Introduction
Carl von Clausewitz was a military strategist. No one in the world has ever been so quoted and misquoted as Clausewitz had been, according to Parkinson (2002). Clausewitz was also the renowned author of On War, which was celebrated as the most influential work of military strategy. However, Clausewitz was misunderstood. His work, in particular, can be a dangerous weapon if not used wisely. This paper will discuss the Clausewitzian theories made by Carl von Clausewitz as to how can it be applicable in the modern warfare and the implication that comes along with it.
Carl von Clausewitz had joined the Prussian army as an ensign in the year of 1792. He was twelve at that time. Despite this, with his nativity and personality, he still lingered as an interloper in his preferred vocation. This had given him an emotionally involved outlook of the traditional military thinking and formulate on the independent theory of war (Deva 2013). The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars had been his essential backdrop for his writings. With the amalgamation of hypothesis and common sense, his book, On War, had become an enduring piece of literature.
According to Heuser (2010), the Prussian mathematician in the name of Dietrich Heinrich von Bulow, therefore, associated the knowledge of war with theory and the art of war with its submission. However, there was still a confusion that surrounded that area regarding war. There was still speculations as to whether one was dealing with art or science. Finally, it was Clausewitz that broke the impasse on the debate procured. He had pronounced that warfare was neither art nor science, but more on the conclusive commerce. Famously, this is where his quote, an “act of policy (Heuser 2010, p. 15),” came from.
Since Clausewitz developed his theories by witnessing first-hand the efficiency of Napoleon’s way of waging war (Buckley & Kassimeris 2013), they have proven to be a remarkable feat to his work. One reason for the durability of such, as Strachan (2007) proclaimed, are ambiguous enough that they have lend themselves to reinterpretation when new conditions come into view. The analysis that have been generalized have been underpinned as one that had penetrated the fundamentals of war itself. It is the desire to further understand the concept of On War that draws readers. On War is of the military context to have delved into the depths of war which had made it all the more satisfying (Strachan 2007).
Clausewitz Regarding the Theories he Conducted
Carl von Clausewitz had fundamental ideas regarding strategy. Clausewitz thought of a world with chaos and sought out to come forth in peace and order into the world. Clausewitz had extensive values and inherent beliefs. In On War, his piece of literary advice to the modern world, he had never been encountered into a situation without being certain. On his work of literature, it can be a strategy for the modern businessmen and businesswomen to accomplish an unlikely feat in the pressure of becoming disorderly and also provide a steady flow in an unstable environment (von Ghyczy, von Oetinger & Bassford 2002).
Clausewitz was a worthy person to be called to as inspiring. He was the walking epitome of inspiration to those who sought the proper assistance regarding professionalism. Clausewitz refused to be constricted in a given situation. He was a person who admitted defeat, but still came up with solution after solution for every problem. Carl von Clausewitz exuded passion in his ability to persuade people to do the same, as well (von Ghyczy, et al. 2002).
Through the book, On War, Clausewitz wanted everyone to remember the book he had written. He wanted everyone who finds the book interesting to pick it up even after a few years and still appreciate what he had to offer (Clausewitz 1976). According to Strachan and Herberg-Rothe (2008), it has been suggested that the idea of Clausewitz was not only pertinent, but also in the contemporary day context. The ideas are still germane, hence, timeless. For the most part, how are Clausewitzian thoughts fully fabricated?
For Clausewitz (1976), “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means (Clausewitz 1976, p. 87).” However, for some, the Clausewitzian thought on war is not entirely applicable, just as much to the twenty first century. As Van Crevald (1991) stated, , the Clausewitzian thought is slowly deteriorating and becoming out of date. He further explained that the Clausewitzian thought cannot be fully comprehended into the modern warfare of the century. Some, like Dexter (2007), also described the Clausewitzian thought as an old tradition of warfare. Since we are from a new paradigm, the “old” and “traditional” thought by Carl von Clausewitz is not entirely understandable in the world to which one lives in (Dexter 2007).
Moreover, On War can only be described as a resource manual or a survival guide manual in groundwork of a war written by a general himself for other generals. Nonetheless, the most truth-seeking side to which Clausewitz elucidated was that the renowned Trinity of its mechanism—which are coherent, poignant and military—the perception of roughness within it or the absolute war, which can give the possibility to arrive at a deep and enriching analysis, which compares the background and essence of wars from the past up to today. (Clausewitz 1976).
