‘Four score and seven years ago’ – Those were the first words out of the mouth of the sixteenth President of the United States in November of 1863, and although it is widely considered one of the greatest and most important speeches in the short life of America, it was preceded by a much more significant event just a few months prior. It had not quite been 87 years to the day that America had tasted victory and gained its independence from the British, when the deadliest battle in American history broke out – The Battle of Gettysburg. This renowned battle was fought between the Army of the Potomac, fighting for the Union, and the Army of Northern Virginia fighting for the Confederacy. During the battle there were over fifty thousand casualties between the two forces over the three day period from July 1st ‘ July 3rd, 1863 in the now infamous city of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Not only was this a battle of the forces but also of the minds. Great generals populated the landscape, in particular the leaders of the Potomac and Northern Virginia Armies, Major General George G. Meade and General Robert E. Lee respectively. In the end, it was General Lee, although considered one of the American’s greatest generals, who failed to understand, through either ineptitude or impatience, how to doctrinally construct an effective offense and exercise proper mission command that ultimately led to defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg and sealed the fate of the Confederacy in the American Civil War.
In order to understand Lee’s failures at the Battle of Gettysburg, it is important to understand the events that led to the battle as well as understand the scheme and maneuver of the three days at Gettysburg to properly analyze the actions and decisions that influenced the overall outcome. Two months prior to the Battle of Gettysburg in May, the armies of the Confederacy and the Union faced off against each other in Virginia, specifically at Chancellorsville. At the time, Union forces were under the command of Major General Joseph Hooker who had maneuvered forces south towards the Rappahannock River. At Chancellorsville the Union had failed to achieve victory in two previous attempts under two other Union Commanders, but nevertheless Hooker was up for the challenge. (Symonds p. 13) As Hooker moved his forces south, Lee responded with his own maneuver, and soon Union and Confederate forces were separated only by the natural barrier of the Rappahannock River. The battle raged for days but ended with Hooker’s retreat back to the Potomac area and the Confederates claiming victory. The Battle of Chancellorsville didn’t have an overwhelming effect on the war as whole but was significant for several reasons. First it was significant due to the loses that accumulated there. Although, the south has been victorious, the Civil War was becoming more and more of a numbers game and by the numbers it was true that the north had taken more casualties, but the south had lost a greater percentage of their force at an estimated 21 percent compared to only 15 percent of the north’s. (Symonds p 16) Second, Lee began to feel the political pressure in the south as politicians began to try to steer the Confederate war strategy rather than Lee deciding the follow on coarse of action. The current math of winning battles and land but losing manpower was unsustainable for the Confederacy. Lastly, what is not depicted clearly enough in the loses for the south in the Battle of Chancellorsville, was the devastating loss of General Lee’s most trusted and strategically, operationally and tactically sound subordinate, Major General Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. Jackson suffered a wound during battle that would require his left arm to be amputated and he would die shortly after due to complications. (Symonds p 16) This loss would prove costly later in the war as we will see the absence of Jackson will greatly effect Confederate mission command.
Coming off his victory at Chancellorsville, Lee was now faced with the pivotal decision of what to do next. He came to the realization that he had four options. First, he could essentially keep the status quo and continue his defense, as most of the battles had been in the south and he was often outnumbered. Second, he could remain in Virginia where most of his forces were and transition to the offense against Union forces. The third option was to send forces west to assist in the fight at Vicksburg, which seemed to be the most popular among politicians, or he could take the fourth option which would be to march the Army of Northern Virginia north to meet the Army of the Potomac in Union territory. (Spruill p 5) Lee mulled his options. He realized that remaining on the defense at the current math game of victories at high casualty rates was unsustainable and it would only be a matter of time until an overall defeat in the Civil War. He didn’t put much faith in the offensive in the south either as he felt the result would be much the same. The option of moving forces out to the west would be essentially the same as option one, which would just delay establishing a defense in Virginia albeit in the west. The fourth option he concluded, had the best probability of success as he understood much like his army, the forces in the north were not absolved of their own political pressure and by taking the initiative he may be able to overcome the north. (Spruill p 6)
