popular protests, cross-border fighting, armed insurgencies, exploding car bombs and where of the 18 % reported armed conflicts in 2013 were in this region (Armed Conflict Report, 2014), provides an important and rich area of investigation into the study of civil war. Some have tried to address the causes of political instabilities in general, and in the Middle East, in particular. They focus on the different factors ranging from foreign intervention (Albornoz & Hauk, 2014) to economic factors (Djankov & Reynal-Querol, 2010; Sambanis, 2005) as the motives of the civil war. Some believes that the rise in terrorist activities and civil wars coincided with the US invasion of Iraq which created large power vacuums in the country allowing different factions to surface and become violent. But we believe that this is a trigger factor allowing different factions to surface, and it is not the root cause of the civil war in the region. As Andrew Heywood (2011) put it the political instability in the Middle East can be traced back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. This led to the establishment of UK and French ‘mandates’ over Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and what became Iraq. This on the one hand, bred a sense of humiliation and disgrace, and also resulted in political borders that reflected the interests of western powers and showed no regard for the facts of history, culture and ethnicity, and from the other hand resulted in the installation of authoritarian and corrupt governments which is resulted in a general weak governance all around the region. This paper complements theoretical and empirical literature by developing a systematic investigation of the role of poor governance as a determinant cause of civil war in Syria. Regarding this factor the article illuminates how poor governance has led to the civil war in Syria.
Research Method
The paper is intended to investigate why and how civil war in Syria was triggered. In doing so, after reviewing the existing civil war theories, we further a theoretical framework to study the civil war in Syria, which is the paper innovation. In order to investigate the whys roots of civil war in Syria we use governance characteristics. Also, we consider regional effects and international relations situation to understand when and how the civil war was triggered. In recent research, governance is assumed as a determinant cause, and regional effects and the nature of international system as effective factors.
Civil War Theories
Klem and Frerks (Klem & Frerks, 2008) argue that three major schools of thought can be discerned on the root causes of violent conflict: the cultural school, the economic school, and the political regime school. The cultural school argues that the root causes of civil war are rooted in cultural difference. Ethnic nationalism is often seen as the main source of group cohesion and intergroup war; of 709 ethnic groups identified around the world approximately 100 had engaged in the wars against the state during 1945 to 1998 (Fearon, 2006). In this view, ethnic groups rebel because they harbor grievances arising from discrimination by ethnic majorities (Connor, 1994; Horowitz, 1985). Also, “modernist” theories highlight this point of view and emphasize that ethnic conflicts arises when these groups are socially and politically excluded to experience economic modernization (Gellner & Breuilly, 2008), and finally this situation leads to civil war with the promise of shifts in future power (Powell, 2006).
This school of thought is poor to address all of the civil wars, and have some deficiencies. Ethnic, cultural and religious fractionalization cannot be as the cause of civil war, in itself. A reason that there are many states around the world with different ethnic, cultural and religious groups, but have not had experienced civil war. These cleavages should be inconsistent with other factors (i.e. low income, exclusiveness, poor governance) to act as a driving force in civil war.
The economic school describes the civil war based on economic factors like rebels seeking economic gain and low income. The first one is called insurrection as competition for resources which was presented by Trygve Haavelmo (Haavelmo, 1954). This theory considers two rivalry parties, a rebel group and a government, that compete for resources. The absence of resources in this situation means that “there is a smaller pie to fight over” (Blattman & Miguel, 2010) which makes the war sever. The second, low-income is another economic factor which has had prominent place in civil war theories. Collier et al. (Collier, 2003) showed that low-income countries are prone to risk of civil war 15 times higher than the OECD countries. Many contemporary civil wars also have taken place in ‘weak’ states (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Collier, 2005), and commonly poverty attributes to civil war. Indeed, the correlation between low per capita incomes and higher inclination to internal war is one of the strongest empirical relationships in the civil war literature (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).
The economic theories of civil war are under question from two points of view: firstly, they have linear approach to the civil war, and do not present a theoretical frame to understand how and when the civil war is occurred. An understanding of how and when the civil war is occurred helps us to identify
the states which are prone to the civil war. Secondly, these theories do not present a solution to settle the ongoing and future possible civil wars.
