The Persian Gulf region was a treasure trove of petroleum, and a strategic location as a western asset and a weak spot in the Containment perimeter. If the USSR gained entrance into the Gulf, they had the ability to break the lines of defense through disrupting Western communication and supply lines, specifically those of oil (Marsh, 3). In 1951, democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, and the Majlis (Iranian parliament) nationalized the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (AIOC). Mossadegh ran on the platform to rid Iran of all British constraints, and the AIOC was his first radical step. Soon after his election, British subjects were exiled (Moyara de Moraes, 467). These actions were in response to the British refusal to halt what the Iranians deemed “exploitation” of their national economy. British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill was particularly opposed to this Iranian action because after the recent loss of India, and the appearance of their empire unraveling, Iran was one of the final British strongholds (Kinzer, 1). Although, oil was not only a vital to the British economy, which was amidst reconstruction after the end of the second World War, but also the Iranian economy. Without oil revenues, the Iran would be condemned to economic demise, and the communist Tudeh party would exploit this opportunity to establish their rule (Marsh, 4-5). It appeared as if a hegemonic proxy confrontation was inevitable, the USSR vs. Great Britain.
The pawn in these war games was Mohammad Mossadegh, often described as a “royal blooded eccentric.” He was fond of melodramatics and often delivered pathos filled speeches, moving himself and his audience to tears. His heavy handed nationalism and unorthodox antics, such as conducting business from the comfort of his bed, made him somewhat of a spectacle to the Western world. In a 1951 visit to the United States, Newsweek reported that he was a “fainting fanatic”, and observed that many dismissed him as senile and unhinged, but was truly a shrewd, iron fisted ruler. TIME magazine elevated his celebrity by declaring him 1951’s “Man of the Year” (Kinzer,1). The American fascination with Mossadegh, and his peculiarity, manifested itself into a polarizing debate that would eventually result in the joint American-British 1953 coup d’etat: Operation Boot & Ajax.
The 1953 coup d’etat of democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in CIA led Operation Ajax should be considered the greatest failure of American Cold War politics due to the lasting impact on Iranian democratic conditions, as well as the effects on American relations with the Middle East from the 1950s through the 21st century. To delve deeper into the roots of the crisis, policy changes and continuities between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations must first be explored in relation to their Cold War policies in Iran. Moreover, the factors that led to the coup were the nationalization of the AIOC, Churchill’s grip to empire, and the all consuming hysterical fear of the proliferation communism. The combination of these factors led to the eventual 1953 coup, which gave way to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which in turn sparked subsequent decades of strained American relations with Iran, and the rest of the Middle East. This prompts the conclusion that Operation Ajax was one of the greatest failures of the Cold War because of the impact it had on the formation of a theocratic Iran, and the resulting strained American relations in the region.
President Harry S. Truman (1945-1952) maintained that the United States was to serve as a neutral mediator to aid in the search for a peaceful solution in the Persian crisis (Moyara de Moraes, 469-470). He did view it as a Cold War issue, but was not convinced that the USSR would actually take any military action in Iran itself, but rather would enable the Tudeh party to rise in the wake of economic collapse. Truman did initially attempt to maintain a sense of neutrality, acknowledging that British actions were both reckless, and enabled the potential for Iran to fall to communism. Truman’s proposed solution was improving socioeconomic conditions in Iran, a use of what is considered to be “soft power”. However, the foundation of President Truman’s policy was held in four basic assumptions in planning: (1) there is a dire need to work with western sympathizers within Iran by associating with Iranian nationalists and avoiding creating any association with imperialist motives (2) be sympathetic to British interests (3) avoid destabilizing Iranian markets (4) and avoid Soviet involvement in Iran at all costs (Marsh, 5). Additionally, the aforementioned Truman Doctrine can account for many of the thoughts the administration held regarding Iran and Mossadegh. In this doctrine, Truman maintained that the United States can no longer sit idly as the Soviets expanded totalitarianism into democratic nations, as it had evolved to become a matter of national security. Here, the United States committed itself to preserving democracy by all means necessary in the face of the encroaching Soviet Union (CITATION).
