David Harvey first posed the idea of “time-space compression” (Harvey, 1989: 260) in 1989 in The Condition of Postmodernity. Once far away places and cultures are closer than ever before and our world has undergone dramatic social, economic and cultural reconstruction in recent decades, propelled in part by globalisation, capitalism and the increasingly-interdependent nature of the world. By viewing the global-local as a network through which local places are shaped through associations with others (Crang, 2014: 18), as opposed to a mosaic in which the world is segregated into distinct pieces (ibid), we can appreciate the implications for inequality and diversity. This essay shall outline the importance of analysing these whilst considering to what extent the world of 2030 will radically differ from our world today.
The debate on globalisation’s distributional effects is characterised by two prominent schools of thought. One optimistically argues globalisation benefits all, including low-income groups. Echoes of the Kuznets Hypothesis can be seen here which argues for an initial rise in inequality followed by a decline when industrialisation is achieved by the nation (Milanović, 2000). The other school recognises the general income-improving qualities of globalisation, criticising its failure to equitably distribute benefits among citizens (IMF, 2007: 31). Economic inequality was and continues to be a prominent issue exacerbated by globalisation and capitalism. Currently, the richest 1% of people own 48% of global wealth, with the bottom half owning less than 1% (Credit Suisse, 2014: 11). Global capitalism thrives on inequality and history shows this with inequality produced by colonisation maintained by Western hegemony and unfair trade agreements, directly related to globalisation. In Rethinking Global Political Economy: Emerging Issues, Unfolding Odysseys (2003), Barbara Jenkins argues a “widespread acceptance that…economic inequalities are somehow natural” and “social and political inequalities between rich and poor are…inevitable” (Jenkins, 2003: 67) is required for efficient capitalist functioning. Despite increased activism efforts such as the Occupy Movement in response to inequality, the world of 2030 will be one which embodies greater economic inequality driven by uneven landscapes created by globalisation and capitalism.
Gender relations will differ in 2030 and whether this differentiation will be positive or negative is contentious. On the one hand, Rosemarie Tong paints an optimistic picture, arguing by recognising domestic labour’s value, women will develop a “consciousness of themselves as a class of workers” (Tong, 2009: 101). Contrastingly, other Marxist feminists argue that capitalism, which encourages unhealthy male-female social relations in the form of patriarchal roles and which has historically oppressed women, will continue to do so. This will render it hard for women to enter the world of work, keeping them rooted in a cycle of uncompensated domestic labour.
Globalisation will mean the world will be more connected by 2030 in more diverse ways, uniting a greater diversity of people. However, with this increased interconnectedness and interdependence comes heightened possibility of outbreaks of conflict. This has already been witnessed to an extent, examples include the Arab Spring uprisings of the past 5 years and 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Individuals will be more equipped than ever to perpetrate violence, as “individuals and small groups will have greater access to lethal and disruptive technologies” (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 3) and with the increasing empowerment of individuals, there is a greater possibility of violent outbreaks as a means of responding to world injustice. The continuous need for resources to fuel globalisation may lead to conflict as supplies become sparser as time progresses. Ethnic conflict is also important to consider as something which is likely be higher in 2030. Chaos theorists would suggest “a direct connection between globalization and ethnic conflict” (Ishiyama, 2004: 2) and posit that the homogenising nature of globalisation potentially creates conflict by eroding traditional cultural practices through an imposition of Western ideologies.
With the National Intelligence Council boldly stating “no country—whether the US, China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic power” (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 3) by 2030, it is clear the international role of nations will dramatically shift over the coming years. Consequently, it is argued the world of 2030 will be radically different. Central to this is the role of the United States and the shift of this in the coming years, in particular “whether [it] will be able to work with new partners to reinvent the international system” (ibid: 10) as this will be an “important variable in the future shape of global order” (ibid). 9/11 and “[widespread] unhappiness with US. Policies… [and] U.S.-led corporate globalization” (Friedman and Chase-Dunn, 2005: 1) may signify an end of U.S. hegemony. Also relevant is the part played by the West more generally, with the degree to which the West dominates the international system having the potential to vary greatly, especially with the rise of China and India as economic powerhouses. China’s resurgence in particular, occurred due to it “demonstrat[ing] indigenous capabilities in manufacturing, launching, and controlling satellites…[and] highly ambitious endeavours in the field of space exploration” (Aliberti, 2015: 185-186). With Chinese and Indian influence predicted to extend greatly, traditional hegemony will be challenged and it is very possible the world will be radically different in 2030 and polycentric in nature.
It is the case that the world will be radically different from the one we witness today, with an increased diversity of people being connected. The world has been shaped dramatically by the forces of globalisation, both negatively and positively. The richest 1% of people now own 48% of global wealth (Credit Suisse, 2014: 11) and globalisation may continue to exacerbate such trends of economic inequality along with poverty, gender inequality and conflict due to Crang’s networked world through which local places are affected by global going-ons (Crang, 2014: 18) – in this case, globalisation and capitalism. However, we may see a phenomenon similar to that of the Kuznets Hypothesis where inequality will eventually decrease as industrialisation increases. Whatever happens to levels of inequality, the world will be radically different by 2030, especially with suggestions of a restructuring of hegemonic power and a polycentric world.