To the political regime school, the root of violent conflict lies in the lack of democracy and in the absence of mechanisms to address the problems existed between different groups in society. In this view, a functioning, pluralistic, and mature democracy is an essential component of perpetual peace, regarding that a freely and just competitive electoral process provide an alternative to use violence to express grievances or achieve political goals (Evans, Lane, Turner, & Pealer, 2013). Thus, democracy is a powerful form of nonviolent dispute settlement (Kinsella & ROUSSEAU, 2009). Democracy can provide a system in that marginalized groups can voice their opinions. The equity that a deep democracy can provide would be solution to prevent particular ethnic, religious, or social groups’ inclusion, which consequently supports peace by alleviating the potential resentment and fear that minority groups may have toward the majority (Evans et al., 2013).
Although the political regime school is rich to address the root causes of civil war, but it has some limitations. First, international relations scholars have questioned the empirical validity of this claim that democracies do not often experience civil conflict. Second, democracies can settle the peace provided that it has the following characteristics: 1) it should grantee the minority groups’ rights and wills; 2) being accountable and transparent; 3) grantee of the mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society; 4) providing processes and institutions which meet the needs of society; 5) providing a system that grantee the rule of law. To the some extent these characteristics are correspond with good governance characteristics.
Existing civil war theories are poor to address why, how and when the civil war is occurred. These three schools would be essentially seen complementary, and only a combination of socio-cultural, political and economic reasons can explain the root causes of civil war. Governance has the potential of combination of the three schools, and can provide us with a comprehensive theoretical framework. Regarding that governance refers to various ways through which social life is coordinated, good governance can underpin peace.
Governance: a framework to study civil war
There is a shift from government to governance (Heywood, 2011), and the cause of the shift lies in the benefits of good governance in facing with the political, social and economic challenges. The World Bank and other multilateral development funds focus on transparency and accountability, regulatory reform, and public sector skills and leadership -namely on economic institutions and public sector management- as good governance indicators. Other organizations, like the United Nations are more likely to highlight aspects of political governance including democracy and human rights which avoided by the World Bank. The European Union defines the following indicators as crucial to a complete understanding of governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (Kardos, 2012). Also, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific characterize good governance indicators as follows: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency and accountability. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of the society (Sheng, 2008). While principles, such as accountability, efficiency, transparency or the rule of law belong to the administrative core, respect for human rights, participation and democratization belong to the political core. While some focus on the administrative core to the proper functioning of the state administration and the regulative framework (Kardos, 2012), other authors highlight the element of democracy, as a key variable for good governance (Neumayer, 2005). Despite numerous definitions by various organizations, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific present the most applicable framework for reliable and appropriate assessment of governance, because combine political, social and economic cores. The following section focus on governance in Syria.
Poor governance in Syria
This section investigates good governance in Syria. Based on United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, good governance has 8 major characteristics which will be applied on Syria to examine governance situation.
Participation is one of the 8 major characteristics of good governance. Although participation is essential to good governance (Sheng, 2008), representative democracy and holding election as such do not make a country democratic. The most obvious evidence is that in single-party governments, more than 99% of the votes are cast in favor of the ruling party (Rose, 2000). Participation needs to be informed and organized which means freedom of association and expression and an organized civil society (Sheng, 2008). Table 1 and 2 show voter turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections in Syria.
Good governance requires just legal frameworks and also full protection of human rights, and in particular minorities rights (Sheng, 2008). The rule of law and separation of powers shows how power is exercised, disputes are settled and to what extent government is separate and is in concord with the legal system. Regarding that the rule of law helps to protect the rights of individuals, a country with a better functioning legal system is expected to resolve grievances, peacefully (IEP, 2014b). Because a country with the rule of law tends to accept non-violent mechanisms to settle conflicts, it supports peaceful responses to civil tensions. Since the rule of law requires the guarantee of individuals’ rights, it is also important to recognize its strong links with the acceptance of the rights of others. Hence, the rule of law requires both formal institutions and a culture supporting them (Mani, 1998). Table 3 shows the status of rule of law in Syria, from 1996 to 2014.
Transparency means that decisions are taken and enforced in accordance with rules and regulations (Sheng, 2008). Accurate and well-distributed information provide transparency of government decisions (IEP, 2014b). It also means that enough information in easily understandable forms is provided. Lack of transparency means corruption. As IEP findings shows, there is a correlation between low level of corruption and peace (IEP, 2014b), in other words the high level of corruption, the less level of peace. Figures 1 shows the level of corruption in Syria.