President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) , the successor to President Truman held the belief that the Persian crisis was to be dealt with on Cold War terms. His approach was heavily influenced by the growing red scare, as he feared an Iran without substantial oil revenue would collapse, thus creating a void that would be quickly filled by the communist Tudeh Party. To Eisenhower, this potential reality was not just a danger to Iran, but to the region at large (Moyara de Moraes, 468). It is crucial to note that Eisenhower agreed with the four aforementioned assumptions in attacking the Persian crisis, however the approach to implementing those assumptions into policy is where the two differed. Similar in concept to the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine was formally established 4 years after the coup in 1957. Although the coup predates the doctrine, it can be used to explain many of Eisenhower’s policy decisions in relation to the Cold War. Eisenhower and Congress set the precedent that nations could request economic and military aid from the United States if it was being threatened by another entity, singling out the Soviet Union as the primary aggressor (CITATION). Additionally, his approach to the Persian problem was heavily influenced by his Secretary of State from 1953-1959 John Foster Dulles, and his brother Allen Dulles, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). John Foster Dulles believed that Iran was a central problem of the Cold War era, and held that the root of the problem was far more mutlifacted than originally anticipated, meaning it was more than just oil. The root was an Iran without oil and the chaos that would ensue. He also believed that Iran in chaos would inevitably lead to the Middle East in chaos, which is why he saw the crisis as imminent. Dulles and Eisenhower agreed for the most part, and the two shaped the foreign policy platform, and initiatives, that would lead to Operation Ajax as executed by brother Allen Dulles and the CIA (Moyara de Moraes, 469-470).
The question remains, were there a radical paradigm shift in policy between the two administrations that precipitated the coup? Although the two pictured a starkly different role for the United States in Iran, one as a mediator and the other viewing the conflict through the lens of war, the core goals and values that were to be upheld were the same, even if the execution was to be slightly different. So, it can be concluded that the coup was not a result of a change in administration, but rather it must have been the logical last resort for Eisenhower. At this point in 1953, it appeared as if the doors that were previously open had closed, as the fear of the proliferation of communism was on the rise, and Iran’s position on the geopolitical stage was becoming increasingly precarious. Historians often argue that had Truman still been in power, he would have made the same decision. Therefore, the execution of Operation Ajax was a logical choice rather than a radical one (Marsh, 2).
The factors that led to the deposition of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 CIA Operation Ajax were the nationalization of the AIOC, Churchill’s grip to the collapsing British Empire, and the fear of the spread of communism. The motivations of the operation itself were reflections of its later failure as they were largely influenced by neo-imperialist sentiments, big business agendas, and the paranoia of McCarthyism. It can be directly stated that the event that marks the official beginning of the crisis is the nationalization of the AIOC in 1951, and Mossadegh’s previously discussed anti-British agenda. Additionally, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) called for the continuation of the AIOC in its former state, Mossadegh ignored their request. This action henceforth ended the possibility of pursuing compromise through international bodies. Mossadegh’s decision to nationalize the AIOC, and the subsequent British oil embargo meant several things for Britain, and and the globe. For Churchill, it signified further loss of his Empire. Amidst the 20th century, much of the British Empire had already disintegrated, most crucially perhaps with the loss of the jewel of the empire, India. In 1947, the Mountbatten plan split India into two dominions known as India and Pakistan. With this loss, it appeared that one of the final British strongholds was slipping away. These feelings created a sense of urgency and panic for Churchill, who maintained a deeply rooted belief in the importance of a British Empire, even if these sentiments were neo-imperialist and antiquated (Kinzer, 1). For Iran, the issue of nationalization could prompt unintended domestic consequences, such as a loss of oil revenues that were essential to their economy, and without a deal with the British, an Iranian economic demise seemed imminent. For the globe, not only was an Iranian economic collapse dangerous for the chaos that would emerge, but also because the oil was essential in rebuilding Europe in the post World War II era. Great Britain was particularly weak after the war, and needed the AIOC not only as an economic asset, but as was partially physically dependent on the oil for physical reconstruction. The United States further stated their dire need for strength in their British ally to fight communism, and without oil, Britain was looking towards weakness as a superpower (Marsh, 4-5).
