“The general public…were terrified of war, and as desperate to avoid it as Chamberlain himself” .
Chamberlain saw another world war would destroy Britain, hence his policy of appeasement. The policy of Appeasement was closely associated with Prime Minister Chamberlain, but had been pursued by previous British governments since World War One(WW1). Appeasement was seen as a defining feature of foreign policy throughout the interwar period. It was adopted to prevent further disagreement, in Chamberlains case it was to give Germany an advantage to benefit Britain in the long run. Chamberlain’s perception of Appeasement was peace at any price and it was possible he recognised Germany had many grievances due to the harsh conditions in the Treaty of Versailles. It is generally considered appeasement was a failure and very controversial at the time. However, modern historians believed appeasement was used tactically by the British government; although they hoped for peace, they also hoped to establish national defences in order to prepare for the inevitable outcome of war. It is imperative to explore the context of the time to establish why historians sought to restore the reputation of Chamberlain in association with the policy of Appeasement.
It is important to explore the history of appeasement prior to Chamberlain as the policy was not limited to 1937 and previously perceived as a failure. The policy was an attempt to maintain peace and initiate possibility for negotiations and diplomacy. Anthony Eden’s highlighted the struggle of involvement with foreign affairs, particularly in regards to the Suez Crisis. Hence Chamberlain’s commitment to appeasement. Eden argued appeasement served to simply “feed the appetite ” of an aggressor. Although many supported the Munich Analogy, appeasement during the 1930s was significant in relation to its legacy, political leaders condemned appeasement of dictators in the present. The failure of appeasement in the past only highlighted weakness of the policy. Appeasement develops and changes in regards to the effects of the First World War(FWW), which cannot be underestimated, due to the influence the loss of life had on not only the political leader but the public. This resulted in the strategy of appeasement becoming a significant part of British foreign policy, and aim to avoid war at all costs. The wars substantial impact on society, only shaped public attitudes further, resulting in the anti-war feeling. This only pressured Chamberlain to support public opinion. Despite the argument it was a flawed policy, historians today adopt an alternative approach, by recognising the complexity of the times and the context of the time in order to present Chamberlains response was somewhat logical in the political times and the right policy for then.
The FWW left a widespread feeling Britain was now safe from the possibility of another war. Ultimately leading to Chamberlain adopting the policy of appeasement in order to avoid the loss and destruction faced in WW1. Malcom Pearce stated Britain “like some lady of advanced middle age who had over- exerted herself, Britain now wanted a cup of tea and a snooze”, highlighting the general feeling of the British public. Throughout the inter-war period the general consensus of avoiding war at all costs could be seen as Chamberlain deciding Britain had experienced extensive human and financial loss. Therefore Britain needed time to progress without the threat of war so soon after, thus advocating the policy of appeasement. Arguably, this brings into question how much Britain understood about the Nazi regime, and failure to understand the extent of re-armament, with Hitler’s expansionist policies developed a more sympathetic approach toward Chamberlains position. It can be said attitudes began to change rather than the original critical approach people began to see Chamberlain was only doing all he could in order to postpone the inevitable. Historian AJP Taylor, portrayed Hitler as an opportunist and Chamberlain someone “who fought with skill and persistence… to follow a moral line ”. In addition Taylor also percieved the Munich agreement was a “triumph for those… who preached equal justice between peoples… denounced the short-sightedness of Versailles” , the Munich Conference was seen as a new beginning for European affairs as Versailles had failed, a new system built on mutual trust was put in place. Chamberlain articulated “I believe that its peace in our time ”, whilst Hitler stated “I have no more territorial demand on Europe” , we can argue Europe also felt they had avoided war and therefore Chamberlain cannot be seen to take all the responsibility for Hitler’s actions.
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement insinuated British policy failed to fully comprehend Hitler’s aims and the Nazi regime itself. From this failure historians are able to a have a greater understanding of appeasement and why it remained a dominant policy in British society. As A.J.P Taylor discusses Hitler’s aim to restore Germany’s status “commensurate with its population and industrial power” and his policy was continued from past tradition. Therefore it was not seen as a failure of the British government as Hitler’s objectives did not differ from previous German governments. It seemed clear Hitler’s “ideology defined the scope of his territorial ambitions” , alongside the view “security was in direct proportion to its territorial dimensions” , arguing war was inevitable. There was a difference in opinion amongst historians, as they also saw Hitler’s territorial expansion was not just an adaptation of treaty revision it was “enabling pre-condition for action on a much larger agenda of racial conquest and enslavement” , therefore Britain should of understood the extent of Germany’s objectives. Arguably, no matter the territory Hitler gained, he would always want more, the Nazi regime had extended past any German leader before. In hindsight as we have the knowledge of what occurred and how ideology differed, we are able to conclude appeasement as a failure in policy, as we can see the Nazi regime was in fact progressing. We can understand why some historians therefore remain critical of Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement.