Voice and accountability entail the responsiveness of politicians to public concerns. IEP analysis supported this idea that countries which are more peaceful tend to also have a greater capacity for citizens to interact with government and hold it to account (IEP, 2014b). Accountability is required to good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law (Sheng, 2008). Accountability is hard to achieve without adequate access to information. Public accountability is founded on two pillars. The first pillar is related to accountability by the executive and the second pillar is based on institutional change. Accountability can be classified in four categories. These are public, financial, horizontal and vertical. Informal checks on these relat
ionships are reinforced by the civil society. Table 5 shows voice and accountability for Syria.
Good governance requires mediation of various interest groups in the society to reach a broad consensus which is a peaceful way to support all of the stakeholders’ interests. It also requires broad and long-term perspective on the requirements of sustainable human development and also strategies to achieve the objectives of such development (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003).
Consensus decision-making involves “identifying and addressing concerns, generating new alternatives, combining elements of multiple alternatives and checking that people understand a proposal or an argument” (Graham et al., 2003) that empowers minorities, those who have objections that are hard to state quickly. Table 6 shows Syria’s rank in democracy and also their score in civil liberties. Also, table 7 shows inclusions of minorities in Syria.
A society’s wellbeing depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, and in particular the most vulnerable have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being (Sheng, 2008). Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index and also freedom status show equity and inclusiveness in different countries. Tables 8 shows Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (2015), and table 9 shows freedom status in Syria.
Good governance means that processes and institutions meet the needs of society while making the optimal use of resources. The concept of efficiency also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment (Sheng, 2008). It also promotes efficient public delivery systems. One aspect of poor service delivery is corruption which can be alleviated by competitive salaries and motivating staff through incentives. Table 10 shows government effectiveness in Syria.
Discussion
Syria, a professed republic which has been long ruled by one family that enriches itself at the expense of the great majority of its people. When Bashar took power, the regime became even more of an Alawite and family affair. One brother, Maher, heads the Presidential Guard; a cousin on his mother’s side, Adnan Makhlouf, commands the Republican Guard; and two other cousins, Adnan and Muhammad al-Assad, are leaders of the Struggle Companies. Almost the only non-Alawite among them merely confirms the idea of a Ba’thist brat pack in power since he was Manaf Tlas, son of perennial defense minister and one of Hafiz’s oldest friends, Mustafa Tlas (Rubin, 2007).
What can be meant participation (factor 1) in such a state? This is a fact which that shows representative democracy cannot necessarily make a country democratic, and sheer attention to voter turnout can be misleading. Voter turnout have always been above 65 percent and 70 percent in Syrian parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively (IDEA, 2011) (see table 2). But, when voters are forced to elect the candidates from a pack which Bashar characterizes, when there is no civil society which support and protect democracy and control the state behavior, when there is no independent supervisory committee to monitor elections, and when there is no freedom (of speech, press etc.), elections cannot mean something more than demagoguery, and political show. Syria is a republic which is ruled by one family, and real democracy and participation threaten the ruling family.
The rule of law (factor 2) corresponds to civil harmony/tension. Because a country with the rule of law tends to accept non-violent mechanisms to settle conflicts, it supports peaceful responses to civil tensions. President in Syria Ba’th System is the source of law making. President can announce state of emergency (principle 101 of Syria Constitution (1973)), and make low (principle 111 of Syria Constitution (1973)). He is also the head of Supreme Judicial Council (principle 132 of Syria Constitution (1973)) which violate judicial independence.
Situation of rule of law in Syria shows a downtrend from 1996 to 2014 (see table 3). Syria lacks of such a mechanism. What began as a peaceful civil uprising inspired by the successful Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings in 2011 has long since devolved into a complex, protracted civil war fueled by an array of external interventions on all sides. Assad’s system neither provides just legal frameworks and full protection of human rights, nor a culture supporting rule of law.
In such a system, disputes are intended to be converted to complicated civil wars, and the ruling family is not intended to settle the conflict peacefully. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has consistently called the opposition forces confronting his government terrorists. Assad’s system response to the tension was aerial bombing as a counterinsurgency tactic which in view point of some scholars drives civilian populations to support the insurgents (Kocher, Pepinsky, & Kalyvas, 2011). Moreover, such tactics also have increased the number of attacks from insurgents, who respond to bombings in an effort to maintain their reputations for effectiveness. The result of this process has been lasting civil war in Syria.