The decision to move north was not strictly to take the initiative, Lee was one of the Civil War’s most season and well-educated leaders and rarely made strategic decisions based on one purpose alone. Virginia itself was becoming decimated from the constant fighting, however on the contrary, the north still maintained many of the necessities for war. The north far outweighed the south in things like manpower, weapons and ammunition, raw materials and the industrial capabilities for sustaining the war effort. This fact coupled with the northern blockage to markets overseas for the south made the move to the north all the more clear. (carhart p 109) Lee began to reorganize his units and leadership in preparation for the march north and by mid-June, with the addition of reinforcements from other southern states, the Army of Northern Virginia now stood at approximately 75,000 men. (symonds p. 23)
In early June, Lee began to move his forces north and by late June he found himself in the Pennsylvania town of Chambersburg. Calvary units from both the north and south were tasked with scouting their opponent’s movement and positions but neither side was particularly precise with their reporting. (Spruill p 21) What added another twist to the impending conflict was that just five days prior to the start of the Battle of Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln had named Major General George Meade commander of the Army of the Potomac after an onslaught of complaints about Major General Hooker’s ability to lead from subordinates and peers alike. (Symonds p 24) Meade was a brilliant tactician that could match Lee’s military expertise. Although, cavalry units from both sides were dispatched to report back, due to their inefficiency, by the time each side was able to send back a useful report, both Union and Confederate forces were essentially on top of each other with only Gettysburg proper separating them. Historians argue the true importance of the geographic location of Gettysburg to the war because neither the north nor the south really intended to fight at Gettysburg. Lee was hoping to get much closer to Washington D.C. and the Union’s strongholds, and the Union hadn’t anticipated that the Army of Northern Virginia would push this far north, but on the morning of July 1st, forces were positioned such that there seemed to be no other option. (reardon and vossler p. 42) Meade, however, realized that Lee’s forces were in close proximity, and given the strategic importance of Gettysburg in Meade’s eyes, due to dense network of roads and ease of movement of forces, Meade assessed it necessary to control the area. (Haskell p. 7)
Shots rang out on the morning of July 1st, 1863 as the Battle of Gettysburg began. The north met the south west and north of the town of Gettysburg at the start of the day. Forces of General A.P. Ewell’s Corps of Northern Virginia and General Buford’s Cavalry Division of the Potomac battled just west of Macpherson’s Ridge, a piece of key terrain near downtown Gettysburg. Confederate forces were at the time in Gettysburg in search of supplies when they were spotted and gunfire ensured. As Buford faced off against forces from Ewell’s Corps it was clear that he could not hold his ground against the larger opposing force and began to fall back to take the high ground of MacPherson’s Ridge where they would receive reinforcements from General Reynold’s I Corps. By mid-day it seemed to be a stalemate as each side had held their positions. (Carhart p. 123) But the Confederates, having inflicted more casualties with no ground to show for it, wanted to seize an opportunity and Ewell ordered another attack on the reinforced Union forces on Macpherson’s Ridge. The decision paid off and Confederate forces pushed the Union forces back south of the town of Gettysburg were they consolidated around Cemetery Hill, a piece of high ground that would prove key in the days to come. (symonds P. 96)
The second day of battle followed on the morning of July 2nd. By morning on the second Meade had arrived in Gettysburg placing his forces in the famous fish hook formation. That is, he aligned his forces in a shape of a fish hook with the hook portion wrapping around Cemetery Hill oriented north and the rest of his forces created the stem of the hook forming a line from Cemetery Hill extending about a mile and half south to Little and Big Round Top, a set of two hill tops, with force oriented west. (Spruill p 49) The Confederates began to maneuver forces on the second with corps led by Generals Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet oriented from north to south respectively. Union forces consisted of corps commanded by Generals Howard, Hancock, and Sickles oriented from north to south respectively and were actively preparing for the defense. Given the distance covered by the north south running line which resembled the stem of the fishhook, Meade felt he need to reinforce Sickels Corps who would be responsible for holding Little Round Top. It was a decision that would prove brilliant. (Adkin p. 413) The south attacked on several fronts on the Union left flank around Little Round Top all the way north to Cemetery Hill but with little success and by days end they had gained no significant ground, which would set the conditions for the final day of the battle.
