The invasion of Iraq in 2003 stemmed from the United States’ (US) decision to disarm Iraq from its rumored possession of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Due to the Islamic terrorist attacks led by Al-Qaeda on September 11th of 2001, the newly elected president of the US, George W. Bush, decided to prioritize disarming any states of their weapons to prevent another attack. When the British Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair claimed that Iraq was hindering inspections by the United Nations (UN) regarding its mass weapons, Bush declared an end to diplomacy and issued an ultimatum. When the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein refused to leave Iraq in the 48-hour ultimatum, US military and air forces dropped bombs in Iraqi bunkers, officially starting the invasion of Iraq, also referred to as Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Even though the Iraq war happened almost twenty years ago, the decisions made by the Canadian government at the time still impact current day socio-economic assessments. When the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien disagreed with the Bush administration regarding the invasion, Canada was successful in avoiding the conflict and its drastic consequences. As a pivotal moment in history, it is important to examine the reasons behind Canada’s wise decision to not participate in the US-led invasion as this case was the start of Canada becoming a more defined state in the international stage. There was a variety of reasons for this noncommittal decision, and they range in the political, military and social areas. At the time, Canada was incapable of and unwilling to make such a significant commitment to the Iraq invasion, and it was rightfully so – as validated and supported by the Canadian public. It was a hectic period as the Canadian government faced a federal election, trade disputes with the US, and fluctuating global prices for energy. This paper will examine the several reasons behind the Canadian government’s decision not to join the coalition in the war against Iraq and argue that it was rightful based on political, military, and social factors despite the arguments supporting the war based on its potential benefits.
Socio-Politics – Domestic and International
Federal Elections
Both domestic and international politics greatly affected the Canadian decision to not support the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. As for the domestic aspect, most the Canadian public opposed participation and the government acted in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the electorate. It was in the interests of the liberal government of PM Jean Chrétien that aided in the preclusion to a move to war. While the possibility of the Iraq invasion was looming, the ruling Liberal party prioritized the approaching federal election. The Conservatives, led by Stephen Harper, and the Liberals, led by Chrétien with his successor Paul Martin, took different stances on the war for a major percentage of the votes. Harper strongly supported the war as he believed that Canada should support the US as the two states have always had a strong and faithful relationship. Chrétien argued that the invasion was based on the uncertainty of Iraqi possessions of WMD, as the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the UN, Hans Blix, failed to find any evidence of the possession that the Bush administration justified their invasion on (Harding, 2004: 16).
Chrétien stated that Canada would only support the invasion if there was definitive proof that Iraq was in possession of these weapons (Kirton, 2007). Three major political parties, including the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Green Party, and the Bloc Quebecois, leaned towards the Liberal party’s stance on the invasion (Barry, 2005: 219). Chrétien’s decision was in fact a continuation of the Liberal party’s tradition of previous Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau. Historically, the Liberal party tended to oppose Canadian involvement in US-led conflicts (O’Connor, 2010: 531). Both the former prime ministers opposed to support the Vietnam War, unlike the Conservatives who usually supported the US (Barry, 2005: 219). Hence, the ruling party and the upcoming federal election at the time greatly influenced Canada’s decision to not participate in the invasion.
Multilateralism – United Nations
The Canadian government’s decision was also affected by the government’s changing policies to a more multilateral approach. PM Chrétien stated that if Canada were to support the invasion, it would be through the approval of the United Nations. He believed that the only way to legitimize force would be through acceptance from international organizations, and “if military action proceeds without a new resolution in the Security Council, Canada will not participate” (Fiorino, 2015). As there was a lack of UN sanctions when the US decided to invade Iraq, Canada opted out. Chrétien and his administration chose a multilateral approach that reflected Canada’s important role in the history of international law and the UN as a peacekeeping nation and continued its “heritage of independent foreign policy in Suez, Vietnam, and now Iraq” (Harding, 2004: 72).
The United Nations strongly stated that the invasion should only happen with definitive proof of the Iraqi possession of WMD. It iterated that “the use of force would be so fraught with risks for people, for the region and for international stability that it should only be envisioned as a last resort” (Hinnebusch and Fawn, 2006: 262). It is important to note that despite the opinion that so many nations and Kofi Annan himself repeated that the invasion was a breach of the UN Charter, the US went ahead with the invasion and even warned member states that it would be a very unfriendly act if they did not support the US in this war against Iraq (Hinnebusch and Fawn, 2006: 262). Hence, with the UN’s strong opinion that the invasion should not happen, Canada ultimately decided to adhere to UN resolutions. As the chief weapons inspector in Iraq could not discover any of the weapons that Bush and his administration had believed, the United Nations did not even consider the invasion, which led Canada to follow suit as it strongly believed in multilateralism Vucetic, 2006: 143).
