“The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, unlawful transfer, or other malicious activities involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, or their associated facilities,” according to the IAEA.
Nuclear security attempts to safeguard individuals, property, society, and the environment against ionising radiation’s negative consequences.
The goal of nuclear security work is to prevent, detect, and respond to harmful acts involving radioactive chemicals or directed at facilities or activities that use such chemicals.
Each state bears sole responsibility for nuclear security. However, a number of states have failed to comply with key documents or to adequately implement them through their national legal and regulatory systems. This situation creates flaws in the global system that terrorists or criminals can exploit.
The universal observance of key laws, the harmonisation of national legal and regulatory frameworks, and the effective implementation of necessary measures can all help to combat nuclear terrorism. The IAEA aims to educate and advise countries on important international legal instruments, as well as urge their adherence and implementation.
There is also no specific international instrument that covers all aspects of nuclear security. The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendments; the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) and its Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources; the Safeguards Agreements and their Additional Protocols; and the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention are the main international regulatory frameworks for nuclear security.
The CPPNM and its Amendment are the legally binding international instruments in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. They establish measures related to the prevention, detection, and punishment of offenses related to nuclear material in international transport.
In the domain of physical protection of nuclear material, the CPPNM and its Amendment are legally binding international treaties. They create measures for the prevention, identification, and punishment of nuclear material-related violations in international transportation.
States commit to reinforcing the safety and security of radioactive sources by establishing effective controls and ensure the timely detection of theft, loss, or unauthorised use or removal of radioactive sources, according to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
Safeguards Agreements and associated Additional Protocols contain requirements for nuclear material accounting and control, as well as the construction of related systems. These requirements are an important part of the worldwide nuclear security infrastructure. The goal of safeguards is to detect diversion of significant amounts of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for unknown purposes, in a timely manner, and to deter such diversion through early detection the threat. In terms of nuclear security, the goal of the state’s physical protection system should be to create conditions that reduce the chances of unauthorised nuclear material removal and/or sabotage.
1.3. Nuclear Material
According to the IAEA, nuclear material includes the metals uranium, plutonium, and thorium in any form. This is further broken down into “source material,” which includes both natural and depleted uranium, and “special fissionable material,” which includes enriched uranium (U235), uranium-233, and plutonium-239.
Special nuclear material, source material, byproduct material, and radium are the four types of regulated nuclear materials, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In special nuclear materials (Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium with U233 or U235) the amount of fissionable material content found is higher than in nature. Thorium or uranium with a U235 content equal to or less than that found in nature is used as source material. Radioactive material that is neither a source nor special nuclear material is referred to as byproduct material. It can be an isotope created by a nuclear reactor, tailings, and waste from uranium or thorium extraction from ore processed primarily for its source material composition. Discrete sources of radium-226, discrete sources of accelerator-produced isotopes, or naturally occurring isotopes that represent a threat larger or equivalent to a discrete source of radium-226 can also be classified as product material. Radium is a controlled nuclear substance that can be found in nature and is formed by uranium’s radioactive decay. Radium has a half-life of roughly 1,600 years.
Nuclear materials were first discovered in the 1950s, and by the end of the decade, they had established themselves as an internationally acknowledged field of study. Presentations and discussions at the First and Second International Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in 1955 and 1958, are credited for launching this discipline. The main journal for this field of materials research, the Journal of Nuclear Materials, was created in 1959. Nuclear materials science and engineering grew at the same rate as the parent discipline of materials science and engineering. Nuclear materials, like its parent field, brings together the hitherto independent fields of metallurgy, solid-state physics, ceramics, and materials chemistry, all of which were once committed to nuclear applications. The modest priesthood of early researchers in a half-dozen countries has expanded to tens of thousands, with home institutions in over 40 countries.
1.4. Safety at Nuclear Facility
Nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants, fuel manufacturing plants, and waste processing and storage sites, can expose workers to a variety of occupational health and safety hazards. Hazardous processes and materials, such as hot steam, harsh chemicals, electricity, pressured fluids, and mechanical risks, can be found in such facilities. During the course of their work, workers may be exposed to these aforementioned hazard and other dangers (including slips, trips, and falls, driving accidents, and drowning). Industrial safety mishaps, as well as their immediate effects on the persons involved, can tarnish the image of nuclear power plants and their public approval.
The state of being shielded from bodily harm as a result of job conditions is referred to as industrial safety. In a nuclear setting, industrial safety programmes include regulations and safeguards put in place to protect nuclear site personnel against risks that could cause harm or disease. The goal of this article is to highlight best practices that nuclear firms can and have implemented to create high-quality industrial safety programmes, as well as to highlight what employers may do to limit, minimise, or eliminate injuries, illnesses, and other negative consequences.
Industrial safety is crucial to the overall security of nuclear power plants. An effective management system that includes a strong management commitment to safety and a strong safety culture helps to ensure this. This includes ensuring that industrial safety measures are of the highest quality.
“The primary responsibility for safety rests with the person or entity in charge of any facility or activity that poses a radiation risk.” This means that a nuclear facility licensee retains responsibility for nuclear safety when acquiring or delegating services that potentially affect nuclear safety, and must have systems in place to ensure safety under all circumstances. Other parties, such as vendors, suppliers, constructors, contractors, or outside technical support organisations, may have legal, professional, or functional safety duties; however, the primary obligation cannot be transferred or delegated.
Management systems are a collection of interconnected or interacting elements for setting policies and objectives and achieving them in a cost-effective and efficient manner. They’ve progressed from simple quality control systems (such as inspections and tests) to quality assurance and quality management systems (such as ISO standards) and more contemporary integrated management system (IMS) methods (such as those defined in IAEA Safety Standards).
“An arrangement for the planning, implementation, monitoring, and review of necessary preventive and protective measures shall be included in the non-radiation-related safety programme, which shall be integrated with the nuclear and radiation safety programme. All staff, suppliers, contractors, and visitors (as appropriate) must be trained on the non-radiation related safety programme and its interface with the nuclear and radiation safety programme, as well as follow its safety standards and procedures. In the area of non-radiation related hazards, the operational organisation shall provide support, direction, and help to plant personnel.”
“A competent entity or institutions should be nominated as appropriate, to develop, implement, and assess a national strategy for the establishment and promotion of OSH management systems in organisations. This should be done in conjunction with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organisations, as well as other bodies as needed.”
“Safety culture is the collection of qualities and attitudes in organisations and individuals that establishes that nuclear plant safety issues are given the attention they deserve as a top priority.” The term “safety culture” refers to a collection of elements that might influence an organization’s safety culture from both the outside (societal) and the inside (internal). Beliefs, values, standards, morality, and acceptable behaviour norms are among these influences.
The necessity of a strong safety culture in ensuring that both companies and individuals meet high safety standards is widely acknowledged. It is acknowledged that common points of beliefs, attitudes, behaviour, and cultural differences have an impact on safety considerations, and that these differences must be closely aligned with the organization’s shared system of values and standards in order to achieve the desired level of safety behaviour.
2021-6-11-1623400685