On July 3rd, Lee considered his options. He felt he had three realistic ways to proceed. He could continue the offensive and conduct another attack, reorganize into the defense, or he could move his forces away from Gettysburg. (Spruill p 84) Lee made the decision to conduct one last final push on the offense. Although Lee had desired to perform a double envelopment of Meade’s forces from the north and south, based on what he assessed his forces to be currently capable of, he was forced to use Major General Pickett’s Division which had not previously fought the past two days to conduct a frontal attack on the center of Meade’s left flank.(Spruill p. 85) Unfortunately for Lee, Meade had war-gamed with his staff and predicted that if there was to be an attack, it would be on the center of his left flank and repositioned artillery as need to disrupt that attack the night prior. (symonds p 214). On the Afternoon of July 3rd, Lee attacked Meade’s center with Pickett’s Division known as ‘Pickett’s Charge.’ The Union artillery wreaked havoc on the advancing Confederate force enough so that it could not sustain the attack and were forced to retrograde. (Spruill 87) Lee’s forces faced similar fate at the north end of the fish hook as well. On July 4th, Lee marched the Army of Northern Virginia back to Virginia and the Army of the Potomac declared victory. Total combine casualties are estimated to be north of 50,000, the most coming on July 3rd, making it the bloodiest battle in American history. (Stanley p. 138)
Now that we have a general understanding of the events of each day we can dissect how General Robert E. Lee failed to exercise proper Army Doctrine, specifically Army Reference Doctrine Publication (ADRP) 3-90 Offense and Defense from a strategic, operational and tactical perspective, as well as his failure to apply the principles of Mission Command detailed in ADRP 6-0 Mission Command. ADRP 3-90 defines the offense as ‘combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers.'(ADRP 3-90) Following Chancellorsville, Lee desired that one decisive win that would cripple the north which really drove his decision to take his army north on the offensive. Tom Carhart writes in his book Lost Triumph, ‘No, what he wanted was a triumph in the north such that he killed, captured, or scattered, the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac'(pg 108) Lee could have potentially experienced victory by constructing a defense in the north, but his previous victories had not quite had the devastating effect that he now was in search of. He would need to go on the offense to reach his desired end state.
If we examine the actions of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia over the course of the three day battle it is apparent that he failed to execute in large majority the proper offense. Lee rarely used the element of surprise to his advantage on the tactical level which ADRP 3-90 defines as attacking the enemy at a time or place the enemy does not expect or in a manner that the enemy is unprepared for. (adrp 3-90) On a strategic and operational level, Lee did well to surprise the north in that his decision to march north was a departure from the norm thus far in the war. On the tactical level he did not fare so well, and the first example started well before the fight at Gettysburg. Once Lee began movement north, he dispatched Major General Stuart’s Calvary Division ahead of the main body to provide intelligence and early warning about the Union composition and disposition. But Stuart’s Division marched too far east and lost all communication with Lee’s main body until July 2nd, which left Lee in the blind. He had other cavalry units he could deploy to fill the gap but chose not to which left him with no idea of where union forces were, which really crippled his ability to utilize the element of surprise in formulating his attack. (Spruill 21)
The second example of failing to utilize surprise, was on the July 1st, when the Union Cavalry spotted the Confederate force searching for supplies in the vicinity of Gettysburg. This was a tactical mistake, as it alerted the north that Confederate forces were in Union territory. Not only did he lose the element of surprise but he failed to take advantage of an outnumbered Union force that his troops came in contact with by not concentrating those forces on MacPherson’s Ridge to gain a decisive advantage. This was largely due to the fact that Lee had not yet formulated the tactical plan for the northern campaign, which again was because he lacked the battlefield intelligence his cavalry would have provided.(Spruill 22) The third instance where Lee failed to capitalize on the element of surprise was in his decision to execute a frontal attack known as Pickett’s Charge. On the afternoon of July 3rd, forces were arrayed on both sides so that a frontal attack seemed imminent from Lee’s army and the north had prepared for such an attack. Lee had intended to perform a double envelopment which would have garnered some element of surprise but instead chose the obvious choice which led to a crushing defeat. (symonds 214)
In regards to the aforementioned Calvary and really the use of Calvary overall in the battle, it is clear that throughout the lead up as well as the battle, that Lee, although somewhat not at fault, constantly received faulty intelligence about the disposition and composition of the enemy or sometimes didn’t receive any intelligence at all. Imagine the time of the battle and the war’1863. Technology was such that communications equipment was non-existent. Craig L. Symonds a scholar on Gettysburg writes in his book History of the Battle of Gettysburg, ‘Effective and timely battlefield communications was – and is – one of the most important elements of military success. In the nineteenth century it was also one of the most difficult. Once commanders were beyond earshot of one another, they had to rely upon awkward and inefficient systems of communications: either couriers had to carry oral messages that they committed to memory, or they had to deliver handwritten notes scrawled on scraps of paper, and either method took up valuable time.’ (symonds 121) Consider the time in transit for these messages as well. Frequently, by the time the message had been delivered, the battle field had already changed. Lee faced these issues throughout the Battle of Gettysburg and in addition got very little from his cavalry units. Unfortunately to maintain any sort of offensive tempo or pressure, Lee was forced to make decisions with either faulty intelligence or none at all due largely to Stuart’s absence. The inability to communicate would also hinder Lee’s ability to implement sound mission command as we’ll examine later.