Based on the IEP findings, there is a correlation between low level of corruption (factor 3) and peace (IEP, 2014b), in other words the high level of corruption, the less level of peace. In IEP’s 2014 Global Terrorism Index (IEP, 2014a) report it was found that the ten nations most impacted by terrorism were also more corrupt when compared to the global average. Transparency International (TI) (2014) reported that Syria is ranked in corruption perception index 159 out of 175 states survived by TI. In terms of control of corruption Syria’s score is about -1.0539, and it is ranked among highly corrupted states.
But how Assad’s system has responded to the problem? As Rubin (2007) put it as a substitute for reform, Bashar’s strategy was to enhance his credentials as a militant Arab nationalist, a fighter against Israel, defender of Islam, friend of revolutionaries, and sworn foe of America. This strategy is called “resistance.” “Resistance” is to battle against something, not to have any positive program of one’s own. The word means a reactionary effort to maintain an undesirable status quo. When in March 2001, Ba’th party members asked Syrian Vice-President Abd Halim Khaddam at a public meeting why the regime did not do more to solve the problems of corruption, incompetence and the slow pace of reform, his answer was that the Arab-Israeli conflict permitted no changes at home. Corruption actually has become an integral part of the system. Licenses to commit corruption are given to regime supporters. In Assad’s system corruption is not a disease but is one of the many antibodies the system uses to survive.
Voice and accountability (factor 4) describes how strongly the public is able to influence and participate in the decision making processes of government and the wider society. As it is emphasized Syria is ruled by one family, and participation in decision making process is only possible for persons who are from ruling Alawite family. The World Bank data for Syria in term of voice and accountability index during 1996 to 2014 show that the average value for Syria is -1.65 points with a minimum of -1.80 points in 2014 and a maximum of -1.33 points in 1996. Syria is ranked 187 out of 193 states.
After a long period of strife, Alawite, a despised minority group with a radical program, came to power. That group needed a doctrine which would justify not only its hold on power in Syria but also that state’s expansion to dominate its neighbors. History has shown that the easiest way to unite a people is inspiring
a common fear and hatred of others. In this situation, Assad’s system ascribe any deficiency to the enemy. The following statement reveals lack of voice and accountability in Assad’s system: “and your problem, the reason that life is not better, is not due to your government’s incompetence, greed, and oppression. Rather, your enemy is the imperialists and Zionists who are holding you back and want to destroy everything you have and enslave you. Therefore, to fight for your rights you must unite behind—not against–your dictator (Rubin, 2007, p. 26).
The level of voice and accountability can also be strongly dependent on how efficiently information flows between government and society. An example shows the depth of the disaster in Syria. When a New York Times correspondent in 2003 asked Bashar about the notorious
deal in which his cousin and business manager received a big bribe to give a mobile phone contract to a foreign company, the regime simply left this out when it translated the interview into Arabic. Of course, no Syrian newspaper dared mention either the deal or the omission (Rubin, 2007).
Good governance requires mediation of various interest groups in the society to reach a broad consensus (factor 5). Syria is a fragile ethno-religious entity that could easily unravel. The country’s population is divided among Sunni Arabs, Christians, Alawites, a Shiite offshoot, Druze, and various, mostly Sunni, ethnic minorities, primarily Turkmens, Kurds and Armenians (Carpenter, 2013). The Alawite Assad family has based its power for more than four decades on the solid loyalty of its religious bloc in a loose alliance with Christians, Druze, and, sometimes, one or more of the other smaller, ethnic groups. Alawite ruling family needed a doctrine which would justify not only its hold on power in Syria but also that state’s expansion to dominate its neighbors. On top of that, with its claim to Islam questionable such a regime would have to find some powerful ways to win support and control such a turbulent country. The strategy was inspiring a common fear.