However, Echavarria (1995) stated that Clausewitz has a different perception on war and that his outstanding trinity, as well as his clasp of the association flanked by politics and war will still triumph as long as conditions, drug alliances, combatant kinfolks and revolutionary groups have a mind to wage war. It can be inferred that one should not attempt to take Clausewitz’ take on war word-for-word for the modern day context. However, applying a newer angle to how it can be perceived is another thing entirely. The applicability of Clausewitz’s thoughts can fully be appreciated by doing such, as to how the modern day warfare is conceived today.
As to generalize, readers of On War have assumed that the book itself is a how-to-do- guide on the war itself since it has been transcribed by a Prussian general. In hindsight, a more or less concrete and effects-based standpoint is supposed. As Paret (2014) had keened at, war changes forms. Overtime, war can change form and concentrate from this learning a figure of which would discourse war as a communal spectacle (Paret 2014). However, the questionable aspect with making a strategy happen is that the overall theory is the principal instrument of ancient investigation. It is a compulsory reconsideration of analysis. General theory concepts may be in a useful manner regarding strategies. However, these concepts cannot fully provide a framework for action. Rather, it can be a way of conceptualization regarding thought since the perspective of it and the eventualities are far too prudent.
Originally, the Clausewitzian thought can be concluded in three fundamental ways. The first part is the indispensable aggression, the abhorrence and the hostility. This, in particular, is the emotional stability of the part which is correlated to the population of the state. The second one is on the part of the politics. This is conventional by the balanced restrictions of the war so that it can be led to proper intentions. The last and final part is the part of the military genius (Paret 2014). Clausewitz relates this, in particular, with the realm of probability and chance. This is made in reference to the courage and talent perceived for the generals of the battlefield.
What Scholars and Academics Have been Interpreting
Many commentators have suggested that Clausewitz himself thought that war can easily be governed by reason and controlled by the dictates of policy or interest (Waldman 2016). Furthermore, it has been perceived that Clausewitz viewed war, in particular, as something more than a rational instrument for the attainment of rational common trimmings. The Clausewitzian thought can also be perceived as the political philosophy of war which is simply balanced and involved. The proponents of Clausewitz can also be guilty of the overplaying of the aspect of his thought (Waldman 2016).
The poignant part of the war, according to Kitchen (1998) is that it has something to do with the psychological realm. Clausewitz took to it to make the French Revolution an example. War has become the commerce of the people with the formation of a nationwide army which was the demonstration of the “nation in arms” (Esposito 1954). Awaiting after that, the professional armies were formed by mercenaries who were already for reasons beyond them. This is because of an economical recompense. With the Napoleon wars phenomenon, Clausewitz realized the determinant significance of the well-liked negotiation with war. Because of such, the nation had a country on their backs for the first time.
Ultimately, it is not surprising that there is coincidence in new research conducted through the application of Clausewitz’s conceptualization and theorization into the present world (Pommerin 2014). In Austria, particularly, such concepts have been pursued. The broad definition of state-on-state wars opened up a vast field and previously responded to the problem of whether or not the existing forms of personage and cooperative use of strength were enclosed by Clausewitz’s formulations. In Austria, special examples of such and references were available within reach.
On another note, Austria has partaken in the event of the United Nations peacekeeping operations ever since 1960. They have also gained experiences in the art of peacekeeping missions. However, there are more appropriate instances and corresponding deductions that can be legislated from the war that occurred at Yugoslavia (Pommerin 2014). In it, there were no state-on-state in the traditional sense was waged.
Peter Paret (2014) gave his resilient opinion on how Carl von Clausewitz emphasized that the theory should only be a study and not considered as a doctrine. He also accentuated that Clausewitz’s intentions were also not fully recognized, but easily accepted. Other readers of On War have difficulty partaking in some theoretical explorations done by Clausewitz. As scrutinized, some practices are not unswervingly enlightening or not entirely experienced at shortest consequences. This thinking is what has brought them to him since they have given their commitment onto the words described by Carl von Clausewitz.
Resurgence of the Wars
In the modern era’s society, there has now been a categorization of diverse terrorizations and confrontations to partake in. The War on Terror had already been stated as something different from the World War I and II, as well as the Cold War. According to Kaldor (2005), the “Old War” refers to the idealized version of the war characterized by Europe between the late 18th century and the middle of the 20th century. In addition, “Old War” is a war between the states struggled by armed forces where the critical meet was conflict itself. However, “New War” is something different than to what was described as it is the polar opposite (Kaldor 2005).
In America, the most imperative influence concerning the enlargement of post-Cold War premeditated theory has been the singularity of globalization. This had already been happening for some period proceeding to the end of the twentieth century (Kinross 2009). Globalization is the development wherein intensification in progression of interdependence and association to which has risen in the social, political, economic and military sense.