Lee failed to maintain offensive tempo during the three day battle. At the end of each day the battle essentially was put on hold. Although this would be beneficial to both sides for reasons like planning, rest, and reconstitution of forces, it clearly favors the defense and generally kills any momentum the offense many have mounted during the day. Even during breaks in the fighting, Lee failed to develop a battle plan and scheme and maneuver that would overcome the defense that Meade had constructed.
One of the offensive tasks that Lee intended to use in his offense based on his overall goals for the northern campaign was an attack, which is a task that aims to destroy or defeat enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain or both. (ADRP 3-90) We know that Lee was in search of a decisive victory, he didn’t just want to beat the north he wanted to crush them. But I’d like to focus more on the seizing and securing of key terrain, specifically the lack of Lee and his forces to gain and maintain key terrain which largely contributed to his inability to penetrate Meade’s defense. His forces failed to recognize the importance of the key terrain in Gettysburg from day one when Buford’s Calvary fired the first shots against Ewell’s Corps. Ewell failed to understand the importance of the elaborate roads systems that would allow commanders to concentrate forces and facilitate ease of movement to other strategic positons. High ground to the west of Gettysburg to include MacPherson’s Ridge could provide the defense the ability to establish blocking positons and could also enable an offense freedom of maneuver on the roads systems and protect supply and communications lines. (Spruill p. 28) Although Elwell’s Corps was able to gain some ground on Union forces, it was only at the whim of the Union. They fell back strategically to take advantage of even more key terrain behind them. (Spruill p. 29) Lee and his forces failed to understand the importance of seizing and holding key terrain and how control of it is essential to the tactical task of attack, which was the purpose for the Confederates in the north.
One of the most glaring failures that Lee and the Confederates made was based on sheer numbers. Army doctrine explains that for offensive operations the offensive force should have a 3:1 ratio in men and equipment advantage and conversely to conduct a proper defense it can withstand a 1:3 ratio advantage for the enemy. Lee had exercised these principles in prior battles and had won. He was primarily on the defense, often due to the size of his force compared to those of the attacking north and at this point in the war, each force was aware of their adversary’s available man power. This begs the question why Lee would even attempt to head north? Perhaps given his options following the Battle of Chancellorsville he really had no other choice but the Army of Northern Virginia numbered approximately 75,000 whereas the Army of the Potomac numbered at about 95,000. On numbers alone, this put Lee at a disadvantage and he made matter worse by going on the offensive, failing to understand many of the key facets of how to conduct successful offensive operations according to ADPR 3-90.
Although he failed to implement ADRP 3-90 in conducting the offense at the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee’s negligence was only exacerbated by failing to maintain and understand mission command, specifically the principles of mission command found in ADRP 6-0 that must be present in every military operation at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. ADRP 6-0 defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ARDP 6-0) Mission command is found in military operations as a philosophy, a war fighting function, and as a system. Lee’s failures of mission command were primarily as a philosophy and war fighting function because technology of the day had yet to really develop mission command as a system. Mission command is characterized by six principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.
Lee failed to exercise mission command from day one of the Battle of Gettysburg. We recall the first engagements on July 1st were between Ewell’s Corps and Buford’s Division as they battled on MacPherson’s Ridge and later onto Cemetery Hill. As Buford moved back to take better terrain on Cemetery Hill, Ewell received a mission order instructing him, ‘to carry the hill [Cemetery Hill] occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions in the army.’ ( Spruill p 38) Ewell was perplexed by the order, it was extremely ambiguous. It left him contemplating Lee’s commander’s intent, questioning if he was supposed to actually take the hill or just avoid an engagement? (Spruill 39) In the absence of Lee’s clear commander’s intent, Ewell was left with the option to either attack or to hold his positon and wait. If he attacked and won, he would have secured key terrain, if he was unsuccessful, he would have forced Lee to commit more and more troops to the fight on day one of the battle effecting his operational plans for Gettysburg. What Lee was attempting to convey was to hold and wait for more forces to arrive so he could concentrate them on Cemetery Hill to take the terrain, and for Ewell only to act if he felt that he could take it overwhelmingly. But he never provided that clear and concise commander’s intent that allows subordinate commanders to make decisions within that intent. His vague guidance fostered hesitation in the mind of Ewell and led to operational and tactical errors. It also didn’t help that Lee held his plans closely and issued orders without his subordinate commanders understanding the big picture.