In order to determine the difference in opinion on the policy of appeasement and how historians changed in their position to attempt to restore Chamberlains reputation, it is crucial to explore the context around decisions made and how this affected not only Chamberlains opinion but the publics, which impacted greatly on British Foreign Policy. Chamberlains strategic aim was fundamental to Britain’s policy of appeasement towards Germany, relating to the idea Britain’s military responsibilities were of more importance than fulfilling them. Britain was strained by the protection of its imperial interests and they had great imperial responsibility since inheriting parts of former Germany’s empire in the FWW settlement. This meant severe economic depression, limiting the availability of funds for defence, it was also suggested Chamberlain was cautious not to commit the resources for rearmament. This is supported by the ten year rule which was based on belief no war involving Britain would occur so soon after the FWW. The introduction of the Committee of Imperial Defence argued “we cannot foresee a time when our forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, and vital interests against Germany” , highlighting Chamberlain did not prioritise re-armament. This presents the argument adopting appeasement was strategic, Britain throughout the 1930’s did not think there was need from the British army outside of home defence. This led to the reduction of the army’s budget in order to fund expansion of the RAF, which would take the place as the nation’s first line of defence. This was disputed by many some of which stated it would “threaten Britain’s fourth arm of defence: its economic power and financial stability…the very backbone of Britain’s ability to sustain a long war for which the German economy was disadvantaged ”, to an extent restoring Chamberlain’s reputation; without this decision Britain would have been far more unprepared than they had been. Alongside appeasement Britain’s policy of non-intervention in Eastern Europe was of great importance. As stated “even if Britain had been better armed in 1938 it is doubtful that she would have embraced a military solution with Czech…insisted the Czech fate be determined by diplomacy not forces ”, highlighting the persistence to avert war. In Chamberlains view “the most formidable deterrent to war that could be devised” , was the strengthening of the RAF, in doing so national defences were in a better position for when the war broke out in 1939.
Additional factors contributing to Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement to drive foreign policy was due to allies, France, lacking military strength. Although France were aware Germany were becoming an increasing threat, they were equally determined to avoid war much like Chamberlain; therefore it was clear France “lacked the political will and military capacity to make credible threats of force ”. The invasion of the Rhineland only escalated fears of security within France. Their reason for appeasement was due to military weakness, Hitler argued if France had responded with force Germany “would have had to withdraw…for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate ”. Consequently, France relied heavily on Britain which impacted Britain’s policy of appeasement. The development of bombs was seen to have converted the nature of armed conflict, as seen in the FWW when 300 tons of bombs dropped in London resulting in 5,000 casualties. The fear of what another war would entail, such as the belief Germany would be able to wipe out London at the start of a world war and the country could be defeated. Furthermore, increasing problems were the intelligence assessments. It became clear German air strength were exaggerated adding to Britain’s reluctance to take military action against Germany again highlighting the experience of the FWW had on Britain. Harold Macmillan later stated “in 1938 we thought of air warfare rather as people think of nuclear warfare today” . The intelligence assessments influenced British foreign extensively , these underestimated the military threat Germany posed. Despite, understanding Nazi Germany were re-arming, although violating the Treaty of Versailles it was justified as national security. It was argued Britain were unlikely to get involved and risk their economy in order to prevent Germany from simply protecting their nation. By 1936 intelligence reports were exaggerated, influencing further the policy of appeasement as Britain lacked capability to succeed in what the war was likely to entail. Historians expressed the lack of correct intelligence reports as expressed by Dutton “British intelligence failed to comprehend the dynamic expansionist thrust of Nazi ideology ”. Moreover, political context was significant as the Labour had a longstanding history of pacifism and maintained the position that Britain’s policy was to retain collective security. The conservatives also did not see it as important to take action against Hitler as they had perceived communism as the greatest threat. As we can see the context was significant in determining Chamberlains policy of appeasement. This articulates further why modern historians and commentators attempt to restore the reputation of Chamberlain.
Appeasement was perceived as a failure, this was not the view of the public at the time, hence Chamberlain’s approach was of importance. Chamberlain did not view appeasement as “an unhappy necessity” and “insisted on seeing appeasement as a positive good”, appeasement was a success in the eyes of the public. Additionally, the publics support for Chamberlain’s success at Munich in 1938, was significant as he had the ability to get Hitler to sign an agreement. A book published in 1940 “Guilty Men” openly condemns appeasement defying it as “a deliberate surrender of small nations in the fact of Hitler’s bullying” , the text had an overwhelming impact on the public’s view of appeasement. After the war verdict was widely seen and the 1930s saw a succession of other books adopting a similar view to Guilty Men including Winston Churchill, Naimer, Rothestin and Coates. Although it is articulated in some memoirs, from those such as Sir John Simon and Lord Halifax, that Chamberlain’s policy had been appropriate at the time in terms of the context he was faced with. They also agreed Munich had given Britain the time to prepare for the inevitable war that was to come. D.J Dutton argued the list of “guilty men” implied a unity and pattern in British policy during the 1930s. As we can see the book title refers to “men”, emphasising he saw there to be more than one leader to blame for appeasement, despite Chamberlain being the man who received most criticism. The post war view was advocated and saw many writers adopt similar views, alongside many today who still see Chamberlain as ‘guilty’. Arguably the post war feeling with “46% of the public viewed appeasement will keep us out of war until we have time to rearm” establishing the post war mood against appeasement helped with the build-up to the cold war. Despite the early critics of appeasement, those of which who see the 1930s as a “low, dishonest decade ”, criticising texts such as “Guilty men”, which entirely condemns appeasement.
