On September 2, 1945, following the official surrender of the Japanese government, the Second World War ended. In the aftermath of the brutal conflict, with much of Europe and Asia in ruins, America and the Soviet Union emerged as the world’s two superpowers. With opposing economic philosophies, yet similar ambitions for global influence, these two countries soon became locked in an undefined and increasingly aggressive rivalry known as the Cold War. In 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested their first nuclear bomb, creating a wave of panic among government officials and civilians in the United States. Determined to respond to the expanded Russian threat, the United States government proposed a new set of civil defense measures, strategies which were meant to help Americans survive a nuclear attack. While these strategies alleviated the fears of millions of citizens, they would have been useless in the event of a nuclear attack. The true purpose of United States civil defense policy between 1949 and 1961 was to create a false sense of security for Americans, instilling in them a confidence and willingness to curb the growth of the Soviet Union and the global spread of communism.
For most Americans, conflict with the Soviet Union became a serious issue after the country conducted its first successful nuclear test. After the United States first used atomic bombs, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered his military to begin the development of their own nuclear weapons. Four years later, on August 26, 1949, the Soviet Union conducted their first successful test. When President Harry Truman informed the nation of the test on September 23rd of the same year, Americans were quick to fear the start of a nuclear war. Major news papers such as The New York times ran stories the next morning which stoked fears of such a conflict occurring. The nuclear test did not just frighten American civilians. Government officials were also surprised and worried by the progress made on the Soviet nuclear program.
Many within the United States government, which had not expected a Soviet atomic bomb until 1953, were caught off guard and frightened by the progress of the country’s nuclear program. In the months following the test, internal government reports discussed the increased likelihood of a nuclear conflict. A State Department memo from 1950, for example, described possibility of war as being “considerably greater” due to a Soviet commitment to the “defeat of the United States.” In response to these mounting concerns, President Truman tasked the National Security Council with drafting a new set of principles by which the United States could approach relations with the Soviet Union. In April of 1950, the National Security Council presented to Truman NSC-68, a report which would become the driving force behind America’s early Cold War policy. The report insisted that the United States had to stop the growth of the Soviet Union and impede the spread of communism by amassing a strong nuclear arsenal at home and fostering favorable economic conditions around the world. As President Truman and his advisors began to implement their new policy, known as deterrence, they began to focus on the importance of civil defense.
For many Americans, the threat of nuclear war created a crippling fear that the world would end in a flash of fire and light. This fear, which came to be known as nuclear terror, was disastrous for President Truman’s deterrence policy. Nuclear terror had the potential to undermine deterrence by either convincing Americans that it was unwise to fight a war with such grave consequences, or by making people believe that no country, including the United States, should have nuclear weapons. The only way of overcoming this terror, the government realized, was to convince Americans that a nuclear war could be survived by taking appropriate civil defense measures.
Consequently, on December 1, 1950, President Truman signed an executive order establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). The expressed goal of the FCDA was to “prepare comprehensive Federal plans and programs” that would be utilized to protect Americans in the event of a nuclear attack. In reality, the FCDA focused on much more than just protecting civilians. The organization cared more about creating an illusion of safety than it did about actually working to guarantee the protection they promised.
From its earliest days, the FCDA was unmistakably focused on the importance of strengthening American confidence and resolve. The organization’s first project, in fact, had very little to do with the actual implementation of civil defense. Weeks before he the FCDA became operational, President Truman directed the group to conduct a study assessing the effects that civil defense could have on the mindset of the American public. Soon after, a group was created within the FCDA to focus specifically on public relations. It was this division which worked exclusively on projecting an image of stability and safety to the American people – regardless of whether that image was accurate or not. Throughout the 1950s, members of the American media frequently consulted the FCDA for specific information regarding the nation’s civil defense planning. In response to these requests, the FCDA selectively released information they felt would make Americans feel safer, hiding less appealing information behind the cover of federal secrecy and classification laws.
