C515 JOPP Exam AY 13-14
Instructions: The Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) Exam is worth 60% of the C500 grade and is due at the end of the block, after lesson C515. Specifically, this exam has ten requirements for you to apply the JOPP to an operational scenario. You may use the C500 online lessons and readings to help you answer the exam; moreover, you should not start the exam until you have finished the C500 block of instruction.
All work must be your own. Do not discuss this examination or your answers with anyone other than a Department of Distance Education (DDE) instructor or your academic advisor. Your answers to the exam questions must be typed and double-spaced throughout, and must use Times New Roman 12-pitch font and one-inch margins. Write your answers as complete sentences, not as bulletized comments. This assignment does not have an associated CGSC Form 1009W Writing Evaluation.
The primary reading for the exam is Chapter II “Operation Chromite” of Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (dated 15 July 1997). Read this document thoroughly, and then answer the exam questions, which begin on page three of this document. The primary doctrinal reference is Joint Publication 5-0 The Operations Process (2011). Other references include:
JP 1-0 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013)
JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2014)
JP 3-0 Joint Operations (2011)
If you state information from the lessons, readings, or doctrinal references as part of your answer, you must give a citation in accordance with ST 22-2. You may use parenthetical citations, endnotes, or footnotes.
Overview: In June 1950, forces of the North Korea’s People’s Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea with the intent of unifying Korea. President Truman ordered General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Far East, to use his air and sea forces to support the Republic of Korea forces south of the 38th Parallel. General MacArthur visited Korea to personally assess the situation and realized that only the immediate commitment of ground forces could stop NKPA forces. NKPA spearheads were successful in pushing United Nation forces south to the Naktong River. General Walton Walker, Commander of the US Army Eighth Army, and General MacArthur decided that they must stand and fight or be ejected from Korea. It was here that the 140 mile long Pusan Perimeter was established. General MacArthur’s successful campaigns across the Pacific during World War II gave him deep appreciation for amphibious operations. He decided upon an amphibious operation, Operation Chromite, for his counterattack. The planning and execution of Operation Chromite by General Douglas MacArthur in September 1950 established the operational art that guides joint operations today. Modern warfare demands a joint approach (JP 5-0).
1. Operational Environment [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 5-0 states that “The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander…Included within these areas are the adversary, friendly, and neutral actors that are relevant to a specific joint operation.” The Commander must be able to describe the current environment and how the environment should look when operations conclude to visualize an approach to solving the problem.
Using the reading on Operation Chromite, describe the operational environment in the summer of 1950. Your analysis of the operational environment should include, but is not limited to:
The operational environment in the Operation Chromite AO in the summer of 1950 was complex and rapidly evolving. The UN resolution requesting that member states ‘repel the invasion’ drew the US firmly into action in late June of 1950. US forces, however, are ill prepared with regards to manpower and equipment. The battlefield terrain was rough, remote, and unimproved stretching lines of communication and supply. Operational momentum was held by NKPA who had enjoyed variable resistance and resolve from the ROK forces. North Korea is paying no heed to the UN resolution. Early use of inadequate UN forces led to further NKPA victories boosting enemy confidence. As the summer of 1950 progressed and the US gained air and naval superiority, the opportunity to shift from defense to offensive was developing. Operation Chromite was a deep surprise attack designed to strike the NKPA center of gravity at Inchon and shift momentum to Allied forces.
Invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) had destabilized the region and violated a sovereign nation. The NKPA is approximately 135,000 strong, equipped with Russian tanks and weapons. NKPA forces have the advantage of momentum and surprise. Republic of Korea (ROK) forces attempted defense, however their forces are not well trained or equipped and mounted variable resistance. ROK forces supported by the US Eighth Army and allied forces have been pushed down to the southwestern tip of the island and are attempting to hold the Pusan Perimeter. Allied forces are not prepared for rapid action in this theater due to rapid post World War II drawdowns. The US has four divisions of the 8th Army, the 7th fleet, and the Far East Air Force in the area. These resources are understrength and fielded worn and outdated weapons. In addition to personnel and equipment problems, Eighth Army and ROK force movements and supply are further complicated by poor infrastructure, particularly roads.