However, there was a time when there was uncertainty amongst the Canadian political officials. Before Canada made it clear that it was not going to participate in the invasion, PM Chrétien did say that Canada would participate even “without a UN resolution, so long as there was conclusive proof that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction” (Azzi and Hillmer, 2016: 733). However, on other occasions, he insisted that approval from the UN Security Council was required (Fawn, 2008: 521). Even the Minister of National Defence, John McCallum, stated that Canada might participate in the invasion regardless of the UN sanction, but Chrétien told the press in January 2003 that the resolution from the United Nations was required before Canada make any decisions (Azzi and Hillmer, 2016: 733). The Canadian officials voiced the same message in private as well. They reported to Washington that “Canada would take part in a UN-authorizes mission, but would not commit either way to a campaign that took place without a UN mandate” (Azzi and Hillmer, 2016: 733). Despite the initial uncertainty, it became clear domestically and internationally that the Canadian government preferred multilateralism and chose to act in accordance with international organizations.
National Identity and Anti-Americanism
There are certain aspects of Canadian politics that were less concrete in early 2003 that affected Canada’s decision. Firstly, most of the Canadian public had strong feelings of anti-Americanism. In this case, anti-Americanism refers to the “attitude toward the United States and its people which is profoundly mistrustful-a prejudice that colors the way a person interprets Americans’ choices, and consistently attributes them to negative values and purposes” (Bow, 2008: 341). With an anti-Americanist environment, the Canadian public was against the idea of doing the work of the Americans or even support it in various global excursions. Previous Canadian politicians, such as John Diefenbaker and Pierre Trudeau, have proved that they gain popularity in opposing the US publicly, and PM Chrétien himself boasted it to the Belgian PM (Bow, 2008: 350). The invasion of Iraq was not so different. With the UN not authorizing the invasion, making it illegal in international law for the US to invade, the Canadian government decided not to send its troops and participate in the war. Their national identity to be more independent and less Americanized resonated in this decision.
There was the existing issue that Canada already sent a significant number of troops and resources to the war in Afghanistan in 2002, to aid the US in what Bush called the war against terrorism. The Canadian government already regarded this commitment as significant in the long run. Chrétien wanted to make this mission the only Canadian contribution, and so having the Iraq invasion come up so suddenly made it even more difficult for Canada to support its neighbor. Although Canada is “caught” between the Anglo and American empires, its “multinational character, especially Quebec, connects it with Europe, especially France” (Harding, 2004: 72). The Canadian identity is often known as a peacekeeping and stabilizing nation with European influences. Thus, with the federal election approaching and aiming to please its citizens, the government avoided the possibility of Canadian troops harmed and at risk in the dangerous mission in Iraq due to American pressures. Chrétien would rather have a relatively safe mission (as it committed in Afghanistan) than risk its troops again for the US, especially when the consensus within the public was that the Canadian identity would be a peacekeeping state.
In early 2003, there was a general dissatisfactory feeling towards the US and the Bush administration from the Canadian side. There was global empathy due to the 9/11 events, but that subsided. In an effort to help its ally, Canada went to war in Afghanistan for the first time after the Korean War. However, “the Bush administration-especially in its rush to war in Iraq, but also in its unabashed rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and other global regimes-effectively unearthed these half-buried attitudes and provoked a new outbreak of anti-Americanism” (Bow, 2008: 350). In addition, these feelings were strengthened when the fratricide incident of Tarnak Farm happened. This incident refers to a friendly-fire incident that occurred in Kandahar, Afghanistan of April 2002. Four Canadian soldiers were killed and eight were wounded when they were bombed by fighter jets piloted by US Majors Umbach and Schmidt, who wrongly thought they were threats (Yaniszewski, 2007: 363). The “four soldiers killed at Tarnak farm were the first Canadian soldiers to die as a result of fratricide since the Korean War, and their deaths unleashed a firestorm of media coverage” (Yaniszewski, 2007: 363).
In addition, there were ongoing disputes regarding natural resources and trades, such as the softwood lumber war, which the Americans seemed to disregard due to their pressing need for allies in the invasion. The softwood lumber trade dispute was initiated by US producers when they claimed that “Canadian lumber was subsidized through low stumpage fees,” and so they tried to resolve the dispute by settling on a series of short-term trade measures (Johnston, 2017: 135). This trade dispute was important to Canada’s economy and so Canada was more concerned with economic trade and issues rather than a war that was based on allegations made by the US (Johnston, 2017: 135). Canadians believed that the US was selfish and ignorant of other states – the Americans only prioritized their interests and needs.
Lastly, the Canadian public was suspicious of the US claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. When asked to provide evidence that the UN and the chief weapons inspector did not find, the US State Department admitted that certain information regarding the WMD in Iraq were not verified. There were more suspicions when the public believed that the United States was invading Iraq to gain control over the substantial oil reserves – one of the largest reserves globally. In the US, “oil, natural gas and coal together provide about 82% of all energy, and oil and gas roughly two thirds” (Nell and Semmler, 561). As such, the US military-industrial economy was so dependent on and vulnerable to oil that by 2020, “the US will have to import two-thirds of its oil” (Harding, 2004: 47). In the eyes of Canada and other states, it appears the US linked the two tasks of “achieving geopolitical superpower supremacy and controlling a security of supply of oil” (Harding, 2004: 47).