Revisionist and post revisionist allow us to reconsider traditional views to help restore Chamberlain’s reputation and policy of appeasement to which he was associated. Throughout the 1960’s numerous books and articles were published challenging guilty men’s verdict. Historian’s Max Beloff, F. S. Northedge and William Norton Medlicott discussed altered arguments on appeasement. They defended Chamberlain, suggesting it is essential to view the context as factors limiting Chamberlains options for policy, including limitations on resources, economic weakness, imperial commitments and need to retain support of Empire. Therefore, the idea appeasement was in fact nothing new and not exclusive to 1930’s rather as the forefront of British policy since the Great War. Historian Mediclott discussed his doubts in regards to the Orthodox view of appeasement he defended Chamberlains actions to which “he never doubted that a rearmed Germany would throw its weight about” . Chamberlain did support rearmament as a “Check to German heavy handiness” and with knowledge “England’s huge responsibilities vastly exceeded her resources” , allowing us to consider how valid these new assessments of appeasement were. Therefore allowing for greater sympathy towards Chamberlain for the political problems he faces throughout the inter war period. It is understood revisionists rejected Guilty Men, although appeasement was later seen as a misguided policy, it was seen to be a strategy in order to avoid war or time to prepare armed forces. As argued by Martin Gilbert, appeasement had become part of British foreign policy post the FWW and became an “attitude of mind…a noble ideal ”. Therefore the policy should been seen as “atonement for the grievances of Versailles” , rather than failure of policy. Despite, attempts to restore Chamberlains reputation and the policy of appeasement, others still argued the policy lacked significance. Gilbert and Taylor brought new interest to the topic and allowed for many to further look in the issue, discussing around the same time Wilson’s Labour government adopted new policy of reducing closure period of restricted government papers to 30 years. The newly realised documents created new sources for revisionists to explore and furthered the argument for whether the policy of appeasement was all bad. Arguably, it further discredited guilty men.
Although modern historians attempted to restore Chamberlains reputation, many saw there were viable alternatives to appeasement. Chamberlain had attempted to delay war, he did however, make other mistakes during his time in office. Dutton argued Chamberlain overestimated his ability to reach an agreement and in his hope to prevent war was blinded by Hitler. Despite the failure of policy many were uncertain anyone could of done a better in regards to the context of the time. Ultimately the Grand Alliance was seen as the most significant alternative to the policy of appeasement. The formation of the three great powers would be able to prevent any actions of the Nazi regime. It was clear this was a realistic prospect to prevent Hitler, as we saw in 1945. However, in the context of the 1930s this was only seen as a possibility, as America were remaining isolationist and the Soviet Union signing of the non-aggression pact. It was during a time when communism was greatly feared, alongside Stalin entering into the non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939 it proved the alliance impossible. Another alternative to appeasement suggested if there had been a stronger effort in relation to the League of Nations it was possible to have averted war. In an attempt to make the League work and was greatly supported by members due to the want for support for disarmament and international reconciliation. However, throughout the 1930s people began to view the League as countries who should act in a way to restrain aggressors by using force to result in countries complying to the League. The strength the League had previously failed to successful suppress, such as the invasion of Manchuria and Abyssinia in 1931, despite public support in 1930s “was not for appeasement but for the League of Nations and collective security” . Subsequently, questioning if there was valid alternatives at the time, hence the changed opinions of historians in attempts to restore Chamberlain’s reputation.
Overall, we can question whether there was possibility any other leader would have been able to bring about such change, in regards to what seemed an inevitable outcome. Chamberlain and Britain had faced significant loss due to the war, therefore the interests he had been concerned with were to keep peace at any costs. Arguably, this being the opinion of contemporary historians, they were understandable to the position Chamberlain was in and the actions he was limited with. Historians argued Chamberlain was unaware the power Germany obtained, alongside this France was the only committed ally, who found it hard to gain military strength to oppose Hitler’s power. Concluding, modern historians and commentators have made much improvement in restoring the reputation of Neville Chamberlain and policy of Appeasement. It is clear Chamberlain was to an extent an effective war leader, even though he opposed the war and lacked leadership to gain popular support from the public much like Churchill was able to. It was clear he was not viewed as popular by the public but did the best with what he faced, an unpredictable situation. Although as a PM failed, it’s hard to argue anyone or an alternative approach at this time could have succeeded.
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