Imagine a society knowingly driving itself towards destruction, too stubborn to divert away from its current path. This sounds like a bleak science fiction movie, but it also describes the current state of humanity as it draws nearer and nearer to a climate change catastrophe. Almost everyone agrees at this point that climate change is occurring, but few are willing to make changes in order to stop it, and time is running out. International agreements have mostly proven unhelpful so far, as taking action to stop climate change is a prisoner’s dilemma. I believe that we are most likely to have success confronting climate change when states either have a clear incentive to act or a strong international body requiring them to do so (which would also be done through the use of clear incentives).
If states clearly saw the need to act in order to prevent climate change, this would change the bargaining scenario to incentivize cooperation. For example, researcher Scott Barrett hypothetically proposed a machine that would destroy the entire Earth if greenhouse gas levels rise above a certain threshold (453). While he was not serious about the idea, it has some merit. In this sort of situation, the rationale for cooperating changes. While before, humans were better off not changing their behavior and suffering some minor consequences, this would hardly be the case when continuing to pollute would result in certain destruction. Humans are self-interested creatures with a strong tendency towards self-preservation, and they would not go over the assigned limit. Authoritarian measures imposed from the top-down would force people to act on climate change. Barrett mentions the Montreal Protocol and how it incentivized states to act by restricting trade between those who did not follow the protocol and those who did follow it. To maximize their number of trading partners, states all followed it (657). While a machine that would destroy the world goes far beyond what would be at all morally acceptable, and trading restrictions do not go far enough, international actors should work together to devise a solution that would fall somewhere in the middle of these two ideas. For example, the public likely cares more about political sovereignty than trading rights, so if there was a system put in place that would restrict the political sovereignty of states who refused to act on climate change (such as by removing their leaders and installing an administration that was willing to act), this would strongly incentivize cooperation. It is not a moral choice, and what I am suggesting may actually be quite ridiculous, but as Garrett Hardin explained, some issues cannot be solved through technology alone and require a solution that may be less morally correct (638). Climate change is definitely one of those issues. A solution in this vein is likely our best option.
The other primary way to prevent overexploitation of the commons is by regulating its use, likely through the use of an international institution or treaty that has enforcement power over states. This is a strategy that has already been used at the national level in some states, such as the US cap-and-trade system. In addition, many environmental treaties have been signed, such as the Kyoto Protocol and Montreal Protocol (Barrett). If a powerful international institution could be established that would be dedicated to the creation and enforcement of climate change regulations, this could work. An institution could guarantee the cooperation of other actors, ensuring that there is not a commitment problem. However, this could be a difficult strategy to use, as rising nationalism in states like the US and UK has led to increasing distrust of international institutions. States may be reluctant to commit to participating in another powerful institution like the UN. It is also difficult to privatize something like the Earth, which is a non-excludable, rivalrous good. Because it is non-excludable, this institution may have difficulty enforcing its rules. The violator could not be prevented from continuing to pollute but could be punished through economic sanctions or possibly military action in extreme circumstances. Treaties have sometimes been effective, like in the aforementioned case of the Montreal Protocol, but have often had trouble incentivizing participation and enforcing their rules. I believe the first strategy I described would be more likely to work.
We need to create a strong, universal incentive that will ensure all nations cooperate to stop climate change, and something like the machine Barrett described would certainly be enough to motivate people to act. Sadly, I believe that we may not decide to cooperate until we are at the point of irreversible destruction. Once the seas start flooding our cities, animal species we care about die, and we have to grow different crops due to rising temperatures and disappearing bee populations, people will notice and actually be willing to work together to fix the Earth. However, it will be too late. We need to do something drastic in order to get people’s attention before we reach that point. We can still fix things as of this moment, and we need to take advantage of this chance. There is only one Earth, and we should do everything in our power to save her.