Essay: Was the Cold War a definite security dilemma?

The Cold War signifies a momentous period in history which radically changed our understandings of international relations and remains one of the most widely debated topics amongst scholars. My main thesis for this essay is that the Cold War did not initially start as a security dilemma, but it evolved into one over time. Firstly, I will explain that the Cold War mainly started as a war between ideologies in 1945 until 1955. Next, I will argue that the Cold War then developed into a security dilemma (especially after Stalin’s death) between 1961 till late 1980s, due to the threat of mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.), and the increase in military forces. Lastly, I will justify that Gorbachev’s policies and Soviet economic decline helped the two superpowers escape the security dilemma and led to the end of the Cold War.
In order to determine whether the Cold War was a security dilemma or not, I will establish a clear definition for the concept. A security dilemma can be defined as a conflict that occur because of a state’s actions to increase its security, which then prompt reactions from other states, thus causing a decrease (rather than increase) in the initial state’s security.  There are three main aspects that are essential in a security dilemma: 1) an anarchic system to produce uncertainty, 2) a lack of malignant intent on both sides and 3) an accumulation of power that includes offensive capabilities.
Following this, I believe the Cold War started as an ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Despite their joint victory in World War II, the relationship between the two states remained tumultuous due to their clash in ideologies. Both countries feared the advancement of the other: the Americans feared that Soviet expansion under a Marxist-Leninist system will threaten the spread of democratic freedom while the Soviets resented America’s call for capitalism.   George Keenan depicted the rivalry as irreconcilable, as he believed ‘there could be no permanent modus vivendi between them’.  This was mainly due to the role of Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader who wanted expand the Soviet empire in order to achieve non-security goals.  According to Robert Jervis, this is concurrent with the traditional view of the Cold War which believe that the Soviet Union was “inherently expansionistic” due to Stalin’s determination to spread the communist ideology.  As a result, the United States initiated a series of foreign policies based on the ‘containment’ strategy such as the Marshall Plan in 1947 which provided financial aid in Western Europe in order to block Soviet expansion.   However, fears about Soviet expansion intensified  due to alarming events such as the Czech coup in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade in June 1948.  Therefore, this explicitly shows that the Cold War was not a security dilemma in the late 1940s.
The Cold War remained a clash between ideologies as it expanded all over Europe from 1945 till 1955. Both superpowers tried to extend their geopolitical influences in the region by introducing alliances such as the Northern American Treaty Organization (NATO) and  later, the Warsaw Pact. The rivalry expanded globally as Third World countries also became contested terrains. In Korea and Vietnam, the Soviets support the northern communist regimes while the United States backed the democratic southern regions.  The divide in these countries caused by the ideological struggle erupted into proxy wars on the behalf of the superpowers.  Neither had a direct security motive that called for such expansion, as their primary goal was to block the spread of their rival’s ideological influence.   This was evident as the Americans used the domino theory (suggested that a communist government in one country would lead to communist takeovers in nearby states) to justify its involvement in Vietnam.  Therefore, this proves that the Cold War initially started as an ideological conflict between two superpowers, but it was not a security dilemma.
With that said, I believe that the Cold War developed into a security dilemma over time, especially due to nuclear expansion. After World War II, the United States was the superior power due to their development of nuclear weapons.  However, American superiority was quickly undermined as the Soviet Union tested their first nuclear weapon in 1949.  This led to a nuclear arms race as both compete to increase their nuclear capabilities, such as the creation of the H-bomb by the Americans in 1952, followed by Soviet’s own success in its hydrogen bomb program in 1953.   The nuclear arms race increased hostility and uncertainty between both countries, due to the fear of M.A.D., a strategy that calls for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in a state to increase their second-strike capabilities under the threat of a nuclear attack.  One can argue that when a state increases their nuclear weapons in order to improve their security, this  would alarm the rival state to do the same due to the fear of M.A.D. and the cycle will continue itself into a security dilemma. This was evident during the Cuban Missile Crisis when the Soviet Union (under Nikita Khruschev) placed nuclear weapons in Cuba which caused misperceptions between American officials who thought that it was the first step to an imminent nuclear attack.  However, Khruschev had defensive intentions in mind as he armed Cuba to protect the state from another American invasion.  Therefore, this shows that the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals due to the fear of M.A.D. caused both superpowers in the Cold War to fall into a security dilemma in 1961.
Moreover, the Cold War developed into a security dilemma due to the increase in military forces by the Soviet Union.  The Soviets expanded their ground forces from 188 divisions (1981) to 191 divisions (1985) in order to maintain Soviet control in their Eastern Europe territories.  However, the increase in conventional arms actually decreased their security because it was misperceived the United States who then expanded their strategic forces and nuclear arsenals.  Hence, this threatened the Soviet Union who now has lesser security than before. This chain of reactions proves that there was a security dilemma in the Cold War until late 1980s.
After years of instability, the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union finally ended in 1991. I believe one of the main factors that led to the end of the Cold War was the policies introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev.  Gorbachev was the Soviet leader from 1985 to 1991 who implemented perestroika (a series of political and economic reforms) to the state in order to reduce economic stagnation and improve relations with the United States.  A key impact of perestroika was the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in December 1987 that called for the elimination of a significant amount of nuclear missiles in Europe.  Hence, this shows that Gorbachev’s appeasement approach with the United States helped the Soviet Union escape the security dilemma previously caused by the nuclear arms race. Moreover, the limitations of nuclear weapons contributed to ensuring the end of the Cold War.
Lastly, I believe that the most important factor that led to the end of the Cold War was the failure of the Soviet economy.  Under Stalin, the Soviet Union developed an inflexible economic system which then failed to respond and adapt to the demands of the global economy.  For example, economic decline was evident in 1986 when the internal debt counted for 20% of the Soviets’ GNP.  This led to the inability to sustain satellite states as the costs to maintain the Soviet Union’s geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe and other regions  doubled.  Thus, this prompted Soviet leaders to agree on reforms in order to restore the economy by reducing military spending and their stockpile of nuclear weapons.  They also retrenched their position internationally by reducing commitments in the Third World and liberating Eastern European countries.  This shows that economic decline made it extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to maintain its arms race with the United States due to financial constraints. One can argue that the reduction in armaments by the Soviet Union created a more secure environment between the two superpowers thus ending the security dilemma. In 1991, the war finally came to its end following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I believe that Soviet economic failure played a significant part in ending the security dilemma that ultimately led to the end of the Cold War.
In conclusion, it is difficult to determine whether the Cold War was a definite security dilemma or not due to the various events took place within the span of 45 years. Therefore, we should shift our focus on determining when it was a security dilemma, and when it was not.  Following this, I believe that the Cold War started as a war between ideologies between 1945 till 1955 especially due to Soviet expansion under Stalin’s leadership and American involvement in the Vietnam War, but it later fell into a security dilemma in 1961 until late 1980s following the Cuban Missile Crisis that was a consequence of M.A.D. and the increase in conventional forces by the Soviet Union in 1985. That being said, Gorbachev’s perestroika policies and the failure of the Soviet economy enabled the superpowers to escape the security dilemma because the Soviets were unable to maintain its defense programs, which prompted the collapse of the Soviet Union, and finally brought the Cold War to an end.