For nation-building to occur, the ruling political elites of the state must represent a core group that is well defined and has a clear criterion of inclusion. Consensus making and inclusion of different interest groups is a prerequisite for nation-building. Exclusion of different interest groups threaten peace and may bring instability. Syrian Constitution (1973) do not have this potential of inclusion of different interest groups. Principle 1 in Syrian Constitution (1973) introduces Syria as an Arab state and ignore non-Arab nation living in Syria. Also, principle 4 characterizes Arabic as a formal language and do not recognize other languages. A prominent feature of the 2011–12 rebellion is a largely Sunni Arab bid to overthrow that “coalition of minorities” regime. In fact, civil war in Syria has emerged along an array of different cleavages including a repressed majority versus a dominant minority divide, with notable center-periphery tensions (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009; Fearon, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2011), and a secular-versus-religious/jihadist cleavage, which overlaps partly but not fully with the ideological cleavages, Baathist versus non-Baathist cleavage.
Beside of inclusiveness, equity (factor 6) is the other prerequisite for good governance. Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index shows the level of equity and inclusiveness. Based on the UNDP (2015) data, Syria is ranked in 149 in terms of Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index. As the data show Assad’s system could not stablish equity among different interest groups. The other factor which is in close relation with equity is freedom status. Equity without freedom cannot be stablished. Freedom House (2016) findings in terms of freedom status in Syria during 1990 to 2014 show that it is among least free states and is NOT a free state. Assad’s system has seen any request for freedom and equity as poison. Bashar defines freedom as having no “controls so that [foreign enemies] could blackmail any regime from the inside.” Economic reform really means, “They want us to open our markets” in exchange for very little in return. Cultural reforms mean the West wants Syrians “to get out of our skin and become a copy of them” (Rubin, 2007, p. 119).
The last factor in good governance is government effectiveness (factor 7). It means that government make the optimal use of resources in order to meet the needs of public. The World Bank data for Syria in term of effectiveness and efficiency index during 1996 to 2014 show that the average value for Syria is -0.99 points with a minimum of -1.44 points in 2014 and a maximum of -0.60 points in 2010. But how Assad’s system justify the government ineffectiveness is so interesting. “Your problem, the reason that life is not better, is not due to your government’s incompetence, greed, and oppression. Rather, your enemy is the imperialists and Zionists who are holding you back and want to destroy everything you have and enslave you (Rubin, 2007, p. 26). Judge us not by our economic performance or delivery of services, he says in effect, but by our steadfastness and intransigence (Ibid, p. 193). Blaming others for one’s troubles and believing that removal of this heavy external hand will allow quick and easy progress is Assad’s system strategy to keep holding power.
Conclusion
This article began with the observation that good governance is an important concept in search of civil war cause. To that end, this article makes two main contributions. First, it demonstrates that the state is the main but not the sole responsible for peace/war. Second, it makes a difference between causes and factors in civil war investigation.
Good governance indicators can guide us to find civil war causes. Looking at these indicators show: lack of free and fair elections, low level of rule of law, high level of corruption, lack of voice and accountability, exclusion of different interest groups, inequity and government ineffectiveness in Syria during the covered years. These indicators would be more meaningful when are investigated considering the factors like ethic and religious diversity, and the nature of regional and international systems.
Syria is a professed republic which has been long ruled by one family, passed down like a hereditary sinecure. It is largely controlled by a small group that enriches itself at the expense of the great majority of its people. When Bashar took power, the regime became even more of an Alawite and family affair. Assad’s system believes that a utopia could be built in the country by imposing a system of one ideology, one people, top-down rule, a planned economy, and a single party.
Bashar insists that reforms are poison for all Syrians. Foreign enemies is a discourse to excuse its own domestic shortcomings and justify its rule. Like his father Bashar is virtually indifferent to economic or social issues. He does not talk much about the need for education, better health, equality for women, or any other development issue. The sole message is the traditional one: the only problem is that evil forces are attacking the Arabs and Muslims, who must resist by all means possible. The solution, then, is not reform but resistance, not social change but struggle. In this situation, Arab Spring acted as a spark and civil war in Syria were started. Bashar al-Assad has consistently called the opposition forces confronting his government terrorists. Regional and international powers intervention has caused the war to be more complicated. The result is 6- year war, about 500 thousands causalities and displacement of about 8 millions.
The civil war in Syria will not be ended until a democratic state is stablished. Creation of a global alliance to fight against terrorism provided that the different forces fighting against terrorism in Syria are u
nited under the supervisory of the UN. Holding a free and fair elections under supervisory of the UN supervision committee can be the second step. The third step would be withdraw of regional and international states forces from Syria except for UN peacekeeping forces. Prosecution of war crimes perpetrators would be last but fair step.