The fall of Seoul and Inchon allowed the NKPA Air Force to operate out of Inchon and facilitated the southward march of NKPA troops. ROK confidence was waining. US and ROK forces are understrength. Additionally, both forces lack antitank weapons, artillery, and updated equipment which further limits effectiveness. General MacArthur seeing this situation called for back up to hold the Pusan Perimeter while they built adequate manpower to execute Operation Chromite.
Operational reach is a factor for both sides. Korea is mountainous and difficult to navigate due to poor infrastructure. The North Korean People’s Army controls all but the Pusan Peninsula and is using Seoul to resupply of forward NKPA forces. Due to Korea’s location UN forces are at the end of their operational reach and must control sea and air ports near Seoul to mount an effective joint forces campaign. Operation Chromite recognizes Seoul and the nearby port of Inchon as decisive points which, if taken by allied forces, would cut off NKPA supply chains and ease pressure on the Pusan Perimeter. This isolates NKPA forces facilitating a simultaneous offensive along the perimeter providing an advantage to allied forces.
2. Strategic Guidance [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page. You should write one paragraph for each question below.]
JP 5-0 states that “The President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff with appropriate consultation with additional NSC members, other USG departments and agencies, and multinational partners formulate strategic end states with suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national interests.”
General MacAurthur’s end state for Operation Chromite was to establish control of the air and sea ports and disrupt lines of communication in the Inchon and Seoul area to limit activities of the NKPA. Supported by simultaneous X Corps attacks along the Pusan Perimeter this will facilitate further operations to stabilize the region. In this post Operation Chromite environment the ROK, US, and UN allies would have air, sea, and land superiority allowing freedom of movement.
The role of JTF7 and X Corps in the success of this amphibious assault demonstrate the importance of joint operations in achieving success in complex environments. The coordinated air bombardment, marine assault and naval actions delivered manpower to the objective were critical to success. X Corps served as the embarkation and assault elements formed around the 1 Marine Division and 7th ID. The JTF7’s primary role was to secure the objective area at Inchon. The JTF used phase lines and control measures to coordinate the actions of supporting fires and X Corps. The X Corps was assigned as a subordinate unit under JTF 7 for Operation Chromite to ensure synergy. This reorganization allowed for parallel chains of command, optimizing mission command during this complex joint operation.
3. Decisive Points [10 points (5 points for each decisive point). Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 5-0 states that a “decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective).”
Operation Chromite’s success hinged on a successful amphibious landing at Inchon and coordinated attacks along the Pusan Perimeter. There were key decisive points at both Inchon, the communication lines, and in the south, the supply lines. However, it was the simultaneous nature of the attack on both of these decisive points that amplified the impact on NKPA forces and allowed for a rapid shift of momentum to ROK and UN forces.
One of the key decisive points was the NKPA communications network connecting Inchon-Seoul to southern forces. The control of communications was pivotal in the change in momentum and eventual success of UN and ROK forces. Control of communication lines at Inchon allowed increased freedom of movement of UN and ROK forces south of Inchon and crippled NKPA movements.
In this dual pronged attack, lasting victory hinged on gains along the Pusan Perimeter. The successes along the perimeter were a direct result of actions on the key decisive point of the southern operation, the NKPA supply lines. Coordinated air attacks and pressure at Inchon strained resupply efforts of the NKPA and lead to decreased morale and the gain of over 70 miles of territory along the perimeter by UN and ROK forces.
4. Operational Maneuver [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 3-0 describes maneuver as “the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s mission accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological effects, and physical momentum. Maneuver also may enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.”