Lee did use mission orders, but not in the sense of an operations order like we use today. They were mostly verbal orders that were either delivered via written form or verbally by a messenger as mentioned earlier. It was not ideal given the time and space of the battle, but it was really the only method. In his use of mission orders however, he was never really able to create a shared understanding with his corps commanders so everyone was synchronized on the battle field. The second day of the battle provides a great example of the lack of shared understanding within Lee’s army. Lee would use Longstreet and Ewell’s Corps to conduct simultaneous attacks on Union forces at Cemetery Hill the morning of the second. The two corps were to work together on opposite flanks to envelop union forces on the hill. The order had been issued but it soon became apparent that the two corps commanders lacked a shared understanding of the depth of the plan. Due to this lack of shared understanding, the corps began to fight on their own rather than in unison and Ewell’s corps arrived late to their position and actually never attacked which allowed Union forces freedom of maneuver and to gain reinforcements rather than remain fixed and overwhelmed which was the overall goal in an attempt to take Cemetery Hill. (Symonds 119) Ewell attacked unsupported which was destined for failure given the terrain advantage of the Union troops. There were several factors that contributed to the two corps misunderstanding of the concept of the operation, but mostly errors in communication between Confederates and Lee’s inability to paint the picture of the battle field and create the shared understanding facilitating mission command.
Following the events on the morning of the second, there was even more troubling examples of mission command failures that night. As Lee was preparing for what would be the final day of the attack at Gettysburg, he made the decision to employ what we know as Pickett’s Charge, but that was not the mistake. First, he failed to exercise disciplined initiative. On the night before what was going to be thus far the most important day and largest attack, Lee, rather than gather his commanders together to discuss the plan, devised the plan himself. He never sent for his corps commanders and they never came to him either.(Spruill 83) Lee never took the initiative to hold a planning conference at his headquarters with what would seem to be his most trusted and intelligent military minds in his army to develop a successful plan. Not only could they aid in the planning, but they could have provided Lee with key intel about what they were seeing are far as the enemy composition and disposition to date as well as the status of their own forces. Longstreet’s corps had taken significant casualties from the battle on the second and he did not want to participate in the attack. (Spruill 84) Second, some reports show, feeling like Lee was wrong when he received the orders to attack on the third, that Longstreet took matters into his own hands and disobeyed the order because he didn’t feel it was the right tactical move. (Carhart 168) This demonstrates the lack of mutual trust between commanders and subordinates.
This probably could have been prevented if commanders were invited to have a say in the battle plans, but Lee had a habit of keeping them to himself and thus in times when he truly needed commanders to just execute and to trust him, he receive push back and disobedience.
Lastly, was Lee, at least at the Battle of Gettysburg and one could argue the decisions for a northern campaign, was not a commander who accepted prudent risk. Based on his options it may have been that he had to move north for a fight on Union soil, but once the battle began he took far more risk than he should have. It was not a prudent risk to misuse his cavalry and at times make decisions based on little to no intelligence. It was not accepting prudent risk to go on the offensive when he lacked the numbers and the key terrain to claim victory, and it was clearly not prudent risk to launch Pickett’s Charge given the state of Longstreet’s corps and the location of Union forces on Little Round Top and their well emplaced artillery. In fact, the only realistic time Lee’s really accepted prudent risk was when he chose to accept defeat on the forth and not launch another attack, which saved the lives of many of his men from certain death.
The Battle of Gettysburg is one of the most well-known battles of the American Civil War, and rightfully so. It was a decisive point in the war, the first time Confederate troops moved into Union territory, and it was a much needed win for the Union army. Although history records this battle as a Union victory, in reality we should really look at is as a Confederate loss. General Meade did show brilliance on the battlefield at Gettysburg, but it was General Lee’s actions that essentially handed the battle and war over to the north. Lee, the great tactician and Civil War general who had experienced so much success previously, failed to integrate the key doctrinal elements outlined in ARDP 3-90 on offensive operations and he poorly executed the principles of mission command detailed in ADRP 6-0, both of which are of paramount to the success of this military operation. The Battle of Gettysburg was the battle that ended the Confederate fight in the Civil War and was one of the most influential battle in shaping the future of the United States we live in today.
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