Seeing as the Cold War was well underway, the United States shifted from its role as a spectator in Middle Eastern affairs to an active player as the red scare fully set in. In regards to proximity, Iran is geographically close to the former Soviet Union, and hold a strategic location in the Persian Gulf. This area held many Western assets, and was known as a weak point in the containment perimeter. If the Soviets were to gain asset to the Gulf, they would then break the Western line of defense, and cold disrupt both communication and supply lines. Hypothetically, with this access, the USSR could gain control of the entire Middle East. Moreover, Iran’s abundant oil reserves made it a strategic pawn in war games, whoever held the pawn also held an unforeseen wealth in black gold (Marsh, 3). Although these were all hypotheticals, it is imperative to look at them in context of the period. With the Cold War came an atmosphere of paranoia, as reflected in McCarthyism. In a Red Scare, events that may be seen in other times as far fetched hypothetical situations suddenly appear to be not only possible, but impending. With Eisenhower’s entrance to office, along came another enabler in addition to the previously existing paranoia, money to back that paranoia. Eisenhower’s Republican connections with big business allowed oil companies who sought to protect their revenue to exert greater influence on American foreign policy (Marsh, 1). Therefore, not only was the paranoia present, but it now had financial and political clout behind it. When the agenda of corporate America intersects with widespread hysteria, the result is an unstoppable agenda, particularly when all that is needed is one final push. The foundation was set with Trueman, and maintained with Eisenhower. It just so happened that although Truman And Eisenhower was extremely similar, Eisenhower had a different set of mouths whispering in his ear. He was subject to the influence of the Dulles brothers (therefore the CIA), big business, and Great Britain, all of which were pushing him in the same direction: toward a coup.
The British specifically were elated with the election of Eisenhower in 1953 as they thought that his administration would be more attentive to British needs and more willing to see the issue from their perspective in comparison to his predecessor. As a Republican, they were convinced he would see the reality that American capital abroad must be protected, and this must be done through hard power rather than soft. They additionally believed that Eisenhower would be enthusiastic to prove his legitimacy early in his term with a swift success against communism, and would thus be more likely to act than Trueman simply based upon the fact that he was a new incumbent. As a result, two weeks after the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, he and Prime Minister Anthony Eden met to discuss what would from then on be called the Persian Problem (Moyara de Moraes, 470). And with that, the roots of the coup had taken hold, and it was only a matter of time before Eisenhower succumbed to the abundance of temptation around him.
The coup itself was a series of failures in its execution, however the leadership of the CIA is what resulted in its complete execution. The plan itself was a myriad of intricate and arguably vague actions ranging from what would be called “propaganda and provocation” to “demonstrations and bribery.” This is not to mention the use of false flag operatives, dissident military leaders, and paid protesters to execute this actions. With that, it is no surprise that on the first try, Operation Ajax was a complete and utter failure. However, with the actions of the chief of Middle Eastern Operations Kermit Roosevelt, and unnamed CIA operatives, it was eventually a success. It should be noted that the success was in fact not to meticulous planning and flawless execution, but luck and improvisation. This is best illustrated in the choice of song for the operation, Frank Sinatra’s Luck Be a Lady, which makes both a poignant and satirical comment on the outcome of the operation. In action, the coup manifested itself in mass protests marked by cheers, chants, gunfire, and exploding mortar shells and was formalized with Washington’s chosen successor to Mossadegh addressing the nation over the radio. High ranking army general Fazlollah Zahedi declared himself the rightful, and lawful Prime Minister. The coup was then completed with the Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had fled amidst the coup only to later return, constitutionally removing Mossadegh from office. With this the paradigm shift emerged as the pro-western Shah launched the nation into the 20th while conversely ruling with what resembled 19th century despotism (Kinzer, 1). By modernizing the nation the Shah also secularized it, leaving the largely traditional base discontent. The only space left for the expression of political dissent was the Mosque, as tradition was slowly replaced with western ideals force fed by the shah, and by proxy, the United States.
President Eisenhower presents one of the most uncensored accounts of American action in Iran, along with information regarding the extent of his involvement, and knowledge, regarding the coup. This information is found within Eisenhower’s detailed personal diary. Topics covered range from domestic issue to matters of foreign policy, beginning in 1930 continuing on through his presidency. A particular entry in 1953, only three weeks after the coup on October 8th, is the only known admission of involvement in the covert operation by the President. Here, he praises Kermit Roosevelt’s effectiveness, and expressed his fear that the release of information indicating American involvement in the coup could tarnish the American image abroad.