(1) Operation Chromite reversed the situation at the Pusan Perimeter by shifting momentum. Both the NKPA and UN forces are fighting at the limits of their operational reach. Up to this point UN forces had struggled to resupply and reinforce forces on the Pusan Peninsula. However, as NKPA forces moved further south they also strained lines of supply and communication. Through maneuvers targeting vulnerable supply lines Operation Chromite disrupted the supply chain and route for resupply of forces for the NKPA. The result of this surprise attack was a weakening of support to NKPA forces fighting on the Pusan Perimeter. The loss of support resulted in a physical and mental weakening of NKPA forces, thus shifting momentum to the Allied forces along the Pusan perimeter. This resulted in gains along the perimeter during the coordinated offensives.
(2) The Allied forces gain a positional advantage over NKPA forces through Operation Chromite. This advantage is due to the rapid shift in air, sea and ground superiority. The amphibious maneuver at Inchon hit a NKPA center of gravity. This decisive movement of ground forces to take the ports and airbases in the Inchon Seoul area allowed great freedom of movement for allied forces along the Pusan perimeter. The NKPA was unable to provide adequate forces to defend the attack at Inchon and continue the assault along the Pusan perimeter. This demoralized NKPA forces and emboldened allied forces allowing allied forces to shift to the offensive and gain ground at Pusan.
5. Joint Fires [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 3-09 states that “Integral to the CONOPS is the concept of fires. The concept of fires describes how lethal and non-lethal joint fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the Joint Force Commander’s operational objectives. The JFC determines the enemy’s center of gravity (COG), associated critical factors, and decisive points and how the application of fires can assist in creating the desired effects to attain the objective.”
Heavy naval bombardment from US and British ships in the Gunfire Support Group off shore will be used to prepare the objective. Landing forces at Inchon will be supported by fires from Navy, Marine and British air units from the Fast Carrier and Air Supports Groups. Fifth Air Force will isolate the objective with general air support. Simultaneously TF 91 will serve as the covering and blocking force during the landing.
(2) This attack is instrumental to interdicting NKPA lines of communication (LOCs), effectively isolating the main NKPA army in the south around Pusan. Once the landing forces are engaged and have secured the beach the priority of fires will shift to attacking lines of communications and further limiting mobility of NKPA forces in the Seoul area of operations.
(3) To prevent reinforcements and counterattacks, operational fires directed by the Fifth Air Force will focus on NKPA transportation systems north of Seoul. Prior to D-day air support will target rail systems in and around Seoul to limit enemy movement and reinforcement. (op chromite H.O. II-9) The simultaneous attacks along the Pusan perimeter will divide NKPA efforts and limit the ability to reinforce along either front.
6. Operational Reach [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 5-0 states that “Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.”
(1) Air Force and Naval superiority extended operational reach. A joint approach was necessary to allow for the amphibious attack at Inchon. Without air and naval support, this COA would have lacked feasibility. The Air force extended operational reach by providing supportive fires. The Navy provided access to the harbor and expertise to plan and navigate the tides and channels. The Marines provides an amphibious assault team to execute the landing attack.
(2) The difficulty of movement by ground, high tides, and narrow harbor made an attack at Inchon unlikely in the enemy’s view. This is demonstrated by the lack of manpower assigned to defend this location. The geographic and logistical challenges at Inchon necessitated a joint team to extend the operational reach and attack the enemy behind it’s lines. An amphibious attack behind enemy lines leverages the element of surprise, divided NKPA forces from their lines of communication and supply and stopped the enemy’s use of air and sea ports in the Inchon Seoul area. This weakens forces opposing the Eighth Army and provided an opportunity for the Eighth Army to gain ground along the Pusan Perimeter. This was far superior to continuing a direct approach fighting the enemy’s main front which had been unsuccessful thus far. Reinforcing the Eight Army may have increased chances of success in battles along the perimeter, however this would not have changes the Allied force’s operational reach.