Subsequently, even more to what their forerunners can do, modern military theorists also strive to understand the relationship between their subject and the undercurrents of modification distressing the widespread world. However, theorists have conceived this as something to be relied on by information technology. In particular, Americans have been culpable of placing their confidence in the conception of having supremacy concerning information (Kinross 2009).
With the end of the insurgence of war, officials in the United States and its Coalition partners have taken to find themselves in the control of a country that had been artificially created in the 1920s. Advantageously, the conclusion of the foremost struggle procedures in Iraq looked irrelevant when given assessment to what has occurred subsequently. Contrary to what Carl von Clausewitz was thinking at the time, the particular “posting of guards (Darley 2006)” acquisition has already become a calculated subject. In addition, elections can also be volatile in some countries, such as Iraq, to which can also be seen as a form of conflict in derivation from the Clausewitzian philosophy of war (Darley 2006).
As such, from the explanation of above, the following observations had been done in exacting to the American strategic thought since the Vietnam War and to determine the Clausewitzian thought of encouragement behind it. Upon doing so, the work has also demonstrated the fundamental strategic truth. It actually concerns and governs the pre-emptive and functioning level to which has an impression upon strategy as vice versa.
The Cold War thinking tended to overlook this truth given the concern with such philosophies of intercontinental relationships to discouragement and arms control. An attempt to see the bigger picture has also been observed to borne out the one in Clausewitzian’s disputation that all strategically planning respites on pre-emptive success alone. In addition, only countless tactical achievements lead to a great strategic output.
From an idiosyncratic perception of scrutiny, the fundamentals of the trinity reveal their unbiased superiority. Upon a first glimpse, it may appear that the tendency of chance and indecision—to which exemplifies as it does with the conceptualization of friction—exert an unequivocally negative and incapacitating effect on strategic presentation (Waldman 2016). Clausewitz purposefully wanted to reveal how there are specific influences which can obstruct all characteristics of military movement—like the activity in a resistant element, for example. However, the strategic perception discloses a dissimilar story. Friction is communal for all the belligerents; to those who can mitigate its worst effects can have an advantageous conclusion.
However, it is still a misinterpreted remark since academics and scholars are theorizing on the foundation of work conducted by Clausewitz. However, there is still much of a limited view regarding this since Carl von Clausewitz also categorized war as something that has a more underlying meaning to it which encapsulates such dictating ideas and political relations. In addition, much needed interpretation is, henceforth ,needed rather than taking the face of it all into value (Bassford 2003). There is nothing astonishing as to how people can miscalculate Clausewitz’s point of view regarding war and the inclusions itself. Another famous misconception is his words regarding Trinity.
The problem with the governing ideas concerning on Clausewitz’s Trinity is that people rely on concrete facts or a model regarding the government, the people and the army (Bassford 2003). It has been argued that this tripartite organization is, in one way or another, extraneous to the modern warfare of the nation. It does not particularly distinguish the differences and likes of the government, the army and the people (van Crevald 1991). The perceived alter on the theories is interrelated to the “Old Wars” and “New Wars” concept regarding the claim that the War on Terror and other divergences connecting non-state actors symbolize a move away from the “Classical War (Heng 2002, p. 227).”
As Bassford (1994) shared in his book, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945, a Colonel in the name of James John Graham undertook publication of a book entitled, Elementary History of the Progress of the Art of War to which Bassford described as a sophisticated work. Another work by Graham, as informed by Bassford (1994), was entitled Military Ends and Moral Means, which is a definitive statement regarding the campaigner assessment of the British military. It sufficiently conveys his concern on the moral factors of war (Bassford1994). On the book itself, it can be assumed that Carl von Clausewitz had influence on the work specifically. However, it was not sufficiently covered with enough evidence to do so.
Furthermore into Bassford (2003), Clausewitz was engrossed in the necessary truth that war can have. On the other hand, with the Clausewitzian thought intact, it became less interesting to the British military men, in particular, as one of his concerns was the “nation in arms (Bassford 2003).” For them, there has been a considerable amount of attention towards Clausewitz. As it is, his work was well-known within the British camp as it was relatively small and closed-knit. Thus, Carl von Clausewitz may have played a greater role in the British military thinking that has been documented, in particular, is the inscription and schooling of military antiquity.
In another strategic thought, Carl von Clausewitz has still given contribution with his thoughts on war. He, along with other theorists, has given their initial paradigm on war itself (Handel 2005). Wars are not clashes between abstract entities, with each unbendingly following to a universal reason of strategic exploit. There are also political groups to which are either fast or slow to learn the proper strategic education from their experiences. Even if they have learned the correct lessons, they still may be led by inept leaders. Those particular incompetent leaders may also be pursuing personal and not unavoidably balanced or carefully intended thoughts.
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