In general, Canadians did not view the US as a great ally nor neighbor as many of them believed that there was too much of a US influence. They did not want to do the US more favors by committing to another significant military invasion especially with the current political issues in Canada. The Canadian government simply did not want to go against the UN and support the US on false pretenses that Iraq possessed WMD, especially if it viewed the reasons behind the invasion was regarding securing oil reserves in Iraq.
Military and Strategy
Limited Resources
Other than the political factors that happened both on the internal and external levels, there were military factors that affected Canada’s decision to not support the Iraq War. The general public was aware that the Canadian military could not possibly take on such a mission due to its limited capabilities and resources. The harsh reality is that even if Canada wanted to support the war, there would be a severe shortage of troops. Towards the end of the Cold War, the Canadian government, both the Conservatives and Liberals alike, have severely cut back the budget of the Department of National Defense, mainly to save costs. The defense budget was first cut right after the Cold War, and then cut again during the ‘Internationalist’ stage in politics, which advocated for a more cooperative economic and political relationship amongst various nations. Having a strong and capable military at the time would send the wrong message. However, during this period, the Canadian Forces took on numerous missions that were ordered by the government, but their resources and other expenses were taxed heavily. This resulted in the Forces being divided into three much smaller units that relied considerably on each other for shared supplies and budgets. Hence, their training and equipment was limited.
Around the early 2000s, the headcount for the Canadian Forces, including the army, navy, and the air force, was approximately 60,000 soldiers. Not only that but the Canadian military was limited on air transport that it could only transport one of the three units cross-continental to Iraq. Due to all the budget cuts and the already set commitment in Afghanistan, Canada could not participate in the Iraq Operation as there simply was a tremendous lack of troops and resources. Limited Capabilities
The Canadian Forces were limited in capabilities as well. The military would face the obstacle in order to get to Iraq. As the Forces have no way of transporting the solders in a long-range either by air or sea, it would be very difficult in transporting their troops across continents. Due to this lack, the Canadian military relies on certain private contractors to transport heavy military equipment globally, and this can prove to be a problem as they are not affiliated with the government and has a bigger risk associated with using private contractors. Hence, the Canadian military would have to rely on strong allies that have the capability to transport forces in the air and on sea. Although the US would have been willing to offer this help as it was in a position to acquire more support, the Canadian forces have already tied down their aircraft capabilities and troops in Afghanistan – under the Operations Apollo and Athena in 2001, just a few years before the invasion in Iraq. Lastly, even if the Canada was able to station their troops in Iraq, the government would not have the means to continue to supply and maintain the deployed soldiers, as it had difficulties with transportation and limited capabilities to do so.
In the case that the Canadian Forces had enough soldiers and equipment needed to go to Iraq, they would still be incapable of taking a major role in the invasion. Many of the equipment that the Iraqi Forces have are far superior than those of the Canadian forces as the Russian Federation has been the supplier for their weaponry. Even though it could be argued that the Canadian Force are better trained, their capabilities are limited due to their inferior equipment. Training cannot surpass the strength and effectiveness of more durable and precise weaponry. Therefore, if the Canadian government were to send out their troops to Iraq to take on a more aggressive role and fight on the battlefields, it is very possible that their soldiers would have been greatly wounded or even defeated entirely due to the superior Iraqi equipment. Knowing this issue of limited capabilities, the soldiers would probably have been stationed for other less-risk jobs, such as administrative tasks, such as they did in the 1991 Gulf War. However, this is all very unlikely as the Canadian government at the time was against the idea of participating in this invasion that did not have the approval of the UN, let alone potentially sacrifice their soldiers in a high risk environment.
Limited Will – Hesitant Soldiers
The Canadian government and the Forces were hesitant about going to war in Iraq for several reasons. The first reason is that a war is very costly; it requires expenses in many sectors, such as ammunitions, weaponry, war transportation, and other supplies that are needed to maintain the soldiers. At a time when the military and its budget was limited due to post-Cold War policies and being committed to Afghanistan, Canada could not possibly fund the Iraq mission. Expensive spare parts would be needed and they would be sent in an untimely fashion as there were obstacles with transporting both troops and resources to the Middle East. Next, the Canadian Forces were concerned about being involved in a conflict that had an uncertain end date. The invasion could result in years and years of conflict, albeit low-intensity and less-risk, and this would severely drain manpower of the army, navy, and air forces. The possibility of this invasion being well-funded is incredibly low due to the very minimal political support.
The last reason that the Canadian Forces were hesitant about committing to an invasion in Iraq is that it would have revealed some sensitive information to the public regarding the unpreparedness of the Forces itself. It would not look so great on the military if Canadian citizens found out that Canada could not send their troops nor equipment to Iraq and sustain them in the long-run without the help of other states. Overall, the Canadian military was not ready nor capable of deploying its soldiers to Iraq and sustaining and providing the resources required if they managed to even get to Iraq. Both the government and the leaders of the Forces were aware of this major obstacle, and so they decided not to support the US-led invasion.