7. Arranging Operations [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 5-0 states that “Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to reach the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging operations.”
(1) General MacAruthr’s staff used simultaneity to place insurmountable strain on NKPA forces by attacking from two positions simultaneously. First, Allied forces attacked by sea at Inchon to the rear of the NKPA main front, which had pushed South to fight the Eighth Army, ROK and UN forces at the Pusan Perimeter. Concurrently, UN ground forces supported by air strikes launched a supporting attack against the NKPA main body to break free from the Pusan Perimeter and pushed forward to Taejon. Combined with propaganda pamphlets, these simultaneous operations successfully crippled key capabilities of NKPA forces.
(2) General MacArthur’s plan at Inchon exemplifies the application of depth. Rather than reinforce the Eighth Army in the South, he extended the operational reach of Allied forces by attacking deep into theater. Operation Chromite pressured the NKPA forces to redirect efforts previously dedicated to the Pusan Perimeter. The effect of this attack on the supply chain of NKPA forces limited reinforcements to the Pusan Perimeter and facilitated a 70 mile gain of territory.
(3) Timing played an important role in the success of Operation Chromite. General MacArthur quickly assessed the situation in Korea in late June and desired action in July. However, recognizing the equipment and manpower constraints, the mission was delayed. General MacArthur knew the window to act was short as NKPA forces continued to gain ground. However, he also knew that the timing must be perfect to support the amphibious landing. These timing constraints made the attack at Inchon such an unlikely course of action in the enemies eyes that it was poorly defended.
(4) Tempo during Operation Chromite was often dictated by external forces. Reinforcements were slow to arrive from great distances. To be successful, the manpower and equipment to support a complex, simultaneous sea, air and ground attack had to be in place and the entire operation timed with the rising tides.
8. Defeat Mechanisms [10 points (5 points for each defeat mechanism). Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 5-0 states: “Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. Combat aims at defeating armed enemies – regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all means necessary.”
(1) General MacArthur used the destroy defeat mechanism during Operation Chromite. He did this by applying combat power to enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities in Inchon. The attacks were designed to be a decisive destroy action, targeting the enemy communication and supply lines in the Inchon area.
(2) General MacArthur was able to isolate forces south of Inchon, physically, through the amphibious attack on the critical capabilities in Inchon. The simultaneous break-out offensive along the Pusan perimeter was successful due to the isolation from communication, resupply and reinforcements achieved. The enemy was no longer able to operate effectively as the NKPA was already at the limits of it operational reach. The physical isolation was compounded by psychological warfare tactics used to emphasize the fear and uncertainty created by isolation. This nicely demonstrates the amplifying power of a synergistic, multifaceted design.
9. Direct and Indirect Approach [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
JP 5-0 states: “The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity (COG).”
(1) General MacArthur applied an indirect approach by using coordinated attacks to isolate forces and attack critical vulnerabilities. Although the communication lines in the Seoul area could be thought of as a center of gravity, an isolated victory there would not have been enough to destroy the enemy or shift momentum to allied forces. The multiple coordinated indirect attacks however successfully isolated NKPA forces physically and mentally.
(2) General MacArthur used an indirect approach due to limitations associated with operational reach, manpower, and experience. General MacArthur realized that both forces were operating at the limits of their operational reach. Direct attack in this scenario would not favor the limited troop number and limited experience of the allied force troops. The seizure of air bases and ports at Inchon limited NKPA supply, communication and command and control. Additionally, control of these ports and bases facilitated further air attacks and helped establish allied Sea, Air and Land superiority in theater. With air and sea superiority, allied forces were able to move more freely and gain ground along the Pusan perimeter.
10. Operational Risks [10 points. Do not exceed one typed page.]
According to JP 5-0, “Operational risk defines aspects of the campaign or operation in which the commander will accept risk in lower or partial achievement or temporary conditions. It also describes areas in which it is not acceptable to accept such lower or intermediate conditions.”