O'Neill asserts that duties of justice must be fulfilled because if they aren't people have been used as mere means. She declares that Kantian ethics does not say anything about the moral status of unintentional action, or in other words, agent K letting the famine problem continue whilst purchasing a new fur coat. She shows that in any situation, whether it's as part of a famine-stricken society that has a rationing scheme or not, or whether one like the United States in relation to Senegal, one must always be dutiful as a matter of justice. One must not deceive or take advantage of. The second key principle she mentions pertains to Kantian duties of beneficence. That is, helping to promote others' ends and their capacities to be independent. As an example, it would be fun to purchase a fifty dollar ticket to Sea World, but it would be better, or rather, more important to contribute it as a means by which to assist someone.
O'Neill goes on to illustrate the difference between her advocated Kantian famine solutions and the Singer’s utilitarian approach that Singer represents, which entails the knowledgeable consequences of all possible actions. One such difference is the comprehensive scope that utilitarianism takes to the problem. This scope requires that the agent predicts the exact outcome to the scenario, having to hyper analyze each situation. Critically, it also involves the unintentional realm of action. Kant would not believe that people who have done something unintentionally "wrong" would be unjust or bad. Indeed, this is precisely why O'Neill argues for the Kantian approach to famine: Kantians would not need to know all the miserly details of a causal utilitarian scope or the full results of any possible action. Instead, they must have good will, good intentions, and it must be reflected through their actions.
In contrast to O'Neill's Kantian approach, Singer adopts a very strong utilitarian solution. He inserts the utilitarian element of the argument, that of advocating for the greater good, by writing that if it is within one's ability to prevent something bad from occurring, and in the process, not sacrifice something of comparable moral good, then one is bound to do it. Unlike the Kantian approach, Singer's does not exempt certain actions by virtue of space-time excuses. By accepting that people are equal, one is bound to help no matter where the famine is. That is, without sacrificing something of equal moral good. For example, if an agent passes a toddler drowning in a large puddle, it would be a duty to help the toddler out of the puddle. There is no difference, according to Singer, with the problem of famine. Singer's argument is just that simple, but broadly sweeping in nature. Unlike the Kantian approach, it would entail major changes to the way civilization works. There are areas where O'Neill and Singer agree. They agree that people dying and hurting from famine is bad, while duties of beneficence are good. The difference lies in the duties assigned. O'Neill believes it will be all right as long as the intentions are good and people do not commit injustices. Singer believes that by ignoring a responsibility to help others one is engaging in grave injustice. The contrast between these prevailing ideas is stark.
However, I believe that Singer has the better response to the duty of beneficence. While it is certainly more asking of the agent, I believe that it will bring about better outcomes. While people are inclined to include one’s motivation to do an act in assessing morality, I inherently believe that this is incorrect. No one will remember that the person who assassinated the president was actually aiming for the foreign dictator next to him. Instead, he will still be seen as a traitor and a horrible person to the public. In 100 years, he will still go down in history as the one who killed the president. However, assuming that consequentialism is not inherently superior to Kantianism, O’Neil’s theory makes some valid claims that Singer fails to address, like the right to beneficence. According to a utilitarian, if a bunch of people in a prison were suffering, it would be our duty to reduce that suffering. While one could claim that helping the prisoners escape would never happen, because then they would go off and make the world a worse place, reducing the prisoners would be an obligation just as equally as assisting starving children. So, to sum up my point, I think that O’Neill presents some solid arguments as to where utilitarian beneficence has flaws, but because it operates under the principle that motivation is more important than outcomes, I still hesitate to agree with it.