Many other civil defense policy initiatives also demonstrated the government’s goal of creating a false sense of safety for the American people. In 1950, the National Security Resources Board, close counterpart to the FCDA, distributed a pamphlet titled Survival Under Atomic Attack across the United States. The booklet, which describes nuclear bombs as being “just another…explosion” with “limited” power, grossly understated the risk posed by nuclear weapons. Perhaps not surprisingly, Survival Under Atomic Attack concluded by focusing on the dangers of a “panic” that would surely result in avoidable death and destruction. In 1951, the FCDA released a short film promoting a strategy known as Duck and Cover. The video, which was aimed at children, stated that hiding under desks during a nuclear blast would ensure survival for those not caught directly underneath a bomb. Again, the government downplayed the risk posed by radiation to give civilians a false sense of security. Hiding under a desk might save students in the short term, but it would provide no defense from the lasting danger of nuclear radiation. Unquestionably, a desire to maintain calm continually prevailed over the government’s responsibility to accurately inform American people of the hazards they faced.
As the Cold War progressed, the FCDA expanded their efforts to mislead Americans about the reality of a nuclear war. In 1954, under the leadership of President Dwight Eisenhower, Americans began participating in Operation Alert, an annual, nationwide simulation of a Soviet nuclear strike. While Operation Alert was described to civilians as an accurate simulation, it was really another elaborate attempt at creating a false sense of security for Americans. Starting in 1955, the government relentlessly censored media coverage of the simulation in order to control what Americans would see at home. Weeks before Operation Alert 1955, FCDA and White House officials met with media executives to set up “ground rules for covering” the event, giving the government the chance to “frame and streamline” the public interpretation of the simulation. While many within the government were quick to accept this blatant dishonesty, some officials attempted to expose the true nature of Operation Alert. Following Operation Alert 1955, the Deputy Director for Civil Defense in Washington D.C. criticized the exercise as being nothing more than a “s
how.” He was fired immediately.
In addition to representing an appalling instance of government interference with the press, Operation Alert also exposed the true shortcomings of Cold War civil defense policies. After Operation Alert 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a review of the simulation which was presented to President Eisenhower and his cabinet. The report slammed civil defense planning as being “grossly inadequate,” and the President was encouraged to overhaul his civil defense programs. Hoping to streamline the nation’s civil defense apparatus, Eisenhower merged the FCDA with the Office of Defense Mobilization – another government body which focused on the functions of government during wartime – to create the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization (OCDM). In the end, the merger had little substantive effect on Eisenhower’s civil defense policy. Following the lead of its predecessors, the OCDM soon began to value American morale over the distribution of accurate analysis and information.
When the OCDM became operational in 1958, it assumed the task of educating American households on how to conduct themselves during a conflict with the Soviet Union. Much of this training focused on preparing families to survive in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear attack. From its inception, the OCDM worked to perpetuate a troubling narrative first crafted by the FCDA. In an FCDA produced film titled Facts About Fallout, Americans were informed that radioactive fallout was nothing more than “dust” and that it could be “removed like dust” as well. While it may have been comforting to hear that radioactive material was little more than a common housekeeping nuisance, handling fallout irresponsibly could have had catastrophic consequences for ill-informed civilians. The OCDM presented nearly identical information about radioactive material in a television series co-created with CBS. The series exploited public trust in the accuracy and independence of a media station like CBS to further convince Americans of their guaranteed safety. Despite creating an image of reform and progress in his administration’s civil defense institutions, President Eisenhower did little more than give the government’s longtime fabrications a new face.
Today, it is fair to ask whether the United States government behaves any differently than it did during the Cold War. In a society plagued by fears of terrorism, we trust our government to protect us just like civilians did throughout the Cold War. It only seems right that American lives will be valued above strategic goals. In the end, however, we cannot know this for sure. Does relinquishing our laptops when we fly protect us from terrorism any more than hiding under desks would have saved us from radiation poisoning? Is a travel ban rooted in any more truth than Operation Alert? As citizens of a nation that prides itself on governmental transparency, these are the questions we must be asking.
For the United States, few times have been marked by more uncertainty and tension than the Cold War. Following hardship of World War Two, Americans expected the latter half of the twentieth century to be a time of peace and global stability. In reality, a new enemy and new fears soon overwhelmed society. During the 1950s and 60s, the government fought back against the spread of communism around the world, while playing a dangerous game of disinformation at home. Americans lived their daily lives comforted by a carefully fabricated nuclear reality – one that was meant to ensure the cooperation, not safety, of the American people.